

VIRTUE OF CHARACTER IN ARISTOTLE'S *EUDEMIAN ETHICS*

by

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
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In two cases, drafts were willingly shared with me that I have not been able to give thorough consideration to in this document. These are Jessica Moss's and Susan Sauvé Meyer's contributions to the 2017 Symposium Aristotelicum on *EE* II. Had I had more time to devote to their work earlier on in the writing process, I have no doubt that my own writing would have improved. I look forward to working in the future with these essays, as well as with Béatrice Lienemann's *Aristoteles' Konzeption der Zurechnung* (Habilitation-Schrift: Frankfurt, 2016) and Dorothea Frede's two-volume *Nikomachische Ethik* (Walter de Gruyter, 2020), neither of which reached me soon enough or for long enough to make an appropriate impact on this dissertation.

A serendipitous sequence of events led me to work on these issues in the first place. Giulio Di Basilio kindly invited me to his 2018 conference on the *NE* and *EE*; there, I met Christopher Rowe, who shared his *EE* edition drafts with me, and Friedemann Buddensiek, who offered to talk with me should I find myself in Frankfurt. Even better, he welcomed me to Frankfurt for this past year, and he shared freely his expertise and his time.

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Aristotle tells us that “it is not unimportant how we are habituated from our early days; indeed it makes a huge difference – or rather all the difference.” Thirty years of love and support from my parents, Ross and Sonja, continue to make all the difference to me, and I dedicate this work to them.

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## Abstract

Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*) is much less well understood than his *Nicomachean Ethics*. Only since Kapp's *Das Verhältnis der eudemischen zur nikomachischen Ethik* (1912) has the *EE* been recognized as authentically Aristotle's; the first complete modern translation did not appear until 2011; and an improvement on the 1884 critical edition of the Greek text is just now being produced. I examine Aristotle's unique conception in the *EE* of the development and maturity of virtue of character.

I argue that, on Aristotle's view (1) habituation results in the ability to act in a certain way through repetitive movement, (2) the pleasures and pains that accompany virtuous and vicious action guide the development of virtuous and vicious character, and (3) the virtuous person's non-rational desiderative faculties set correct ends (4) in pursuit of which deliberation then identifies appropriate action—excellent deliberation produces action conducive to a contemplative yet active life. The virtuous person chooses fine actions *qua* fine but also because they aim effectively at her mundane desires.

Previous research on all four of these points consists entirely of a handful of largely philological essays focusing on individual passages and recent, unpublished drafts of a generally synoptic nature. For example, the only prior work on habituation specifically in the *EE* consists of two exegeses of *EE* II.2, 1220a39-b6 (Chamberlain 1984 and Ferreira 2017) and unpublished manuscripts from two symposia: the 2017 Symposium Aristotelicum on *EE* II and the 2018 Dublin workshop "The Relationship between Aristotle's *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*." My work is thus the first sustained examination of moral virtue in Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics*.

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*) offers a distinctive view of character development and ethical action. Yet ever since Aspasius' popular second-century commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE*)<sup>2</sup>, the *NE* has received far more attention. In both works, Aristotle has much to say about character: indeed, he coined the Greek ἠθικός, and with it established the field of *ethical* (character-based) inquiry.<sup>3</sup> Character-related questions have become more popular in contemporary philosophy in recent decades with a resurgence of interest in virtue ethics. Even this renaissance, however, has largely missed the *EE*.

Even if we look beyond the topic of this dissertation, no philosophical monograph has been published solely on the *EE*. Library shelves full of books on the *NE* put this deficiency into relief. Indeed, aside from the 2019 dissertation of Giulia Bonasio and two recent symposia partially on the *EE*, there are not even sustained examinations of the work that have yet to be published, so far as I am aware. Pervasive themes in the work are simply unexplored, since what secondary literature exists considers the work piece by piece. In

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- 1 All translations in this document are my own, based on Christopher Rowe's January 2020 draft collation of the *Eudemian Ethics* manuscripts unless otherwise noted. I footnote the text I read for each passage I cite. Outside the *EE*, I use the Oxford Classical Text (OCT) editions of the Greek. The Bekker number citations I use for the *EE* and the *NE* come from the OCT editions, though these (at least for the *EE*) are unfortunately sometimes inexact.
  - 2 My arguments rely only on the special books of the *Eudemian Ethics* (=EE), to which I exclusively refer with that title. I denote the so-called "common books" or "disputed books" as *NE* V, VI, and VII to emphasize both their home in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (=NE) for much of their life and their lack of participation in my discussion. For more on the *NE*, the *EE*, and the disputed books, see Appendix C.
  - 3 LSJ *s.v.* ἠθικός; Chamberlain (1984: 176, 183). Chamberlain: Aristotle coined τὰ ἠθικά because "[i]t is the working in one's soul of ἦθος which brings about moral excellence, that is, the managing of desire so as to be what reason orders." (And our "moral" owes to Cicero's coinage of *moralis* from *mores* (*De fato*, 1).)

particular, as can be inferred from my bibliography, published work consists of a few dozen articles on specific passages of the *EE*; a few commentaries in English, Italian, and German; and notes to translations also in these languages.

The philological history of the *EE* helps to explain this lack of scholarly perspective. Until the early twentieth century, when Kapp published on the relationship between the *NE* and the *EE*, scholars did not consider the *EE* authentic; and it began to receive serious philosophical attention only in the 1970s, with the work of Moraux and Harlfinger, and Kenny. Classicist Christopher Rowe is only now producing an updated and definitive Greek text; previous texts left out key manuscripts (Susemihl 1884) or made widely-criticized editorial emendations (Walzer and Mingay 1991). Friedemann Buddensiek is preparing a first commentary and translation of Rowe's new text, a long-sought improvement on the outdated Dirlmeier (1963) or incomplete Woods (1982).

This dissertation aims to begin to correct these shortcomings in study of the *EE*. I explain the *Eudemian* view of virtue, which Aristotle separates into two kinds: intellectual virtue and virtue of character. He defines intellectual virtue as the good condition of the part of the soul that uses reason to give commands and virtue of character as the good condition of the part of the soul that obeys reason by following such commands.<sup>4</sup> The *EE* confines its observations on virtue almost entirely to virtue of character, however, and its explanation of human flourishing attributes much less to the part of the soul using reason than we might expect given these definitions.

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<sup>4</sup> In what follows, I will describe neither of these parts of the soul as “irrational.” Instead, I use “non-rational” (synonymously “arational”) to describe that which does not have any rational capacities at all (for example, the vegetative soul). Adult human beings are *irrational* when they draw intellectual conclusions contrary to reason, but *non-rational* when they do not use reason at all in whatever they are doing. It is however possible that rational structure may be brought about in a soul-part that is non-rational.

The first two chapters examine Aristotle’s development of an account of virtue of character by focusing on the roles of habituation, pleasure, and pain in its formation. These first two chapters deal roughly with the first half of *EE* II.<sup>5</sup> Aristotle’s *Eudemian* habituation might even be called “habit” to reflect the rote repetition which appears to be its key mechanism. This quite general notion of habit supports a theory that pleasure and pain both characterize and help to form states of character. While Aristotle does not collect his thoughts on the matter, I reconstruct this uniquely *Eudemian* theory. As it turns out, Aristotle’s account of the formation of character virtue relies on a psychologically straightforward process, one that could potentially even proceed without guidance. And yet – as I explain in the brief “Interlude” between Chapters 2 and 3 – in a telling aside in *EE* VII on friendship, he mentions the role of the statesman in guiding people to become good.

Chapters 3 and 4 address mature virtue of character. In the third chapter, I explain how non-rational desires in the virtuous person set specific and correct ends for action. Most modern students and teachers of Aristotle know that part of the work of intellectual virtue must be to deliberate about ends. This view has long been a scholarly consensus, opposed only recently by Jessica Moss’s *Aristotle on the Apparent Good* (2012). I show how the common practice of indiscriminately sourcing *NE* and *EE* material contributes to her problematic argument, but that an even stronger version of Moss’s theory actually captures the *Eudemian* picture well.

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5 That is, the end of *EE* II.1, continuing to *EE* II.2-5 (1220a13-1222b14). This part of the book follows discussions of happiness (*EE* II.1, 1218b31-1219b26) and of the two unique parts of the human soul (*EE* II.1, 1219b26-1220a12). Aristotle explicitly demarcates both the start of his discussion of virtue of character (μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον πρῶτον περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡθικῆς) and the start of the next topic, human beings as special kinds of starting-points (λάβωμεν οὖν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐπιούσης σκέψεως).

I argue in the fourth and final chapter that instead of deciding what we aim for, our intellectual virtues make a threefold contribution to how we aim for it. As human beings, Aristotle thinks, we are naturally inclined toward intermediate affections, desires, and actions that are “as reasoning indicates.” Virtuous pursuit of ends takes place with an eye to contemplation of god as a standard (ὄρος) for deliberation. And Aristotelian προαίρεσις (roughly, “choice”) selects actions that will contribute both to that ὄρος and to the ends identified by virtue of character.

In general, I aim to give proper consideration to the *Eudemian Ethics*’ unique perspective on virtue of character and the moral psychology behind it. Doubtless some interest in my topic will derive from a desire to compare Aristotle’s two ethical treatises, as has generally been the case in the literature thus far.<sup>6</sup> However I do not aim to compare. Rather, I examine uniquely *Eudemian* theses, since I focus on the special books of that treatise. These are *EE* I, II, III, VII, and VIII; *EE* IV, V, and VI are identical to *NE* V, VI, and VII, being printed in manuscripts of both treatises. I do not consider these so-called “common books,” since scholarly work has yet to determine to which treatise these books properly belong, and the most likely answer to the debate seems at the moment to be that they are neither wholly *Eudemian* nor wholly *Nicomachean* in composition.<sup>7</sup>

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6 E.g. J. Donald Monan, in a book-length argument that the Aristotelian φρόνιμος’ role as ethical standard deprives nature of any role in explaining ethical principles: “the psychological horizon of the *EE* has broadened beyond the narrow identification [in the *NE*] of man with his νοῦς” (1968: 132). Some years later, John Cooper contrasts the “mixed life” promoted by the *EE* with the “intellectualist ideal” in the *NE* (1986: esp. 144-145, citing Rodier in Hubert and Gilson 1926: 50-55). Note the importance of chronology to these interpretations: Monan thinks the *EE* is the later ethical treatise, while Cooper orders the treatises as follows: *EE* (including *NE* V-VII), *De Anima*, and the *NE* special books. For more discussion, see Appendix C.

7 I defend this position in other work, on stylometric analyses of the books. Again, see Appendix C.

## 1 The Inquiry into Virtue, Character, and Habit

In this chapter and the next, I explain the substantial and unique account of the formation of character contained in the *Eudemian Ethics*. That the treatise addresses the formation of character at all will come as a surprise to some, who emphasize that the *EE* is lacking in this respect. The way in which the *EE* discusses the topic is also controversial: I show in the first two sections of this chapter that Aristotle makes what we might call an abstract inquiry – as opposed to one that is directive (regarding how to be virtuous or how to act) – into the formation of character in the first two books of the *EE*.

If my argument in the first three sections of this chapter is successful, it will be clear that Aristotle is concerned with the issue of the formation of character, that he thinks this issue is of great importance in the treatise, that he addresses the issue with an eye to theory more than action, and that he attributes the development of character to habit (ἔθος). We will then want to know the specifics of the *Eudemian* account of the formation of character and of habit in particular. Unlike the *NE*, however, the *EE* material on these points is not presented in a unified manner and requires some reconstruction. It also requires a lengthy discussion of pleasure and pain in Aristotle's ethical psychology. I therefore save a thorough explanation of what the *EE* has to say about the formation of character for Chapter 2.

In the remaining sections of this chapter, I prepare for the Chapter 2 presentation of the *EE*'s rather periphrastic account of the formation of character via its comments on pleasure and pain. This preparation considers the direct commentary we do have on habit, as the only explicit means Aristotle identifies regarding the formation of character. I discuss Aristotle's explicit comments on habit in Sections IV, V, and VI, presenting a novel perspective

on their general scope. I also discuss the uniquely *Eudemean* ideas that character is a quality (ποιότης) and that habit results in an “ability to be active” (ἐνεργητικός). In discussing habit in the *EE*, I do not disagree with the common observation that the *EE* has little to say on habit as a means to develop character. Rather, I argue in Chapter 2 that the *Eudemean* account of the formation of character is quite different than that found in the *NE*, that it is substantial in its own right, and that given what I say in this chapter, it is appropriate for Aristotle’s approach in the *Eudemean* treatise.

Aristotle ties together the topics of this chapter and the next – character and pleasure – right from the dialectical opening of the *Eudemean Ethics*, where he comments on an inscription at Delos:

“The finest thing is what is most just, to be healthy is best, and most pleasant of all is the attainment of that which one desires.”

We should not agree with [this], for happiness, being the finest and best of all things, is the most pleasant.<sup>1</sup>

These lines may well set out the project of the entire *Eudemean Ethics*,<sup>2</sup> But for our purposes it is more important to see that Aristotle is preparing us here for the structure of his account of the formation of character. The function argument of *EE* II.1 (1218b31-1219a39) defines happiness in terms of virtue (b38-39), and Aristotle’s Book II discussion of virtue returns again and again to pleasure and pain, as we shall see in Chapter 2. Our natural interest in happiness directs us, or so the function argument would have it, to virtue, and especially to virtue of character. And our subsequent inquiry into virtue of character requires an

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1 I.1, 1214a5-8: Κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ’ ὑγιαίνειν, πάντων <δ’> ἥδιστον οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν· ἡμεῖς δ’ αὐτῷ μὴ συγχωρῶμεν, ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον ἀπάντων οὐσα ἥδιστον ἐστίν.

2 So Bonasio 2019

understanding of pleasure and pain in its formation. By the time we reach the end of the *EE*, Aristotle's critique of the inscription at Delos makes sense: the happy life, the virtuous life, and the pleasant life are one and the same. Much of this commentary is promissory, but it is worth knowing that Aristotle's connection of character and pleasure early in the *EE* serves this broader aim.

Immediately after the opening remark about the inscription, Aristotle turns to questions about method and subject matter. We will follow him in this, focusing on Aristotle's approach to the question of the formation of character in the *EE*. I begin with a discussion of the way in which Aristotle inquires into the matter, arguing that his inquiry is practical (as opposed to theoretical) and exploring what practicality means for the actual *use* of his theory. I then show that, even in the proem, Aristotle works to identify practice (*ἄσκησις*) and habit (*ἔθος*) as the means by which we attain virtue.

## I The essence and origin questions in *EE* I

As his discussion moves from happiness to virtue and further from virtue to virtue of character, Aristotle conceptualizes his overall task by dividing it in two. On the one hand are questions of essence: what is happiness? what is virtue? what is virtue of character? What parts do they have; in what do they consist? He sets these against questions of origin: how is "living well" achieved? What are the sources of happiness, of virtue, and of character?

This essence/origin division is a subset of a more general distinction between two types of subject matter. We see this general division in the first lines following the remark about the inscription at Delos, which being the train of argument of the proem to the *EE*:<sup>3</sup>

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3 I take the proem to run from the beginning of I.1 through I.6, ending at 1217a17 (referred to with *πεπροοιμισασμένων* at II.7, 1217a18).

T1: Of the many subjects of investigation (ὄντων θεωρημάτων) which raise difficulties and need investigation concerning each matter and each nature, some have to do only with knowing (τὸ γινῶναι), but others also with the getting (τὰς κτήσεις) and doing (τὰς πράξεις) of things. Regarding those involving only theoretical philosophy (φιλοσοφίαν . . . θεωρητικὴν), we must state whatever is appropriate to the inquiry when the right time comes, but first we must examine what living well consists in and how it is achieved . . .<sup>4</sup>

Aristotle draws a distinction here between two types of subject matter for investigation (ὄντων θεωρημάτων), referring to each type twice. Some subjects have to do with knowing things and not with getting or doing things, and they involve only theoretical philosophy. Other subjects, by contrast, *do* also have to do with κτήσεις and πράξεις. The subject matter of “living well” (τὸ εὖ ζῆν) belongs to the latter category. We can see why it falls into the latter category just from Aristotle’s specification of “living well.” We are interested in “what living well consists in and how it is achieved.” That is, we want not just to know what it is (τὸ γινῶναι) but also to know how people come to live well and what people do when they are living well (τὰς κτήσεις and τὰς πράξεις). This specification of “living well” also brings us to the divide I want to emphasize here: questions about “what living well consists in” are questions of essence, and questions about “how it is achieved” are questions of origin.

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4 I.1, 1214a8-15: πολλῶν δ’ ὄντων θεωρημάτων ἃ περὶ ἕκαστον πράγμα καὶ περὶ ἑκάστην a10 φύσιν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖται σκέψεως, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν συντείνει πρὸς τὸ γινῶναι μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικὴν λεκτέον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα καιρὸν, ὅτι περὶ οἰκεῖον ἦν τῆ μεθόδῳ· πρῶτον δὲ a15 σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ πῶς κτητόν . . .

Editors have emended the manuscript text printed here. Woods brackets τοῦ πράγματος without explanation, and Inwood and Woolf adopt Spengel’s περὶ τὰς κτήσεις τοῦ πράγματος καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις. Both emendations, but the latter especially, mislead as to the importance of action in happiness and virtue, a theme we shall come to later in this chapter. Other translators render the manuscripts’ text.

This essence/origin division structures much of the first two books of the *Eudemian Ethics*. At the end of T1, in the proem to the *EE*, Aristotle introduces lists of *endoxa*<sup>5</sup>. These *endoxa* address both the essence and the origin question, as they relate to “living well” (τὸ εὖ ζῆν): “we must examine what living well consists in and how it is achieved” (I.1, 1214a15).<sup>6</sup> In the lists themselves, he speaks of εὐδαιμονία instead of τὸ εὖ ζῆν, though in the *EE* he seems to treat the two expressions as equivalent.<sup>7</sup> Outside the proem, we see the structure yet again in the first half of *EE* II. Aristotle discusses the two sets of questions there at greater length, beginning shortly after the function argument has defined happiness in terms of virtue, thus focusing discussion on the latter. Aristotle sets out a plan for his argument through II.5 by narrowing his focus further, from virtue in the abstract to virtue of character in particular: “regarding virtue of character, we must investigate, first, what it is, and what

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5 Aristotle tells us a bit later that some opinions are not worth considering (I.1, 1214b34-1215a2). This passage probably refers to the two lists of *endoxa* introduced at 1214a15. If so, Aristotle is suggesting that we may not have complete lists. Indeed, the second list at least seems lacking, without money, fame, power, etc., though these are mentioned later.

6 *σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ πῶς κτητόν*. This phrase introduces the discussion of *endoxa* (1214a14 through 1214b24), and I.2, 1214b25 concludes it: ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτ' αἴτια τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως περὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τί ἐστι καὶ γίνεταί διὰ τίνων.

7 Aristotle's rhetoric in I.1 indicates this equivalence: he introduces his topic in the *EE* as εὐδαιμονία (1214a7-8), then switches to τὸ εὖ ζῆν (1214a15) before talking of εὐδαιμονία again here (1214a15-30). Other than at I.1, 1214a15, Aristotle only mentions τὸ εὖ ζῆν in I.2, 1214b13, I.3, 1215a10, and II.1, 1219b1-2 (with εὖ πράττειν), and in the context of friendship at VII.12, 1245b3.

Aristotle seems to use τὸ εὖ ζῆν interchangeably with τὸ καλῶς ζῆν in the *EE* (I.2, 1214b6-13 and perhaps I.3, 1215a10-13). The latter expression also occurs at I.1, 1214a30-31 (with μακαρίως, though see I.3, 1215a10), I.2, 1214b16-17 and I.5, 1216a33-34. In the *NE*, we find τὸ εὖ ζῆν only in conjunction with εὖ πράττειν (at I.4, 1095a19 and I.8, 1098b21), though also by itself in a disputed book (VI.5 1140a28). τὸ καλῶς ζῆν appears once, though perhaps in a non-technical sense (IX.9, 1170b27). In both treatises, then, Aristotle uses “living well” (and “living finely” in the *EE*) largely in his introductory comments. He prefers to talk (perhaps more specifically) of εὐδαιμονία in the remainder of both works.

kind of parts<sup>8</sup> it has (which comes to the same thing), and by what means it comes to be.”<sup>9</sup>

After II.6 introduces a different topic of discussion, Aristotle’s interest in the essence/origin structure wanes, though we can still see him asking one question or another at various points later in the treatise.<sup>10</sup>

Aristotle remarks directly on the relative importance of these two questions: knowing what things virtue comes from (ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν) is more valuable than knowing what virtue is. We see this point most directly in Aristotle’s riposte to Socratic intellectualism in *EE* I.5:

T2: The elder Socrates thought that knowing virtue was the end, and he looked into what justice is and what courage is and each of the parts of virtue. He did this reasonably. For he thought that all the virtues were instances of knowledge, so that one happens at the same time to know what justice is and to be just. For when we get to know geometry and building we are geometers and builders. So he sought out what virtue is but not how and from what things it comes about. This method corresponds to the theoretical sciences (τῶν ἐπιστημῶν . . . τῶν θεωρητικῶν) as there is nothing to astronomy or the natural sciences or geometry except knowing and theorizing about the nature of the objects of those sciences’ subjects, not that anything prevents them from being incidentally helpful for us in many necessary things. But the end of the productive sciences (τῶν δὲ ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν . . . τὸ τέλος) is something other than the science and investigation, just as health is the end of medicine and good order or something else similar to this is the end of political science.

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8 On the “parts” of virtue of character, Woods writes that “[t]he ‘parts of virtue’ are not the individual virtues, but the elements in the definition of virtue of character” (96). Dirlmeier agrees, explaining the parenthetical remark in the 1220a13-15 passage: “Daher der Zwischensatz, der besagt, daß Erkenntnis der Teile Wesenserkenntnis bedeutet” (236). Simpson suggests that “parts” *could* mean the individual moral virtues, listed in II.3 (243n19). I.5, 1216b2-6 supports this point.

9 II.1, 1220a13-15: σκεπτέον πρῶτον περὶ ἀρετῆς ἠθικῆς, τί ἐστὶ καὶ ποῖα μέρη αὐτῆς, εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνήκται, καὶ γίνεταί a15 διὰ τίνων.

10 Most prominently, the discussions of the individual virtues in *EE* III illustrate Aristotle’s continued efforts to clarify the essence of virtue, as each discussion in *EE* III attempts to explain not just what the virtue looks like in practice but how it manifests psychologically.

Now knowing each fine thing is indeed fine. Still, concerning virtue, it is not knowing what it is that is most valuable but knowing what things it is from. For we do not want to know what courage is but to be courageous people, nor what justice is but to be just people, even as we wish to be healthy rather than to know what health is and to be in a good state rather than to know what being in a good state is.<sup>11</sup>

Focus for now on the second half of T2. Aristotle tells us that knowing what things virtue is from is more important than knowing the essence of virtue. That is, while we can gain knowledge about the essence of virtue or of the individual virtues, gaining knowledge about how virtue or the virtues come to be is more valuable. Notice, however, that Aristotle speaks in terms of knowledge on both counts. The claim that the second is more valuable than the first is not cashed out in terms of a difference between an enterprise that is useful and one that is not useful, or in the terminology I shall employ here, between an enterprise that is *directive* and one that is not directive regarding how to become virtuous or how to act.<sup>12</sup>

Rather, *knowledge* of origins is more valuable than knowledge of essences.

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11 *EE* I.5, 1216b2-25: Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ᾧ ἐστὶ τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ἐπεζήτει τί ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ **b5** ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. ἐποίησε γὰρ ταῦτ' εὐλόγως. ἐπιστήμας γὰρ ᾧ ἐστὶ εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον· ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐσμὲν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι. διόπερ ἐζήτει **b10** τί ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἀλλ' οὐ πῶς γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τίνων. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν συμβαίνει τῶν θεωρητικῶν, οὐθὲν γὰρ ἕτερον ἐστὶ τῆς ἀστρολογίας οὐδὲ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲ γεωμετρίας πλὴν τὸ γνωρίσαι καὶ θεωρῆσαι τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ὑποκειμένων ταῖς ἐπιστήμασι· **b15** οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐθὲν κωλύει πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἶναι χρησίμους αὐτάς ἡμῖν· τῶν δὲ ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἕτερον τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ γνώσεως, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ἰατρικῆς, εὐνομία δὲ ἢ τι τοιοῦθ' ἕτερον τῆς πολιτικῆς. καλὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἕκαστον **b20** τῶν καλῶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γε περὶ ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι τιμωτάτον τί ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐδέ τί ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ' εἶναι δίκαιοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ **b25** ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ ἔχειν.

12 I use “directive” instead of “useful” because my point is not that the *EE*'s inquiry may be “useless.” As I make clear below, I think its practical nature gives it great value, but I do not think that it is engaged in the project of directing the student how to become more virtuous or how to act. I owe thanks to Julia Annas for pointing out the perils of the term “useful” in this chapter.

This point brings us to our next topic. I will now argue that Aristotle engages in a practical inquiry in *EE* I and II, though the claim requires an extensive look into what “practical” means in the *Eudemian* context. One upshot of the argument will be that while we might well prefer having virtue to knowing its essence, neither in T2 nor elsewhere in the *EE* is Aristotle concerned with the question of how to attain virtue. Now it might be the case that when we realize that we want to be virtuous (and not just to know what the virtues are), we will see that knowing the origins of virtue is more valuable than knowing what virtue is. But the dialectic of T2 does not imply that knowing the origins of virtue in some way fulfills a desire to be virtuous. All we can conclude from T2 is that, perhaps because of our desire to become virtuous, the origin question is more urgent than the essence question.<sup>13</sup>

## II The practical inquiry into the origins of virtue

Is the question of the origin of virtue more *practical* or even more *directive* than the question of what virtue is? To see Aristotle’s perspective on practical and theoretical questions, we need to look back to T1 and the first half of T2. From those texts, I will argue in this section that while Aristotle’s inquiry into the origin question is indeed practical, he recognizes that knowing about the origins of virtue will not make us more virtuous. For rational agents aspiring to virtue, such practical knowledge importantly yields a knowledge of what is going on as virtue is acquired. However, as Aristotle argues in T2 and as we shall see in the next chapter, that acquisition itself cannot be accomplished intellectually.

In T1 Aristotle mentions theoretical philosophy and distinguishes among knowing, getting, and doing things. T2 compares the theoretical sciences to the productive sciences. To

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<sup>13</sup> See further my critique of London on this passage in the next section.

give some structure to our inquiry here, it will be expedient to look at explicit comments Aristotle makes in *Metaphysics* E on types of inquiry. There, Aristotle distinguishes physics, a theoretical science, from the practical and productive sciences.<sup>14</sup> Some commentators have seen the *Metaphysics* distinction, interpreted in one way or another, at play here in the *EE*. I doubt that Aristotle would have encouraged too close a look at the *Metaphysics* in an ethical context, but since we find ourselves nearly bereft of scholarly perspective on the *EE* passages, I lay out a few different ways commentators have read the *Metaphysics* distinction in order to approach T1 and T2.

(1) W. D. Ross thinks the distinction concerns the *aim of the person inquiring*. The distinction is then among the “theoretical [inquiries], which aim at knowledge for its own sake, the practical, which aim at knowledge as a guide to conduct, and the productive, which aim at knowledge to be used in making something useful or beautiful” (1923/1995: 62).

(2) Christopher Kirwan presents the distinction as one of *subject matter*. Theoretical knowledge concerns what is the case. Practical knowledge concerns what should be done or how it should be done. And productive knowledge concerns how something should be made (1993: 184-185).

(3) Michael Woods refers to a third interpretation, where the distinction concerns the origins of change found in the subject matter. Theoretical sciences investigate what contains its own origin of change; in the practical and productive sciences, the origin of change is in the agent, outside the science itself (46).<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> *Metaphysics* (M) E.1, 1025b18-28; see also *Topics* VI.6, 145a15.

<sup>15</sup> Woods cites Kirwan’s commentary on the matter (Woods 46), but in Kirwan the point about origins is rather secondary to the main distinction by subject matter (1993: 185) – and at any rate Aristotle only uses the origin to distinguish physics (as theoretical) from the practical and productive together.

Now Aristotle never explicitly draws a three-fold distinction among practical, productive, and theoretical sciences in the *EE*. But these interpretations of the *Metaphysics* distinction can help us to see what is going on in T1 and T2, as I now explain.

In T1, Aristotle distinguishes among “subjects” (ὄντων), between those involving “only theoretical philosophy” and those that have to do not just with knowing but with the getting and doing of things. Right away, we can see that the distinction made in T1 does not concern the aim of the person investigating. So (1), Ross’s way of seeing things in the *Metaphysics*, does not fit T1.<sup>16</sup> And if Aristotle is thinking of the *Metaphysics*, he certainly does not make any mention of the origin of change as important to his distinction, as in Woods’ interpretation, (3). Though other interpretations of the theoretical/practical/productive distinction are no doubt possible, (2) seems to fit T1 rather well. Instead of investigating subjects that involve “only theoretical philosophy,” Aristotle directs our attention to more practical matters. The subject matter of “living well” is a practical matter: “how [living well] is achieved” is an eminently practical question: it asks questions about the doing of things (τὰς πράξεις).

In T2, Aristotle tells us that the non-theoretical sciences<sup>17</sup> aim at something other than the science itself. Similarly, our aim in studying virtue, he says, is to become virtuous. And therefore, the argument goes, “knowing what things [virtue] is from” is most valuable. This conclusion might come as a surprise: why should knowledge of something (even of the

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16 T1 begins by mentioning the ὄντα θεωρήματα, which I have translated as “subjects of investigation.” We need not read θεωρήματα in this expression as a technical term: that is, Aristotle is not speaking only of theoretical (as opposed to practical or productive) investigation in T1. If he were, his specification that some subjects involve only “theoretical philosophy” would be hard to interpret.

17 As Woods points out, ποιητικός here (“productive”) can refer to both making and doing; see also II.3, 1221b5 and II.11, 1227b29, as well as *NE* VII.3, 1147a28 (Woods 57).

origins of something) be most valuable if, instead of a theoretical inquiry, we are engaged in a practical one? This question derives from a mistaken understanding of the practical/theoretical distinction. Both practical and theoretical inquiries aim to attain some sort of knowledge; they differ in the kind of questions they ask.

No doubt Aristotle would agree that actually *being* virtuous would be far more valuable than any sort of knowledge regarding virtue. But his point here concerns objects of knowledge. In writing about virtue, Aristotle focuses on its origins and not its substance, because his audience does not want to know *what* virtue is (a theoretical question) nearly as much as they would like to know *how* to get it (an aim which requires inquiry into practical questions).

That said, knowing how virtue comes to be does not yield step-by-step instructions regarding its acquisition. It is in this sense that we cannot call practical knowledge *directive*: practical *experience* will be directive; practical knowledge might at least convince us to get out there and accumulate this experience. Indeed, virtue-acquisition is an excellent example of the split between knowledge and experience where the direction of action is concerned. As Kirwan's interpretation of the *Metaphysics* passage suggests, the practical sciences need not be any more directive than the theoretical ones.<sup>18</sup> Nor need our aim in investigating be different, though as Aristotle states, when we investigate virtue we usually do aim to become better. The subject matter *itself* differs: just as medicine is concerned not with medicine but with health, so too ethics is concerned with the acquisition and possession of virtue and not merely with theoretical ethical issues. My contention is that the distinctions drawn in both T1 and T2 concern the content and aim of subject matter (τῶν ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν τὸ τέλος at

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<sup>18</sup> London refers us to the *Magna Moralia* on this point, where Aristotle explicitly distinguishes a non-directive, theoretical aspect of practical science (*MM* II.10, 1208a31-b2, cited in London 557).

I.5, 1216b16-17), not the aims of the person doing the investigating or how directive or useful the knowledge discovered may be. Similarly, as in the examples of T2, studying the craft of building does not make you a builder, nor can it direct an inexperienced student how to build: one must undergo practical training to gain the expertise. But the content and aim of the subject matter of building are themselves practical: no one would sit down to read about how to be a builder without quickly realizing that she needed practical experience.

Some commentators disagree with this interpretation of the *EE*'s practical inquiry. In an extensive article on moral knowledge and virtue acquisition in the *NE* and *EE*, Alex John London concludes that “the *EE* is fairly sanguine about the usefulness of ethical theory without regard to an agent’s knowledge of particulars” (570). But much of London’s argument toward this conclusion is negative: the *EE* lacks many of the *NE*'s points regarding the difficulty of learning to be virtuous (566-569).<sup>19</sup> Despite beginning with a more cautious thesis,<sup>20</sup> London treats the absence of evidence as contributing to his conclusion about the usefulness (or in my language, the directiveness) of ethical theory according to the *EE*.

London’s positive evidence that the *EE*'s practical inquiry is directive relies repeatedly on two troublesome interpretations. First, consider I.2, 1214b6-15, a passage in which London crucially follows an emendation of the manuscripts’ agreed text.<sup>21</sup> Instead of “everyone capable of living according to their own choice lays down some end (σκοπός) for

19 London’s argument for this point occupies much of his section III (565-571).

20 London opens with a more cautious thesis than that just quoted: “Aristotle’s views in the *EE* leave open the possibility of a ‘theory first’ approach to ethical development. According to this approach, it is possible to acquire general moral knowledge independently from one’s experience with the practical affairs of life and to benefit from using this knowledge to shape one’s subsequent activities.” This is true even if “one will still need considerable practical experience in order to be able to apply this knowledge successfully” (565). The run of his subsequent argument illustrates that he wants to show a good deal more than this.

living finely” (as I have rendered the passage in Chapter 4, page 157), London translates “everyone who can live according to his own choice should adopt some goal for the fine life.”<sup>22</sup> As for London’s second key passage, look again at the second half of T2. London seems to take Aristotle’s rhetoric here literally. Aristotle connects the second and third sentences of the second half of T2 with γάρ (“for”): knowing what things courage is from is most valuable *for* we want to become courageous people. London seems to take the dialectic to imply that knowing what things courage is from will help us to become courageous.<sup>23</sup> But it is equally possible that knowing what things courage is from is more valuable merely because it concerns an issue we care deeply about, even if this knowledge will not *make* us more courageous or *tell us how* to be so.

In short, London wants to draw two points together: that the *EE* is more theoretical and that according to the *EE*, theory is more directive. I grant the first (for practical inquiry need not give direction), but the second does not follow.<sup>24</sup> Perhaps the fundamental reason for his mistake is that he draws the distinction between the theoretical and the practical in

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21 δεῖ θεσθαι at 1214b7, written in the margin of P (P<sup>2</sup>), adopted by Gigon, Woods, and Inwood and Woolf. Friedemann Buddensiek first brought this emendation to my attention.

22 Relying on his reading of this passage, London concludes that “[t]he practical aim of the *EE* is to present an account of the human good around which agents can shape their choices and activities” (559, see 559-561 and 578-579: “Aristotle is worried that we will fail to organize our lives around the proper ends if we lack an understanding of the best life,” whereas “in the *NE* Aristotle is [also] worried that without properly habituating our affections and desires, this sort of philosophical inquiry will not be of any use to us anyway.”

Others make the same mistake regarding this passage, for example Di Basilio (2017: 17).

23 We can see this in his discussion of an *NE* passage: “[In *NE* II.2, 1103b25-32], as in the *EE*, Aristotle has just noted that the end of the present study is not theoretical knowledge, and that we are investigating the nature of virtue in order that we may become good ourselves” (569).

24 Di Basilio also expresses these two points, though his argument for the second point depends on his general view of habituation in the *EE* (2017: 17-20). I argue against Di Basilio on habituation in §IV.

the way Ross does above – in interpretation (1) of the *Metaphysics* passage discussed earlier in this section. London thinks that engagement in practical inquiries must have a practical, or action-oriented, aim.

Woods makes this same mistake. According to Woods, our T1 (I.1, 1214a9-14) “presupposes a division of sciences, inquiries, or branches of knowledge into theoretical and practical” (46). He suggests three possible ways we might conceptualize this division, but none of the three strictly concerns subject matter.<sup>25</sup> Again, Aristotle separates the practical science of virtue from purely theoretical inquiries not because the former gives us more direction for action or because our aim in engaging in it is more action-oriented, but because the subject of virtue concerns “the getting and doing of things.”

Woods’s insistence on knowledge of virtue as actionable leads to several difficulties in textual interpretation of T1 and T2. On T1, he remarks that “[s]ince the aim of the inquiry is practical, the question what happiness is is relevant only because it contributes to its attainment” (46). And on T2: “It is difficult to see how ethics can contribute to the practical

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25 Here are Woods’s three alternative interpretations of this two-fold division:

(i) between inquiries’ results: those yielding knowledge only as opposed to those also useful for (in my language, directive of) action or production

(ii) between aims of the inquirer: only knowledge as an aim as opposed to action or production also as an aim

(iii) between the place of the originating principle in the inquiry: in the matter itself as opposed to “in the person who has the science” (in both the practical and the productive sciences)

As should be clear from the text, I think none of these directly relevant to the *Eudemian* point at hand: though (iii) is the closest to my reading of the *EE* text here, I do not see Aristotle distinguishing in the *EE* in terms of the origin of change. The practical/theoretical point of T1 seems to focus instead on whether the matter studied involves action, wherever that action may come from. I follow my reading of the basic distinction in Kirwan instead.

aim which is [in I.5, 1216b16-25] insisted on except by answering theoretical questions of [the kind for which Aristotle criticizes Socrates]” (57). If the inquiry or the inquirer *were* oriented toward actually becoming good, then it would indeed be difficult to see the import of purely theoretical questions. I hope to have shown that a different picture of Aristotle’s inquiry does not raise the puzzles Woods leaves us with in his commentary.

Woods’s puzzles bring us back to the division between questions of origin and questions of essence discussed in the previous section of this chapter. It should be apparent from his language that he risks conflating a distinction between theoretical and practical (or productive) inquiry with a distinction between questions of origin and questions of essence. But as I have already stated above and as should now be clear, both origin-related questions and essence-related questions belong in the *EE* to practical inquiry.<sup>26</sup> In T1, “what living well consists in and how it is achieved” are set against subjects “involving only theoretical philosophy”: the former are practical questions, the latter theoretical. And in T2, Aristotle tells us that the second of these practical questions – the question of origin – is most valuable. It is to that question that we turn in the next section.

In this section, I have discussed the top-level distinction among theoretical, practical, and productive knowledge. I have argued further that Aristotle locates both questions of essence and of origin (introduced in Section I) within the scope of practical knowledge. Thus we have two divisions: the theoretical/practical/productive division, and the essence/origin division. I hope also to have excluded two bases for division in each case: neither of these

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26 Whether or not Woods (improperly) lines up these two distinctions (that is, theoretical-essence and practical-origin), he does remark correctly that practical inquiry requires some purely theoretical work (e.g. psychological divisions) (46). In this respect Woods’s “practical” and “theoretical” are closer to my own uses of those words than Kenny’s: Kenny treats questions both of essence and of origin as “theoretical” in contrast to the “practical” question “What goal in life should I pursue?” (1978: 192).

divisions concerns the aim of the person inquiring, and neither of these divisions concerns how much direction the subject under investigation gives, or how useful it is. In the *EE*, Aristotle appears to be interested in the subject of how virtue comes about. His interest is a practical one, but only in the sense that virtue is a practical subject, and not explicitly in the sense that he thinks the inquiry will help his readers to become virtuous, tell them how to go about becoming virtuous, or simply tell them what to do.

And yet even on this level of practical but not explicitly directive investigation, questions of origin are deeply interesting. How *does* virtue come about? Aristotle has told us that these are the most valuable kinds of questions. How does he answer them? In the remainder of this chapter, we will see what Aristotle has to say most explicitly on the matter. In the next chapter, I elucidate the more comprehensive theory giving an answer to the origin question in terms of pleasure and pain.

### III Identifying habit as the source of happiness

Even in the proem to the *EE*, we can see Aristotle making an argument, at least where the question of the origin of happiness is concerned. He starts, as I have mentioned above, by listing endoxa on both the origin question and the essence question, as they relate to happiness. Like everything else that comes to be, happiness might come about by nature, learning, practice (*ἄσκησις*),<sup>27</sup> some divine force, or by luck (I.1, 1214a15-30; see T3 below). And regarding its essence, happiness might consist in wisdom, virtue, or pleasure (I.1, 1214a30-33).

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<sup>27</sup> Alternatively “practice” (Inwood and Woolf), “exercise” (Simpson, 194), or “training” (Crisp, Woods). Woods seems to take *ἄσκησις* to be at least partly epistemic (see “learning what happiness is,” 47). LSJ on *ἄσκησις*: exercise, practice, training; generally, mode of life, profession

We hear a great deal in the rest of the treatise about the essence question, as Aristotle discusses the structure and individual components of happiness, but we have to work harder to understand his answer to the origin question.<sup>28</sup> Now in the next section of this chapter, we will see that Aristotle tells us directly that character – and by extension virtue and happiness – comes about through habit (in text T5). But how does he arrive at this statement? In *EE* I.1, I.3, and I.5, Aristotle develops a list of endoxa on the origin of happiness and uses it to suggest through elimination that happiness derives from habit and not from learning or nature, or luck or the divine. He thereby answers the origin question, but only in a multiple-choice manner, relying on the options gleaned from the endoxic method. After discussing habit in the *EE* in the rest of this chapter, I explain in the next chapter what Aristotle has to say about the acquisition of virtue more generally.<sup>29</sup>

For now, I focus on the eliminative argument in I.1, I.3, and I.5. First, I discuss the options as they are presented in I.1 (T3). I then focus on the elimination itself, working from I.3 (T4) and I.5. Here is the entire passage in I.1 listing the endoxa on the matter:

T3: (continuing from T1) . . . but first we must investigate what living well consists in and how it is achieved, whether it is by nature that everyone who attains this label comes to be happy, as do tall and short people and those of differing complexions, or through learning, with happiness being a kind of knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*),<sup>30</sup> or through some sort of practice (*ἄσκησις*) – for many things come to human beings neither from nature nor from learning but from becoming habituated (*ἐθισθεῖσι*), bad

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28 The *NE* presents a much more clear account of the acquisition of virtue (and so, of happiness). Perhaps the difference in clarity accounts for the fact that much work on the matter in Aristotle considers the *EE* only for support, if at all. Take Marta Jimenez’s recent article “Aristotle on Becoming Virtuous by Doing Virtuous Actions.” Jimenez uses just one *EE* passage (II.1, 1220a22-26). This chapter and the next suggest that such a focus is misguided, as Aristotle does have resources to explain the acquisition of virtue and happiness in the *EE* as well.

29 I am therefore in disagreement with Woods, who writes that “the answer to the [essence question] given by Aristotle determines the answer to the [origin question]; at any rate, we do not find the two questions discussed separately” (47).

things from becoming habituated badly, and good things from becoming habituated well – or in none of those ways, but in one of these two: either by the influence of some spirit, like people possessed by nymphs or gods, as if divinely inspired, or by luck; for many people say that happiness and good fortune are the same thing. That it comes to be present in human beings through all or some or one of these ways is clear, for pretty much all comings to be fall under these principles, since we might group together those due to thought (διάνοια) with actions due to knowledge (ἐπιστήμη).<sup>31</sup>

Aristotle lists five possible sources of happiness: nature, learning, practice, some divine force, and luck. The last two are set off from the first three. They are entirely external in the sense that they might not depend on the disposition, upbringing, or any other attribute of the agent at all.<sup>32</sup> Happiness will be a very different type of thing if it depends primarily or entirely on the divine or on luck.

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30 Rackham (followed by Dirlmeier and Simpson) takes οὔσης existentially, with εὐδαιμονίας dependent on ἐπιστήμη (“. . . there being a science of happiness”) (cited in Woods 185).

31 I.1, 1214a14-30: πρῶτον δὲ a15 σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ πῶς κτητόν, πότερον φύσει γίνονται πάντες εὐδαίμονες οἱ τυγχάνοντες ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, ὥσπερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χροιάν διαφέροντες, ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως, ὡς οὔσης ἐπιστήμης τινὸς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἢ διὰ τινος ἀσκήσεως· πολλὰ γὰρ οὔτε κατὰ a20 φύσιν οὔτε μαθοῦσιν ἀλλ’ ἐθισθεῖσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φαῦλα μὲν τοῖς φαύλως ἐθισθεῖσι, χρηστὰ δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς· ἢ τούτων μὲν κατ’ οὐδένα τῶν τρόπων, δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον, ἥτοι καθάπερ οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεόληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιπνοία δαιμονίου τινὸς ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἢ διὰ τὴν τύχην· πολλοὶ a25 γὰρ ταυτό φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν. τι μὲν οὖν ἢ παρουσία διὰ τούτων ἀπάντων ἢ τινῶν ἢ τινὸς ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἅπανσαι γὰρ αἱ γενέσεις σχεδὸν πίπτουσιν εἰς ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ γὰρ <τὰς> ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας ἀπάσας πρὸς τὰς ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης a30 ἂν τις συναγάγοι πράξεις.

a21 L has φαύλους for φαύλως and χρηστοῖς for χρηστῶς. This variant would leave us without any evidence in the *EE* for particular sorts of habituation (“bad” and “good”). I do not take the point up because of this variant.

a26 ἢ παρουσία διὰ PCBL, OCT, Susemihl: τῆς παρουσίας [διὰ] Spengel, Rowe

a29 <τὰς> Casaubon. Dirlmeier suggests that this starting τὰς specifies γενέσεις instead of πράξεις (150).

32 Aristotle later considers the opinion that lucky people are so by nature (VIII.2, 1247a29-31).

The other three possible sources of happiness – nature, learning, and practice – all rely on various aspects and capacities of the soul, though perhaps in conjunction with external factors. Indeed we might expect these sources of happiness to be two instead of three, since in the ethical works Aristotle often separates things that are by nature from things that are not,<sup>33</sup> and since this opposition in the *Ethics* is correlated with the two types of existence in the *Physics*. As the *Physics* has it, “[o]f things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes.”<sup>34</sup> “Other causes,” in both the *Physics* and both *Ethics*, involve some sort of specifically human agency. Since their rational capacities distinguish human beings from the other animals, we might reasonably conclude that things exist, according to this distinction, either by nature or through some rational capacity of the human soul.

In fact, the conclusion of T3 seems designed to assure us that this natural-rational distinction does apply to the first two possibilities in the list of five (that is, nature and learning). The final phrase of T3 (I.1, 1214a28-30) tells us that *ἐπιστήμη* and *διάνοια* are similar principles; thus the presence of the former (*ἐπιστήμη*) in the list of five seems to stand more generally for a rational principle. Thus of the three possible non-external sources of happiness we were considering – nature, learning, and practice – nature and learning seem to be on opposite sides of the natural-rational divide.

What, then, of “practice” (*ἄσκησις*): on which side of the *Physics* distinction is it?

This is an important and difficult question, one that will recur through the remainder of the dissertation. As we can see in T3, Aristotle further specifies *ἄσκησις* by telling us that some

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33 Consider the common book division between things that are pleasant by nature and things that are not (VII.5, 1148b15-19). Also in the common books, Aristotle contrasts wisdom (*σοφία*) with other intellectual virtues: wisdom alone cannot come about by nature, whereas he suggests that the other can (*NE* VI.11, 1143b6-14).

34 This is the opening of *Phys.* II. Aristotle goes on to explain that what exists by nature includes the results of “growth and decrease . . . or alteration.”

things come to human beings through their “becoming habituated.” This links the presence of ἄσκησις in the list with Aristotle’s later discussion of habit, and thence with our consideration of character more generally. Ἄσκησις itself does not recur in the *EE*. In the *NE* Aristotle uses the word just once, in the list parallel to T3. The *NE*’s list implies that habit is only one type of ἄσκησις, a possibility T3 leaves open but does not address.<sup>35</sup> Instead of telling us more about ἄσκησις, Aristotle moves quickly to habit in both treatises. Indeed, in the *EE* he gestures perhaps rather vaguely to “some” (τις) ἄσκησις. Given the lack of information elsewhere,<sup>36</sup> we can only guess what other types of “practice” might be candidate sources of happiness. As far as the origin question is concerned, the three non-external sources of happiness will be nature, learning, and habit.

Now that we have some grasp of what the five possible sources of happiness are, I turn to consider Aristotle’s eliminative argument for habit. In *EE* I.3 Aristotle suggests elimination of four of the five possibilities listed in T3 above. This eliminative rhetoric leaves us with an answer to the origin question: happiness comes from ἄσκησις, specified in T3 and later discussed as habit. This answer receives confirmation both in the passage on habit (see the following sections of this chapter) and in his account of the formation of character through pleasure and pain (again, in Chapter 2). Here is the I.3 passage in which Aristotle eliminates possibilities from his endoxic list of answers to the origin question:

T4: For if living finely (τὸ καλῶς ζῆν) consists in things coming to be from luck or from nature, many people could not hope for it, for its acquisition is not from diligence nor in their own

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35 *NE* I.9, 1099b8-9. Aristotle condenses his list from the *EE* to learning, habit, some *other* practice, divine dispensation, and chance. Notice also Aristotle’s omission of nature from the *NE* list. (The *NE* special books do not mention “natural virtue,” either.)

36 In the *NE*, ἄσκησις occurs only in the parallel list (I.9, 1099b10 and b16) and in a reference to Theognis at IX.9, 1170a11. See also διατελῶ at III.5, 1114a9 and ἐπιτηδεύω at X.9, 1180a2. *De Anima* is silent on both ἄσκησις and habit.

power (ἐπ' αὐτοῖς) nor subject to their attention; but if it consists in oneself and one's actions being of a certain sort, the good would be more common and more divine, more common by making it possible for more people to share in it, and more divine by establishing happiness for those who make themselves and their actions certain sorts.<sup>37</sup>

Aristotle writes here that if happiness derives from luck or from nature,<sup>38</sup> it will be less common and less divine. It is unclear exactly why he thinks that happiness being less common is a strike against the candidacy of the sources that would make it so. But he does elaborate on his comment that happiness would thereby be more divine: if instead of being dependent on things outside of our control, happiness depends on quality of character and action, this will make it more divine.

From the original list of five conceivable sources of happiness, Aristotle has just eliminated nature and luck. This leaves us with learning, practice, and the divine. But presumably if the source of happiness is divine, this too will be outside our control in the

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37 *EE* I.3, 1215a12-19: εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γινομένοις ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ζῆν ἐστίν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἶη πολλοῖς, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ δι' ἐπιμελείας ἢ κτήσις οὐδὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς a15 οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας· εἰ δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτὸν ποιόν τινα εἶναι καὶ τὰς κατ' αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον ἂν εἶη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ θειότερον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχασθαι μετασχεῖν, θειότερον δὲ τῷ κεῖσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν [ἄ] τοῖς αὐτοῖς παρασκευάζουσι ποιούς τινας καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

a14 ἐστὶ PCBL: ἔσται Rowe following a suggestion of Walzer's

a18-19 [ἄ] τοῖς αὐτοῖς [sic] Rowe, Susemihl: τοῖς αὐτοῖς Rav.; ἕως: ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς P<sup>2</sup> in margin, OCT; ἄ τοῖς αὐτοῖς P<sup>1</sup>CBL. The P<sup>2</sup> text (followed by the OCT) results in a rather different point: happiness is in those things which bring about qualities in agents and actions (so Woods 3).

Also at a18-19, B adds καὶ after κεῖσθαι (a18) and does not have ποιούς τινας (a19). Without including ἄ, then, B's text tells us that happiness is more divine by establishing happiness and actions as things which people bring about for themselves.

38 Woods suggests that Aristotle rehabilitates the endoxon that happiness comes from nature. He writes that "a natural capacity is required [for happiness] – one which animals lack (cf. I.7, 1217a24f.) – but this natural endowment is possessed by all normal human beings, though whether this natural endowment is so developed that a man leads a happy life depends on other factors" (47).

sense of T4. Aristotle does not make this implication explicit in T4, but we may well see it there. And finally, we have already seen from T2 that learning cannot account for virtue – or, that is, for happiness.

This scattered but complete eliminative argument seems to leave us with practice (*ἄσκησις*) as the only plausible candidate for an answer to the origin question. And where practice is concerned, we should look to habit, as Aristotle suggests in T3. I now turn to the only passage in which Aristotle addresses habit in the *EE*. There and for the remainder of this chapter, I will consider what Aristotle tells us about the origin question in his comment on habit in the *EE*. I conclude that he presents a very general account not focused on virtue of character or even particularly on character at all. Instead, in the *EE* Aristotle thinks character develops through pleasures and pains, as I explain in the Chapter 2.

#### IV The sentence about habit in *EE* II

What is the account of habit in the *EE*? Coming from an *NE* perspective, our expectations for such an account will be high. Even if we confine ourselves to the *EE*, we have just seen that Aristotle’s preliminary remarks suggest that we can answer the origin question (“how does virtue arise?”) by appeal to habit. As we shall see in this section and what follows, Aristotle’s *EE* consideration of habit is a quite general sketch rather than a specific theory about human virtue. In Chapter 2 I explain how Aristotle answers the origin question by developing a theory about the effects of experiences pleasure and pain.

Aside from T3’s use in passing of ἐθισθεῖσιν (“from becoming habituated”), Aristotle mentions ἔθος or ἐθίζω in the *EE* in only one passage – in fact, in just a single complex thought: T5, just below, which will serve as the topic of discussion for the remainder of this

chapter. Habit comes up in T5 because Aristotle is concerned to set out a definition of what character ( $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ) is and he does so in terms of habit, defining habit along the way. But we cannot learn more about habit by reading up on  $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$  in the *EE*, as all the explicit information we have about Aristotle's view of  $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$  comes from T5's definition of the term. While Aristotle mentions  $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$  in a few other places, none gives us additional information about what  $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$  is. Other than in the context of T5 and in a parallel passage in II.1 (for which see page 179 of Appendix B), Aristotle only uses the term  $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$  when he needs a more general term than the ubiquitous  $\eta\ \eta\theta\iota\kappa\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\eta$  ("virtue of character").<sup>39</sup> So for both habit and character, we must look to what I read as a single sentence:

T5: But since character ( $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ) is [possibly: what it is] as even its name indicates because it is capable of development through habit ( $\xi\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ), and that [which becomes habituated] becomes habituated by a non-innate pattern of behavior by moving [or being moved] many times in a certain way, eventually in this way [becoming] the thing able to be active [or able to activate], and we do not see [this] in inanimate things, for though you throw a stone up countless times, you will never do this without force, therefore let character be this, a quality of that in the soul which is able to follow reason in accordance with commanding reason.<sup>40</sup>

39 For example, he connects character ( $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ) to pleasures and pains at II.4, 1221b32-34. He recalls and further specifies this connection in the final definition of virtue of character at II.10, 1227b5-11, in an expression similar to that of II.1.

$\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$  also turns up a few times in passing, in comments regarding praiseworthy or choiceworthy characters (III.7, 1233b16-18 and VII.1, 1234b21-22) and the stability or instability of various characters (VII.2, 1236a38-b1 and VII.5, 1239b12-14). As Woods remarks (99), forms of  $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$  may mean "characters" or "traits of character" depending on the context.

40 *EE* II.2, 1220 a39 b1  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota\ \delta\prime\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \eta\theta\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\mu\alpha\ \sigma\eta\mu\alpha\iota\ \nu\epsilon\iota\ \acute{\omicron}\tau\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\ \acute{\epsilon}\theta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\ \tau\eta\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\sigma\iota\nu,\ \acute{\epsilon}\theta\iota\zeta\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \delta\grave{\epsilon}\ \tau\omicron\ \acute{\upsilon}\pi\prime\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\omega\gamma\eta\varsigma\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \acute{\epsilon}\mu\phi\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\grave{\omega}\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\kappa\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\iota\ \nu\epsilon\iota\theta\alpha\iota\ \pi\acute{\omega}\varsigma,\ \omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\varsigma\ \eta\delta\eta\ \tau\omicron\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\eta\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\nu,\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\psi\acute{\upsilon}\chi\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \omicron\upsilon\chi\ \acute{\omicron}\rho\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\nu\ \omicron\upsilon\delta\grave{\epsilon}\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \mu\upsilon\rho\iota\acute{\alpha}\kappa\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\rho}\acute{\iota}\phi\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\ \tau\omicron\nu\ \lambda\acute{\iota}\theta\omicron\nu\ \omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\ \pi\omicron\iota\eta\sigma\epsilon\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \beta\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \cdot\ \delta\iota\delta\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\omega\ \eta\theta\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron,\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\tau\alpha\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\ \lambda\acute{\omicron}\gamma\omicron\nu\ \delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\upsilon\ \delta\prime\ \acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\theta\epsilon\iota\nu\ \tau\grave{\omega}\ \lambda\acute{\omicron}\gamma\omega\ \pi\omicron\iota\acute{\omicron}\tau\eta\varsigma.$

In the case of many passages in the *EE*, the poor state of the manuscripts requires emendation to produce a readable text. T5 is not one such passage. Only in the last decade or so have commentators realized this,<sup>41</sup> improving on past translations of emended text with renderings of the text delivered to us by the manuscripts, which are univocal with two minor exceptions.<sup>42</sup> I discuss T5 and defend my text and translation at length in Appendix B. There, I also focus on the numerous interpretations of the syntax of the passage so that in this chapter I can work from the translation I have produced and the text footnoted above while leaving syntactic disputes aside.

Before I discuss the passage, I want to highlight some ambiguities in its text. I flag these ambiguities in the hopes that doing so will help us to avoid all-too-common overinterpretations of this passage, which make it push one way or the other on some of the points I have just mentioned. Each of these ambiguities will resurface later below in discussion of those points.

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See Appendix B for extensive discussion.

41 So far as I know, Simpson was the first to do this, by translating Bekker's text without modification (2012: 545-546). The text I print is identical to Bekker's except at b3, where Bekker prints ὃ (with one manuscript) instead of καί. Buddensiek (2019) seems to read the same text as Simpson. Rowe (2020) additionally brackets δ' and τῶ λόγῳ in b6. Only Ferreira (2017) both reads καί and makes no emendations (as I have done). Other editors and translators do much more with the text.

42 Here are the two exceptions. I defend my text in each case in Appendix B.

1. At b3, at least one manuscript has ὃ instead of καί. Rowe gives καί PCB: ὃ L. Bekker, Susemihl, and the OCT agree, ascribing ὃ to M<sup>b</sup>, Π<sup>2</sup>, and L respectively. After καί, Rowe prints ἐν τοῖς ἀφύχοις without comment. The other three editions print the same text but note the variant ταῖς ψυχαῖς from M<sup>b</sup>, Π<sup>2</sup>, and L.
2. At b5, Rowe has ἦθος τοῦτο ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον PCL: τοῦτο ἦθος ψυχῆς καὶ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγων B. Bekker and Susemihl note τοῦτο ἦθος M<sup>b</sup>. The OCT does not print any alternatives, as it does not consider M<sup>b</sup> or Rowe's B.

Four of the ambiguities concern particular words in the text to T5. In a39, we may read ἐστὶ as predicative or absolutely: character “is” as its name indicates, or perhaps just character “is what it is.” Next, κινεῖσθαι (b2) may indicate activity or passivity: the habituee might *be* moved or might itself move. In the same line, ἀγωγῆ presents a similar problem. It might be “guide,” but perhaps it does not carry the sense of an external force; hence my “pattern of behavior.” A fourth difficult word is ἐνεργητικός (b3). What evidence we have suggests that it might imply transitive activating or rather (perhaps intransitive) activity.

Two other phrases are not as specific as some commentators would have them be. The contrast with τοῖς ἀψύχοις and the example of the stone (b3-b5) serve to highlight a difference between human beings and lifeless things, not necessarily between human beings and either non-human things or non-moving things. Finally, κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον in b5-b6 (“in accordance with commanding reason”) tells us little more than that reason commands in some way; it is quite unclear *what* is κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον. For each of these six words or expressions, I have tried to translate conservatively, and in what follows I attempt to draw out what the text *does* tell us, without relying too much on bits of this passage to construct a satisfying theory of habituation. After all, as I argue in Chapter 2, Aristotle has other resources for that.

I now return to the argument of T5. If we see the entire sentence as one compressed argument (as is indeed not unusual in Aristotle), we may formalize it like this:

But since (ἐπεὶ δ') (P1) character (ἦθος) is [possibly: what it is] as even its name indicates because it is capable of development through habit (ἔθος),<sup>43</sup>

and (δέ) (P2) that [which becomes habituated] becomes habituated by a non-innate pattern of behavior by

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43 If ἐστὶ is absolute, then perhaps P1 consists only of “character is what it is.”

moving [or being moved] many times in a certain way, eventually in this way [becoming] the thing able to be active [or able to activate],<sup>44</sup>

and (καί) (P3) we do not see [this] in inanimate things, for though you throw a stone up countless times, you will never do this without force,

therefore (διό) (C) let character be this, a quality (ποιότης) of that in the soul which is able to follow (δυναμένου . . . ἀκολουθεῖν) reason in accordance with commanding reason (κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον).

In Appendix B (page 189), I mention more and less structured interpretations of this passage. I discuss an article by Paulo Ferreira, who suggests the more structured interpretation that results in the formalization of the argument just above. He cites parallel arguments in Aristotle with an ἐπεὶ δέ . . . δέ . . . καί structure (2017: 129-130). But I also mention how we may interpret the syntax of the passage to involve P2 and P3 less explicitly in the inference from P1 to C. The syntax of the passage is not decisive: P2 and P3 may be part of the argument, or they may be parenthetical, or perhaps somewhere in between. Instead of relying on syntax, we should look at what Aristotle actually says in the sentence before we assume that it is or is not a self-contained argument.

I turn now to that task, considering for the remainder of the chapter what the text and translation of T5 can (§6) and cannot (§5) tell us about the development of character from habit. I focus on the negative first (in §5), to clear the way for a discussion of what the passage *does* tell us (in §6).

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<sup>44</sup> Simpson, Dirlmeier, and Donini (following Dirlmeier) think that the phrase οὕτως ἤδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν describes τὸ ἦθος. While I argue against this interpretation of the syntax in Appendix B, the argument will be much the same regardless.

## V Overinterpretations of the sentence about habit

To see the impetus for reading too much into the passage, consider its conclusion. After reading through P1, P2, and P3, we may be surprised by the conclusion's content, both because of its simplicity relative to the ideas in P1-P3 and because of its emphasis on reason (λόγος), which Aristotle does not explicitly mention in the premises of the argument. Some commentators seem to have put these two observations together and concluded that the bits of P1-P3 that do not contribute to the idea that character is a quality must instead contribute to the emphasis on reason in the latter part of C.

Their conclusion is not warranted, as we can see by looking at the context of the sentence. C does not depend only on P1-P3. Its connection of character to reason comes quite clearly from II.1, 1220a4-12, just after Aristotle distinguishes the intellectual virtues from the virtues of character and just before he launches his investigation of the latter. Here is that passage:

T6: Since the intellectual [virtues] are with reason (μετὰ λόγου), these sorts belong to what has reason, which is the commanding (ἐπιτακτικόν) part of the soul insofar as it has reason, but [the virtues] of character belong to the non-rational [part],<sup>45</sup> to that which by nature is capable of following (ἀκολουθητικοῦ) the part having reason. For we do not say that someone is a certain sort with respect to his character (ἦθος) because he is wise or clever but because he is gentle or bold.<sup>46</sup>

45 “Non-rational” captures τὸ ἄλογον better than does “irrational.” Translators vary between these two renderings, but it seems to me that the negative implications of “irrational” are to be avoided. τὸ ἄλογον does not mean “the thing contrary to τὸ λόγον” but “the thing without λόγος.”

46 II.1, 1220a8-12: ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ διανοητικαὶ μετὰ λόγου, αἱ μὲν τοιαῦται τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, ὃ ἐπιτακτικόν ἐστι τῆς a10 ψυχῆς ἣ λόγον ἔχει, αἱ δ' ἠθικαὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν ἀκολουθητικοῦ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι. οὐ γὰρ λέγομεν ποῖός τις τὸ ἦθος ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ δεινός ἀλλ' ὅτι πραῶς ἢ θρασύς.

a11 δὲ missing in PCB

Even before we read T5, then, we have reason to believe much of the content of its conclusion. In particular, we know that character is “. . . of that in the soul which is able to follow reason in accordance with commanding reason.” T6 connects ἡθος to the non-rational part of the soul well before the conclusion of T5, and T5 repeats the vocabulary of T6.<sup>47</sup> This is apparent in two respects. First, T6 tells us that the non-rational part of the soul is able to follow reason. In T6, Aristotle uses ἀκολουθητικοῦ; in T5, the expression is δυναμένου . . . ἀκολουθεῖν. And secondly, though Aristotle does not say so explicitly in T6, T6 gives us good reason to believe that the reason that the non-rational part of the soul follows is the reason of the other part of the soul, which is commanding. Both passages uses the word ἐπιτακτικόν.<sup>48</sup> So, much of C has already been shown by the time we arrive at T5.

We should therefore be careful not to overinterpret T5. Overinterpretation will run contrary to what I have just shown: that the vocabulary of T5 contains quite a few ambiguities at key points (listed in the previous section), and that T6 already gives us much of what we need for T5’s conclusion and so we need not treat T5 as logically self-contained (discussed just above). I now address four common interpretations of T5 that fail to take these points into account: some commentators conclude from T5 that (1) habit involves a

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See Appendix B, page 179 for additional comment on part of this passage and its relationship to T5.

47 So there is no need to see a poorly-presented argument in T5, *pace* Woods: “The argument seems to be that since character results from habituation (and not teaching) it belongs to the non-rational part of the soul” (99). The ascription of character to the non-rational part of the soul may rely in part on P1, but it has more solid foundations in T6.

48 II.1 tells us that insofar as the other part of the soul is “with reason” (μετὰ λόγου), it is commanding. II.2 does not mention this other part; instead, the non-rational part of the soul follows reason “in accordance with commanding reason.” Given the remarkable similarity of the expressions, it would be remarkable if the “following” of II.2 referenced something other than the rational part of the soul. II.1, 1220a27-31 introduces the commanding-following relationship between the soul’s parts with the expressions ἐπιτάττειν and πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν.

“habituator,” that (2) certain elements are active or passive in habit, that (3) λόγος has a specific role to play in the process, or that (4) there is a key connection between τὸ ἐνεργητικόν and character or λόγος. These four are related, for by pushing the passage too far on one count, it is easier to go beyond the text in others, too.

One common interpretation has it that T5 tells us about a “habituator.” This view derives partly from particularly active translations of ἔθος (as “habituation”) and ἐθίζεται (as “is habituated”).<sup>49</sup> But for the most part, commentators who see a habituator at work have focused on P2, and especially on the phrase ἀγωγή μὴ ἔμφυτος in line b2. Some translate the phrase to imply active guidance, while others, including myself, emphasize μὴ ἔμφυτος without referring to ἀγωγή as an active “guide.”<sup>50</sup> Take Simpson and Di Basilio as examples of the first approach, even though their similarly active translations of the passage end in quite opposing places. Simpson, on the one hand, points out that plants and non-human

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49 LSJ *s.v.* ἐθίζω does not suggest “habituate.” It also indicates “become accustomed” as appropriate for both active and passive voice. Since Aristotle clearly uses ἔθος and ἐθίζω in tandem here, and since “habit” is a well-established translation of the Aristotelian ἔθος, I use it for ἔθος. I avoid “is habituated” for ἐθίζεται, preferring “becomes habituated” instead for it and also for ἐθίζω. This translation matches the apparent agnosticism of the Greek as to whether some “habituator” is involved in the habituation.

50 In the first group are Buddensiek: “einer nicht angeborenen Führung” (2019); Di Basilio: “non-innate guide” (2018: 4); Dirlmeier: “eine Führung, die keine angeborene ist” (22); Donini: “una guida [di un principio] che non è innata” (35 and 203); Ferreira: “non-innate direction”; Simpson: “a guidance not innate” (26); and Woods: “guidance which is not innate” (15) and “training” (99). In the second group we find Inwood and Woolf: “pattern of conduct that is not innate” (19) and Kenny: “non-innate impulse.” LSJ (*s.v.* ἀγωγή, II) indicates both possibilities, foregrounding the former.

I incline to the latter, which leaves open the possibility of the former without specifying it. I discuss the matter in the text. In additional support of this direction, Julia Annas points to Sextus’s use of the word, and to the fact that the Spartan training system is called the ἀγωγή. Sextus’s “tenth mode” of suspension of judgement includes contrasting ἀγωγαί and their affects on perception. Sextus defines ἀγωγή as “a choice of lifestyle or of a certain behaviour adopted by one or many people,” e.g. Diogenes the Cynic or the Spartans (ἀγωγή μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν αἴρεσις βίου ἢ τίνος πράγματος περὶ ἕνα ἢ πολλοὺς γενομένη) See *PH* I.145-163 (72K in Long and Sedley, I.474, pp. 482-483 and II.463, pp. 472-473).

animals can be trained to grow or behave in certain customary ways and that the customs of human beings can be trained via the “external guidance of parents and teachers” (246-247). This dichotomy excludes human beings’ susceptibility to custom-inducing behavior-modification not only via “external guidance” but also in the ways in which customs in plants and non-human animals can be formed or changed.<sup>51</sup> Simpson is not alone in seeing active guidance at work. In the only article of which I am aware on habituation in the *EE*, Giulio Di Basilio interprets ἀγωγή in a similarly active way. The ἀγωγή here, he writes, is “a guide who issues directives” (5). But then Di Basilio diverges from Simpson. Di Basilio argues for two related and problematic claims, first that habituation requires a passive subject and active “guide” (ἀγωγή),<sup>52</sup> and second that this guide should be identified with “one’s own individual logos” (2018: 3, 13, 20).<sup>53</sup> This identification, in turn, depends on the questionable conclusions that the human capacity for reason is acquired<sup>54</sup> and that this capacity is not natural in the same way that, for example, desire is.<sup>55</sup> From these two conclusions, Di Basilio

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51 This exclusion does not go unnoticed by Simpson, who remarks that “[t]here is an implication here, left unexpressed, that this process of habituation . . . also implants correct commanding in the part of the soul that reasons” (247). Simpson thus adopts a perspective on the phrase diametrically opposed to that of Di Basilio (for which see the following paragraph).

52 In addition to translating ἀγωγή as “guide” (4), Di Basilio arrives at this conclusion by translating κινεῖσθαι as “being repeatedly moved” (5) and ἐνεργητικὸς as “being active” (6). Thus “action is only the output of the process of habituation, and not the triggering factor” (4).

53 I discuss the possibility of “self-habituation” in the context of my consideration of the influence of one’s own reason on character. See Chapter 4.

54 Di Basilio seems to draw this conclusion on two grounds. First, *EE* II.8, 1224b31-35 tells us that human reasoning capacities develop only at a certain age (9), and second, that capacities in the *EE* are in fact acquired and not innate (5). He seems to generalize this second conclusion as follows: Plausibly, some traits of character are capacities. Less plausibly, all traits of character are acquired. Therefore, some capacities are acquired, and (generalizing) all capacities are acquired (5). See further discussion on these points in §V.

55 To establish this conclusion, Di Basilio (2017: 10 and 10n17) brings up the a distinction drawn by Annas, between “mere nature” and “nature (proper)” (1993: 142-150, esp. 147n440), which I

determines that the individual's λόγος is the “non-innate” (μὴ ἔμφυτος) guide.<sup>56</sup> The non-rational part of the soul is passive, and the rational part of the soul is active: “one's individual logos instructs the non-rational part of the soul until it imprints on it certain character traits” (3). Now as will be clear from my footnotes, I do not think Di Basilio's conclusion warranted.<sup>57</sup> But it at least gets past the majority interpretation of the phrase ἀγωγή μὴ ἔμφυτος. Most interpreters follow Simpson in reading T5 to imply active guidance,<sup>58</sup> but this interpretation seems to owe more to the influence of the account in the *NE* than it does to the actual content in T5.

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discuss at greater length below (page 53). I think Di Basilio's insistence that capacities are acquired makes him suggest that reason is natural in a *third* sense, other than Annas's two: that which is “natural past a certain age” (11, citing *EE* II.8, 1224b31-35).

However, if capacities in the *EE*, as in the *NE*, cannot be acquired (as I argue in §V), then both desire and reason will be “merely natural” and we need not object to Annas's claim that “in the books which differ [between the *EE* and the *NE*] the *Eudemian* version does not introduce any important differences” (1993: 142n415).

Even if capacities can be acquired, though, we might well say that it is “merely natural” for human beings to acquire reasoning capacities, thus accepting both Annas's distinction and Di Basilio's capacity-acquisition view. Even on this tack, though, reason will not qualify as something “non-innate” (thus Di Basilio 2017: 13n21, against Kenny 1979: 40).

56 Though Di Basilio cites Dirlmeier (1969: 241) and Woods (108) for support on this point, these two interpreters produce significantly less committal translations of the terms upon which Di Basilio relies to argue for his own interpretation (2017: 13n20).

Later in Di Basilio's paper, he writes that as opposed to the picture in the *NE*, in the *EE*, “the agent of such self-habituation [sic] need not be external” (14; my emphasis). This is a much weaker claim. Also problematic on Di Basilio's view: why would reason, once developed, ever start to form a virtuous character? What would get it started in a positive direction? And it would be remarkable if in the *EE*, character formation does not begin until maturity (thus Di Basilio 2017: 21-22).

57 Previous to Di Basilio, Donini wrote against such a conclusion. Donini: “se la ‘guida’ dell'ethismos non è ‘innata,’ non può trattarsi del logos stesso dell'educando, ma evidentemente di quello di un'istanza esterna che presiede a un processo di assuefazione” (2014: 31n16). Cp. Dirlmeier: “das was nicht durch naturgegebene ἀγωγή bewegt wird, wird πῶς, d. h. von außen bewegt” (240).

58 Thus Dirlmeier: “die Mahnungen der Erzieher” (240) and other commentators back to Rassow (1858), all cited in Di Basilio (6n9).

I propose instead that we be content with T5's very general comments on habit: "that [which becomes habituated] becomes habituated by a non-innate *pattern of behavior* by moving [or being moved] many times in a certain way, eventually in this way [becoming] the thing able to be active [or able to activate]." This comment seems to address habit from a maximally general point of view. However it comes about, an ἀγωγή ("pattern of behavior") can lead to a habit. The pattern, or whatever mechanism that brings it about, must merely be μὴ ἔμφυτος ("non-innate"). For if the mechanism or pattern were innate to begin with, then habituation would bring about nothing new in the agent.

A second problematic interpretation misses the ambiguity of the contrast with the stone in P3: while human beings are certainly unlike stones in the relevant respect (they have a soul), so are non-human animals and perhaps even plants. P3 therefore makes another very general comment on habit, a comment that does not remark specifically on the human case<sup>59</sup> and it does not require (human) rationality.<sup>60</sup>

Di Basilio summarizes P3 correctly but then contrasts inanimate things with human beings: "inanimate things are not capable of acquiring other impulses"; therefore "[h]abituation results in the non-rational soul's capacity to initiate activity in accordance with the dictates of one's non-innate guide." (5) As evidence, he cites *EE* II.7-9 on force in *human* voluntary behavior (7: βία, as at 1220b5 in the passage under consideration). Similarly,

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59 Ferreira seems to draw a similarly general conclusion: "If the argument runs as I claim [with the ἐπεὶ δέ . . . δέ . . . καὶ construction], its premisses guarantee only the first element of the definiens, [viz., that] character must belong to a soul" (2017: 129).

60 Here and elsewhere, we should not identify the particularly human rational capacity with the ability to "think" logically, philosophically, or practically, and we should not concern ourselves with the modern distinction between excogitation, or conscious thought, and the subconscious. Aristotle seems to approach the idea of rationality from a third-person and not from a first-person perspective. For example, the virtuous person's προαιρέσεις (choices) are essentially rational not because she experiences a reasoning process relative to them, but because they exhibit rational features (means-end reasoning, logical structure, etc.) that are ultimately attributable to her.

though Simpson correctly remarks that non-human animals (and perhaps plants) can develop habits,<sup>61</sup> his commentary then immediately turns to the human case (247). This is no doubt understandable, since as Aristotle says, we are concerned with human virtue (II.1, 1219b27-28). In this case (of P3's comments about the stone), we are not at risk so much of overinterpretation as underinterpretation. Aristotle seems to use P3 to give us more information than commentators commonly assume. Habit can indeed happen in the case of human beings, but it is a phenomenon applicable to anything that has a soul.<sup>62</sup>

A third objectionable interpretation of T5 gives λόγος an explicit role in habit in the *EE*. On such an important issue, we might hope for more information from Aristotle. But T5 is all we have on habit, as previously remarked, and the paucity of evidence for a connection between λόγος and habit in T5 speaks against the common insistence that they are connected. Conclusions in these direction often rely in part on one of the two problematic interpretations of other parts of T5 just discussed. For example, Woods uses his translation of ἀγωγή (“guidance,” “training”) to conclude that habit involves the influence of rationality.<sup>63</sup> Woods's conclusion also relies on the contrast he assumes Aristotle is making in P3, namely between inanimate things and human beings.

A particularly problematic source of such interpretations of the role of λόγος in habit is the phrase κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον (“in accordance with commanding reason”) in the conclusion to T5. This is the first of two occurrences of λόγος in the conclusion, the second

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61 He puts the point more actively – “can be trained” – but we have already discussed this problem.

62 The generality of P3 may explain a bit of odd construction in C. C specifies the locus of character first as “of the soul” and only then as “but of the part able to follow.”

63 “[T]he fact that the human soul is susceptible of this sort of training indicates that the non-rational element that is subjected to it is capable of being influenced by rational means, unlike wholly non-rational things, such as inanimate objects, which are not susceptible of habituation.” (99)

being δυναμένου . . . ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. As I also explain in Appendix B, this second expression specifies character as a quality of the part of the soul that “is able to follow reason.” Κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον then tells us how that following happens. Many translators, however, would have κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον modify ποιότης, or the subject of δυναμένου, or even the soul itself. Any of these three alternative interpretations of κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον might lead us to think that character is always in accordance with reason, but I argue that this cannot be the case.<sup>64</sup>

Instead, I propose that we leave λόγος where we find it in T5, only in these two expressions in the conclusion of the sentence, both of which remind us of what the non-rational part of the soul is *capable* of doing.

A fourth and final common problem with interpretations of T5 focuses on the word ἐνεργητικός in P3. Commentators tend to link it directly to character in P1 or C, or directly to the mentions of λόγος in C. A somewhat extended discussion of this fourth overinterpretation shows that these inferences are not warranted.

The expression τὸ ἐνεργητικόν occurs in Aristotle only in T5 and at *Physics* III.3, 202a13-21 (= *M* K.9, 1066a26-34),<sup>65</sup> where what can move is “capable of acting” on the movable (ἔστιν ἐνεργητικὸν τοῦ κινητοῦ).<sup>66</sup> As the word occurs only *once* elsewhere in

64 See my very long footnote in Appendix B, page 175. Chamberlain discusses the view, and Di Basilio argues in favor of it. Elsewhere, Vasiliou correctly objects to Moss’s claim that the process of habituation is wholly non-intellectual (2014: V), since *if* habituation is to yield *virtue*, habituation must be a rational process (2014: 370n7). I return to this point in the next section.

65 2017: 128: “Aëtius V 20.3 [DK 59 A 101] reports the use of ἐνεργητικός as an adjective qualifying λόγος in Anaxagoras; the text, however, is corrupt, and the phrasing may be due to a later source.”

66 Aristotle tells us that a motion is a single actualization both of the potential of the mover to move and of the moved to be moved. Something is a potential mover (κινητικόν) by being able to move (τῷ δύνασθαι) but an actual mover by actually (τῷ ἐνεργεῖν) [moving]. “But it is on the movable that [the mover] is capable of acting,” so that the two activities are one and the same (ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἐνεργητικὸν τοῦ κινητοῦ, ὥστε ὁμοίως μία ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια; trans. Hardie and Gaye 1984: 38).

Aristotle, and that in a somewhat distant context, I think we ought to take a conservative approach to its interpretation. I therefore translate it ambiguously as “the thing able to be active [or able to activate].” This translation generally agrees with other translations of ἐνεργητικός, which follow the meaning in the *Physics* and render the word as either “able to be active”<sup>67</sup> or more specifically “able to activate [sc. movement in oneself or perhaps another].”<sup>68</sup> We should not, once again, read into τὸ ἐνεργητικόν a specific connection with rationality or with character, since its context appears to be quite general. And yet Dirlmeier and Buddensiek both do so with reference to the structure and content of T5.<sup>69</sup>

Dirlmeier reads ἦθος as the subject of the last phrase of P3 (οὕτως ἦδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν). Thus character *becomes* τὸ ἐνεργητικόν, and Dirlmeier can translate as follows: “der Charakter . . . ist . . . auf diese Weise letzten Endes das aktivierende Element” (22).

After comments on the text of T5,<sup>70</sup> Dirlmeier argues that P3 concerns character in general:

Sodann liegt der Schlüssel zum Verständnis [von T5] in οὕτως ἦδη, einer typisch aristotelischen (Bonitz-Index 314a10-17) Ausdrucksweise. . . . Sie besagt, daß im Vorhergehenden Aussagen über das Ethos gemacht sind, die nunmehr zu einem Ergebnis führen . . . [Aristoteles] überträgt . . . seine Grundanschauung von der Tugend des Ethos ([II.1, 12]20a29-31) direkt auf das Ethos - das Ethos (die Tugend) entsteht und

67 So Rowe, in a suggested translation (“that is how [we] already [get] the [whatever it may be that is] capable of acting [in accordance with the acquired ἦθος]”), Buddensiek (2019, translating “able to be active,” noting that the *EE* uses ἐνεργεῖν to mean “to be active”), and the more conservative of Di Basilio’s two translations (“being . . . active” 2017: 6).

68 For example, Ferreira (“that which is habituated . . . is initially subjected to guidance by another, but eventually comes to be able to activate movement by itself,” 127) and Simpson (through “external guidance,” habituees “become activating principles of different behaviors,” 247); in his discussion of the word, Di Basilio follows Woods’s suggested translation: “capable of initiating activity” (189).

69 Simpson also articulates a position like this: “A moral character . . . is an activating principle so generated in the soul . . . what receives the commands is a something able to follow reason” (247).

70 For which see my comments on Dirlmeier’s approach to the syntax of the passage in Appendix B

dann wird es (die Tugend) in der befestigten Richtung aktiv.<sup>71</sup>  
(240)

Unfortunately, Bonitz's citations for this strictly logical sense of οὕτως ἤδη are unconvincing;<sup>72</sup> we should prefer a less syntactically significant translation of the phrase.<sup>73</sup> Without the structure it relies on, Dirlmeier's interpretation falls apart.

Buddensiek, on the other hand, attempts to substantiate his interpretation with textual support from the *EE*. Buddensiek cites the ἐνεργητικόν as that in virtue of which the habituee can follow the λόγος.<sup>74</sup> He then asks the question “[i]nwiefern würde dieses

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71 On Dirlmeier's connection of II.1, 1220a29-31 with T5, see my Chapter 2 discussion of the former passage. Kenny also remarks on the pivotal II.1, 1220a29-31 (1978: 180).

72 Here is Bonitz: “a tempore transfertur ἤδη ad causarum vel ratiocinandi series et consequentiam” (“from time, [the meaning of] ἤδη is transferred to the order and logical consequence of causes or inference”). Bonitz cites two passages in support of this meaning (and others “conferatur”):

*M* Δ.21.1022b19: ἕνα δὲ αἱ τούτων ἐνεργεῖαι καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἤδη: “We call an affection . . . in another sense, *the functionings of* [modifiable qualities like pale and sweet], *i.e. the actual modifications . . .*” (text Ross, trans. Kirwan)

*NE* VI.9, 1142b14: καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη: “Nor is good deliberation any kind of belief. . . . But excellence in deliberation does involve reason. What remains, then, is that it is correctness in thought, since this is not yet assertion. *For belief is not inquiry, but already a kind of assertion*, while the person who deliberates . . .” (text Bywater, trans. Crisp).

73 Ferreira suggests that οὕτως ἤδη may be equivalent to Latin *tum demum* (“then indeed,” “eventually,” “only then”), citing Estienne (1572 *s.v.* ἤδη). Ferreira provides Estienne's citations on the matter (127-128). Ferreira additionally supplies Aristotelian and Platonic parallels, the former being *MM* II.12, 1212a23-24 and *Top.* V.3, 132a11-13 (128).

74 Buddensiek also provides philosophical support for this argument, as follows. He seems to divide possible cases of habituation into only self-habituation and habituation through a teacher. He rejects the first and tells us that the second must require the ability on the part of the learner to follow the λόγος. He identifies the ἐνεργητικόν as the only factor in virtue of which this following could be possible: “Wenn wir nicht annehmen wollen, dass sich der Charakter primär aus eigener Kraft - durch Wiederholung - bildet, . . . muss [es ein Bildendes] von solcher Art [geben], dass es zur Formung des Charakters auf solche Weise beiträgt, dass der geformte Charakter auf den λόγος hören kann. Da das ἐνεργητικόν der einzige aktive Faktor ist, der genannt wird, liegt es nahe anzunehmen, dass durch diesen Faktor Charakter mit Blick auf seinen Bezug zum λόγος zu dem gemacht wird, was er ist - das heißt, es liegt nahe anzunehmen, dass das ἐνεργητικόν seinerseits rational in jeder hier relevanten Hinsicht ist” (2019).

Verständnis von “*energêtikon*” in [II.2.] 1220b5-7 aufgenommen?” He responds that (1) we can find his interpretation of *ἐνεργητικόν* in the double reference to *λόγος* in II.2, 1220b5-6, and concludes that (2) his view has the advantage of making that double reference clear:

[E]s gibt den zeitlichen Bereich, auf den die Rede von “*kata epitaktikon logon*” (1220b5f) verweist. Dies ist der zeitliche Bereich der Formung - im Unterschied zum je aktuellen Fall des Gehorsams gegenüber dem *logos*. Das *energêtikon* - wenn es eine Form von *logos* ist - wäre mit dem anordnenden *logos* in Verbindung zu bringen, der den Charakter - durch seine oft wiederholten Handlungs- oder Bewegungsanweisungen – formt. (2019)

Earlier in this section I explained how both references to *λόγος* in the conclusion to T5 describe the non-rational part of the soul, with no particular reference to the other premises of T5 (see page 47). If my explanation is plausible, (2) will not follow, and if my explanation is correct, neither will (1) have any support in the text of the *EE*.

There are no grounds for seeing an explicit connection to character or to *λόγος* in Aristotle’s use of the expression *τὸ ἐνεργητικόν*. As in the case of other very general expressions in T5, this leaves open the possibility that this expression could apply to non-human souls. Just because the souls of non-human animals do not have a rational part gives us no reason to suspect that the adoption of habits would not result in them being *ἐνεργητικαί*. I only find attention to this point, and that oblique, in Buddensiek. Buddensiek writes that while nonliving things cannot be habituated, “bestimmter (nicht aller) lebender Wesen” can acquire a certain permanent dispositions to act in certain ways. He later clarifies that “Nicht jeder beliebige Teil, nicht jede beliebige hylomorphistische Struktur kann auf diese Weise geformt werden: das *threptikon* mit seinen verschiedenen Ausprägungen kann es klarerweise nicht” and that Aristotle is content to observe that in many cases such formation is not possible, without specifying that in virtue of which it is or is not (2019). We do not

have other evidence to fall back on regarding τὸ ἐνεργητικόν. But this point about non-human cases, like the other comments I have made in this vein, should serve mostly to remind us that in the *EE* Aristotle presents an account of habit that is general enough to allow for such examples, and that he does not elucidate a complex theory of habituation, no matter how much commentators would prefer that he had.<sup>75</sup>

We have just seen four attempts to make T5 say more than it does. T5 does not (1) mention a “habituator,” nor does it (2) tell us what is active and what is passive in habit. It does not (3) specify a role for λόγος in habit, and there are no grounds for assuming that (4) τὸ ἐνεργητικόν refers to character or has a connection to λόγος.

So what *is* Aristotle doing in the passage? First, in T5 Aristotle presents an original, very general, account of habit as a phenomenon found in non-rational souls. P2, supported by P3, tells us about this process of becoming habituated. And second, despite its unilluminating expressions regarding λόγος, C does offer us one key new piece of information: that character is a *quality* (ποιότης). The next section explains these positive features of the sentence about habit, T5.

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75 One final interpretation of the word comes from Ferreira, using a range of Aristotle’s treatises:

If τὸ ἐνεργητικόν is the same as τὸ κινητικόν (in the *Phys.* passage), and τὸ κινητικόν is the same as τὸ ποιητικόν (cf. *De Anima* (DA) III.2, 426a4–6), then one may turn to *Movement of Animals* (MA) 8, 702a10–21 and see each item in the chain in 702a17–19 as capable of activating the item placed right below it—according to which proposal, desire (and therefore character, since character is a quality of the desiring part of the soul) turns out to be capable of activating passion, which aligns well with what Aristotle says in the remainder of our chapter (*EE* II.2, 1220b7–20). Aristotle would thus have in mind the distinction between character (or rather dispositions of character) and passions, not the division of the soul into rational and non-rational parts, when speaking of that which, after a process of habituation, is made capable of activating movement in another. (128–129)

This seems farfetched. As I continue to argue, we should not read more into T5 than is there.

## VI Habit in the non-rational soul; character as a quality (ποιότης)

Aristotle's eliminative consideration of the origin question (Section III of this chapter) suggests that virtue of character comes from practice (ἄσκησις), and more specifically from habit (ἥθος). Aristotle's explicit comments on habit then consider the phenomenon quite broadly, even apart from a connection to character or (human) λόγος. We have already discussed the generality of several aspects of Aristotle's account on habit in P2 and P3, through the rejection of four overly specific readings of the passage in the previous section. I now consider this account of habit in P2 and P3 in its own right.

First, notice that in P1, habit defines the development of character and not the other way around. Aristotle does not, for example, define habit as the mechanism through which character develops. This order of definition makes sense in light of the generality of Aristotle's other comments on habit in T5. As I have argued, Aristotle's contrast case of a stone in P3 and the ambiguity of his vocabulary in P2 leave open the possibility that non-human animals and perhaps even plants might be subjects of habit. Additionally, the generality of Aristotle's comments on habit leave open the possibility that habit can result in inclinations that do not qualify as traits of character. On this point, Aristotle seems to give us two examples at II.10, 1227b10-11, where he observes that we do not say that someone has a "certain sort of character" (ποῖός τις τὸ ἥθος) if they are inclined to sweet or bitter tastes.<sup>76</sup>

Aristotle's very general account of habit also suggests that the process is non-rational in the sense that it need not involve rational capacities on the part of the habituee. To see this, think of the example of exercise and diet that Aristotle points to at the end of *EE* II.1.

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<sup>76</sup> The *NE* contains neither the specification that certain inclinations are not traits of character nor the expression ποῖός τις τὸ ἥθος (Dirlmeier 301; the *MM* has an identical passage). The *EE* requires it, having defined intermediates quite generally in terms of pleasures and pains (Woods 151).

Human beings do not follow exercise or diet regimens from birth; however, later in life the patterns of behavior that constitute such regimens can become habits. As I have remarked, Aristotle clearly aims to apply his idea of habit to human beings. But the account in T5 allows for non-human cases as well. A dog or a cat, for example, will get in the habit of taking its food in a certain way or going about a house with a certain facility if for whatever reason these behaviors occur consistently over a sufficient period of time. When we see a cat jump up to get a treat or a dog climb a flight of stairs with ease, we are observing habits formed without even the potential for rational uptake of their contents. Aristotle's *EE* account of habit is open to these sorts of examples because it is not specifically tied to the development of human virtue (which would require rationality) and because it emphasizes that the key feature of a habituee is a soul.<sup>77</sup>

I have just suggested that the *EE* account of habit does not require rational uptake on the part of the habituee. We might expect instead that a habit will at least involve rational guidance. But the only two references to λόγος (both in T5's conclusion) describe a part of the soul of which *character* is a quality; they need have nothing to do with habit itself. The

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<sup>77</sup> It is of course *natural* – both for human beings and for other animals – to be able to be habituated to do certain things and not others. The resultant habits are not themselves natural, though, in the sense that we do not act out of habit from birth. In both the human and the non-human animal examples, the nature of the agent eventually gains the ability to move of its own accord in the way in which it has been habituated. Here I use “nature” only in the sense Annas calls “mere nature”:

Annas contrasts “mere nature,” which “can be developed either for the better or the worse,” with “nature (proper),” which is “a guide to our ethical aims. A human being “has from [mere] nature an ability and suitability receptive of [virtue]” (1993: 143, 147, 149). On “nature (proper),” Annas highlights *Politics (Pol.)* I.2, 1252b32-33 (“Nature is an end (*telos*), since what we say the nature of each thing is, is what it is when its coming-into-being is completed,” trans. Annas) and points to *NE* V.7, 1134b18-1135a5 and VII.12, 1153a12-15..

See also Irwin's *NE* glossary (*s.v.* “nature,” sense 3, 2019: 387) and Kraut (2007: 207). McDowell discusses the more general idea that “the natural world is in the space of *logos*” (2002: 180; see 180-188 and esp. 184n33).

examples above may well be brought about by rational guidance, as when an indulgent cat-lover holds a treat progressively higher, but they may also develop without a plan: the dog that climbs the stairs does not need to be taught how. It is even possible that the nutritive soul of a plant could develop a habit for growing in certain ways: trees adapt to the availability of light and water in their environment as they grow. Whether or not we think Aristotle would have agreed with this example, we can at least say that the process of habit does not involve some habituator, and it requires only non-rational capacities on the part of the habituee.<sup>78</sup>

Stepping aside from a focus on the rational capacities of human beings, we should take note that Aristotle's account of habit *does* require structure of a different sort. Habits come about through a pattern of behavior (*ἀγωγή*), by moving many times in a certain way (*πῶς*). Sometimes, of course, this behavior *will* be driven by rational capacities (as in the feline example), and in the cases with which we are particularly concerned in both *Ethics* the rational capacities of the habituee will play a crucial role in habit's development (i.e., in virtue). But even in the fully general case, repeated motion in a particular way will leave structure in the soul.

Moss draws a similar conclusion in her analysis of habituation in Aristotle (2011).<sup>79</sup>

While habituation is non-rational, she says, the non-rational part of the soul is "cognitive."<sup>80</sup>

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78 I focus on rational and non-rational capacities to avoid overly emphasizing "parts" of the soul. Aristotle recommends focusing on what *δυνάμεις* ("capacities") the soul has in general, without trying to assign each of these capacities to one or another part of the soul.

79 Moss intends her point to capture Aristotle's view, though she does not make distinctions between the two *Ethics*. If I am correct, there *are* important differences between the *EE* and the *NE* on the role of rationality in virtue. In the dissertation, I explain the *EE*'s perspective. The contrast with the *NE* will be clear, though I comment on it explicitly at various points.

80 As explained in Moss's Chapter 7 and 8. Moss cites Achtenberg (2002) as a forerunner to her view.

Moss's conclusion that the non-rational human soul is "cognitive" agrees with my claim that Aristotle's *EE* account of habit leaves a structure in the soul, though Moss's analysis is understandably restricted to human beings. Other commentators, however, seem to look past this point in their focus on the human case. For example, in a review of Moss, Vasiliou objects to her thesis that habituation is an entirely non-rational process but that "for the habituation to yield virtue, it must be proper habituation, and so 'supervised'" (Moss 2011: 202). Vasiliou writes: "But what is [habituation] supervised by if not reason (one's own or another's)? And if the virtuous capacity for evaluative phantasia is shaped by proper upbringing so that illusory evaluative phantasiai are eliminated, surely there is a clear sense in which such a habituation is a rational process" (2014: 370n7). Vasiliou's objection holds in the case of virtue, but habit applies far beyond that. Somewhat similarly, Buddensiek is right to say that "[der Charakter] als Speicher von (rationalen) Anordnungen zu verstehen ist" (2019), but his focus on character and *rational* order obscures Aristotle's more basic point that a soul, quite generally, is susceptible of being ordered in certain ways.<sup>81</sup>

The "structure" that I have said habit must leave in the soul will take on important meaning in the case of human character and especially of virtue (Chapter 2). But even in the much more general context of T5 we can see this structure playing a role, in the one feature of the passage yet to be discussed: the definition of character as a quality (*ποιότης*) of the non-rational part of the soul.<sup>82</sup> Now from a *Nicomachean* perspective we might have expected

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81 Buddensiek continues: ". . . welcher Speicher in späteren vergleichbaren Situationen abgerufen werden kann . . . in die Formung des Charakters rationale Erkenntnisse eingegangen sind. Diese Erkenntnisse reflektieren ihrerseits - vermutlich - Erkenntnisse über Zielsetzungen, Handlungszusammenhänge, Zusammenhänge von Zielen und ihren Mitteln . . . der so geformte Bereich den Gehalt dieses Einflusses bewahrt" (2019).

82 As I argue in Appendix B, character is a quality specifically of the understood subject of *δυναμένου*; that is, of the non-rational part of the soul and not generally of the soul itself.

habit to involve a teacher and a learner, both of whom are engaged rationally in the process. In this case we could understand the structural changes to the habituee's soul perhaps more easily, since in being trained to think or act in a certain way, she eventually comes, rationally, to adopt such patterns of behavior as her own. Such an explanation is not available to us because of the *EE*'s all-purpose account of habit; however the very generality of Aristotle's *Eudemian* perspective leads to his definition of character as a ποιότης.

As I have argued above, T5's conclusion consists mostly of a description of the non-rational part of the soul. What remains of the conclusion defines character as a ποιότης. Nowhere in the *NE* do we find either part of this definition: Aristotle does not define character (ἦθος) apart from virtue of character (ἠθικὴ ἀρετή),<sup>83</sup> and there is no mention of ποιότητες in any context.<sup>84</sup> Even in the *EE* Aristotle mentions ποιότης only in the immediate context of T5 (II.2, 1220b5-20).<sup>85</sup> While I discuss the idea of character as a ποιότης to a greater extent in Chapter 2, here I want to suggest that Aristotle defines character as a ποιότης because habit develops semi-permanent psychic structure, changing *how* the soul is.

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83 In the passage parallel to the *EE*'s connection of ἦθος to ἔθος (*NE* II.1, 1103a14-23), Aristotle ties ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, not ἦθος, to ἔθος. The *NE* often remarks non-definitionaly on ἦθος.

84 Except one: ποιότης figures briefly in the discussion of pleasure and the good at *NE* X.3, 1173a13 and a15,

Stewart argues to the contrary that the *NE* does bring up qualities, and in a context that shall concern us very shortly. He asserts that the three things in the soul at *NE* II.5, 1105b19-21 (and also in the present context) are all ποιότητες (1892: 187-189), because *Cat.* VIII, 8b25ff. likewise divides ποιότης into ἔξις, δύναμις, and πάθος. The only Nicomachean evidence he cites, though, is I.9, 1099b31, which tells us that political science aims at producing citizens of a certain kind (τοῦ ποιούσ τινος). Even if it is not too much of a stretch to think of ποιότητες in a *Nicomachean* context, Aristotle certainly does not there discuss ethical ποιότητες, as he does in the *EE*. And the connection between the three things in the soul and a ποιότης is tenuous at best.

85 With ποιότης at II.2, 1220b15 as well as b5, though only in these two places in the *EE*; Aristotle also asks at *EE* I.4, 1215a22-25 whether happiness is having a certain kind (ποιόν τινος) of soul or whether one's actions must also be of a certain kind.

Though the ethical works provide no support for this claim (or any other) concerning ποιότητες, Aristotle's discussion of qualities in *Categories* 8 suggests it. *Categories* 8 first gives a minimal definition of qualities: “[those things] in virtue of which things are said to be qualified somehow.”<sup>86</sup> But ποιότης is πλεοναχῶς λεγομένη (“said in many ways”), and Aristotle lists four:

(1) ἔξεις (states: e.g. the branches of knowledge or the virtues) and διαθέσεις (conditions: e.g. “hotness and chill and sickness and health”) are qualities;

(2) δυνάμεις φυσικαί ἢ ἀδυναμίαι (natural capacities or incapacities: those things in virtue of which we call people “boxers or runners or healthy or sickly”) are qualities;

(3) there are παθητικαὶ ποιότητες (affective qualities), on the one hand

(3a) “sweetness, bitterness, . . . paleness, darkness,” which are “productive of . . . affection[s] of the senses,” and on the other

(3b) ἡ μανικὴ and ἡ ὀργή (“madness” and “irascibility”), which are “present right from birth as a result of certain affections”; and finally,

(4) “shape and external form of each thing” are qualities.

Aristotle specifies these senses further by discussing their permanence or impermanence.

Within (1), ἔξεις are more stable and longer lasting than διαθέσεις. Similarly, a given example of paleness or irascibility is just a πάθος (an affection) if temporary circumstances bring it on (as when one is pale through fear or “bad-tempered in distress”). But Aristotle enumerates two parallel sets of examples of paleness or irascibility as a quality: first, a pale complexion or irascibility “present right from birth”; and second, paleness “from long illness,

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86 8b25: Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ’ ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται. Translations from the *Categories* are Ackrill’s (1984); the text is from Minio-Paoluello (1949).

[which does] not easily give way”) or irascibility similar to that present from birth but which results from “any aberrations that are not natural (*μὴ φυσικαί*) but result from some other circumstances, and are hard to get rid of or even completely unchangeable.” The passage implies that these final two examples (the non-natural but at least semi-permanent qualities) are examples of “affective qualities.” Thus the distinction between affective qualities and affections appears to be that the first are longer-lasting, even if they are not permanent. On the other hand, Aristotle refers to conditions (in sense (1)) as “easily changed and quickly changing.” Relative permanence does not characterize all types of qualities, then, but it does distinguish capacities from states, and affective qualities from affections.<sup>87</sup>

If we can bring the *Categories* distinctions to bear on the *EE* claim that character is a quality, we might naturally think that character is a quality in sense (1), and further as a state and not a condition. After all, Aristotle gives “the virtues” as examples of states. But this identification happens well after T5. Instead of looking to classify character using the senses of *ποιότης* in the *Categories*, we should notice the importance of permanence to most of the ways *ποιότης* is used. We will have duration in mind anyway, from T5’s description of the process of habit. And so it seems reasonable to think of character as a quality, in the context of T5, because when someone has a character, their soul – or the way their soul is, its structure – has undergone a semi-permanent change. This description could perhaps match any of (1), (2), or (3), though not the conditions of (1).

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87 Woods also mentions this passage. He summarizes it by saying that only *ἔξεις*, *διαθέσεις*, and *δυνάμεις* (but apparently not *παθητικαὶ ποιότητες*) “would naturally be ascribed in answering the question what someone is like, hence they are required by Aristotle to be relatively long-lasting, unlike affections” (99-100). The passage seems to suggest partly to the contrary that the *παθητικαὶ ποιότητες* are longer lasting than *διαθέσεις*, at least in some cases (compare irascibility “present right from birth” to sickness that is “easily changed and quickly changing”), and that we might well describe “what someone is like” by using any of Aristotle’s senses of quality, except perhaps (4).

On the definition of character as a ποιότης, T5 is not more explicit than it is in so many other respects. But the idea that habit brings about structure in the soul does make some sense of the idea of character as a ποιότης, and also perhaps of the phrase τὸ ἐνεργητικόν. As discussed above, we do not have enough evidence to rely on a specific interpretation of “ἐνεργητικός” and to draw conclusions from that interpretation.<sup>88</sup> However, whatever the word may mean, it is fairly clear that it designates a new capability<sup>89</sup> of the soul, a capability that results from habit. Further, this new capability seems to have something to do with the psychic structure instilled by habit. Perhaps the structure resulting from habit *just is* what Aristotle calls τὸ ἐνεργητικόν. Or perhaps souls, once ordered by “patterns of behavior,” are such as to develop an ἐνεργητικόν, which gives them the ability to function in a corresponding way. Or again, perhaps τὸ ἐνεργητικόν is a capacity like any other in the soul and habit can bring about structure in the soul in virtue of it.<sup>90</sup> We do not know. A minimal interpretation would suggest that Aristotle defines character as a ποιότης (C) because character comes from habit (P1) and habit in turn changes the quality of a soul in a semi-permanent way (P2-P3).

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88 Thus I think we can at least begin to understand character as a ποιότης without too close a reading of P2, *contra* Woods: “The crucial point is the interpretation of ἐνεργητικόν and the preceding οὕτω ἤδη, as the main ground for holding ἦθος to be a ποιότης must occur in that part of the sentence” (189).

89 By writing “capability” I hope to avoid an explicit link with Aristotle’s δυνάμεις, which I translate “capacities.” I discuss the relationship of δυνάμεις to character – but not explicitly to habit – in Chapter 2.

90 A suggestion of Buddensiek’s seems to head in this direction. Recall that Buddensiek explains the ἐνεργητικόν as “that in virtue of which the habituee can follow the λόγος” (see my page 49). He cites as a benefit of this explanation that “das *energētikon* nicht selbst der Charakter, d.h. eine Beschaffenheit ist, sonder vielmehr eben etwas, das für das Zustandekommen des Charakters (der Beschaffenheit) zuständig ist. Ein Vorteil ist dies, weil Beschaffenheiten nicht selbst aktivitätsfähig oder aktivierungsfähig sind, sondern weil sie Modifikationen entsprechender Strukturen sind“ (2019). The other alternatives I list in the text also avoid identifying τὸ ἦθος with τὸ ἐνεργητικόν.

Now if I am correct about what Aristotle says in P1, P2, and P3 of the sentence on habit, we should be rather disappointed in him. After all, the sentence began boldly with ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος; we might well expect a detailed account of character. Further, since Aristotle focused our attention on human virtue before arriving at T5, we might expect Aristotle's comments on character to head in that direction (as they do in the *NE*). But after tying character to habit in P1, Aristotle gives us an all-purpose sketch of habit in P2, confirmed as fully general by his contrast case in P3. P1-P3 tell us about habit, and the conclusion tells us that character is a quality (ποιότης), but we still do not know much about (human) character, and we have learned next to nothing about virtue.<sup>91</sup> More pertinently for the topic of this dissertation, Aristotle seems to have failed to tell us how character comes about. Where, in a word, does Aristotle tell us how to become good? In the next chapter, I tackle this question.

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91 Meyer suggests that the application to virtue is understood: “Curiously enough Aristotle here in the *EE* [II.2.] 1220a39-b5 fails to state that character virtue arises from habituation—a point he makes in the *EN* version of these remarks ([*NE* II.1.] 1103a17-23). Perhaps he thinks it goes without saying; his earlier remarks [at *EE* II.1.] 1220a11-12 presuppose but don't state that character virtue is a ποιότης in respect of (adv. acc.) one's ἦθος” (2017: 26 and 26n45). That habituation should lead to virtue hardly seems like a proposition Aristotle would leave as an exercise, though. On this point, see my comments on *EE* VII.2 in the Interlude following Chapter 2.

## 2 Pleasure and Pain in the Formation of Character

We have just seen Aristotle's direct account of habituation in the *EE*. This account falls short of its *NE* analogue in several respects:<sup>1</sup>

- (1) As we have seen, the *EE* provides far less detail than we find in the *NE*. The *EE*'s picture is so general that we can imagine it applying to non-human animals as well as to human beings.
- (2) The *EE* lacks the analogy between virtue<sup>2</sup> and skill found in the *NE*.
- (3) In the *NE*, pleasure proper to virtuous activity aids in developing character. There is no parallel to this passage in the *EE*.<sup>3</sup>
- (4) The *EE* also lacks an account of how it can be that repeated virtuous actions make one virtuous. The *NE* tackles this puzzle directly.

Aristotle clearly wants and needs more than such a minimal and general account.<sup>4</sup> As we have seen, Aristotle poses the origin question both frequently and forcefully in the *EE*.

Where in the *EE*, then, does he deliver?

In this chapter I show that the *EE*'s discussions of pleasure and pain contain

Aristotle's *Eudemian* understanding of how character comes about. In one respect, we should

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- 1 The *Nicomachean Ethics* contains an extended discussion of habituation (at *NE* II.1-4, 1103a14-1105b17).
  - 2 I will use "virtue" to mean "virtue of character," except of course where the term refers to the more general ἀρετή of something, as in P4 below.
  - 3 However, see §VII.
  - 4 This stark difference between the two *Ethics* is strikingly absent from Inwood and Woolf's list of six primary divergences (xvii-xxiv). They do not mention the *EE*'s lack of a proper account of habituation, the absence of the skill analogy from the work, or the fact that the *EE* does not discuss the pleasures of virtue.

not be surprised by this: pleasure and pain are central to both Ethics' understanding of how we express character traits. But whether we are reading the *EE* with the *NE* in mind or not, the account is at first somewhat obscure.

No doubt this obscurity accounts in part for the lack of substantial past work on the topic of this chapter. We have already seen that commentators do not find solutions to the origin question in the *EE*. On the more general issue of pleasure, the differences between the two treatments of pleasure in *NE* VII and X dominate discussion, since if the former belongs properly to the *EE*, then the two treatises differ in their approach to pleasure.<sup>5</sup> But as of the current writing, so far as I know we do not have an account of how character develops, according to Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* proper.

Our discussion will revolve around a key text, *EE* II.1, 1220a29-37. There, Aristotle generates an account of the development of character by making general comments about the creation and destruction of conditions (διαθέσεις) and then applying them to virtue itself. But to understand the application to virtue, we need to look to Aristotle's discussion of the underlying psychological principles and the nature of pleasure and pain, both found throughout the first half of *EE* II. Only then can we appreciate what Aristotle is doing in II.1.

I therefore proceed as follows. I begin with Aristotle's preliminary remarks about conditions in II.1 (§I). The next three sections provide the background we need to apply those remarks to virtue: I discuss Aristotle's psychological terminology and his remarks on pleasure and pain in II.1-2 and II.4-5 (§II-IV). I then return to the key text in II.1, where

<sup>5</sup> In the introduction to their translation of the *Eudemian Ethics*, Inwood and Woolf bring the difference between the treatments of pleasure in the *EE* and in the *NE* to the reader's attention. But they confine their observations to the differences between *NE* VII (which they title *EE* VI) and *NE* X instead of bringing up the much less studied (and perhaps more interesting) issue of the differences between the *EE* and the *NE* on the relationship between virtue and pleasure.

Aristotle answers the origin question (§V). We find additional evidence for his answer elsewhere in *EE* II and III (§VI), and a concluding section addresses possible roles of pleasure in the virtuous and happy life. In the main, I show how Aristotle uses pleasure and pain to develop an account of character formation and expression.

## I The argument of II.1: general cases

While investigating “those things through which [character] comes about [γίνεται διὰ τίνων]” (II.1, 1220a14-15), Aristotle lays out two principles and draws a conclusion. In this section, I discuss the two principles. After intervening discussion of psychological background, I present the conclusion, where Aristotle applies these two principles to virtue (§V).

P4: “The best condition [διάθεσις] comes about [γίγνεσθαι] through the best things [τῶν βελτίστων], and . . . the best things are done [πράττεσθαι ἄριστα] in each case in accordance with the virtue of each.”<sup>6</sup>

That is, for every kind of condition that a living thing can be in, that condition will turn out best if the things that produce it are in their best state when they do in fact produce it.<sup>7</sup>

Aristotle’s example is the best physical condition of the body, which results from the best food and training, whatever those may be.

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6 II.1, 1220a22-24: ἡ βελτίστη διάθεσις ὑπὸ τῶν βελτίστων γίγνεσθαι, καὶ πράττεσθαι ἄριστα περὶ ἕκαστον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκάστου ἀρετῆς

a22 γίνεσθαι B

7 Aristotle tells us that this principle and the one that follows are clear by induction. Using his example of physical condition (discussed later in this section), we can imagine many more examples that would work in a parallel manner. Of course, there will be *some* conditions to which this principle does not apply, notably conditions that cannot turn out “best,” e.g. sickness. I owe this final point to Robert Wardy’s commentary on this chapter.

P5: “Every condition comes to be [γίγνεσθαι] and is destroyed [φθείρεσθαι] by how the same things are applied.”<sup>8</sup>

Here we learn about destruction as well as the creation we saw in P4: the same things destroy a condition as bring it about. Applying it to the first principle, we can see that the “best things,” used improperly, would destroy the best condition. We will see shortly what exactly this means.

In these two principles, we find three distinct claims:

*In general:*

- i. From P4: The best things bring about the best condition or virtue of each thing.
- ii. From P4: The best condition or virtue of each thing brings about the best things.
- iii. From P5: If  $y$  brings about a condition  $x$ , then  $y$  applied differently destroys  $x$ .

Between P4 and P5, Aristotle discusses physical condition (and after P5, health more generally). As the example of physical conditioning shows, these two principles from *EE* II.1 hold generally for living things: the best food will bring about the best physical condition not just for a human being, but also for any animal. But his discussion gives us more than just an illustration, as I show:

*With respect to physical condition:*

- i'. The best exercises bring about the best physical condition (a virtue of the body).

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8 *EE* II.1, 1220a26-27: ἔτι πᾶσαν διάθεσιν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πῶς προσφερομένων

a26-27 γίγνεσθαι B

- ii'. The best physical condition (a virtue of the body) brings about the best exercises.
- iii'. Food, exertion, and climate<sup>9</sup> bring about health. Applied differently, they destroy it.

*Implied:*

- iv'. Exertion of a certain quality brings about physical condition of that same quality.
- v'. Physical condition of a certain quality brings about exertion of a certain quality.
- vi'. Things of a certain quality bring about conditions of that same quality.
- vii'. Conditions of a certain quality bring about things of a certain quality.

i', ii', and iii' derive directly from i, ii, and iii, applied to the example of physical condition or health. A note is in order regarding ii', for Woolf argues *ad loc* that Aristotle's point throughout P4 and P5 is not very good, because only in some cases would it even be possible for the "things" that produce a certain condition to result from it. For example, the best food or climate cannot result from good physical condition. Indeed they cannot, at least not in the sense that the best exercises can. But someone in good physical condition will choose healthy food and desire a propitious climate. I think the argument here is sound well beyond the limits Woolf assigns to it.

Now iii' leads to the four further propositions: in iii' (unlike in iii), it is clear that Aristotle intends there to be a relationship between the way in which something (*y*) is applied to create a condition (*x*) and how *y* is applied to destroy that condition. Namely: the quality of the things applied will be reflected in the quality of the condition produced. Thus while it is convenient for Aristotle to say "created" and "destroyed" to illustrate the basic point, these words create the false impression that there are only two ways to apply something: either to

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<sup>9</sup> ὥρας. Woods: "time of life." Inwood and Woolf's translation makes more sense of the term.

create or destroy the relevant condition. To the contrary: good health is created by good exercise, but exercise of a mediocre quality brings about mediocre health and poor health is (often) due to poor exercise. We could rephrase the last point by saying that poor exercise “destroys” good health, which it does indeed. But Aristotle’s point is much more general here, as I have stated it in vi’ and vii’, which follow<sup>10</sup> from the generalized examples in iv’ and v’.

The generality of vi’ and vii’ should lead us to think about virtue, since it is also a quality of the soul. And indeed Aristotle turns to virtue in the passage immediately following the text we have just been considering. But before continuing there ourselves, we need to look later in *EE* II at Aristotle’s thinking on affections (τά πάθη), capacities (αἱ δυνάμεις), and states (αἱ ἕξεις), and at his comments on pleasure and pain. My eventual contention will be that the things that lead to and that come from virtue (its κινήσεις, ἔργα, and πάθη in i’ and ii’ above) can be understood in terms of the pleasure and pain that accompany them. Thus via pleasure and pain Aristotle can account for the development of virtue, building on the example of physical condition (i’-iii’) discussed here.

## II Background: Psychological terminology

Aristotle’s move from physical conditions to virtue requires an understanding of the place of character in his technical psychological vocabulary. The passages most central to the discussion here and are in *EE* II, beginning with II.1-2, 1220a22-b20 and continuing with II.4-5, 1221b27-1222a17 and b9-14. These two passages (II.1-2 and II.4-5) are separated by the account of the mean and of the vices opposed to it. After discussing human action,

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<sup>10</sup> The argument is not watertight. Aristotle relies explicitly on induction in this passage and in many others.

voluntariness, and προαίρεσις, Aristotle summarizes the results of these discussions in another passage relevant here: II.10, 1227a38-b11, where Aristotle gives a final definition of virtue of character.<sup>11</sup>

At II.1-2, 1220b10-20 Aristotle distinguishes between affections (τά πάθη), capacities (αἱ δυνάμεις), and states (αἱ ἕξεις).<sup>12</sup> Character traits, including the virtues and vices, are psychological states: ways of being, we might say.<sup>13</sup> States correlate with both capacities and affections,<sup>14</sup> but the capacities and not the affections account for them.<sup>15</sup> That is, even when

11 The *De Anima* or indeed the *Physics* or the *Categories* might help to elucidate what Aristotle has in mind. Though I refer to these sources as possible comparisons, I prefer to use just *EE* material whenever possible.

12 Especially II.2, 1220b10-12. Cp. *NE* II.5, 1105b19-20, where Aristotle's list of these three seems to be exhaustive of the "things in the soul." (There, Aristotle argues eliminatively that αἱ ἀρεταί, probably restricted to the virtues of character, must be ἕξεις.) The first sentence of the *EE* passage (1220b10-12) locates the distinction "ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις"; Jonathan Barnes suggests deletion of the entire sentence. See Dirlmeier 1962 for a discussion. Rowe, the OCT, and Susemihl print the sentence. Simpson suggests that it refers to *Virtues and Vices* (2013b).

Whether we accept the sentence or not does not make a difference to the content of the passage or my explanation of what is going on, since Aristotle goes on to explain all three things anyway.

13 II.2, 1220b7-10; II.5, 1222b4-14; II.10, 1227b8. See comment (A) in §III for a discussion of an alternative interpretation, according to which some character traits, according to this passage, are capacities, not states. I argue against such an interpretation.

Aristotle describes character (ἦθος) as a quality (ποιότης) of the soul at least two times in II.2 (cp. ἦθος as a ποῖος at 1227b8-10). Compare the interpretation that I gave in the last chapter (matching but not necessarily drawing on *Categories* 8) to the analysis here: it should be clear that the qualities we ascribe to people (and so to their souls) refer to a complex of psychological features. So while we may say that people are good or bad, here I am answering a more specific question: in virtue of what kind of psychological feature do we say that someone has an ἦθος of whatever quality?

14 II.2, 1220b7-10. Again, see comment (A) in §2.

15 II.2, 1220b14-15: καὶ κατὰ μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι ποιός τις, ἀλλὰ πάσχει, κατὰ δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ποιότης. Earlier in the rather short II.2, Aristotle has told us that character traits are qualities (1220b5-7) of a certain part of the soul. And just before this passage, he has defined and given examples of affections (1220b12-14). The context shows us that ταῦτα are affections, and that when we read that a ποιότης is on account of (κατὰ) capacities and not affections, we should understand that this holds true specifically (at least) for character traits, which have just been described as

not experiencing the relevant affections, we retain our states of character because the capacities that underlie them are always present (though they can change over time, of course). Character traits are expressed, though, by affections of various kinds.

Take the first character trait listed in Aristotle's table at 1220b38 as an example: irascibility (ὀργιλότης). Irascibility (a state) is a feature of someone's character, that is, a character trait, if and only if he is irascible (a capacity). Because of his capacity to be affected in this way, he feels anger (an affection) more often than one should. But even when he is not feeling anger, he is still irascible, and in virtue of the fact that he has that capacity, people think he exemplifies irascibility, even when (or perhaps especially when) he is not angry. When he actually is angry, of course, he feels the relevant affection. Especially to the non-psychologist, then, affections are the indications of both states and capacities.<sup>16</sup>

### III Background: Pleasure and pain

I now turn to the place of pleasure and pain in the psychological picture of character just described. Now pleasure and pain play important roles in Aristotle's psychology in general, too, beyond their specific roles in character. But we need not explore the more general roles of pleasure and pain to understand their importance here: the *EE*'s special books contain no direct treatment of pleasure and pain, and even if the "common-book" discussion in *NE* VII belonged to the *EE*, it comes well after the current discussion both rhetorically and in terms of its supposed position in a "complete" *EE* manuscript. What is more, Aristotle discusses the importance of pleasure and pain in character in and around just

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ποιότητες.

16 Thus Aristotle says, after referring back to the II.2, 1220b10-20 discussion, that capacities and states are both about (using the genitive) affections (II.4, 1221b35-36): αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις τῶν παθημάτων.

the same passages that we have been looking at so far, and in the context of the three psychological terms we have been exploring: affections, capacities, and states. I now discuss the relationship between pleasure and each of these three terms, though it will be most illustrative to proceed in the reverse order, starting with Aristotle's comments about pleasure and pain in states of character<sup>17</sup> and proceeding to capacities and finally to affections.

States of character are concerned with (*περί*) pleasure and pain. Aristotle makes this point over and over in the *EE*, contrasting sharply with the *NE*. Given the context, he focuses mostly on virtue and vice, and not on other states of character, though the point seems to have broad application. To give an idea of how he uses the phrase, here is a simple list of the occurrences in *EE* II, where the topic comes to the fore:<sup>18</sup>

- “Virtue and vice are concerned with (*περί*) pleasures and pains” (II.1, 1220a34-35)  
The statement serves here as a premise, as opposed to all of the other instances (though see II.4, 1222a2-5), where it is a conclusion or part of a definition.
- “Virtue of character is concerned with (*περί*) pleasures and pains” (II.2, 1220a38-39).
- “Bad and good character are about the pursuit and avoidance (*εἶναι τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν*) of certain pleasures and pains” (II.4, 1221b32-34).
- “Every virtue of character is concerned with (*περί*) pleasures and pains” (II.4, 1221b37-39 cf. 1222a2-5 and 11-12).

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17 Whereas in §2 we could avail ourselves of Aristotle's general comments on affections, capacities, and states, there is no such general discussion of pleasure and pain outside the general thrust of Aristotle's argumentation in the *EE* special books. Since he aims to define virtue of character throughout the book, we find pleasure and pain only in that context.

18 I do not mark a difference between the use of *ἡδονή* and the substantivized use of *ἡδύς* (similarly for pain), though note Aristotle's careful use of both at II.5, 1222a11-12.

- “All the virtues and vices of character are concerned with (περί) excess and deficiencies of pleasures and pains” (II.5, 1222b9-10).
- “Virtue and vice are concerned (περί) with pleasures and pains” (II.10, 1227b1-2).
- “Virtue is entirely (πᾶσα) concerned (περί) with pleasures and pains” (II.10, 1227b5-6).
- See also II.10, 1227b1-11, which supplies two additional (though oblique) pieces of evidence for this omnipresent conclusion.

We should understand the περί in two ways, though Aristotle discusses the first at much greater length than the second: (a) Virtues are “concerned with” pleasures and pains first because, as I shall conclude below, every virtue of character consists in having certain sets of capacities to experience certain pleasures and pains in certain circumstances. In short, one experiences a virtue in oneself, and one can often see it in another, via experiences of pleasure and pain. (b) Virtues are also “concerned with” pleasures and pains because people who are virtuous or vicious experience pleasure and pain proper to their virtue or vice (and separately from the affections that attend their actions). These are the “pleasures of virtue” (and the opposite for vice) discussed in the previous chapter. I return to them below in §VII, where I also discuss recent work on the pleasure the virtuous person takes in the pursuit of natural goods.

Regarding (a), let us look at Aristotle’s primary argument for it in II.4, 1221b32-39. In the next section, I consider the text that follows this argument, which also helps to support the conclusion (a) offered here.

Aristotle argues as follows:

- (1) Premise: “Capacities and states are about affections (παθημάτων)” (II.4, 1221b35-36).
- (2) Premise: “[A]ffections are distinguished (διώρισται) by pain and pleasure” (b36-37).
- (3) Implied conclusion: Eliding the affections, we can say that capacities and states are also distinguished (at least in part) by pain and pleasure.
- (4) Assumed premise: Every virtue of character is a state and consists in capacities.<sup>19</sup>
- (5) Conclusion: “Every virtue of character concerns (περί) pleasures and pains” (stated twice: b32-34 including virtue and vice and b38-39 regarding virtue).
- (6) Implied conclusion (a): Therefore, every virtue of character consists in having certain sets of capacities to experience certain pleasures and pains in certain circumstances.

This argument helps to explain Aristotle’s περί, at least to some extent. Aristotle aims to connect pleasure and pain with the virtues of character. He has just explained his conception of the mean and given us a list of examples of vices opposed to the mean. The current argument serves to link those conclusions with pleasure and pain: once he has shown that the virtues of character are about pleasure and pain, in II.5 he can explain how the mean and various vices also have to do with pleasure and pain.

Notice that the psychological background from §II, combined with the conclusion (5), gives (6), which already tells us about the place of pleasure and pain in capacities and affections. On the relationship between capacities and pleasure and pain, we do not have much from Aristotle, aside from two comments we have already seen. First, in II.2 Aristotle defines capacities as those things in virtue of which people are said to experience affections. For example, the irascible person experiences anger, as we have already seen. Second, when

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<sup>19</sup> Aristotle explicitly draws on “previous theses” at II.4, 1221b37-38. The substance of the conclusion here makes it clear that he is referring to II.2, 1220b7-20.

Aristotle recaps those psychological distinctions, he writes that capacities and states are both about affections.<sup>20</sup> Pleasure and pain do not figure directly into these descriptions, though, so we must look to a discussion of pleasure and pain in the affections themselves to see how pleasure and pain relate to capacities.

Affections, Aristotle writes, are “on the whole (ὅλως) those things which perceptible (αἰσθητικῆ) pleasure or pain properly (καθ’ αὐτά) accompany, for the most part (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ).”<sup>21</sup> Aristotle could have been more clear here, but as I will argue in the next section,<sup>22</sup> we should understand here that all affections essentially involve pleasure and pain, though some individual experiences may be exceptions to this rule. Without pleasure or pain, in other words, one cannot usually experience an affection. Aside from my philosophical and textual arguments about why such a theory is preferable, we can also look to Aristotle’s own examples, particular in his descriptions of the virtues.

Aristotle often describes the expressions of individual virtues in terms of pleasure and pain. Envious people feel pain at others’ deserved success (II.3, 1221a38-40, see also III.1, 1229a38-39); Aristotle observes the opposite regarding the unnamed vice opposite to envy. Jealousy also involves pain.<sup>23</sup> Though these two examples both link vice and pain, Aristotle makes it clear that it is not the case that vice is accompanied by pain and virtue by

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20 These two locations are II.2, 1220b16-17 and II.4, 1221b35-36. Both were also discussed in the previous section.

21 II.2, 1220b11-13. See comment (B) in the next section for a discussion of the meaning of ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ here.

22 See mainly comment (B) in the next section.

23 III.1, 1229a37-38. See the casual comment “appetite and spirit are always with pain, but we decide on many things even without pain being present” (II.10, 1225b30-31; on spirit, see also III.3, 1231b6 and 15).

pleasure.<sup>24</sup> Rather, sometimes the mean point involves pleasures, sometimes pains, and sometimes both (II.5, 1222a13). For example, courage sometimes involves great pain, and one is courageous in such cases partly because when one acts, one acts in spite of the pain accompanying the action (III.1, 1229a8-9). The profligate person, Aristotle says, doesn't keep his books because it is too painful for him to do so (III.4, 1232a18). The great-hearted person would be characteristically pained to suffer dishonor if she were subjected to unworthy rule (III.5, 1232b13). And finally, if a loss can cause more pain than it should (as Aristotle says about the illiberal person at III.3, 1231b30), then clearly there is a right amount of pain to feel in such circumstances. All such examples support (though only inductively) the conclusion that affections are accompanied by pleasure and pain, especially – or at least mostly in the sense argued for in (B) below – when they arise from the exercise of a trait of character.

To summarize: We know now that pleasure and pain accompany the affections that characterize the expression of character traits. It is primarily in this respect, then, that we should read Aristotle's repeated comments that character "is concerned with" pleasure and pain. As we have seen, a given state of character will consist in the possession of certain capacities to experience certain affections in certain circumstances. Pleasure and pain accompany the affections. Capacities, then, can also be explained as propensities to experience pleasure and pain due to characteristic action in certain circumstances. Speaking casually, we might say that someone's gentleness makes their life much more pleasant, or that someone's courage makes her life more painful, because she doesn't take the easy way out.

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<sup>24</sup> That is, in the sense relevant to conclusion (a) in this section. Regarding (b) – the idea that virtue involves pleasure proper to its action or activity – see §6.

#### IV Background: Two points of contention

I now address potential problems related to the features of the accounts of the two preceding sections: (A) concluding in §II that character traits are states, and (B) concluding in §III that pleasure and pain accompany (all) affections, and so also capacities and states.

(A) Regarding the conclusion that character traits are states:

Woolf argues from the 1220b7-10 passage that “Aristotle appears to assign some traits of character to the class of capacities, others to that of states” (100).<sup>25</sup> First, we should notice that when Aristotle completes his definition of virtue of character, he refers to it as a state.<sup>26</sup> But let us also consider Woolf’s point in the context of the 1220b7-10 passage.

Aristotle does specify two psychological features to answer the question “because of what are states of character of certain kinds?” (κατὰ τί τῆς ψυχῆς ποι’ ἄττα<sup>27</sup> ἦθη): (1) because of capacities for affections, and (2) because of states. He explains these answers as follows: (1) people “are called affective (παθητικοί) because of their capacities for certain affections,” and (2) “people are said to be affected in a certain way or to be unaffected concerning those affections because of states.”<sup>28</sup> Here, Aristotle is not saying that states of character *are*

capacities and/or states. Rather, the point is that the particularities of someone’s states of

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25 Woolf draws a far-ranging conclusion from his interpretation of Aristotle on what character traits are, psychologically: He concludes that the distinction between capacities and states is not entirely clear. “Capacities are [in *NE* II.1 and II.5] treated as innate, whereas here, being treated as a class of traits of character, they are acquired” (100). As I make clear, I disagree.

26 II.10, 1227b8-10: τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἠθικὴν ἔξιν προαιρετικὴν μεσότητος τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς, καθ’ ὅσα ποιός τις λέγεται τὸ ἦθος ἢ χαίρων ἢ λυπούμενος

27 This is 1220b7 following Rowe and Dirlmeier, who read ποιὰ ἄττα, against the OCT and Susemihl, which accept Spengel’s emendation to ποιότης τὰ. Dirlmeier translates: “mit welchen Seeleninhalten Charakter-formen von bestimmter Qualifikation zusammenhängen.”

28 II.2, 1220b7-10: ἔσται δὲ κατὰ τε τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων καθ’ ἃς ὡς παθητικοὶ λέγονται, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις καθ’ ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη λέγονται ταῦτα τῷ πάσχειν πῶς ἢ ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι

character are due to her particular (1) capacities and (2) states. Since character traits just are certain states of character, (2) follows immediately: we describe someone as often angry because of his irascibility. (1) is true in virtue of the fact that a psychological state owes its characteristics to the capacities that underlie it, as I have explained above (II.2, 1220b15).

(B) Regarding the conclusion that pleasure and pain accompany affections:

The issue I now raise concerns the scope of ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ at II.2, 1220b11-13. In an article on these particular lines, Stephen Leighton presents three alternative readings of ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ here (which I have translated as “on the whole”), arguing for the first:<sup>29</sup>

- A. “Usually the species of the genus τὸ πάθη are accompanied by perceptual pleasure or pain” (135). (i.e., most but not all species of the genus are accompanied by perceptual pleasure or pain.)
- B. “Most instances of any given species of the genus τὸ πάθη are accompanied by perceptual pleasure or pain.” (Woods’ interpretation *ad loc*) (135).
- C. “The reason for the qualification ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ is that there are certain πάθη which stir our mind rather than our body” (137).

Leighton sensibly rejects (C), but concludes in favor of (A), arguing that some of the evidence we have just seen (concerning the ways in which particular virtues are expressed), tells against (B). That is, if anger involves pain, it cannot be that sometimes anger is expressed without pain. However, after his discussion of the extreme states opposed to the mean points (all of *EE* II.3), Aristotle returns to the broader psychological discussion. He restates the relationship between affections, capacities, and states, this time concluding that “every virtue of character concerns pleasures and pains.” In fact, many of the passages where

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<sup>29</sup> Leighton 1984

Aristotle repeats this dogma come after the passage at issue here. And, if we believe (as I have argued) that pleasure and pain accompany every trait of character, then the repetition of this phrase and its variants count as evidence against (A) and for (B). Leighton’s article does not mention this preponderance of evidence.<sup>30</sup>

Consider the potential consequence for the account of character formation I develop in the following sections: If pleasure and pain only accompany affections some of the time (on the second or especially the first interpretation of the passage), then they might be inadequate as central tools to develop character, or at least to complete such a process. And the “usually” is never mentioned after this passage. The question underlying the shift away from the “usually” in II.2 might well be: “how would we develop character if only some (instances) of the states of character were accompanied by pleasure and pain?” So much is conjecture, but I hope to have shown that (B) is the more sensible interpretation.

I now return to the argument of II.1, begun in §I. We will now see Aristotle apply to virtue his general comments about the development and destruction of conditions. States of character, he will argue, can be formed using pleasure and pain.

## V The argument of II.1: the application to virtue

With the background presented in the last three sections in mind, let us return to the argument of II.1, where Aristotle applies his general theorizing to virtue, via his example of physical condition. First, recall the two principles discussed there:

P4: “The best condition [διάθεσις] comes about [γίγνεσθαι] through the best things [τῶν βελτίστων], and . . . the best things

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<sup>30</sup> See page 69 of this chapter for these passages. Two tell directly against Leighton’s thesis: II.4, 1221b37-39 (cf. 1222a2-5 and 11-12) and II.5, 1222b9-10. We might characterize the difference between Leighton’s (A) and (B) as a type/token distinction. My argument for (B) in the text favors the token interpretation, since Aristotle ascribes pleasure and pain to all types of character trait.

are done [πράττεσθαι ἄριστα] in each case in accordance with the virtue of each.” (II.1, 1220a22-24)

P5: “Every condition comes to be [γίγνεσθαι] and is destroyed [φθείρεσθαι] by how the same things are applied.” (II.1, 1220a26-27)

Here at last are the lines following those principles and the example of physical condition:

T7: Therefore, virtue is a condition of this sort, which is brought about [γίνεται] by the best movements [κινήσεων] of the soul and through which the best works and affections [ἔργα καὶ πάθη] of the soul are produced [πράττεται], and by those same things that it comes about [γίνεται] in one way, in another way it is destroyed [φθείρεται], and the use of it is toward the same things by which it is both developed [αὐξεται] and destroyed [φθείρεται] and toward which it arranges things in the best way [πρὸς ἃ βέλτιστα διατίθησιν].

We can see this because both virtue and vice are concerned with pleasures and pains. For punishments happen through these means, since they are treatments and are accomplished [γινόμεναι] through opposites, just as in other cases.<sup>31</sup>

Aristotle applies the principles P4 and P5 to virtue in the first part of T7. I label the steps of his argument i’-iv’ to link them with their respective moves in §I.

*In virtue:*

- i’’. The best things [κινήσεις, ἔργα, πάθη]<sup>32</sup> in the soul bring about virtue.
- ii’’. Virtue brings about the best things [κινήσεις, ἔργα, πάθη] in the soul.
- iii’’. These same things, applied variously, bring about, develop, and even destroy virtue.

31 II.1, 1220a29-37: καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἄρα ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις ἐστίν, ἣ γίνεται a30 τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων περὶ ψυχὴν κινήσεων καὶ ἀφ’ ἧς πράττεται τὰ ἄριστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πῶς μὲν γίνεται, πῶς δὲ φθείρεται, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτ’ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑφ’ ὧν καὶ αὐξεται καὶ φθείρεται <καὶ> πρὸς ἃ βέλτιστα διατίθησι. σημεῖον δ’ ὅτι περὶ ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρὰ a35 καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γὰρ κολάσεις ἰατρεῖαι οὖσαι καὶ γινόμεναι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τούτων εἰσίν. See Appendix B for notes on my text and translation.

32 Aristotle clearly does not intend a sharp distinction between what brings virtue about and what virtue effects. The symmetry between creation and destruction in the second half of the first sentences shows us that much. Of course there are more and less felicitous words to use when expressing each of these, and Aristotle chooses on that basis.

iv”. Conjectural: Exercising virtue involves these same things, toward which virtue also disposes one well. (This matches the argument in §VII below, but I do not discuss it here.)

Before we continue to Aristotle’s justification for these principles (in the second half of T7), note that here, *ἀΰξεται* is used in addition to the generic *γίγνομαι* used to establish P4 and P5.<sup>33</sup> There, the point could be that a condition of a certain quality either comes about or it does not come about. If we take *ἀΰξεται* seriously, though, we will have to think in terms of degrees (here, of virtue).<sup>34</sup>

The second half of T7 supports Aristotle’s statements in the first half. This may be surprising: i”, ii”, and even iii” (with the exception of the point about development) should follow directly from i, ii, and iii, even without any of the intervening text. And if we take iii” quite generally, it seems to express the same idea as vi’ and even vii’, both of which of course we have already seen. However, Aristotle is no stranger to multiple justifications for a single claim. Also, the conjectural iv” above may need more explanation than the preceding lines would provide.

Focusing on iii”, let us consider the points about pleasure and pain and punishment in the second half of T7.

In §II, we saw that virtues are states, consisting in capacities to experience affections under certain circumstances. §III argued that those affections are accompanied by pleasure and pain, and so pleasure and pain characterize virtuous states as well. In the examples

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33 We also do not see more interesting vocabulary in the example of physical condition and health.

34 It is just one word among many instances of *γίγνομαι*, but all the manuscripts have it, and we should think carefully about why it is present, as I attempt to do here.

adduced in §III, of pleasure and pain in the accounts of the individual virtues, the action and activity of virtue were apparent. Virtues are concerned with pleasures and pains, then, because the affections and actions they characteristically involve are accompanied by pleasures and pains.

My contention is that Aristotle uses pleasure and pain in T7 because the things that lead to and that come from virtue (its *κινήσεις*, *ἔργα*, and *πάθη* in i” and ii”) can be understood in terms of the pleasure and pain that accompany them. Thus having understood the place of pleasure and pain in virtue, ii” will be immediately obvious (since *κινήσεις*, *ἔργα*, and especially *πάθη* fit the psychological picture we have developed), and i” will then follow. iii” and iv” will start to make more sense given all of the passages we have seen where virtue “concerns” pleasures and pains. But regardless of the effectiveness of Aristotle’s comment about pleasures and pains here, it should be clear that pleasure and pain do the work in bringing about, developing, and destroying virtue.<sup>35</sup>

How? Aristotle gives one rather odd example, of punishment. The idea is a straightforward application of principles we have already seen (e.g. vi’ in §I): apply pain in a certain way, and a condition of a certain quality will result. Suppose I endure a (painful) fine when I do not buy a ticket for the metro. In anticipation of such pain, I opt for the more pleasurable alternative of buying a ticket and not being punished. This action (not the painful fine but its opposite, the comparatively pleasurable obedience) brings about a better state of character. And that better state of character, though it is perhaps only grudging acceptance of the rules, results in more instances of (ticket-buying) action along with the comparatively pleasurable (fine-avoiding) obedience that accompanies it. In general, Aristotle need not have

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<sup>35</sup> What about maintaining virtue? We can only speculate, but perhaps lacking *NE VI* – where virtue just is complete virtue – we might here have an account of virtue that can always be improved.

used punishment as an example here; the point could also be made through an example of positive motivation or any type of encouragement that involves pleasure and pain.

Interestingly, Aristotle does not mention such use of blame in the improvement or the getting-worse of character during the accounts of praise and blame. Nor when it comes to shame in either ethical work does Aristotle bring up this topic. In the *NE*, however, we do find Aristotle referring to punishment in similar contexts.<sup>36</sup>

In this section, I hope to have shown Aristotle's concern with the development of character in II.1, 1220a22-37. But there is no doubt that in T7, as in the work as a whole, his resources are inadequate and his account far from complete. If I have interpreted the punishment example correctly, then the relative pleasure of avoiding a fine will encourage me to be virtuous. We could tell a similar story with other virtues, ones for which even the exercise of the novice involves pleasure and little pain. (The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, for vice.)

But life is not so easy: the exercise of courage, liberality, and great-heartedness (we have seen) involves significant pain.<sup>37</sup> Perhaps (1) there is pleasure alongside that pain that can encourage the development of character. This seems unlikely, though, given Aristotle's descriptions of these virtues, and indeed from everyday experience of how hard it is to be good. Maybe a connection to habit and the development of capacities is in order, drawing on the last chapter. In this case, perhaps (2) the point is that a habit of acting in a certain way comes about through the bare repetition of the pleasure or pain felt in the *κινήσεις, ἔργα*, and *πάθη* involved in the exercise of a certain trait. This would fit with the habituation story

<sup>36</sup> See *NE* II.3 as punishment as a cure and *NE* X.9 on the use of punishments by a legislator.

<sup>37</sup> I take it this is the problem that comes closest to the heart of the argument in this chapter. There are of course other problems with the account. For example, we might well ask the question that begins *NE* II.4, for the problem addressed there should now be clearly in view.

told directly after the text we have been considering. Other than this proximity, there is no apparent link between habituation and pleasure and pain.

I doubt that this problem is resolvable given only the *EE* special books (or indeed with the “common books” as well, though see the “Interlude” for a suggestion based on a surprising passage in *EE* VII). In place of conjectures, then, I now continue to two additional sections dealing with material that may support the claim I *do* think the *EE* establishes: that pleasure and pain have to do with the development of virtue. I first (§VI) consider additional evidence for the conclusions of this section. In the final section (§VII), I briefly address the attractive solution suggested by the union of pleasure and virtue in the happiest life, to be touched on again in the Interlude.

## VI Additional evidence: from II.4-5

We have now seen Aristotle’s main statement regarding the formation of character. One additional passage needs our attention, given its direct comments about pleasure. We find this passage in the same context as Aristotle’s argument that every virtue of character has to do with pleasures and pains, which concludes at II.4, 1221b37-39, as we have seen above. Immediately following the conclusion of that argument, Aristotle offers additional evidence in support of the b37-39 conclusion. The additional evidence occupies the next several lines: II.4-5, 1221b39-1222a5.<sup>38</sup> In presenting this additional evidence, he brings up the role of pleasure and pain in character formation again, though somewhat obliquely.

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38 *πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχῆς [sic] <ἔξις> ὑφ’ οἷων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτά ἐστιν [ἢ ἡδονή]. δι’ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαύλους εἶναι φημὲν, τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἢ ὡς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅς μὴ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ διορίζονται πάντες προχείρως ἀπαθείας καὶ ἡρεμίας περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς, τὰς δὲ κακίας ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων.*

First, I focus on the passage as an addendum to the argument in §III. We might add on to that argument as I have laid it out above as follows:

(7) Premise: “For the pleasure of every soul is related to and concerns those sorts of things by which it naturally becomes worse or better.” (1221b39-1222a1; see Appendix B).

(8) Example of (7): “We say people are base because they pursue and avoid pleasures and pains, either in the wrong way or the wrong ones” (1222a1-2).

(9) “Everyone defines the virtues with reference to impassivity and calmness regarding pleasures and pains and the vices with reference to the oppose [dispositions]” (1222a2-5).

(10) Implied premise: (8) and (7) provide support for (9) by explaining why the latter proposition is the case: if pursuing and avoiding certain pleasures and pains in certain ways makes one base, then it would make sense to define the vices in terms of certain dispositions having to do with pleasures and pains.

(11) Conclusion: (9) provides additional support for (5),<sup>39</sup> which is restated at 1222a10-12 when Aristotle includes the result of his discussion of the mean and the result of this extended argument in a new definition of virtue.

Second, I consider what the passage at hand has to add to our current discussion on character formation, proceeding through its premises as I have just listed them. Start with premise (7). Pleasure “is related to (πρός) and concerns (περί)” those things that develop character traits in the soul. We don’t know what those things are yet, but we know they have to do with pleasure. Now perhaps premise (8) could be taken to ascribe the *becoming* base to

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39 “Every virtue of character concerns (περί) pleasures and pains” (II.4, 1221b38-39).

the pursuit and avoidance of pain, instead of just the *being* base. The Greek is εἶναι, counting against such an interpretation, but the context of premise (7) seems to encourage such a reading. Moreover, in the discussion that follows (II.5, 1222a6-8), virtue is described as that through which people are *able* to do what is best and in best *disposing* people toward what is best.<sup>40</sup> Now (from §III) every character trait consists in having certain sets of capacities to experience certain pleasures and pains in certain circumstances. The virtues are such traits, and we have just seen that they point us toward what is best. So it is likely that our experiences of pleasure and pain – the ones that differentiate the effects of one virtue from another – help both to point us toward what is best (as in 1222a6-8) and to develop character traits in the soul (from premise (7)). The implications should now be clear. The development of character that we considered in the last section is here supported by the abilities of virtue to enable the doing of what is best and to dispose its possessor well toward those same things.

This passage does not provide direct evidence for the claims of the previous section. However, with II.1, 1220a22-37, it points in the same direction: pleasure and pain help character to develop by encouraging or discouraging certain kinds of behavior.

Note that this general principle applies to vice, virtue, and any other state of character: there is no reason to think that it is biased toward virtue or away from vice. However, in §III, we discussed Aristotle’s catchphrase “states of character are concerned with (περί) pleasure and pain.” I mentioned there that the περί might well stand for two separate relationships. We have seen a great deal about the first: that pleasure and pain help to form states of character and are the hallmarks of our experience of such states. In the next section,

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<sup>40</sup> Respectively, ἀφ’ ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν βελτίστων (the LSJ refers us to *NE* I.9, 1099b31 and V.1, 1129a8) and καθ’ ἣν ἄριστα διάκεινται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον.

I return to the second relationship: there may be reason even<sup>41</sup> in the *EE* to think that the expression of a state of character carries with it pleasure and pain proper to the fact that the character state is being expressed. And if character is related to pleasure and pain in *this* way, then virtue may well have the upper hand.<sup>42</sup>

## VII Pleasure and virtue in the happy life

Aristotle is clearly concerned to establish that pleasure is proper to the happy life, or that the happiest life is also the most pleasant.<sup>43</sup> As we have seen, the *EE* opens by asserting that εὐδαιμονία, as the finest and best thing (κάλλιστον, ἄριστον), is also the most pleasant (ἡδίστον) of all things.<sup>44</sup> These dramatic opening lines seem programmatic, but the special books of the *EE* announce the question directly only in I.5 and declare it solved in VIII.3. Nowhere does Aristotle specifically address the issue.<sup>45</sup>

41 Recall my comparison of the *NE* and the *EE* on this general point in the last chapter.

42 This speculation and the following section are on the edges of what we should infer when interpreting the *EE*. I present them here tentatively.

43 The life of pleasure ranks as one of the three possible lives, coordinate with one of the three most likely sources for happiness. Pleasure takes this place beginning in the proem with the epigram from Delos (I.1, 1214a4), then at I.1, 1214a33 and I.4, 1215a35-b4. We see it in this context again at II.1, 1218b35.

44 See *NE* I.8, 1099a27-28, where Aristotle makes the same point with less fanfare.

45 We need not be too concerned with the vexed question of where and how Aristotle treated pleasure in the “original” *EE*. There are three references to such a discussion in the special books: I.5, 1216a37; III.2, 1231b2-4; and VIII.3, 1249a17-19. In the proem (at I.5), Aristotle marks for later a discussion of the place of pleasure in the happy life. Dirlmeier notes that *NE* VII as we have it does not fulfill Aristotle’s promise in I.5 or contain the particulars of the summary in VIII.3, 1249a17-21 (177-179, esp. 178). Woods agrees (54), though contrast Kenny (1978: 52-53) on *NE* VII.11-14. *NE* VII does “make distinctions regarding the kinds of pleasures,” though, as III.2 promises.

Relatedly, Aristotle comments on the role of pleasure in virtue-based friendship, though only once: “the primary kind of friendship . . . is the one involving virtue and through (δίᾳ) the pleasure of virtue” (VII.2, 1238a30-32; see also VII.12, 1245a30-b5 on the pleasant perceiving of a friend’s

I will not adduce VIII.3 as evidence of an answer to the question. Woods thinks that the passage may not belong there, while Dirlmeier and (at some length) Monan argue that it is continuous with the previous discussion of fortune. In any case, it does not contain much of an *argument* as to why we should think that the happiest life is the most pleasant: its engagement with the question takes the form of an assertion instead.<sup>46</sup>

Given the absence of a direct consideration of the question, we cannot say anything for certain. Aristotle could have connected the life of pleasure and the life of virtue in many ways. To take a few: (1) Aristotle questions in I.5 whether the happiest life might involve just those pleasures that people attribute to the most pleasant life (though this seems unlikely). (2) The temperate person characteristically enjoys the pleasures of taste and especially touch (III.2). Perhaps the virtuous person enjoys certain pleasures and not others, to an especially great extent.<sup>47</sup> (3) Again as Aristotle suggests in I.5, there may be a different way to share in pleasure, through friendship, for example. (4) Perhaps there are pleasures that only the virtuous person can enjoy, ones connected essentially to the experience of acting virtuously.

I suggest that this final option (positing what I shall call the “pleasures of virtue”) has the most to offer, partially because if Aristotle had it in mind, it would help to answer two questions raised in our discussion so far. In addition to making possible a satisfactory answer to the question of why the most virtuous life is the most pleasant, it would give us

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virtue, though the phrase is not mentioned there).

46 Woods 178; Dirlmeier 497-498; Monan 125-134. Woods writes that “What is surprising is that he says that things that are pleasant without qualification will count as natural goods, but not satisfy the conditions for being fine.” I do not see where Woods finds this in the passage.

47 Though he does not reference taste and touch, this might be one way to explain the second of the two alternatives in I.5. (3) and (4) here might be other ways of explaining it.

additional resources to answer the “origin question” discussed in Chapter 1.<sup>48</sup> For if it is pleasant to act virtuously, then the aspirant to virtue would have an additional (and quite natural) source of motivation to improve. We cannot say much more on the topic of pleasure and virtue here, for the simple reason that Aristotle does not offer us more text to go on. But since the second half of this dissertation, beginning with the next chapter, will focus on the workings of mature virtue, I first turn in the following “Interlude” to the very question of improvement, which as I have noted the idea of “pleasures of virtue” would begin to address. In short: how does a person progress from Aristotle’s rather mechanistic habituation and pleasure- and pain-driven development to a state of mature virtue?

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<sup>48</sup> See Chapter 1, page 16. That is, as Aristotle phrases it, how is “living well” achieved? More generally, what are the sources of happiness, of virtue, and of character?

## Interlude: *EE* VII on Becoming Virtuous

In this section, I consider the question of the maturation of virtue.<sup>1</sup> Like Aristotle's comments on the matter in the *EE*, this section is short and suggestive. And yet it is necessary, for our conclusions in the two preceding chapters do not seem to afford a satisfactory theory of the development of virtue.<sup>2</sup>

Chapter 1 showed us that the *EE* presents habit as a broadly useful tool, explaining that repetition of a certain movement results in the gaining of a capacity to make that movement. But though the theory of habit is perhaps broadly useful, by the same token it is not tailored to the development of human virtue and therefore brings with it no virtue-specific resources like those available in the parallel *NE* account.<sup>3</sup> Chapter 2 progressed further than Chapter 1 on the question of virtue acquisition by arguing that the best κινήσεις, ἔργα, and πάθη in the soul both lead to and result from virtue, and that these three "best" things can be understood in terms of the pleasure and pain that accompany them.<sup>4</sup> Aristotle's example of punishment gave us a single and abstract example of the development of virtue using pleasure and pain,<sup>5</sup> but nowhere else in the *EE* does he speak about how the principles explained in Chapter 2 are actually supposed to work.<sup>6</sup>

1 I leave the question of whether virtue can always be improved to one side. As I noted in Chapter 2, since the *EE* does not contain what we know of as *NE* VI, this may very well be the case. See the text and footnote to the discussion of T7 and i"-iv" on page 79.

2 See my conclusion, in which I propose that perhaps, in fact, they do.

3 See the list of such resources that opens Chapter 2.

4 See Chapter 2's T7, the following propositions ii", iii", and iv", and my argument in the subsequent text.

5 The punishment example is also in T7. After explaining it, I give some preliminary suggestions about how the process may work.

6 There is the one exception of *EE* VII.2, which I consider below.

In short, Aristotle's theory of the development of virtue in the *EE* leaves us without answers to a host of questions related to virtue development that will arise when we turn to his moral-psychological theorizing about virtue and the virtuous person. His theorizing on these topics is extensive, as Chapters 3 and 4 begin to show. But how does he think the agents he is theorizing about actually gain mature virtue (if they do at all)?

We might plausibly posit three crucial characteristics of the virtuous person: when the virtuous person does something virtuous, she knows *that* it is virtuous, she knows *why* it is virtuous, and she *desires to do it for its own sake* rather than for some other reason. A complete discussion of these characteristics in the *EE* would require an extensive look at the accounts of the individual virtues in *EE* III. But in this brief consideration of the problem of virtue acquisition, they will serve merely to raise questions that seem reasonable to ask about the process.<sup>7</sup>

These questions may be divided into three types, regarding what Aristotle's theory of the development of virtue can tell us about the *desiderative* aspects of virtue-development, what it can tell us about the *cognitive* aspects of virtue-development, and *to what extent* the theory is applicable to the development of various virtues. I now present a sketch of questions related to each of these in turn.

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7 Here is one of the many issues this superficial sketch of mature virtue will raise: in what order do we acquire these characteristics? Take Burnyeat's classic formulation of the problem as one example of an opinion on this issue. "[M]orality," he writes, "comes in a sequence of stages with both cognitive and emotional dimensions" (1980: 70-71). He thinks that the development of a "taste" for the noble and the just happens *before* one gains understanding of *why* such things are noble and just but after one knows *that* they are noble and just (78-79). Unfortunately, Burnyeat cites the *EE* only at a few non-critical junctures (e.g. 78). For a recent look at the same problem, but also in the *NE*, see Jagannathan 2019. I do not know of anyone who addresses virtue acquisition in the *EE*.

Desiderative aspects of virtue: Consider the virtue of honesty. Punishment might motivate honest riding of public transit (as in the example in Chapter 2), but can it motivate a desire to *be* honest, or just a desire to *act* honestly? As we saw at the end of Chapter 2, Aristotle does not explicitly posit “pleasures of virtue.” But if there is no pleasure proper to honest actions, then why should we think that the soul’s non-rational desires will ever agree with a rational desire to do the honest thing? How, in other words, does incontinence develop into virtue? What is more, if as we saw just above in Chapter 2, the virtues are defined as “impassivity and calmness regarding pleasures and pains” (1222a2-5), then how can pleasure and pain both lead to and result from virtue? On such a definition of the virtues, it would seem that the more virtuous one became, the less Aristotle’s story about pleasure- and pain-motivated development would obtain.

Cognitive aspects of virtue: Aristotle’s theory of habituation might perhaps account for learning *that* riding the metro with a ticket is honest. Repeated instances of being instructed with this proposition might lead to the ability to produce it for oneself and perhaps to belief in it. As we have seen, however, Aristotle does not mention any cognitive aspects of his idea of habituation. It therefore seems highly unlikely that an explanation would be forthcoming from the habituated agent as to *why* such propositions about what is or is not virtuous are true.<sup>8</sup> In addition, beyond the simple case of ticket-buying, the virtue of honesty will require knowing *when* to be honest. Habituation as repetition will hardly be able

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8 Inference to the best explanation, more than textual evidence, leads Burnyeat to the conclusion that “practice has cognitive powers, in that it is the way we learn what is noble or just. . . . by doing the things you are told are noble and just you will discover that what you have been told is true” (1980: 73-74). The *NE* does have much more to say on the matter, though, so such conclusions are better grounded there than here.

to give the aspirant to virtue the extensive cognitive resources she needs to determine what virtues apply when in the endless variety of actual life.<sup>9</sup>

Applicability: Regardless of the ability of Aristotle's theory to answer the types of questions just raised, there is a further question: as far as it goes, does his theory actually apply to all the virtues? The theory that the best *κινήσεις*, *ἔργα*, and *πάθη* in the soul lead to and result from virtue seems to fit well with many of *EE* III's examples. A wealthy person might develop *μεγαλοπρέπεια* ("magnificence") by giving appropriately lavish gifts throughout his youth. And a person worthy of little, but one who characteristically thinks himself worthy of what he is worthy of, might later obtain the virtue of *μεγαλοψυχία* ("great-heartedness"), if this same attitude accompanies a rise in his worth.<sup>10</sup> But even if we can tell similar stories for the other virtues, there may be desiderative or cognitive boundaries on the applicability of Aristotle's virtue-acquisition theory, if we do not read beyond the text. Giving fittingly and generously might bring with it pleasure from the beginning, but making the courageous decision in military matters – or for that matter in social or intellectual matters – might always be painful. Appropriate estimation of one's own worth might result from *EE*-style habituation, but the cognitive demands of justice will surely elude the person habituated merely through pleasure and pain.

In all three respects, then, we run into questions about the formation of virtue given the resources the *EE* has provided. I do not aim in this section to solve these problems, as I

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9 As Julia Annas has remarked in conversation, the habituee will have to do this without ever consciously thinking about bravery, or about its point, or about what kind of situations it requires getting into.. Too much, she suggests, is here packed into the "non-rational" part of the soul, without recognition that it requires some rational capacities.

10 For these two examples, see *EE* III.5 and III.6.

do not think that Aristotle has the resources to do so directly in the *EE*.<sup>11</sup> But there is one passage we have not yet seen that pertains to virtue acquisition. It is as suggestive as it is unprecedented in the treatise and unexpected in its context. We find the following comment in a digression from Aristotle's theorizing on friendship in *EE* VII.2.

These things [what is good without qualification and what is good for oneself] should harmonize – and virtue brings this about. Statecraft is in charge of this, so that it may come about for those in whom it is not yet the case . . . What is fine must be pleasant. When these diverge, one is not yet completely excellent. For the separation of the good and the pleasant in the emotions is incontinence.<sup>12</sup>

In the second half of Chapter 3, we shall consider Aristotle's definitions of what is good without qualification and what is good for oneself. I argue there that the things that are good without qualification are the things that are *fine*, and that the things that are fine, in turn, are (primarily) the virtues and virtuous actions. These belong to and are performed by the virtuous person. Also, we see in Chapter 3 that what is good for a particular person is what is worth choosing for that person. Thus the harmonization of what is good without qualification and what is good for oneself means, in a minimal interpretation, that for the virtuous person the virtues and virtuous actions are worth choosing: they are good for her. Be this as it may, however, such a minimal interpretation of the claim in this passage does not tell us *why* they are worth choosing. We run up against one of the questions raised earlier

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11 Again, see my conclusion, where I suggest that perhaps he does not need to solve some of these problems.

12 VII.2, 1237a2-3 and 6-9: ἂν δεῖ συμφωνῆσαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἢ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ· καὶ ἢ πολιτικὴ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὅπως οἷς μήπω ἐστὶ γένηται. . . . ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰ καλὰ ἡδέα. ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα διαφωνῆ, οὕτω σπουδαῖος τελέως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐγγενέσθαι ἀκρασίαν· τὸ γὰρ διαφωνεῖν τὰγαθὸν τῷ ἡδεῖ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκρασία ἐστίν. I consider most of this passage in a different context below, as T15 (Chapter 3).

in this section: are the goods without qualification pleasant and worth choosing because they are good, or because they are accompanied by pleasure extrinsic to their goodness?

Aristotle turns to the importance of pleasure in the last line of this passage, his most direct statement on the “pleasures of virtue.” “[T]he separation of the good and the pleasant in the emotions is incontinence,” he says, seeming to realize the importance of pleasure in the motivation of virtuous action. But even here, it is not clear whether the pleasure he speaks of should merely accompany virtuous action or whether virtuous action should be pleasant because it is virtuous. For example, we can imagine the virtue of modesty being accompanied by the pleasure of keeping to oneself without the pain of self-deprecation. But such modesty might not be pleasurable *because* it is modesty: it might be motivated more from a fear of public engagement than from a love of virtue.

What about the line in this passage about statecraft? Might that not give us a window into the process of learning to be good? Indeed, the presence of an external agent (the state, or the statesman) in this passage is remarkable in that nowhere else in the *EE* does Aristotle discuss the role of a teacher or habituator. We might take the line in a variety of directions, though: perhaps the state should impose fines and punishments so that the hedonic calculations of the masses lead them to do the virtuous thing. Less plausibly, given the lack of evidence for these suggestions in the *EE*, perhaps the statesman should concern himself with instructing people as to *why* such laws make sense (as in the preambles in Plato’s *Laws*) or even with inculcating in them a love of virtue itself. The passage is suggestive, but we cannot draw such conclusions from it alone.

Now that we have discussed Aristotle’s only other resource to address the acquisition of virtue, I conclude this section with a look at scholarship on the apparent virtue-acquisition

problem in the *EE*. As is the case with many questions in this dissertation, commentary on the issue in a strictly *Eudemian* context is thin. We find the most direct consideration of the problem in the *EE* in Friedemann Buddensiek's notes on *EE* II and in Pierluigi Donini's book and article on habit in Aristotle.

Buddensiek's comments come in the context of his remarks on the sentence about habit in *EE* II.<sup>13</sup> “[W]ir schreiben dem Text nicht zuviel zu,” he thinks, if we suspect that there are “Anordnungen” (perhaps, “instructions”) and “dass die Anordnungen *gezielt herbeigeführte* [“deliberately brought-about”] Wiederholungen bestimmter Art umfassen” (2019, emphasis in the original). Buddensiek hypothesizes the necessity of such “Anordnungen” because of the character-formation problem we have been discussing in this section: “Da bzw. soweit Charakterformung nicht aus dem erst noch zu formenden Charakter selbst heraus erfolgt, *bedarf sie entsprechender externer Einflüsse*, und zwar formender Anordnungen, d.h. wohl: Handlungsanordnungen” (my emphasis). He refers to Hallvard Fossheim's suggestion of imitation as one of the ways in which such “Anordnungen” might work.<sup>14</sup>

Donini's book argues that between writing the *EE* and the *NE*, Aristotle read certain comments by Plato on character development, and that these Platonic ideas prompted him to develop his *Nicomachean* theory of habituation.<sup>15</sup> A difficulty with his thesis (explained in my

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13 For my consideration of this passage, see Chapter 1, Section IV.

14 Fossheim 2006; see also Hampson 2019 and 2020.

note) means that we should read his comments about the *EE* with some hesitation. However, these comments on character development in the *EE* are important, at least insofar as they are a second species of such a sparsely exemplified genus. Donini, in a departure from Burnyeat (1980), thinks that even in the *NE*, the learner may not need philosophical instruction to develop cognitively toward virtue. *NE* habituation, Donini thinks, can lead a person to decide for herself to act in a certain way, even without external guidance, for example that of Aristotle's lectures as in Burnyeat's picture.<sup>16</sup> Now Donini's position on the cognitive aspects of *NE* habituation is unique because of how much cognitive involvement it sees in the habituation itself even without the influence of direct external instruction. We might think that he would interpret the *EE* similarly generously on habituation, or at least that he would build more into *Eudemian* habituation than I have done here. This is not the case. Donini concludes in fact to the contrary that the *EE* has virtually nothing to say on moral development, as we see in these telling lines:

[L]a teoria tipicamente aristotelica della virtù che è anche oggi esposta nei nostri manuali ed è, in realtà, una teoria ancora largamente platonica, nell'*Etica Eudemiana* non c'è quasi niente. (2014b: 55)

If in reading Donini's book we hope for a generous consideration of the sentence on habit in the *EE*, we will be disappointed.<sup>17</sup> We should not be surprised, however, since his thesis depends on the idea of Aristotle developing a post-*Eudemian* theory of moral habituation, inspired by the *Laws* to write *NE* II.4.

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16 See 2014a: Chapter 3 and especially pp. 61-69. Donini prominently cites *NE* II.4, 1105a17-1105b12. Julia Annas has helped me with the Italian in Donini's book; his article (2014b) is a more concise statement of his main theses and is more easily read by the Italian novice.

17 See, however, Donini's translation of the *EE*, where his commentary, though largely philological, does consider the passage.

Buddensiek and Donini exemplify likely reactions to the *EE* on habituation and moral development. While Buddensiek, at least in the one passage I have been able to read, considers plausible ways to fill out the *EE* theory, Donini does not see substantial comment on the questions posed in this section and concludes that the work has very little to say on the matter. In keeping with my generally conservative approach to the text, I propose a solution somewhere in the middle:<sup>18</sup> while there certainly seem to be problems getting from Aristotle's theories of habituation and moral development to his discussions of mature virtue, the *EE* does not generally rule out ways in which such habituation and development could happen. Thus in a way its approach to the questions of this section may be much like its approach to defining habituation: the theory of moral development I examined in Chapter 2 is quite general and does not enter into the specifics of how it might be applied in the case of one virtue or another, or in the case of the cognitive or the desiderative aspects of mature virtue.

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<sup>18</sup> I suppose this solution inclines rather more to Buddensiek than to Donini. One could surely be much more adventurous in theorizing what Aristotle had in mind in the *EE* on these matters than Buddensiek has been. Indeed, I only quote one passage of Buddensiek's thinking on the matter, and I hope to use it mainly as indicative of a possible approach to the problems raised in this section.

### 3 Virtue of Character and the τέλος of Action

In the previous two chapters, we have seen Aristotle's *EE* account of the development of virtue of character. In this chapter and the next, I explain how virtue<sup>1</sup> functions once it has developed. In its primary role, virtue sets the ends of action, but in practice it does this only in concert with reason.<sup>2</sup> I therefore address virtue and ends in this chapter and virtue and reason in the next.

In the first of the two sections of this chapter, I argue for two related claims:

1. Aristotle argues that we adopt ends through our moral character. In particular, virtue makes our ends correct. These ends range from quite general to somewhat specific.
2. Agents desire ends non-rationally, that is, with ἐπιθυμία or θύμος.

The second part of the chapter contains an extensive consideration of Aristotle's divisions of types of goods in the *EE*. This analysis identifies which goods it is that the virtuous agent desires and pursues.

In contrast to the argumentation of Chapters 1 and 2, where we followed Aristotle from *EE* I through the first half of *EE* II, in these two chapters we shall have to consider Aristotle's argument somewhat out of its order of presentation in the *EE*. Aristotle begins his comments on virtue, reason, and action with a discussion of human beings as the starting-points of action (II.6).<sup>3</sup> But his comments in II.6 have their basis in the more fundamental theory of II.10-11 on the role of virtue in setting those starting-points, or ends, for human

1 In this chapter I use "virtue" to indicate virtue of character, since the intellectual virtues do not enter the discussion here.

2 Cases of natural virtue are exceptions to this rule, but I do not attempt an evaluation of the scattered references to natural virtue in the *EE*. It is interesting to note, however, that the expression "natural virtue" only occurs in the *EE* and in the common books.

action. Additionally, the accounts of the individual virtues in *EE* III contain useful evidence for both this chapter and the next.

## I Virtue of character and the specificity of ends

Aristotle focuses the *EE* squarely on virtue, though he also discusses other character states, notably vice. Because of his focus, the general point that we adopt ends through moral character will be best seen by looking at how virtue results in correct ends, or how, as II.10 has it, virtue makes the end correct.

The ends of our actions, whether virtuous or not, come in a wide variety. The extent of this variety has been a subject of debate, and so I show that the ends of action, while they can be general, are often somewhat specific. We can see this if we adopt an adequately developed picture of the relationship between ends and the things toward the ends (τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος).

Throughout this chapter, I will focus on three key passages from Aristotle's discussion of virtue and προαίρεσις in the *Eudemian Ethics*, which we find at *EE* II.10-11.

T8: Having made these determinations, we must say whether virtue makes προαίρεσις unerring and the end correct, so that one προαιρείσθαι for the sake of what one should, or whether as it seems to some that it makes the reasoning correct.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> II.10, 1227b12-15: τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων, λέγωμεν πότερον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀναμάρτητον ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ τέλος ὀρθόν, οὕτως ὥστε οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ προαιρείσθαι, ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισὶ τὸν b15 λόγον.

1227b12 λέγωμεν PL (the OCT, apparently mistakenly, has λέγωμεν L; λέγομεν PC)

1227b14-15 τὸν λόγον PCB<sup>1</sup>L; τῶν λόγων B<sup>2</sup> (over line: tau and omega over the omicron in τὸν, omega over the second omicron of λόγον) (Rowe)

T9: What does virtue make [correct]: the end or the things toward the end? We hold [that it makes] the end [correct], since neither inference nor reasoning is about that.<sup>5</sup>

T10: If all correctness has as a cause either reason or virtue, and if reason is not the cause, then the end – but not the things toward the end – would be correct because of virtue. Now the end is that for the sake of which. For every προαίρεσις is of something and for the sake of something. Now the mean is that for the sake of which, the cause of which is virtue, [?through] the προαιρείσθαι for the sake of what one should. . . . Virtue is the cause of the correctness of the end of προαίρεσις. That is why we judge what sort of person someone is on the basis of their προαίρεσις, that is, what they act for the sake of, but not what they do.<sup>6</sup>

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5 II.10, 1227b22-25: I discuss the roles of various types of reasoning in Chapter 4. English translations use “deduction,” “inference,” and the like for λογισμὸς; note the OCT’s συλλογισμὸς. Dirlmeier translates: “denn dieses erhält man nicht durch schlußfolgerndes und auch nicht durch beratendes Denken” (43).

πότερον δ’ ἢ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν; τιθέμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπὸν, διότι τούτου οὐκ ἔστι λογισμὸς οὐδὲ b25 λόγος.

1227b24 λογισμὸς Π; συλλογισμὸς OCT

6 (See Appendix B.) II.11, 1227b34-38 and 1228a1-3: εἰ οὖν πάσης ὀρθότητος ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, εἰ μὴ b35 ὁ λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν ὀρθὸν εἶη τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. τέλος δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα. ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τινὸς καὶ ἔνεκα τινός. οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὐ αἰτία ἢ ἀρετὴ τῷ προαιρείσθαι οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ. . . . 1228a1 τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως [οὐ] ἢ ἀρετὴ αἰτία. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν ποῖός τις τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ τίνος ἔνεκα πράττει, ἀλλ’ οὐ τί πράττει.

1227b38 τῷ Fritzsche, IW, Rowe, Woods; τὸ PCBL, Dirlmeier, OCT, Simpson; τοῦ Kenny δεῖ PCBL, Rowe; [δεῖ] Dirlmeier, IW, Kenny, OCT, Simpson, Woods; cp. 1227b14

1228a1 [οὐ] Fritzsche, Dirlmeier, Kenny, IW, OCT, Rowe, Woods; οὐ PCBL, Simpson, von Fragstein αἰτία om. PCB (no editor or translator renders the sentence without αἰτία)

A *Virtue makes the end right.*

As we see in the passages above, Aristotle twice asks the question, “What does virtue make correct?” His answer is unambiguous: virtue makes the end correct. As Jessica Moss puts it in her 2011 article, “virtue makes the goal right.”<sup>7</sup>

To clarify the position I will take regarding the relationship between virtue and the end of action, let us consider a set of progressively stronger theses on the matter:

1. Virtue makes us desire the end.<sup>8</sup>

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7 Moss’s article and subsequent book (*Aristotle on the Apparent Good*, 2012) constitute the most recent publications on the end and virtue in Aristotle. In her work, Moss aims to offer a “more thorough and sustained defense” of arguments found in Burnet (1900: 64-68), Achtenberg (2002), and Fortenbaugh (1964) (Moss 2011: 206n6).

Moss’s 2011 essay problematically addresses “Aristotle’s ethics,” without looking carefully at pertinent distinctions between the two ethical works. (Burnet, Achtenberg, and Fortenbaugh do the same.) The resulting combination of evidence from across the two ethical works, citing one in support of the other, prevents Moss from drawing distinctions between the two and makes for jarring argumentation. For example, Moss introduces the titular topic of her essay with a focus on *EE* II.11, 1227b12-1228a3, but then goes on to cite *NE* evidence in support of her view.

We find another particularly striking example in the reasoning to a key conclusion in Moss’s 2014 article, namely, that “[t]o grasp an entire deliberative syllogism – to reason from the starting-point to the conclusion – is to grasp not merely that something is to-be-done but also, by seeing how it promotes one’s goal, why” (2014: 52). She begins with *EE* II.10, 1226b25-30; provides evidence of the importance of the “laying down of the goal” by drawing a parallel to *NE* III.2, 1112b11-16; concludes partly from the *NE* passage that προαίρεσις is always of something and for the sake of something (a distinctly *Eudemian* doctrine, at *EE* II.10, 1226a11-12); and then cites *EE* passages and *NE* VI.12, 1144a31-33 to argue that “goals in deliberation play a role parallel to hypotheses or definitions in demonstrations” (2014: 49).

8 In her book, Moss labels adherence to this position as “Intellectualist.” She writes that “[supplying the content of one’s view of the end] is a privilege [the Intellectualists] reserve for phronēsis (so that, despite the apparent division of labor in [the passages that refer to virtue making the end right], it is phronēsis’s task to grasp the end as well as the ‘things toward it’); virtue’s role is purely conative” (2012: 174).

In his review of Moss’s 2012 book, Iakovos Vasiliou identifies a middle position, taken by McDowell, between what Moss claims to defend and that of the interpreters Moss labels the “Intellectualists” (2014: 379): “It would seem that Moss ought to agree that ‘having the right goal’ is ‘inseparable from the ability to know what is to be done occasion by occasion.’ McDowell agrees that having the right motivational orientation (i.e. the result of proper upbringing and habituation) is not a product of argument, but still argues that virtue does not direct the operation of *phronēsis*

2. In addition to (1), virtue also supplies the content of one's view of the end.<sup>9</sup>

3. In addition to (2), the end supplied by virtue can be quite specific.<sup>10</sup>

I argue for (3) in this section and the next. So far as I know, Hendrik Lorenz (2009) provides the only sustained account of a position similar to my own on the matter, though I take issue with his argument below. Commentators have largely missed the stark differences between the *EE* special books and the *NE* on the topic of virtue and rationality (and related topics, such as the ends of action).<sup>11</sup> Perhaps this lack of support for (3) (or (2) for that matter) in the literature should not be surprising. After all, an *NE* perspective will conflict with that of the *EE* where virtue and the end are concerned. To consider a classic source on the matter, Rackham explains *EE* II.11, 1227b37-38 as follows: "Virtue by choosing the right means to achieve the End causes the End to be realised."<sup>12</sup> Not only are (2) and (3) out of the question

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'from outside', since there is no way to specify what 'the best' or 'the fine' is other than by engaging *phronēsis*. While Moss says her view is distinct from this, I do not see how" (379, quoting from McDowell 32).

9 I am taking this phrase from Moss, who argues for the view. Moss (2011) characterizes her position variously: "what virtue is doing in "making the goal right" is supplying the goal" (220); "[virtue] literally supplies the content of one's view of the end" (220); and often, "virtue does the work of making the goal right."

10 This thesis has controversial implications for Aristotelian *phronēsis*, as I discuss in Chapter 4. See Vasiliou's positive assessment of Moss (2012)'s "reasonabl[e] refus[al] to relegate *phronēsis* and the deliberation of the *phronimos* to mere instrumental reasoning" (2014: 378).

11 However, Lorenz argues that virtue in the *EE* is entirely non-rational but in the *NE* virtue has rational components.

12 At II.11, 1227b37-38, Rackham translates, "The End is therefore the object for which the thing chosen is the mean, of which End goodness is the cause by its act of choice." Kenny reports this translation, noting that Rackham follows Fritzsche and Susemihl here in emending τὸ to τῷ (Kenny 1979, 85-86). Rackham's interpretation likely owes much less to confusion between "mean" and "means" in English (as Kenny suggests) than it does to a *Nicomachean* perspective on virtue.

for Rackham; (1) cannot work either, as his interpretation of the matter (focused on the *NE*) takes something of an opposite line.

Look back to T8, T9, and T10 above. In T8 Aristotle brings up a divergence in commonly-held views: virtue, people say, either makes προαίρεσις “unerring” (presumably *by* making the end correct) or it makes the reasoning following on προαίρεσις correct.” Now we do not have any further than T9 and T10 to decide between these two options: virtue makes the end correct. The point I wish to show, however, requires us to distinguish how exactly it could be that virtue makes the end correct. The person with virtue ends up desiring the correct end. But is virtue just responsible for the desire, as in thesis (1) above, or is it also responsible for the end itself, as in thesis (2). Here I argue for the latter, focusing on the idea that virtue gives us the end itself (and not merely our desire for it). Resisting the temptation to look elsewhere in the *EE* for evidence in support of this claim, I rely on T8, T9, and T10, the texts central to Aristotle’s explicit consideration of the issue.

According to T9, the reason that virtue must make the end correct is that “neither inference nor reasoning is about [the end].” If inference or reasoning *were* about the end, Aristotle implies, they could make the end correct. How would that happen? Presumably, given a set of possible ends, reasoning would sort through them and identify the right one to pursue. Reasoning does not do this; if it did, Aristotle could not plausibly deny that reasoning had at least some role in making the end correct. But *something* must cause the virtuous person to go for one end and not others. (And again, my focus here is not on the “going for” or the desire, but on the selection of one end in preference to others.) If not reasoning, what could it be?

T10 helpfully posits that “all correctness has as a cause either reason or virtue.” This eliminates the possibility that some third capacity might be responsible for *what* we go for. Reason, as we have seen, is not the cause of the correctness of the end. Virtue must therefore be the cause. And again, this is not an argument about desire but about content: we judge a person’s character, Aristotle reminds us in T10, by the sorts of ends they have, and in doing so, we are judging whether they are virtuous in character or not. Thus (2) holds, and Aristotle has argued for it about as explicitly as one could hope in II.10-11.

So far, we have only seen one of the three progressively stronger theses listed above, all of which I mean to defend in this chapter. I have argued for (2). I now turn to (3), saving (1) for the next section of this chapter. In support of (3), I provide two types of evidence: direct evidence, from examples of ends in the *EE* and from the few direct comments Aristotle makes about the matter, and indirect evidence, consisting of philosophical considerations in favor of the idea that the end can be somewhat specific in the *EE*.

### *B Direct evidence for the specificity of the end*

Commentators on the *EE* take the ends of action to be rather general. For example, Simpson gives “the fine” as an example of the end set by virtue (284), and Moss ends up arguing that ends are fairly general after all.<sup>13</sup>

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13 Though Moss argues that virtue “literally suppl[ies] the content of the goal,” (2011: 225), I go further, showing that the content of the end (Moss’s “goal”) is actually often quite specific. Thus I object that Moss does not give virtue enough work to do, at least where the *EE* is concerned.

On the other hand, Vasiliou argues that virtue has *too* much to do according to Moss, at least in her 2012 book. He focuses on the specificity of the mean. In his review of *Aristotle on the Apparent Good*, Vasiliou contrasts Moss’s assertions that virtue supplies the content of our ends with the examples of the end she gives: “[the end] is simply ‘the mean’ or ‘the best’ or ‘the fine.’” His complaint is that the end set by virtue cannot be “the mean,” when the mean varies so considerably depending on the circumstances. “In actual deliberation one typically does not know beforehand that the issue is simply *how* angry to feel, but also *whether* to feel angry as opposed to, for example, compassionate or fearful” (377-378).

A first reading of the evidence in the *EE* seems to suggest otherwise. In examples scattered throughout the text, Aristotle rarely mentions such general ends as the fine, happiness, or the mean, preferring instead to give more concrete examples. And in the accounts of the individual virtues in *EE* III, Aristotle gives extensive explanations not so much of the kinds of things people aim at but of the kinds of pleasures and pains they aim to pursue or avoid. These pleasures and pains, in turn, give us insight into the sorts of goals that agents might have. Even when Aristotle focuses on happiness as the ultimate end for human beings, he indicates that in our actions, our ends are more specific. I discuss these three kinds of direct evidence in turn.

First, let us look to mundane examples of ends. Aristotle often gives an example of an everyday end in pursuit of some more distal goal. At 1226b28, collecting one's money is a reason for walking, though of course collecting one's money would conduce to wealth, perhaps. A bit earlier, Aristotle suggests that someone might walk or sit for the sake of health (1226a8). Does such a person aim to walk, or is the aim rather for her health? We can hardly argue in favor of one or other exclusively: surely someone walking to be healthy aims both to walk and to be healthy. Other examples seem to bear out this idea that people often have multiple ends: wealth and pleasure, where no method of attainment is given, are ends at 1227a5-13, and making money or taking risks, quite generally, are aimed at the for the sake of being happy (again, 1226a8ff.). We do not need to choose, in other words, between proximate and distal ends, because Aristotle sensibly recognizes that people have ends of all sorts of generality in the doing of a certain action – and they have these variously general ends at one and the same time.

Second, look to *EE* III, where Aristotle often describes virtuous and vicious agents in terms of the things in which they characteristically take pleasure or experience pain. Courage is “about one’s fears”;<sup>14</sup> temperance is eminently about pleasures and pains; mild-manneredness is about rousing your spirit (or being roused?) at the right things; and liberality is about reacting (rejoicing, etc.) “as one ought” (“as reasoning bids”) to gains or losses. Such experiences of pleasures and pains come only with very specific circumstances attached. That is, we cannot say that someone is courageous just because they feel pleasure in aiming at happiness, broadly construed. Perhaps – as in the specific examples just given – they *do* aim at happiness, but to be courageous, a specific situation must obtain and they must take pleasure or feel pain in the right way in that specific situation. The same goes for the other virtues listed here, and Aristotle’s repeated invocations of pleasure and pain in his characterizations of the virtues shows us that he means the point to be quite general.

Third, and in general, when discussing happiness as a goal of human life, Aristotle tends to talk about its constituent parts, or that which conduces to it. Thus at the beginning of the *EE*, good health (εὐεξία) is one of the goods in which living well (τὸ ζῆν εὖ) consists, and can be brought about by “eating meat and taking a walk after a meal” (I.2, 1214b12-13, 23-24). These are examples of ends conducing to happiness, and these ends – the eating and the walking, not the living well – are the ones that we pursue in our everyday actions. When Aristotle narrows the definition of happiness to the best of the human πρακτά (things achievable by action), he draws a distinction between two applications of the term. The healthy and the lucrative are achievable by action, but so are health and wealth themselves. He classifies the second pair as that for the sake of which we act (ὧν ἕνεκα πράττομεν) and

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14 See however discussion below regarding III.1 on the fine and reason in the account of courage.

the first pair as things that we do for their sake (ἅ τούτων ἔνεκα) (I.7, 1217a35-40). We take walks and eat meat, then, for the sake of health. The pursuit of health (ὕγεια) through medicine recurs throughout the text.

Sometimes, though, Aristotle seems to have a more general goal in mind. Consider the closing lines of Aristotle’s polemic against Plato in *EE* I, where Aristotle argues that the common good is not achievable by action (I.8, 1218a38-b3). It cannot be, because each of the crafts aims at something in particular, not at the same (i.e. common) good. The actions in which the craft consists aim at that for the sake of which the craft is practiced. Medicine, for example, aims at health (I.8, 1218b2-3). So far, the theory I defended above holds: we act in pursuit of *goals*, plural (like health or wealth), not – or not only – in pursuit of some more general and singular good.

Continue reading, however, and Aristotle seems to speak to the contrary, of some singular good. He reminds us that we are looking for the “good itself” (αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν) by which he means εὐδαιμονία, earlier defined as the “best of the things achievable by human action” (I.7, 1217a39-40). It is, he says, “that for the sake of which, in the sense of the goal; the best thing; the cause of the things under it; and that which is primary to everything. So the good itself will be this: the goal (τὸ τέλος) of all achievable by human action” (I.8, 1218b10-12).<sup>15</sup>

Here and elsewhere, we should not take Aristotle’s singular language to imply that the goal of *action* is indeed some one, singular thing. Rather, the goal of all *achievable by human action* is singular: happiness, or virtue, or just “the good,” though as we see at the end of the passage, Aristotle’s dialectic has not yet arrived at a conclusion as to the number of

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15 τὸ δ’ οὗ b10 ἔνεκα ὡς τέλος ἄριστον καὶ αἴτιον τῶν ὑφ’ αὐτὸ καὶ πρῶτον πάντων. ὥστε τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρακτῶν.

goods. *EE I* closes by asking the question directly: “Regarding the human good as goal and the best of things achievable by action, we must consider in how many ways the best of all things is, since this is the best” (I.8, 1218b25-27).<sup>16</sup>

In *EE II* and *III*, Aristotle decides decisively in favor of the plural interpretation I introduced above: we act for the sake of many different goals, each the end of some of the particular actions that we take.<sup>17</sup>

### *C Indirect evidence for the specificity of the end*

I now consider additional evidence that the ends set by virtue are often somewhat specific.

#### 1. Practices of praise and blame

Look back to T10 above. Aristotle points out that we praise people for what they aim at, not for how they plan to get there. We might call someone clever in pursuit of any sort of goal, but praise for *character*, in particular, usually concerns the sorts of things people go for. But given that, how could our ends be very general? To adequately assess the moral quality of someone’s ends, surely we would need to know a great deal about them, not just that they are aiming at happiness or the fine but that they are acting in pursuit of what they deem to be the courageous, the generous, or the considerate thing to do. If the end that virtue makes correct were always quite general, then our judgements of people would seem to be limited to two appellations: virtuous for those who aimed at the fine, and vicious for those

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16 τὸ δ’ ὡς τέλος ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν πρακτῶν, σκεπτέον ποσαχῶς τὸ ἄριστον πάντων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο ἄριστον

17 This is not to exclude the possibility of acting for several ends at once. The picture I develop of *προαίρεσις* in the next chapter is also open to this possibility.

who did not. Aristotle seems to intend a much greater complexity of judgement in T10, and our own experience suggests that this is the case.

## 2. The natural virtues

Though the *EE* does not discuss the natural virtues at length, they do have some currency in the work, in particular in *EE* III.7, when Aristotle considers mean states that are not virtues.

Though all these mean points are praiseworthy, they are not virtues, nor are their opposites vices, since they do not involve decision. They all fall under the classification of affections, since each of them is a certain affection. But because they are natural they contribute to the natural virtues [τὰς φυσικὰς συμβάλλεται ἀρετᾶς]. As will be discussed in what follows, each virtue in a way exists both naturally [φύσει] and, in conjunction with [practical] wisdom, otherwise.<sup>18</sup>

Much more could be written about this passage: it is the only place where Aristotle separates the class of mean points from the class of the virtues, and it is one of only a few places where the idea of the natural virtues surfaces. But here we should note that the mean points that are not virtues must involve the pursuit of certain ends. Aristotle has just summarized several such non-virtuous, non-vicious mean points: they like the actual virtues concern correct action in a given situation. They differ from the virtues, as we see here, because προαίρεσις has no part in them. What does Aristotle mean by this? It seems that he must mean that these mean points involve correct aiming, but they do not involve reasoning. And if no reasoning is involved in the actions that come from such mean points, then the state of character that they represent must alone be responsible for setting the correct ends. More generally, in any state of natural virtue (which is distinct from proper virtue in that it is not accompanied by developed reason), virtue alone gets the agent to take the right action. If

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<sup>18</sup> *EE* III.7, 1234a24-30; translation Inwood and Woolf

virtue had the capacity only to make us *desire* ends and not also to set them – or if virtue could only set quite general ends – neither natural virtue nor the “mere” mean points would have a theoretical basis in Aristotle’s ethics. Thus the passage above, and the general idea of natural virtue, supports (3) and (2) over just (1).

### 3. The lack of an account of φρόνησις

Though I will discuss the role of reason at length in the following chapter, it is worth noting here that the lack of a sophisticated account of φρόνησις in the *EE* fits with the picture developed above about specific ends. The *EE*’s silence in this regard might lead us to a conclusion like that of Jessica Moss, who argues in her book that in both ethical works virtue gives us our ends (2012). Her treatment of φρόνησις has been a target of criticism, however, especially in Vasiliou’s review.<sup>19</sup> Since Moss’s thesis regarding the end-setting capacity of virtue is somewhat weaker than my own, it follows – if my argument succeeds – that Moss could have developed a much stronger argument if she had been writing only about the *EE*.

We can take a more general look at the issue by broadening the topic from φρόνησις to the intellectual virtues in general. In the special books, the *EE* never discusses or even lists the intellectual virtues. From the list of five such virtues at *NE* VI.3, 1139b16-17, we find surprisingly little about σοφία (“theoretical wisdom”) and especially about φρόνησις (“practical wisdom”) in the *EE* proper. Of course, τέχνη (“skill”), ἐπιστήμη (“knowledge”),

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19 Vasiliou argues that Moss (2012) implicitly concedes that φρόνησις involves deliberation about ends: “She agrees that *phronêsis* must determine things such as ‘what the fine is,’ ‘what the generous is,’ and ‘what the best is.’ But then she offers no reason for denying that this sort of deliberation is a deliberation about what the end is. At this point she virtually concedes that Aristotelian deliberation *is* about ends, only we should not say so” (378, Vasiliou’s emphasis). Again, “on page 195 she claims that the *phronimos* is involved in ‘identifying what is fine in the circumstances’. It is true that a good person does not deliberate about *whether* to pursue the fine, but that is something with which many Intellectualists agree. The position seems to boil down to an insistence not to call deliberation about ends what it is” (379).

and νοῦς (“intellect”) appear now and then throughout these books, the latter notably in the rather arcane concluding discussion at *EE* VIII.3, 1249a21-1249b25. As for σοφία, Aristotle uses it in only three contexts: adjectivally to exemplify a virtue of thought in *EE* II.1 with συνετός (“intelligent”) at 1220a6 and δεινός (“clever”) at 1220a12; as non-virtue-theoretic “expertise” at *EE* VII.10, 1243b33-34; and in the difficult *EE* VIII.2 passage on the φροníμων καὶ σοφῶν (1248a35).

Defined as deliberative excellence in the *NE*, φρόνησις should interest us most. But we find no account of φρόνησις in the *EE*. The *EE* considers deliberation as a matter of course and not as a virtue, or as a capacity to be perfected. Nor does the φρόνιμος (the person with excellent βούλευσις) play an important role in the *EE*: Aristotle uses the word once in *EE* III on the individual virtues (μεγαλοψυχία, III.5, 1232a36, acting as the φρόνιμος would), once in *EE* VII.2 on friendship (1236a5, to contrast with a foolish person), and then at *EE* VIII.1, 1246b33: “the non-rational [parts?] of φρόνιμοι people have good ἔξεις” (Aristotle uses φροníμως in the preceding discussion, 1246a26-b32) and then twice in VIII.2, again as a contrast case (1247a29) and then in the discussion of people who excel beyond reason through some special ability (1248a35). In none of these cases, as should be clear from my descriptions of them, do we find a proper account of φρόνησις. It almost seems as if Aristotle uses the word casually, even interchangeably with the other words for the human being’s intellectual capacity. Oddly, the scarcity of φρόνησις in the *EE* seems to have gone largely unnoticed in the secondary literature, with the exception of a recent paper given by

Christopher Rowe.<sup>20</sup> No doubt commentators' propensity to treat the *EE* and *NE* together accounts for much of this oversight.<sup>21</sup>

If ends in the *EE* can be somewhat specific, then we can begin to explain why Aristotle may have been less concerned to develop his account of deliberative excellence in the work. Allowing virtue to do more of the work lets Aristotle present a quite limited account of practical reasoning.

#### *D Courage and the fine*

The evidence we have seen, throughout the special books of the *EE*, supports the idea that the ends set by virtue are, at least some of the time, somewhat specific. Toward the end of his discussion of courage, however, Aristotle seems to support the opposite thesis, namely, that all virtuous actions are done for the sake of the fine.

T11: But since every virtue is προαιρετική (and we have already said how we mean this), because [virtue] makes everyone αἰρεῖσθαι for the sake of something, and because the that-for-the-sake-of-which is this, the fine, it is clear that courage too, being a virtue, will make a person endure fearful things for the sake of something, and [he will do this] neither from ignorance, since virtue makes him judge more correctly, nor from pleasure,

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20 “*EE* does not distinguish reflective activity for its own sake from practical reflection; rather the reverse, insofar as φρόνησις as well as θεωρία seems to be implied to belong to the mysterious θεωρητικόν” (2018). Rowe cites *EE* VIII.3, 1249b11-13 on the θεωρητικόν and II.10, 1226b25-26 on its importance in the soul. He contrasts the role of φρόνησις in the *EE* with the situation in the *NE*, where “the definition of the human good at I.7, 1098a16-18 includes a provision for X.8, 1178a12-13’s idea that εὐδαιμονία is in accordance with the highest kind of ἀρετή.”

21 For example, when addressing what she considers the strongest evidence that virtue may be in part rational – namely, that virtue is a ἔξις προαιρετική – Moss cites *EE* III.1, 1230a27-29 alone to argue that “Virtue is a prohairetic state in that its function is to make decisions correct (cf. 1144a86-9), although because it controls only one component of decisions, the ends, it needs the help of something else – *phronêsis* – to fulfill its function” (2011: 210). See the next sub-section for an argument against taking the III.1 passage as direct evidence. Even if we do, though, Moss’s assumption that the *EE* and *NE* largely agree on the topics discussed in this half of the dissertation is problematic.

but because of the fine, since if something is not fine but crazy one does not endure it, for that would be shameful.<sup>22</sup>

Aristotle twice identifies τὸ καλόν as the that-for-the-sake-of-which involved in προαίρεσις. This comes as a surprise, since as we have already seen, other evidence points to προαίρεσις being for the sake of all sorts of ends, ends that are at most derivative of the fine. Approaching T11 from the *NE*, commentators tend to see it as good evidence for a *NE*-based view on which the that-for-the-sake-of-which is always the fine. For example, Jessica Moss interprets the passage as a warning about the importance of reasoning for particularly difficult situations.<sup>23</sup>

We should consider this passage an outlier when dealing with προαίρεσις and the fine because it explicitly refers back to and depends on an earlier *EE* discussion that does not

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22 III.1, 1230a26-33: ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ προαιρετικὴ, τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἔνεκά τινος πάντα αἰρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τὸ καλόν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετὴ a30 τις οὔσα ἔνεκά τινος ποιήσῃ τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε δι' ἄγνοιαν, ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν, οὔτε δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεὶ ἂν γε μὴ καλόν ἦ ἀλλὰ μανικόν οὐχ ὑπομένει· αἰσχρὸν γάρ.

23 Moss: “intellect’s role is to tell us which things are fine, i.e. which things count as fine in a given situation. A person with good character will wish for the fine, but without the right *logos* (i.e. without *phronêsis*) may wind up (e.g.) pursuing extreme dangers to no one’s benefit, and hence acting rashly instead of courageously” (2012: 176n54). In favor of this conclusion, Moss cites the evidence she has assembled, which comes from both ethical works and beyond. She also refers specifically to *NE* X.9: “even before he listens to *logos* a properly habituated person ‘loves the fine’ (is φιλόκαλον, 1179b8), and while *logos* urges the decent person to pursue the fine (προτρέπειεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, 1180a7), he will obey only because he is already ‘living for the fine’ (πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσῃν, 1180a10-11)” (221n43).

Moss needs to restrict the specificity of virtue’s end-setting to allow for the much fuller picture of φρόνησις in the *NE*. In general, Moss’s strategy of lumping the *EE* special books in with the *NE* seems to give her too general a view of the end set by virtue of character in the *EE*.

seem to exist.<sup>24</sup> In the III.1 passage, Aristotle twice identifies τὸ καλόν as the that-for-the-sake-of-which virtuous people αἰρεῖσθαι:

1. “[virtue] makes everyone αἰρεῖσθαι for the sake of something, and . . . the that-for-the-sake-of-which is this, the fine” (τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ καλόν)<sup>25</sup>
2. “courage will make a person endure fearful things for the sake of something, because of the fine” (ἡ ἀνδρεία ἕνεκά τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστ[ε]. . . ὅτι καλόν)

The import of the second passage depends on that of the first, since Aristotle introduces the idea in the first passage and then simply applies it to courage in the second. The robustness of the argument in the first passage depends on how we take the ὅτι in a28. The most logical reading separates ὅτι from the preceding phrase (“we have already said how we mean this”).<sup>26</sup> Call this Reading A. According to Reading A, the ὅτι phrase gives us new information, and there is no implication that “we have already said” that “virtue makes everyone select for the sake of the fine.” I have rendered the passage accordingly above (see T11). But if we read the passage as bracketed by the OCT and Susemihl (Reading B), we might well wonder where we can look before III.1 to see a connection between what is προαιρετικός and the selection of the fine as that-for-the-sake-of-which. It seems that

24 But see the broader discussion of courage and reason in the *EE*: III.1.12-14 (courage in conformity with reason, reason bidding us to choose what is fine), 20-21 (there is a fact of the matter about what is to be feared), 24-25 (the coward and the reckless going wrong because they think wrongly about what is fearful, whereas the courageous person thinks exactly the truth), and 28 (against Socrates, courageous people know how to mitigate danger).

25 Here, ἐστι identifies τοῦτό (predicated of τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) with τὸ καλόν. Kenny’s translation inappropriately softens the point, as τὸ καλόν becomes “what is noble” (2011): “[Virtue] makes a man choose everything for the sake of some end, and the end is what is noble”

26 I have Julia Annas to thank for suggesting this reading of the passage and thus clarifying a seemingly empty reference.

Reading A is the only logical route. We can see this – and the impossibility of Reading B – by looking to the only two passages earlier in the *EE* that discuss what is προαιρετικός.<sup>27</sup> In neither does Aristotle make a connection to the fine.

First, at I.5, 1216a24-26, the πολιτικός does fine actions προαιρετικός for their own sake (τῶν καλῶν πράξεων προαιρετικὸς αὐτῶν χάριν). Though it is not entirely clear what προαιρετικός means in this context, we can perhaps say that he προαιρεῖται fine actions for their own sakes. Now this passage is remarkable because Aristotle does not even mention in the *EE* that one can decide on actions for their own sakes. But setting that point aside, note that this passage cannot be the target of back-reference in III.1 on either reading: there is no connection between virtue (much less every virtue) and what is προαιρετικός (as Reading A requires), and there is no sequence of αἰρεῖσθαι, that-for-the-sake-of-which, and the fine (as Reading B would suggest there should be). Thus while interesting, this passage is not the referent of the III.1 passage; nor does it add to the new information we find in III.1.

We also find προαιρετική in Aristotle's final definition of virtue at the end of II.10 (1227b8-10). There, virtue is προαιρετική, but it is προαιρετική of the mean, not of the fine.<sup>28</sup> However, the surrounding discussion (in II.10-11) seems to be the logical referent of III.1: II.10-11 has an extensive discussion of virtue and προαίρεσις, so if we follow Reading A, we can parse III.1's reference. But perhaps Aristotle does make a connection between the fine and virtue or προαίρεσις in II.10-11, thus making Reading B possible?<sup>29</sup> In fact Aristotle

27 See also III.6, where the μεγαλοπρεπής is also προαιρετικός (1233a37). This example does not concern the fine, and at any rate, it comes after the lines with which we are concerned.

28 Cf. the connection drawn between προαίρεσις and the mean at II.5, 1222a31.

29 As Simpson does (56n12), but we have already seen that *EE* II.11 contains no link between the fine and the that-for-the-sake-of-which. (It does of course discuss the that-for-the-sake-of-which, and presumably this explains Simpson's note.)

brings up the fine only once in his discussion of virtue and προαίρεσις in II.10-11, at II.11, 1228a5-8. He there uses the voluntariness of fine actions as a premise in an argument that virtue and vice are voluntary. But he draws no direct connection between the fine and the the-for-the-sake-of-which involved in προαίρεσις and virtue, as Reading B would suggest. On the contrary, II.11 repeats the idea in the definition at the close of II.10: προαίρεσις is for the sake of the mean, not for the sake of the fine (II.11, 1227b37-38). Once again, we are left with Reading A, and the III.1 passage stands alone as the first connection of virtue to the fine.

Suppose we take T11 (on Reading A) as Eudemian evidence that Aristotle considers ends to be general. We may understand this as follows: while the ends of our actions are themselves often quite specific, they may well have a connection to our final end. At the end of the next chapter, I consider what Aristotle has to say about reflection on our own ultimate ends. Clearly such reflection could yield the connection needed to explain the III.1 passage. But an easier explanation is at hand: surely deliberation about a more general end can result in more specific ends being adopted. Repeating such a process could lead to a connection between the ends of our actions – however specific they may be – and a general goal such as the fine.

## II Types of goods and types of agents

As we have seen so far in this chapter, states of character underlie certain desires, which aim at apparent goods.<sup>30</sup> In order to understand how those desires bring about action – the purpose of the next chapter – we first need to see Aristotle's more detailed account of

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30 VII.2, 1235b24-1236a15, especially 1235b25-26 (τὸ γὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλευτὸν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν) and 1236a9-10. Cf. II.10, 1227a25.

which states of character involve desires for which types of goods. Following the focus of the next chapter, we will concentrate on what goods Aristotle assigns to the virtuous agent.

Aristotle tells us that τὰ ἀγαθὰ are πλεοναχῶς, that the good is (or is said) in many ways (VII.2, 1236a7). To clarify the concept and its usage, he presents two distinct divisions of good in the *EE*. One division, found primarily in *EE* VII.2, separates what is “good for” someone from what is “good without qualification.” This division aims to isolate what is truly good from what is good only in certain circumstances or for certain people. It also distinguishes two ways in which we use the word “good.”<sup>31</sup>

The other division, on the other hand, is central to *EE* VIII.3 and specifies *types* of goods. Aristotle singles out goods worth choosing for themselves as particularly important. These will be a subset of all apparent goods, which are all of the goods we desire.<sup>32</sup> Aristotle then divides the category of goods worth choosing for themselves into natural goods and fine goods.

We will now focus on this second division, among types of goods. Once we understand what types of goods there are,<sup>33</sup> it will be easier to see the first division, between “good without qualification” and “good-for,” which I return to only at the end of the section.

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31 Aristotle makes a similar distinction between the βουλευτόν (the object of βούλησις) ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν and the βουλευτόν ἐκάστω at *NE* III.4, 1113a22-24.

32 VII.2, 1235b25-26 (τὸ γὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλευτόν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν). Cf. VII.2, 1236a9-10 and II.10, 1227a25.

33 I do not mention the “external goods” (τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ) familiar from the *NE* here. But they do come up twice in the *EE*, programmatically at II.1, 1218b32 (where he divides all goods into goods in the soul and external goods) and in passing at VIII.3, 1249a15. With reference to the divisions discussed here, τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ will be any goods that are not the fine goods, that is, both the natural goods and other, merely apparent goods. Notably, the *EE* II.1 division works better with *EE* VII-VIII as explained here than would *NE*’s tripartite division of goods (I.8, 1098b12-14).

Aristotle discusses types of goods most thoroughly in the third chapter of *EE* VIII. In that chapter, Aristotle begins his discussion of types of goods at 1248b16-25, where he mentions goods “worth choosing for their own sakes” (τὰ αὐτῶν ἔνεκά αἰρετὰ ἀγαθά).<sup>34</sup> All of these are good (1248b24-25) and goals (of action, we may assume; 1248b18-19), but only some are also fine, viz. the ones that are praiseworthy<sup>35</sup> on their own account and the ones which produce praiseworthy actions (1248b19-21). Health, strength and acting strongly are examples of goods “worth choosing for their own sakes” that are merely good (and not fine). Aristotle seems to keep these three examples in mind when he goes on to discuss “natural goods” (τὰ φύσει ἀγαθά).<sup>36</sup> He does this in the very next lines, contrasting natural goods with fine goods (τὰ καλὰ ἀγαθά, 1248b26-37). Because of the parallel examples and the textual proximity, it seems likely that we may identify as natural goods all those goods worth

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34 Aristotle only discusses the idea of “goods worth choosing for their own sakes” here, though, so its relation to other types of goods is unclear.

35 Woods translates ἐπαινετὰ in VIII.3, 1248b20-25 as “commended,” instead of “lauded” or “praised” (174, cf. II.6, 1223a10), in an attempt to capture the moral quality of the admiration.

36 See the examples listed in the table above: health and strength seem paradigmatic examples of “virtues of the body” (at 1248b28-29) and “goods of the body” (at 1249b16-21). Bonasio argues to the contrary that “health itself is not a natural good” (107n199), but at least here at 1248b23-26, Aristotle seems to imply that it is. Health and strength, he says, are not fine goods, because their actions are not praiseworthy. Again, since Aristotle has just been contrasting fine goods and goods worth choosing for their own sakes, health seems to belong to the latter category and not the former. It would be odd if health and strength were in some third category of goods worth choosing for their own sakes, apart from fine goods and natural goods, even though Aristotle explicitly lists the virtues of the body (σώματος ἀρεταί) as examples of natural goods at 1248b28-29.

choosing for their own sakes that are merely good and not also fine.<sup>37</sup> Finally, goods that are not worth choosing for their own sakes might well be classed as merely apparent goods,

A few examples will help to clarify the distinctions just drawn. In addition to implying that health, strength and acting strongly are examples of natural goods, Aristotle explicitly lists honor, wealth, virtues of the body, good fortune, and power (1248b28-29), as well as goods of the body or money or friends or other goods (1249b16-21).<sup>38</sup> Natural goods can be harmful due to (bad) character (1248b30-34: διὰ τὰς ἑξεις, e.g., being foolish, unjust, intemperate). This is not true of fine goods, which are the virtues and virtuous actions (1248b36-37 and 1248b21-23: justice and just actions; temperance and temperate actions). But Aristotle complicates this simple enumeration of fine goods by saying that, actually or in a way, any goods are fine when the aim in acting and selecting them is fine (1249a5-7). For example, whatever is τὸ πρέπον (the fitting, i.e., for the noble person), whether wealth, good birth, or power (1249a9-10), will also be fine. Finally, there are also apparent goods (quite generally, objects of desire)<sup>39</sup> that are neither natural goods nor fine goods, and therefore not worth choosing for their own sakes. Aristotle twice seems to mention examples of such merely apparent goods: what departs from nature (παρὰ φύσιν) and is a corruption (II.10, 1227a21-22), and perhaps even the naturally bad things (τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ) mentioned at VII.2, 1238a16-19. On this last point, though some people choose not to have them, perhaps

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37 In the Aristotelian corpus, the expression τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ occurs only in the *EE* special books, mainly in VIII.3 but also in VII.2. The single occurrences at *NE* IX.9, 1169b20 (since the εὐδαίμων possesses natural goods, he must have friends) and at *Rhetoric* I.9.17, 1366b38 (things that are naturally good, and not good for a particular individual, are fine, καλὰ) do not seem to carry any theoretical weight (Bonasio 83-84, 83n166). “Natural goods” occurs in the *EE* in VII.2 at 1237b31 and 1238a17; and in VIII.3 at 1248b27, 1248b40, 1249a1, 1249a7, 1249a26, and 1249b17.

38 VII.2, however, seems to exclude friends from the natural goods (1237b30-34 and 1238a16-19).

39 VII.2, 1235b25-26; Cf. VII.2, 1236a9-10 and II.10, 1227a25

others do not so choose. These things are involved in bad fortune, perhaps especially so for the people for whom they are apparent goods.

Now I turn to the types of people for whom various goods are good, in pursuit of an understanding of what goods are good for the virtuous person. As a preface to his discussion of natural goods in VIII.3, Aristotle introduces what is fine (καλά). He addresses the relationship between what is merely good and what is fine and between the merely good person (ὁ ἀγαθός) and the noble person (ὁ καλοκάγαθος). This passage occupies the lines following the discussion of natural goods just mentioned:

T12: A person is noble because good things that are fine are hers on their own account<sup>40</sup> and because she is the sort who does fine actions also<sup>41</sup> on their own account. And both the virtues and the actions that come from the virtues are fine.

There is a civic state of character, such as the Spartans have and other similar people might have. It is a state of character of this sort: there are those who think they should have virtue, but [they think they should have it] for the sake of the natural goods. So they are good people, for the natural goods are good for them, but they do not have nobility. For the things that are fine on their own account [τὰ καλὰ δι' αὐτά] do not belong to them, which things the noble choose. And not only these things, but also things that are not fine by nature but are good by nature are fine for them. For things are fine when that for the sake of which they act and choose is fine [οὗ ἕνεκα . . . καλὸν ᾗ].<sup>42</sup>

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40 Woods: "A person is fine-and-good because, among goods, those that are fine *for themselves* belong to him." This proposal would make most sense, with 1249a3, if it is true that what is good without qualification is fine. I suggest this below. My translation makes most sense in conjunction with the criterion (2) below, which is also supported by 1248b35-36 and 1249a13-14. Either translation therefore has support elsewhere.

41 Spengel brackets this καί, though Rowe, the OCT, and Susemihl include it. The OCT notes καί II: *idque* Λ<sup>1</sup>: om. Λ<sup>3</sup>. (Rowe and Susemihl do not have this note.) As I discuss below, it is unclear whether the noble person does fine actions only for their own sake or whether she does fine actions both for the sake of some natural good and for the sake of the action itself.

Here we learn that the good person is that person for whom the natural goods are good.<sup>43</sup>

Noble people are also good, but they satisfy two additional requirements: (1) things that are fine are theirs on the things' own account<sup>44</sup> and (2) they do fine actions on the actions' own account.<sup>45</sup> By these statements, I take Aristotle to be saying that noble people have fine things and do fine actions at least partly *because* they (the things and the actions respectively) are fine things or actions and not entirely for some other reason or reasons. We also know from the passages that (3) noble people choose fine things and (4) they act and choose for the sake of a fine end.

Aristotle uses the Spartans as an example of merely good people, since the natural goods are good for them. They “think they should have virtue” for the sake of natural goods. Thus if in fact they do have virtue, they would not have it on its own account, and so they would not satisfy (1). Nor would they fulfill (2), because any virtuous actions they performed would not be performed on their own account, but for the sake of some natural good. The *EE*, however, never says that the Spartans do have virtue or perform virtuous actions.<sup>46</sup> And

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43 1249a1-2; see also VIII.3, 1248b26-27.

44 I will later clarify that the “things that are fine” are, properly speaking, only the virtues. Woods may disagree with me here, as he argues that virtuous actions are primary and virtuous dispositions only derivatively fine. Since “virtues are dispositions to act with a view to what is fine,” Woods remarks that “[i]t seems that virtuous dispositions are properly regarded as fine because they lead to fine actions, and not conversely” (176).

45 (2) is also supported by VIII.3, 1249a13-14: things that are good without qualification are fine for the noble person, who “does many fine actions on their own account (πολλάς γὰρ καὶ καλὰς πράξεις δι' αὐτὰ ἔπραξεν).

46 I disagree here with Kenny and Simpson. Kenny argues that Spartans have virtue but do not satisfy criteria (1) and (2): “Spartans are virtuous people, and so they perform virtuous actions for their own sake, because they are the acts that virtue requires. But their evaluation of virtue differs from that of the noble person. To the second-order question ‘what is the point of being virtuous?’ Spartans answer, ‘Because virtue pays’; the noble person answers, ‘Because virtue is splendid and noble’” (note to 1248b38).

if we look back to *EE* III, we can see why: it turns out that the possession of virtue requires (1), and a person needs to satisfy (2) in order to perform the actions that come from virtue.<sup>47</sup>

Two passages, both in *EE* III, establish these claims by discussing the relationship of virtue to the fine. While we must here rely on *EE* III, there is no reason to doubt either that Aristotle thinks the ideas generalize to virtues beyond courage (indeed, he says this in the second passage) or that the point is valid throughout the *EE* and not just in *EE* III.

T13: Courage is in accordance with reason [τῷ λόγῳ], and reason bids a person to select what is fine [τὸ καλὸν]. . . . Only the person who is fearless on account of what is fine [διὰ τὸ καλὸν] is courageous. . . . Reason does not bid someone to endure things that are very painful and destructive unless they are fine [καλὰ].<sup>48</sup>

T14: [Virtue] makes one select everything for the sake of something, and this “that for the sake of which” is what is fine [τὸ καλόν]. It is clear that courage, being a virtue, will make a person endure what is fearful for the sake of something, not through ignorance [δι’ ἄγνοιαν], for virtue makes a person judge more correctly, nor through pleasure [δι’ ἡδονήν] but because it

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Simpson develops a quite different point because he thinks that Aristotle’s discussion of the Spartans in the *Politics* and *NE* “makes the point [in the *EE*] plain” (290, citing *Politics* II.9, 1271b3-6 and VII.15, 1334a19-34 as well as *NE* X.7, 1177b4-6 and 12-15). He seems to think not only that the Spartans have virtue but also that they would satisfy criteria (1) and (2). They are not noble, he argues, because they do not have the “virtues of leisure,” exemplified by “the virtue of philosophy,” though they have the “virtues of occupation,” notably bravery: “virtuous acts, like most acts, can have two ends: the immediate end that is internal to the act, and the remote end that is the sort of life for which the act is done.” The Spartan “intend[s] the nobility of the act” and “holds bravery to be a noble thing”; “[t]he gentleman, by contrast, is brave for the sake of a life of virtue.” “He intends not only, like the Spartan, the nobility or beauty of each act of virtue, but also the nobility or beauty of a whole life of virtue, and especially of the virtue of philosophy . . . [T]he Spartan has virtue piecemeal . . . but the gentleman has it in its fullness” (290-291). As will become clear, I disagree on a number of points: Aristotle does not think that merely good people have fine ends; he does not classify ends strictly as internal to the act and as the kind of life intended; and Aristotle seems to have a unity-of-the-virtues thesis in the *EE*.

47 Woolf’s commentary drew my attention to this point (175-176).

48 III.1, 1229a1-2, 4, 8-9: ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολούθησις τῷ λόγῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἰρεῖσθαι κελεύει. . . . ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ καλὸν ἄφοβος καὶ ἀνδρεῖος μόνος. . . . ὁ δὲ λόγος τὰ μεγάλα λυπηρὰ καὶ φθαρτικὰ οὐ κελεύει ὑπομένειν, ἂν μὴ καλὰ ᾖ.

is fine [ὅτι καλόν], since if it were not fine but mad one does not endure it. For that would be shameful.<sup>49</sup>

A note on my translation: I consistently render τὸ καλόν as “what is fine.” Since Aristotle regularly switches between expressions with the definite article and those without, it seems unlikely that he has a distinction in mind between “the fine” and “what is fine.”<sup>50</sup> Now a keen reader of the *NE* will have noticed that the expression τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα (“for the sake of the fine” or “for the sake of what is fine”), familiar from *NE* III and IV, is notably absent here and throughout the *EE*.<sup>51</sup> We might think this significant.<sup>52</sup> However, instead of just substituting τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα for the *EE*’s preferred διὰ τὸ καλόν and ὅτι καλόν, the *NE* uses these *Eudemian* locutions as well.<sup>53</sup> And, as in the *EE*, there appears to be no principled distinction governing this variable usage. I therefore think it unwise in either work to draw a sharp distinction either between τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα and the other expressions, or between phrases using the article with καλόν and those leaving it out.

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49 III.1, 1230a29-33: ἕνεκά τινος πάντα αἰρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὐδ' ἕνεκα, τὸ καλόν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετὴ αἰσθάνεται τις οὐσα ἕνεκά τινος ποιήσῃ τὰ φοβερά ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε δι' ἄγνοιαν, ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν, οὔτε δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεὶ ἂν γε μὴ καλὸν ἦ

50 Against Simpson, who thinks that people are virtuous for the sake of *the* noble in the *EE* (290; emphasis mine)

51 We find the expression in a general form at *NE* IV.1, 1120a23-24 (also a28): “Actions in accordance with the virtues are fine and for the sake of the fine.” It also occurs in particular discussions of ἀσωτία (IV.1, 1121b4-5), μεγαλοπρέπεια and its opposite (IV.2, 1122b6-7 and 1123a24-25), and of course courage: “While [the courageous person] will fear [things a human being can endure], he will endure them as he should and according to reason [ὡς ὁ λόγος] for the sake of the fine. For this is the end of virtue” (*NE* III.7, 1115b11-13, see also b22).

52 One familiar objection to the idea that the good person acts for the sake of the fine is that the fine might then take happiness’s place as the ultimate end. If one is especially concerned with this problem, perhaps the *EE*’s avoidance of τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα offers a way out.

53 The good person acts διὰ τὸ καλόν at *NE* III.8, 1116b31 and 1117a8, and at *NE* IX.8, 1168a33-34. Acting ὅτι καλόν is common in *NE* III.8 (and at *NE* X.8, 1178b13).

Let us return to the substance of the two passages quoted above. T14 begins with Aristotle's clearest statement that τὸ καλὸν is the that-for-the-sake-of-which of virtuous actions (τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οἷ ἔνεκα, τὸ καλόν). Aristotle also says that the courageous are fearless "on account of what is fine [διὰ τὸ καλόν]," that they endure what is fearful "because it is fine [ὅτι καλόν]," and that the virtuous person in general selects everything that he selects (πάντα) for the sake of [οἷ ἔνεκα] what is fine.

These passages from *EE* III.1 (T13 and T14) tell us more about which people are noble. VIII.3 laid out two criteria for the noble person, besides being good: (1) things that are fine are theirs on the things' own account and (2) they do fine actions on the actions' own account. Aristotle's descriptions of the courageous person's actions in particular and the virtuous person's selections in general makes it clear that virtuous people do fine actions at least partly because the actions are *fine*. That is, virtuous people satisfy criterion (2). Criterion (1), on the other hand, concerns virtue, not virtuous actions. But in the III.1 passages here, Aristotle focuses on actions; he does not specifically address in what way virtuous people have virtue. However, it would certainly be surprising if the virtue of the virtuous person did not belong to the person "on its own account," using the phrase from VIII.3. We can safely say that virtue belongs to anyone who is virtuous on its own account. Since the things that are fine are only virtue and virtuous actions (1248b21-23 and 1248b36-37), everyone who is virtuous must satisfy (1) as well: things that are fine belong to them at least partly because those things are *fine* things.

Who is noble, then? People who satisfy (1) and (2) are. And this will be anyone who is virtuous and therefore performs virtuous actions. We can also draw one specific conclusion: the Spartans are not virtuous, since they think that they should have virtue for the sake of

natural goods. They clearly don't satisfy (1), and so not only are they not noble (which we knew), but they do not even have virtue or perform virtuous actions.

One final note regarding the division among types of goods that we have been discussing. Consider the concluding sentence of III.1, 1230a26-33, the second passage translated above: "For things are fine when that for the sake of which people act and choose is fine." As Aristotle goes on to say in VIII.3, this sentence constitutes an addendum to the idea that only virtue and virtuous actions are fine (from 1248b21-23 and 1248b36-37). III.1 has told us that the virtuous person selects everything that she selects for the sake of what is fine. A Stoic might take this claim literally, but where Aristotle is concerned, we can assume that the scope of the claim is limited to the things that the virtuous person does insofar as she is and acts as a virtuous person.<sup>54</sup> Even so, within these limitations, everything that the virtuous person selects will be fine, even when that is not a virtuous action. Aristotle elaborates at VIII.3, 1249a4-17, making it clear that these additional things are fine, but only in the sense that they are fine *for* the noble person.<sup>55</sup>

The difference between what is "fine for" the noble person and what is simply fine reflects a more common division Aristotle makes, between what is "good for" someone and what is "good without qualification." This is the *EE*'s other division of good, as follows:

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54 I owe this clarification to Friedemann Buddensiek.

55 It may be, as Dirlmeier (495) and Woods (177) suggest, that virtues and virtuous actions are τὰ καλὰ δι' αὐτά (e.g. 1249a3), while τὰ ἀπλῶς καλὰ (e.g. *MM* II.9, 1207b34 and *NE* V.9, 1136b22) would describe the other fine things – that is, whatever else is fine through the quality of the noble person's action and choice (495). This possibility would make sense of Aristotle's statement at 1249a2-3 that the Spartans do not have the things that are fine on their own account.

“Good” and “good for” in the *EE* (primarily in VII.2)<sup>56</sup>

| Goods without qualification<br>(τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ) <sup>57</sup>  | Goods for a particular person<br>(τὰ τινί ἀγαθὰ)   |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• are worth choosing (αἰρετὸν, 1236b39-1237a1)</li> <li>• are identical with the things that are pleasant without qualification (1235b32-33)</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• are worth choosing for oneself (1237a1)</li> <li>• are, or could turn out to be, bad<sup>58</sup> (respectively III.1, 1228b17-22 and VII.2, 1236b37, reading ἄν πως τύχη with Rowe and Jackson in the latter)</li> </ul> |

For noble (1237a2) and even good (VIII.3, 1249a12-13) people, these specify the same set of goods.<sup>59</sup>

Though this table draws primarily on *EE* VII.2, Aristotle clearly has the division between “good” and “good for” in mind throughout the treatise. In the following explanation, I compare it with the first table, which detailed the types of goods in the *EE*. I draw the striking – and original – conclusion that the “goods without qualification” mentioned here are identical with the goods that are fine. This identification excludes any goods that are only fine for the noble person, and it eschews the common equation of the natural goods to what is good without qualification.

For any individual, the “goods for that particular person” are, for her, worth choosing. But depending on the person’s character, such goods may be bad, or may turn out to be bad. This is true for the large majority of people: Aristotle writes that goods without

<sup>56</sup> Aristotle draws this distinction at 1235b32, 1236a9-10, and 1236b33-1237a2 (all in VII.2).

<sup>57</sup> “Goods without qualification” occurs in *EE* VII at 1235b32, 1236b37, 1236b39, 1237a5, 1237a13, 1237a17, 1237a32, 1238a6, and 1238b7, and in *EE* VIII at 1249a12, 1249a18, and 1249b25.

<sup>58</sup> Though some of the goods-for non-virtuous people may not actually be bad (or good) per se, they may turn out to be bad because used poorly. Aristotle probably thinks that we can also describe this good-for category in terms of what seems *advantageous* to a person. Though he does not often use that term, see VIII.3, 1249a10-11.

<sup>59</sup> The textually corrupt 1238a4-8 probably supports at least part of this point as well.

qualification “are not good for them,” by which he means οἱ πολλοί, “the many” (VIII.3, 1249a11-12). On the other hand, there are some goods that are simply “good,” though as of yet we cannot make this statement more precise. These are the goods without qualification. Aristotle gives no straightforward indication about *what* the goods without qualification are; however, we do know that the two categories of goods are identical for people who are good and (*a fortiori*) for people who are noble.

I propose that this second division of goods adds to our understanding of the topic of the remainder of this chapter: the noble person and her goals. It does so via a correspondence with the first division, among types of goods. To see this, we first need to reject the commonly-held idea that the natural goods (from the first division) are the same as the goods without qualification.

Commentators have often identified the natural goods with the goods without qualification.<sup>60</sup> Perhaps this thesis is tempting because both categories specify goods that either seem or are bad for certain people. The natural goods, as we have seen, may be bad for people with poor character. Wealth, for example, though a natural good, will be harmful when used in the wrong way for for the wrong reason. Similarly, whatever the goods without qualification are, they might seem to be bad to someone for whom other things are good. That is, natural goods can be bad for vicious people, and goods without qualification might seem bad to them.

This proposed identification of natural goods and goods without qualification suffers from a lack of direct evidence. Aristotle nowhere makes the identification, nor does he mention the group of people for whom this category of goods would be good. Goods without

<sup>60</sup> Bonasio “posits [this] as an hypothesis” (85). The index of the *EE* OCT (127) and Woods (177) also suggest this idea. I cannot understand the sense of Woods’ very brief argument for this claim. Besides citing VIII.3, 1249b25 and its context, he writes “

qualification are good for the good person, as we have seen, but it is not clear that this holds for the natural goods as well. Conversely, the natural goods are supposed to be common objects of desire, but the goods without qualification are specifically opposed to the objects of desire of specific individuals. Thus the identification of these two categories seems to require an additional proposal, that what is naturally good and good without qualification is good for any person in some sort of standard state. But such a “standard state” is hard to define, since Aristotle himself never suggests the idea.<sup>61</sup>

Two pieces of indirect evidence have been used to support this idea internal to the *EE*. Woods argues that “the run of the argument [from VIII.3, 1249b17 to the end of the treatise at 1249b25] shows that the same class of goods must be intended in each case” (177). Bonasio also relies on implication to establish her point, pointing to Aristotle’s discussion of what is good and pleasant without qualification for the body at VII.2, 1235b33-1236a7.<sup>62</sup> Woods’s argument relies on the rhetorical structure of the last line of *EE* VIII, which, or so I claim, can just as easily be interpreted to be referring to the discussion not of the natural goods but of a different category, the goods without qualification.<sup>63</sup>

61 Thus Woods: “[T]he notion of being good *simpliciter* (*haplōs*), as opposed to being good for a particular person, seems to be explained in terms of being good for anyone in a normal, natural state” (174). Bonasio also suggests a novel conception of a “standard state” in her dissertation. She develops it in great detail, primarily to discuss for whom the natural goods are good.

62 Bonasio: “The good-simpliciter and the pleasant simpliciter go hand in hand when the body is healthy. The comparison with the healthy body suggests that what is good-simpliciter is not what is good for an ideal or exceptional individual. Conversely, the comparison with the healthy body suggests that what is good-simpliciter is good and pleasant for the individual in a standard state” (2019).

63 Woods seems to take the rhetorical structure of the last lines of the *EE* (just discussed) to suffice to confirm the idea that the natural goods are the same as the goods without qualification, “as indeed has been assumed by previous commentators” (177). He refers the reader of his note on VIII.3, 1248b37-1249a16 to his note on II.10, 1227a18-30. There, he argues that for the virtuous person (and for only that person), what appears good to her *is* good for her, and that this “coincides with what is good without qualification” (148-149). However, if the goods without qualification are the same as the natural goods, then the goods without qualification can be bad for non-virtuous users

I now address Bonasio's argument from VII.2.<sup>64</sup> In the VII.2 passage, Aristotle has just introduced the distinction between what is good without qualification and what is good for a particular individual but not without qualification. He then establishes that what is good for a body without qualification is what is beneficial for a healthy body and that what is pleasant for a healthy and complete (ὀλόκληρος) body is pleasant for a body without qualification. (1235b33-1236a1).<sup>65</sup> Aristotle then presents an analogy by saying that, with reference to the discussion of the body, we should think "similarly about the soul" (1236a1: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς). Without bringing up the good again, Aristotle draws the following analogy: as the child or wild beast is to a mature (καθεστῶτα) human being, so the base and foolish person (φαῦλος καὶ ἄφρων) is to the decent and wise (ἐπιεικῆς καὶ φρόνιμος) person. Bonasio takes this analogy to indicate that, as with the pleasant for the body so too with the good for the soul, what is without qualification is what applies in the case of mature or healthy specimens. But Aristotle's focus has been squarely on the pleasant ever since 1235b33. And even when he finally brings up the good again, in the last sentence of the discussion, he says that good and fine things (τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ) are pleasant (not good) for the decent and wise person (1236a5-7).

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of them. But Aristotle contrasts goods without qualification and goods for a particular person because of the very fact that the latter are, or could turn out to be, bad. The merely contextual evidence of Aristotle's rhetoric at the end of the *EE* is not enough to overcome this disagreement between the text and Woods' argument that the goods without qualification are the natural goods.

64 Bonasio's list of the occurrences of "goods without qualification" is incomplete, oddly leaving out this very discussion (at 1238a1-7), which, or so I argue here, runs contrary to her identification of natural goods and goods without qualification. See Bonasio 85n170.

65 See also a parallel consideration at III.1, 1228b24-26: Aristotle labels as fearful without qualification those things that are fearful to most people and to human beings by nature.

I propose instead that the things that are good without qualification are the same as the goods that are fine. This proposal excludes any goods that are fine because they are fine only to the noble person. Two passages suggest this thesis.<sup>66</sup>

First, in an important discussion abstracted from his line of argument on friendship, Aristotle indicates that the good without qualification is *not* what is good for any person in some standard or natural state (as Bonasio would have it) but what is good specifically for the virtuous person:

T15: These things [what is good without qualification and what is good for oneself] should harmonize - and virtue brings this about. Statecraft is in charge of this, so that it may come about for those in whom it is not yet the case . . . What is fine must be

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66 Here are two small points in addition to the two passages I draw on in the main text. These two points rely on passages first directly before and then directly after the passage quoted as my main evidence in the text.

First, at VII.2, 1237a4-5, Aristotle writes that things that are good without qualification are by nature good for a human being. It may be that in the *EE*, Aristotle considers virtue to be “natural” in the sense that according to nature, human beings are virtuous. If I am right about that, then this 1237a4-5 passage will support the identification of the good without qualification and the goods that are fine, for the goods that are fine will be “by nature” good for a person – that is, when that person is noble.

Second, consider the next discussion in VII.2, which deals with virtue-friendship (1237a9-30). Aristotle several times links what is good without qualification with this sort of friendship. Since only noble people have virtue (as I have already established), the link between the good without qualification and the fine follows – though only indirectly, since Aristotle is here discussing friendship and not goods. Here are the connections he draws. First, the friends in such friendships are good without qualification (ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοί: 1237a10-11). Second, Aristotle appears to remark directly at 1237a17 that “the virtue of someone who is excellent by nature is good without qualification” (ἡ γὰρ τοῦ φύσει σπουδαίου ἀρετῆ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν), thus giving us a sole example in the *EE* of what is good without qualification: virtue. (However, this phrase is clouded by the preceding and succeeding lines: translators render the preceding line (ἔστω γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν φύσει σπουδαίων) as an hypothetical (so, “suppose that a human being is excellent by nature”), thus casting doubt on the finality of what Aristotle says at 1237a17; as for the succeeding line (ἡ δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἐκείνου), it is unclear what the ἀρετῆ of someone who is not excellent would be. Perhaps, though, we should understand ἀρετῆ in a more general sense here. Finally, after linking the good without qualification and the pleasant without qualification (1237a26-27), Aristotle comments that good things enjoy each other (1237a28), and that this applies even to the incomplete person (ἀτελής), it of course applies to the completed person, who is the excellent person (σπουδαῖος: 1237a30). Thus in the last line of the passage, Aristotle links the good without qualification to the noble once more.

pleasant. When these diverge, one is not yet completely excellent. For the separation of the good and the pleasant in the emotions is incontinence.<sup>67</sup>

On Bonasio's interpretation, bringing people to a standard or natural state would be enough for what is good for oneself and what is good without qualification to harmonize. For anyone in such a natural state, the natural goods are good, and the goods without qualification would be too, under her identification of the natural goods with the goods without qualification. However, in this passage we see that the harmonization of what is good without qualification with what is good or pleasant for oneself only comes with virtue, which requires continence.<sup>68</sup> Complete excellence (σπουδῇ τέλεια, though Aristotle never nominalizes the expression in the *EE*) brings about this harmony, and Aristotle even tells us here that we cannot have such harmony without being σπουδαῖος τελέως. For Bonasio's thesis to hold, everyone in the standard state would not only have to have self-control, but they would have to be σπουδαῖος τελέως as well. It is abundantly clear that Bonasio does not intend this.

A second though more textually problematic consideration appears at VIII.3, 1249a17-19. This passage primarily supports the idea that the things that are good without qualification are identical with the things that are pleasant without qualification – that is, if we read the text with Rowe and the OCT.<sup>69</sup> According to this text, things that are pleasant

67 VII.2, 1237a2-3 and 6-9: ἃ δεῖ συμφωνῆσαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὅπως οἷς μήπω ἐστὶ γένηται. . . . ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰ καλὰ ἡδέα. ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα διαφωνῇ, οὐπω σπουδαῖος τελέως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐγγενέσθαι ἀκρασίαν· τὸ γὰρ διαφωνεῖν τὰγαθὸν τῷ ἡδέει ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκρασία ἐστίν.

68 Aristotle even seems to say that when we are continent, we are virtuous. Perhaps he is thinking of a unity of the virtues thesis, but even so, continence is not the same as temperance.

69 The sentence begins with καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δ' εἴρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς ἀγαθόν, on which all manuscripts agree (with variations of L's δ' εἴρηται). In the following clause, Rowe and the OCT do not follow PCB, which read καὶ ὅτι τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἡδέα ἀγαθὰ instead of L's καὶ ὅτι τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ καλὰ καὶ τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα. Rowe follows Ald. in bracketing the second καί. The OCT keeps this καί but brackets the next τε, possibly following the Latin translation.

without qualification are fine. This statement implies that the things that are good without qualification are fine (instead of merely good), given the *EE* VII identification of the things that are pleasant without qualification and the things that are good without qualification. Thus we find evidence in VIII.3 for my proposal as well, albeit rather indirect.

Regarding this evidence in VIII.3, we might think it surprising that Aristotle remarks shortly before the VIII.3 passage that goods without qualification are fine for the virtuous person (at 1249a13). On the other hand, the final clause in the sentence just discussed asserts (in my translation of Rowe's text) "the things that are good without qualification are pleasant," which is not far from the identification of the things that are pleasant without qualification and the things that are good without qualification in *EE* VII. The clause is especially important given its participation in the sentence with the other claims, as well as the possibility that "without qualification" was left off of the final "pleasant" because it had just been stated.

If what is good without qualification is indeed identical to what is fine, then we know even more about what the noble person pursues. Both divisions of goods will apply to

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Fritzsche suggests καὶ τὰ γε. In any case, I think, the entire sentence can be translated as follows: "it has been said concerning pleasure what kind of thing it is and how it is good, and that the things that are pleasant without qualification are also fine and that the things that are good without qualification are pleasant."

According to Dieter Wagner's edition (1970), the Latin translation reads ". . . et quia que simpliciter delectabilia et kala et que simpliciter agatha delectabilia," with one of the three manuscripts omitting – apparently by mistake – the latter part, i.e. "et kala et que simpliciter agatha delectabilia." (Note that this is not the same omission as that of PC.) If we translate this Latin as "and [that] because that which is pleasant without qualification is also fine, also that which is good without qualification is pleasant," then the point I am making is perhaps even a bit clearer: the causal structure of the sentence only makes sense if we identify what is "fine" in the first clause with "that which is good without qualification" in the second. And this, of course, is the point I have been defending. If, on the other hand, we translate the *quia* as "that" (the conjunction introducing indirect statement), then the translation will merely be the same as I have indicated for L (modified by Rowe) above. Many thanks to Friedemann Buddensiek for helping me with the complexities of the Latin translation in this regard.

her. The first division tells us that, while the natural goods are good for her, the goods that are fine are the ones she pursues for their own sakes. And the second division will tell us that though the goods without qualification are good for good people (as well as for noble people), they are only good for good people in a derivative sense: since they (the goods without qualification) are the things that are fine, good people will be benefited by them, but only the noble person will select them for their own sake.

Given the picture developed in this section of the ends of the noble person, I now proceed to consider what the noble person's rational capacities have to do with her pursuit of those ends.

## 4 Rational Capacities and Virtue of Character

In the preceding three chapters, I have argued (1) that qualities of character are habituated through repetition; (2) that this repetition consists of experiences of pleasure and pain; and (3) that while all agents desire natural goods as ends, the virtuous agent pursues natural goods as fine goods, since they are the proper ends of virtuous action.

One does not need to be familiar with the contrasting account presented in the *Nicomachean Ethics* to be surprised at the lack of involvement of the agent's rational capacities.<sup>1</sup> The *Eudemian Ethics* explains a great deal without the involvement of agential reasoning because it defines virtue of character as a quality of the non-rational soul. Moreover, the same affections that characterize states of character account for their development. Thus from beginning to end, character involves propensities to feel certain affections, and in particular pleasure and pain. In virtue of those affections, someone who is courageous and generous – or rash and spendthrift – feels non-rational desires for ends that are specific enough to lead to action.

Human beings are eminently rational, though, as Aristotle will be the first to say, and it is their rational capacities that translate their desires into action. How does this happen? And given the extensive responsibilities of the non-rational part of the soul, how much work does the rational part of the soul actually do? These two questions will guide the current chapter. Throughout, I focus on virtue of character. Since this is *human* virtue, and since human beings are distinctively rational, rationality must play an important role in virtue, the topic of this dissertation.

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<sup>1</sup> In Chapter 1, I discussed the rational structure that will be present in a well-habituated agent.

In Chapter 3 we encountered choice (προαίρεσις), one activity of the rational part of the soul, but only in the context of its aiming at the natural goods that we desire. (My translation “choice” should not be read too literally, since Aristotle’s προαίρεσις connotes not only preference but purpose, and it is less concerned with the actual taking of action than it is with the expression of moral character, that is, it is literally “ethical.”<sup>2</sup>) In fact, choice is a key concept in Aristotle’s action theory in general, since choices are both *for the sake of* the natural goods and *of* the action taken to obtain them. Because it has these two aspects, choice connects states of character with the rational activities of deliberating (βούλευσις), believing (δόξα), and wishing (βούλησις). I present an explanation of *Eudemian* action theory by focusing on choice (προαίρεσις) and its components in Section I. After this answer to the first question posed above (how do rational capacities translate desires into action?), the remainder of the chapter constitutes a three-part answer to the second question (how much work does the rational part of the soul actually do in virtue of character?). The rational part of the soul facilitates virtue of character by using contemplation of god as a standard (ἄριστος) for deliberation (Section II), by being naturally inclined toward intermediate affections, desires, and actions that are “as reasoning indicates” (ὡς ὁ λόγος) (Section III), and by contributing, through the actions it underwrites, to the habituation of character (Section IV).

## I Choice and the translation of desire into action

Our non-rational desires, discussed in the last chapter, motivate our behavior<sup>3</sup> for the sake of their objects, which are our ends. Sometimes we go after a desire “without thinking,”

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2 Translators attempt to capture some of these features. For its preferential nature, “decision” is common; also “rational choice” (*NE*, tr. Crisp and Broadie 1991: Chapter 4, §1) or “deliberate choice” (*EE*, tr. Kenny), and even “preferential choice” (Lawrence 2004: 283ff.). For its purposiveness: “purposive choice” (Kenny 1979: 69n1), “purpose” (Greenwood 1909), and, perhaps the best, “commitment” (Chamberlain 1984: 155-157).

as children and animals would. But when we act *as* human beings, our distinctive rationality must be involved.<sup>4</sup> Given a range of desires, we deliberate about how to achieve them.

Deliberation determines which ends we can and should pursue, and through what plan of action we can do so. It also turns some of our non-rational desires for ends into rational wishes for those same ends, and it results in a belief that the action we take conduces to our wished-for end. We then take the first action necessary to follow the plan our deliberated determined. Aristotle thinks that we make a choice of this first action *for the sake of* a wished-for end,<sup>5</sup> on the belief that the action conduces to the end. Thus choice (προαίρεσις), the

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4 In his more technical moods (e.g. II.6), Aristotle reserves the term “action” (πράξις) for movement where the human being is a “controlling starting-point” (ἀρχή κύρια).

5 II.10, 1226a11-13 and 1227b36-37. The theory of προαίρεσις in the *EE* depends on these two explicit statements of the idea that προαίρεσις is *of* something and *for the sake of* something. Contrast my interpretation of the second passage with Broadie’s (1991: 179-80).

Aristotle comes close to saying something similar in *NE* VI.2, especially in 1139a31-36: because the efficient causes of προαίρεσις are ὄρεξις and λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος, προαίρεσις requires a state of character. In the lines following this *NE* passage, Aristotle discusses the importance of end-directedness and a motive for thought (perhaps as a part of προαίρεσις). But nowhere in the *NE* does Aristotle specify προαίρεσις with reference to two objects, as he does in the *EE*. The explicit connection between προαίρεσις and the end in the *EE* draws virtue of character and προαίρεσις closer together in that work than in the *NE*.

taking (αἴρεσις)<sup>6</sup> of an action, pursues a goal originally desired non-rationally via three capacities of the rational soul: deliberation, wish, and belief.

As I discuss these three capacities below, it will be convenient to use common Aristotelian examples to illustrate their functions. We desire health and happiness, Aristotle remarks, and we believe that we should be healthy or act well. We choose to take a walk or to sit down for the sake of our health, and we choose to make money, or to take a risk, in order to be happy (e.g. II.10, 1226a6-17). This example will guide my explanation of choice, for it includes all three elements I now discuss: through deliberation, we identify walking as conducive to health or money-making as conducive to happiness; we wish to be healthy or to

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6 Aristotle remarks that προαίρεσις is αἴρεσις of one thing πρό another at II.10, 1226b6-8 (Rowe prefers πρό to πρός here against the manuscripts). I suggest that Aristotle usually uses αἴρεσις for the “taking” of an action, whether or not this acting is also chosen. We might also translate “selecting,” as some sentences’ grammar forces me to do, but this should not imply consideration of other possible objects. At II.5, 1222a31-33 Aristotle says that exercise-loving προαιρετικῶν ἕξεις will be health-loving in every αἴρεσις. Thus “selection,” “decision,” or “choice” are overtranslations.

Strikingly, Aristotle prefers αἴρεσις to προαίρεσις in *EE* VIII, and προαίρεσις to αἴρεσις in *EE* I-III. Of the occurrences of αἴρεσις and its forms in the *EE*, we find non-technical usage early in the *EE* in I.5 (1215b21, 1215b35, 1216a15, and 1216a21) and explicit contrasts with προαίρεσις in II.5 (by way of definition at 1226b7 and 1222a33) and in III.1, where reason orders to αἴρεσθαι what is fine (1229a1-2 and in 1230a26-33). At III.5, 1233a4-6 μεγαλοψυχία is the best disposition concerning the αἴρεσις and use (χρησις) of honor and the other honorable goods. I leave out the many occurrences of αἰρετόν and its forms, since Aristotle seems to prefer αἰρετός to \*προαίρετος\* throughout the *EE*, though he does use the latter throughout (and only in) II.10.

Other than in these places, αἴρεσις and its forms only occur in VIII.3, where Aristotle uses the word several times. As we have already seen, goods αἰρετά for their own sakes are goals (1248b18-19) and any goods are fine when that for the sake of which people do and αἰροῦνται them is fine (1249a5-7). Also, for the πράξεις and αἰρέσεις about natural but not praiseworthy goods, the σπουδαῖος needs a ὄρος for their possession, αἴρεσις, and avoidance; later, Aristotle specifies as best whatever αἴρεσις and acquisition (κτῆσις) of natural goods most conduces to contemplation of god (1249a24-b3, 1249b16-19). Against these several instances stands a lone occurrence of προαίρεσις at 1249a2-4, already seen above: “the things that are fine on their own account do not belong to them, which things the noble choose.”

Aristotle’s very extensive usage of αἴρεσις and its forms in *EE* VII contrasts dramatically with *EE* I-III. Its usage might be deemed non-technical in a book on friendship, but προαίρεσις is common in VII as well. Perhaps further investigation would reveal more about what Aristotle is doing here.

act well; and we believe that taking a walk will improve our health, or that making money will also make us happier.

Deliberation (βούλευσις) and reflection make choice possible,<sup>7</sup> so we should start with deliberation in order to understand choice. Beginning with a desire for some end, deliberation identifies a plan of action that conduces to that end. Aristotle's model of deliberation proceeds from the distant to the proximate or from the general to the specific: from the desired end to the first action needed to take to achieve that end (II.10, 1226b12-13). The action identified by deliberation will not always be some *means* to the end but may be the achievement of a constituent part of the end, or an action that tends in the direction of the end.<sup>8</sup> We should think of these actions quite generally as “things toward the end.”<sup>9</sup> They will be the objects of choice.

The previous paragraph summarizes Aristotle's main *Eudemian* discussion of deliberation (*EE* II.10). But the discussion there focuses on individual instances of deliberation and lacks a broader perspective on the phenomenon. Suppose, quite plausibly, that we desire both health and happiness. These desires will occasion deliberation about their achievement, but with only an afternoon to spare, we might not be able to act on both of these desires; indeed, if inclement weather keeps us in our apartment, our desire for health

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7 E.g. II.10, 1226b8: τοῦτο [i.e., προαίρεσις] δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ σκέψεως καὶ βουλήs

8 Aristotle gives some examples of a straightforwardly logical deliberative process: the practical syllogism. Consider the grammarian in II.10, 1226a34-37. The relevance of the practical syllogism to Aristotle's ethics is debated. For doubts, see Wiggins (1980: 33), Segvic (2011: 166), and Annas, 1993: 92-93, nn. 144-151. For various explanations of what the practical syllogism does, see Gottlieb (2006: 220), Broadie (1991), and Reeve (2006). Contrast Tuozzo (1991: especially 197 and 202).

9 τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος (II.10, 1226a7-8). At II.10, 1226b11, deliberation concerns “whether this or that is conducive [to the end]” (πότερον τόδε ἢ τόδε συντείνει) and it is about “the things aiming at [the end]” (περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς τοῦτο τεινόντων).

may have to go unfulfilled. Thus deliberation may address more than one desire at once, and it may identify some of our desires as more worth pursuing or more practically pursued in the present. This elaboration of Aristotle's idea of deliberation will be useful in discussing the ὄρος of VIII.3 (in Section 2), but it also helps us to see why, through deliberation, we wish for desired ends.

Wish (βούλησις), for Aristotle, is a kind of desire, one that belongs to the rational part of the soul.<sup>10</sup> Wish enters the picture when deliberation identifies a non-rational desire that, for ethical or prudential reasons,<sup>11</sup> is worth pursuing. Aristotle's characters wish for happiness and health, as we have seen, but also for wealth and pleasure, and for the fitness or health of others.<sup>12</sup> Such wishes are for the same ends as non-rational desires are, but our wished-for goals are the ones that our deliberation determines we can and should pursue.<sup>13</sup>

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10 *DA* III.9, 432b5; *NE* III.2, 1111b11-19 and V.9, 1136b6-7; *Topics* IV.5, 126a12-13; and *Rhetoric* I.10, 1369a1ff. Contrast *Politics* VII.15, 1334b20-25 and Gauthier and Jolif on *NE* III.2, 1111b19 (*ad loc*): in its essence, they write, βούλησις belongs to the non-rational part of the soul. See also Buddensiek (2017: 42). Aristotle warns against precise distinctions among the elements of the soul (*NE* I.13, 1102b26 and *DA* II.10, 433b1-4).

11 I make the distinction between ethical and prudential reasons frequently in this chapter, but I do not intend by it a strict division between the two. Practical wisdom takes all reasons into account.

12 Wealth and pleasure: II.10, 1227a16. Fitness of others: II.10, 1226a17-18 and 1227b28. Health of others: II.10, 1226a34-37 and II.11, 1227b25-30

13 Wishes are for ends: *EE* II.10, 1226a6-17, especially a13-14 and a16. Note that at a14, wish is “above all” (μάλιστα) about the end. Wishes cannot be for things toward ends as such, but since we wish for some of the natural goods we desire, wishes are not just about our ultimate end (cf. the pursuit of pleasures and avoidance of pains at II.4, 1221b32-34). In the picture of multiple cycles of βούλευσις/βούλησις/προαίρεσις developed below, wishes may well be for ends subordinate even to the natural goods desired in the first such cycle.

Müller (2017), Nussbaum (1978: 335-336), Meyer (2011 and 2016), and Segvic (2011: 173) agree that the object of βούλησις need not be εὐδαιμονία, or even explicitly tied to the final end. There must be some connection, but it may be implicit or well in the past (see Michael Frede 2011: 27).

Aristotle does not make this process explicit; he merely says that deliberation is responsible for the wishing in choice:<sup>14</sup>

T16: It is clear that choice is a deliberative desire of things up to oneself, for we deliberate about [or: wish for] all the things which we choose, but we do not choose all the things we wish for [or: deliberate about]: By “deliberative,” I mean [something] the starting-point and cause of which is deliberation.<sup>15</sup>

In the ethical works, Aristotle divides desire (ὄρεξις) into three species: appetite (ἐπιθυμία) and spirit (θυμός), which I discussed extensively in Chapter 3, and wish (βούλησις). Aristotle begins his discussion of choice with this division because of the common opinion that choice is identical with desire, or that it is a kind of desire (II.10, 1225b24-26). We find T16 well into Aristotle’s explanation that choice cannot be any of these three kinds of desires, when he has already concluded that choice is not wish. He then remarks in T16 that choice is instead a deliberative desire, using ὄρεξις, the general term for desire. Perhaps Aristotle avoids the expression “deliberative wish” because of the origins of choice in non-rational desire and the idea (which I have just proposed) that deliberation brings about a wish for something we

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14 Choice requires wish: II.10, 1226b17-18 and implied at II.7, 1223b39-1224a4. Contrast Hardie (1980: 164).

15 II.10, 1226b16-20: δῆλον ὅτι ἡ προαίρεσις μὲν ἐστὶν ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ’ αὐτῷ βουλευτική. ἅπαντα γὰρ βουλευόμεθα [or: βουλόμεθα] ἃ καὶ προαιρούμεθα, οὐ μέντοι γε ἃ βουλόμεθα [or: βουλευόμεθα] πάντα προαιρούμεθα· λέγω δὲ βουλευτικὴν ἧς ἀρχὴ b20 καὶ αἰτία βούλευσις ἐστὶ.

b18 βουλόμεθα Victorius; *volumus* in the Latin translation; βουλευόμεθα PCBL. At b18-19: βουλόμεθα P<sup>1</sup>L; βουλευόμεθα P<sup>2</sup>CB, εὔ added over the second omicron in P. Rowe notes that the evidence at b18-19 suggests that both *recensiones* (L and PC, though I am not sure where B fits in) will have had βουλόμεθα there. He argues from the sense of the passage that both *recensiones* must also have had βουλόμεθα at b18, but the manuscripts do all read βουλευόμεθα.

In these two locations (b18 and b18-19), I adopt βουλευόμεθα and βουλόμεθα. The sense is clear, though the point is not as neatly expressed as it would be with βουλόμεθα and βουλόμεθα. βουλευόμεθα and βουλευόμεθα (also possible) would bring unsuccessful deliberation to mind (see MA VI, 701a3-5). Aristotle surely recognizes that internal or external circumstances may interrupt deliberation.

already desired. But in any case, T16 shows us that Aristotle thinks that wish, as the desiderative component of choice, originates with deliberation.

Belief (δόξα) has a role in choice as well. Aristotle's belief is a capacity of the rational soul, since it entertains propositions about what is true and false (II.10, 1226a4). Like wishes, beliefs are about ends: we believe that we should be healthy, for example, just as we wish for health (II.10, 1226a13-15). How does belief arise? Aristotle seems to think that deliberation gives rise to beliefs. There are two ways that this could work, both of which fit with Aristotle's text on the matter but to neither of which he seems to give preference. Belief may simply confirm a wish: we believe that we should be healthy. Alternatively, as I have alluded to earlier, our beliefs may assert that the action deliberation recommends conduces to the wished-for end. While the first and simpler alternative has the support of Aristotle's examples at II.10, 1226a13-15, the second alternative ties belief to the result of deliberation and explains why we might reasonably act on the results of our deliberation.<sup>16</sup>

Aristotle indicates the place of belief in choice a bit before T16. Choice is, he says, "based on (ἐκ) wish and deliberative belief."<sup>17</sup> In this phrase we have all three components under discussion: deliberation, wish, and now belief. Choice is "based on" these components because they are its material causes:<sup>18</sup> wish and deliberative belief make up choice, and so we

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16 This second alternative may also have the support of II.10, 1226b21-23, where Aristotle writes that deliberation gives us "a view about why" (ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί) we do what we do. Perhaps when goal-directed deliberation results in a belief that the chosen action conduces to the goal, the agent has gained a διὰ τί.

17 II.10, 1226b4-5: ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἄρα, b5 ἄμφω γὰρ ὑπάρχει τῷ προαιρουμένῳ ταῦτα and b9: ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις. See also II.10, 1225b32-1226a18. Some translations of 1226b5 mislead: "both are present when one decides," for example, implies that προαίρεσις involves some occurrent event. I argue in other work that this is not the case.

have an answer to a question at the outset of II.10: Is choice desire or belief? (1225b23) No, but neither is it something else entirely. It is both a desire (specifically, a wish) *and* a belief. Choice is therefore both desiderative and evaluative, since it consists in these two psychic phenomena.<sup>19</sup> Finally, since (successful) deliberation identifies an action with which the agent can begin the process of reaching her wished-for end, the object of choice will be an action.<sup>20</sup> Recalling the two aspects of choice mentioned above, choice is *of* this action and *for the sake of* the wished-for end.

In sum, non-rational desires lead to deliberation, which occasions wish and belief. Choice consists of deliberative desire and belief, and we choose actions that aim (or so our deliberation indicates) at some of our original non-rational desires.

This entire process need not be confined to the rigid sequence just summarized. Aristotle surely recognizes the complexity of human moral psychology, and he seems to think that instances of this sequence work both in parallel and in succession. Once again, though his account in II.10 presents a more straightforward picture, common experience suggests that his action theory is more complex. Above, I noted that the example of deliberation directing wish toward certain desires supported the idea of the ὄρος in VIII.3 (discussed in Section 2). Here, too, the example I am about to give solves a problem elsewhere in Aristotle. This time, the problem concerns three ideas that seem to challenge the picture just presented.

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19 Rachana Kamtekar has helped me arrive at this position on the structure of choice. In the secondary literature I find only Mele defending a similar point (1984: 154ff.).

I argue in other work that all the phenomena under discussion are ἐνεργεῖαι (“activities”) as opposed to κινήσεις (“movements”) or even other psychic phenomena. Choice is related to action only in an explanatory, and not a causal, way.

20 And so choice is certainly not action. Hardie defines it as “itself an action or the beginning [efficient cause] of an action” (1980: 163). Lawrence seems to equivocate, defining choice as a “taking of one *thing* . . .” (emphasis mine). Is it: “Justin Gatlin took the baton,” or “The Americans take it that they have won”?

(1) After specifying the three kinds of desire at the beginning of II.10, Aristotle rules out appetite and spirit because people “make many choices without spirit or appetite.”<sup>21</sup> How can choices not involve spirit or appetite if, as I have argued above, choice begins with non-rational desire?

(2) As we saw in Chapter 3, virtuous agents choose an action “for the sake of what is fine,” or “for the sake of the fine.” Some commentators maintain that both choice and wish, and not just for the virtuous person, must be about our final end.<sup>22</sup> How can all choice and wish actually concern the action and the proximate end, respectively, if virtuous action involves more distant objectives: our final end, or “the fine”?

(3) Common experience seems to suggest that we do not deliberate about every choice we make, and that some of our choices happen quite quickly. How is this possible, if deliberation precedes every choice?<sup>23</sup>

Suppose, that Axel (a carpenter) is virtuous. He has a non-rational desire for happiness (his final end), as all people do. Among his other desires are wealth (so that he can exercise magnificence and generosity) and health. Axel’s correct conception of happiness includes virtuous activity. Now imagine that Axel finds himself unemployed, just having lost his old position in an economic crisis. His desires for wealth, health, and happiness all come to the

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21 Aristotle states this and also gives evidence: spirit and appetite always involve pain (because one does not have what one desires), but many choices do not involve pain. *EE* II.10, 1225b27-31: ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει ἄμφω ταῦτα, πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας προαιροῦνται· καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες οὐ προαιροῦνται, b30 ἀλλὰ καρτεροῦσιν. ἔτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν καὶ θυμὸς ἀεὶ μετὰ λύπης, προαιρούμεθα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης.

22 See Broadie (1991: 183ff), Anscombe (1965: 69-70 and 1969: 76-7), McDowell (1980: 361), and Dorothea Frede (2006).

23 The *EE* never raises this concern explicitly, but it is endemic in Aristotle’s *Eudemian* (and *Nicomachean*) presentation of choice and deliberation. My response to this worry will also address perhaps more serious problems in the *NE* concerning action in response to quickly-changing circumstances: see II.4, 1105a31; III.8, 1117a18-22; and VI.12, 1144a19.

fore. As we have seen above, deliberation might determine that, where his career is concerned, he cannot worry about health as well as wealth and happiness. He determines additionally that applying for only well-compensated carpentry work is the surest way for his choice of employment to make him happy, for then he will be able to be generous while practicing a skill in which he excels. As a result of this line of deliberating, the only wish relevant to further deliberation is a wish for wealth. Axel eventually finds remunerative and enjoyable employment. Finally, suppose that his partner finds a new job, this time in faraway Minnesota, and he must give notice. He is not back to the drawing-board, because previous deliberation informs his current thinking. Having generalized his conclusions from before, he immediately starts looking for carpentry work at a well-respected firm.

Life's complexity produces many such vignettes. This non-remarkable example solves all three problems above. To (1): his choice of work in Minnesota might not involve non-rational desire for wealth; instead, a wish for wealth just *is* the desire that begins deliberation. To (2), this particular wish for wealth need not concern Axel's final end (happiness). Perhaps at one point, back in his first job search, Axel's soul searching connected his non-rational desires for wealth, health, and happiness. But perhaps not: he might only make the connection if pressed. In any case, if those who insist on the final end as the object of choice are correct, we can explain how Aristotle can think this by giving either an historical or a hypothetical explanation. As for aiming at the fine: Axel's virtue ensures that when he bargains about his salary, he does so at least in part because of the virtuous actions he will be able to perform with the resultant savings.<sup>24</sup> And to (3): deliberation does precede Axel's choice to apply for high-paying Minnesotan carpentry jobs, even if that deliberation

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<sup>24</sup> Since wishes are not necessarily tied to our final end, choices will not necessarily involve it either.

does not feature in his assumption that that is what he should do.<sup>25</sup> This assumption may well come from either (i) a choice in the past always to act in a certain way in job-seeking circumstances, or perhaps (ii) a habit constructed out of repeated choices in such circumstances. In either case, his action may well be deliberate, even though no occurrent deliberation is involved.<sup>26</sup>

One final comment on a key idea in this extended example: It seems entirely reasonable to posit multiple cycles of deliberation followed by wish followed by choice, where the choice of one cycle either *is* to deliberate further or where the chosen action leads to deliberation prompted by the wish of a previous cycle.<sup>27</sup> We need not concern ourselves with the specifics: indeed, Aristotle never says anything explicit on the matter. But such a solution will be necessary in order to resolve tensions in his account of choice.<sup>28</sup>

At the beginning of the section, I commented that agents go for desires even “without thinking,” as animals and children do. Such pursuit of desire features in the lives of

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25 There is no evidence in the *EE* (or, I would venture, the *NE*), that the virtuous person need be able to produce the reasons for her actions. Choice entails deliberative belief, even if this belief is not accessible to the agent at the time of the choice. Contrast Cooper (1975: 9-10).

26 In other work, I argue for a different but complementary thesis, that chosen behavior can be entirely without occurrent deliberation since choice is an *ἐνέργεια* and action precipitates from it.

27 I mention below that virtue is a *ἕξις προαιρετική*. In addition to the reasons given there, virtue in particular involves choice in the sense that (much more than in other types of character) many such *βούλευσις-βούλησις-προαίρεσις* cycles must be present in the virtuous person’s soul at any given time lest the person not be able to respond swiftly enough in all those situations that do not admit of or require time for deliberation.

28 To my knowledge, only Buddensiek and Simpson make suggestions along these lines. Buddensiek gestures at what he calls “cascading *βούλησις-προαίρεσις* pairs” (2017: 63). And according to Simpson, Aristotle thinks that in any given instance of choice, we do not deliberate about or choose the end. That allows that after deliberating about something and making a choice as a result of that deliberation, that object of that choice might become an end of another choice. Simpson gives the example of the bridle-maker and the horse-rider from *NE* I.1, 1094a9-14.

every adult human being. Choice, too, occurs in all types of agents.<sup>29</sup> But choice occupies a special place in the life of the virtuous person, since virtue *requires* choice.<sup>30</sup> Aristotle speaks several times of virtue as a *ἔξις προαιρετική*, a “state that involves choice.”<sup>31</sup> Because of this close connection between virtue and choice, the process described above changes in the case of virtue in two notable ways. First, the virtuous person’s deliberation is the best of its kind. In the *NE*, Aristotle refers to excellent deliberation as *φρόνησις* (“practical wisdom”). And though that term does occur in the *EE*, Aristotle never defines it as anything out of the

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29 Choice can thus be better or worse. See *EE* II.10, 1226b13-15 and II.11, 1228a1-2. The reasoning yielding *βούλησις* is even not always better than the “reasoning” of appetite or spirit (Michael Frede 2011: 21-22; cp. *DA* III.10, 433b8-9). Deliberative quality is part of quality of character, but it would be misleading to say that character determines choices (or their quality), because of deliberation’s role in each individual choice. Rachana Kamtekar has helped me to see this point.

At b15: the manuscripts’ *ἢ χειρόν ἢ βέλτιον* is amended by Rowe, the OCT, and Susemihl follow Fritzsche, emending to *εἰ χειρόν ἢ βέλτιον*. Inwood and Woolf and Simpson read the manuscripts’ text; Dirlmeier, Kenny, and Woods read the emendation.

30 Aristotle writes that “either all of some of the virtues are mean points” at II.5, 1222b13-14: *αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἢ πᾶσαι ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἔσσονται τῶν μεσοτήτων* (see also Rowe, note to *τούτων* at b13). The text is not in dispute, though Woods deletes *αἱ* and *τούτων* to produce the converse of what I have translated here (21: “all or some of these mean states will be virtues”). Though that, too, is true (see III.7, 1234a23-25), Aristotle may be thinking of the intellectual virtues (so Woods 21), or perhaps justice (so Simpson 32n4), virtues that are not intermediate states. Or perhaps some virtues are not intermediates between pleasure and pain (Woods citing Dirlmeier on Kapp, though Dirlmeier translates “die Tugenden entweder lauter Mitten oder aber einige dieser Mitten sein werden,” which seems to match Woods’s interpretation). At any rate, III.1, 1230a26-29 clarifies that since “all virtue concerns choice . . .” (*πᾶσα ἀρετὴ προαιρετικὴ . . .*), and so courage, too, involves making choices.

31 II.10, 1227b8, see also II.11, 1227b40-1228a1 and 1228a11-15. The adjectival *-ική* connotes “specializing in” or “productive of,” added to the word for the thing that is produced or specialized in.

The *NE* ties virtuous action to choice explicitly at II.4, 1105a31-2. Moss’s explanation of this passage suggests a similar interpretation of virtue as a : “This will mean not that the reasoning which culminates in the decision is itself an exercise of virtue . . ., but that virtue has not been manifested unless its function has been fulfilled, i.e. unless it has set a goal toward the realization of which a decision has been made” (2011: 210).

ordinary; like the φρόνιμος (the practically wise person),<sup>32</sup> Φρόνησις seems to have little special significance in the *EE*. Still, by dint of her virtue, the virtuous person will deliberate correctly. A second unique feature of the virtuous person's action-theoretic process owes to her non-rational capacities instead of her rational ones. In a passage clearly aimed at the case of virtue, Aristotle tells us that the that-for-the-sake-of-which in virtuous choices is the intermediate (*EE* II.11, 1227b37). Just like non-virtuous choice, virtuous choice is a deliberative desire for some end. But virtuous deliberation aims excellently at the correct, intermediate, ends.

Now that we have seen how desire leads to action, both in the general case and for the virtuous person, I turn at long last to the second question posed at the beginning of this chapter: given the great extent of the capacities of the non-rational soul, how much does the rational soul contribute to virtue of character? We can imagine both a minimalist and a maximalist answer to this question. As we will see in the remainder of this chapter, Aristotle's *Eudemian* answer takes a middle road: he manages to describe interaction between the non-rational and rational parts of the soul that leaves virtue largely to the former but reserves key roles for the latter in the deliberative process.

## II The standard for deliberation

In this section, I explain that practical wisdom looks to a guiding standard (ἄροος) when determining which goals to pursue and how to pursue them. Aristotle specifies the standard in a difficult passage of VIII.3, in the final lines of the *EE*. In VIII.3, we add to our

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<sup>32</sup> *NE* VI.7: the φρόνιμος, the practically wise person, is the person unqualifiedly good at deliberation. She tends to aim, in accordance with her calculation, at the best human goods achievable with action.

understanding of deliberation from *EE* II, since Aristotle now addresses a situation familiar from all of our lives: how do we deliberate about multiple desires, even if all of them are virtuous? There are two relevant passages in VIII.3:

T17: [As in the case of a doctor] so too for the excellent person, concerning actions and selections of the natural but not praiseworthy goods, there should be some standard for the possession and for the selection and avoidance of the abundance and dearth of material goods and of successes. Earlier on, the “as the λόγος” was mentioned. But this is as if someone said in matters of nutrition “as medicine and as the λόγος”: it is true but not clear.<sup>33</sup>

T18: So, whatever selection and acquisition of natural goods, either goods of the body or material goods or friends or other goods, will most produce the contemplation of god, that is the best, and this is the finest standard. But whatever either through deficiency or excess hinders serving and contemplating god, that is base. It holds in this way for the soul, and this is the best standard, being lease aware of the non-rational part of the soul as such.<sup>34</sup>

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33 VIII.3, 1249a24-b6: οὕτω καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ αἰρέσεις a25 τῶν φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν 1249b1 δὲ δεῖ τινα εἶναι ὄρον καὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ [περὶ] φυγῆς χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλιγότητος καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέχθη τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὡσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφήν b5 εἴπειεν ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης· τοῦτο δ' ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐ σαφὲς δέ.

b3 ἐλέχθη: Some commentators take the subject of ἐλέχθη to be the ὄρος (at b1; Dirlmeier 105, Simpson 188).

34 VIII.3, 1249b16-23: ἥτις οὖν αἴρεσις καὶ κτήσις τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ποιήσει μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν, ἢ σώματος ἢ χρημάτων ἢ φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, αὕτη ἀρίστη, καὶ οὗτος ὁ ὄρος κάλλιστος· ἥτις δ' ἢ δι' ἐνδειαν b20 ἢ δι' ὑπερβολὴν κωλύει τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν, αὕτη δὲ φαύλη. ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ οὗτος [τῆς ψυχῆς] ὁ ὄρος ἄριστος, τὸ ἥμισθα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἄλλου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τοιοῦτον.

See discussion of this passage below.

Nothing has prepared us for these passages, and in particular the idea in T18 that the ὄρος is the service and contemplation of god. Elsewhere in the *EE*, Aristotle only uses θεός (“god”) or θεῖος (“divine”) in a moral-psychological context once,<sup>35</sup> a bit earlier in *EE VIII*:

T19: Or is there some starting-point beyond which there is no other starting-point, and this [hypothesized starting-point] can do such [a thing] because it is such [a thing]? This is the thing being sought: what the starting-point is of movement in the soul. But it is clear: just as god [moves everything] in the universe, [god] also moves everything there [? in the soul]. For in a way the divine in us moves everything. And the starting-point of reason is not reason, but something greater. But what could be greater even than knowledge <B<sup>f</sup>: and intelligence> except god? For virtue is an instrument of intelligence (νοῦς).<sup>36</sup>

35 A *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* search confirms this.

36 VIII.2, 1248a23-29: ἢ ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη ἕξω, αὕτη δὲ διὰ τὸ τοιαύτη [τὸ] εἶναι τοιοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν; τὸ δὲ ζητούμενον a25 τοῦτ' ἐστί. τίς ἢ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. δηλον δὲ ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ θεός, καὶ πᾶν ἐκεῖ κινεῖ. κινεῖ γὰρ πως πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον, λόγου δ' ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλὰ τι κρεῖττον. τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης εἴη ποτὲ <καὶ νοῦ> πλὴν θεός; ἢ γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον.

a24 διὰ τὸ τοιαύτη [τὸ] εἶναι τοιοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν Rowe: διατί τοιαύτη τὸ εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο δύνασθαι ποιεῖν PCL; διατί τοιαύτη τὸ τοῦτο δύνασθαι ποιεῖν B; διὰ τὸ τοιαύτη [τὸ] εἶναι [τὸ] τοιοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν Walzer; *quod tale secundum esse tale potest facere* BF; ὅτι τοιαύτη <κατὰ> τὸ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν Dirlmeier; [διατί] τοιαύτη τῷ εἶναι <τὸ> τοιοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν Susemihl; διὰ τὸ τοιαύτη γε εἶναι τοιοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν Jackson. Rowe accepts Walzer's emendation, changing it slightly. Rowe suggests that τοιοῦτο was corrupted to the manuscripts' τὸ τοῦτο and that this caused the change of δύναται to δύνασθαι. Rowe argues against the relevance of mentioning the τὸ εἶναι of the starting-point, as Dirlmeier's <κατὰ> τὸ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο, Susemihl's τῷ εἶναι <τὸ> τοιοῦτο, and BF's *secundum esse tale* might.

a26 καὶ πᾶν ἐκεῖ κινεῖ Jackson (and Rowe); καὶ πᾶν ἐκεῖνω PCBL; et omne illud Bf; [καὶ] κἄν ἐκεῖνη Spengel; κινεῖ κἄν ἐκεῖνω Ross; καὶ πᾶν ἐκεῖνο Dirlmeier; καὶ πᾶν ἐκεῖ νῶ <κινεῖ> Kenny (World's Classics) (Rowe lists these readings.) Rowe argues against a “sudden ἐκεῖνος” and “adds [to Jackson's proposal] the thought that perhaps ἐκεῖνο was a prior stage in the process of corruption, induced by the neuter πᾶν and the omission of κινεῖ by haplography [the next sentence certainly begins with κινεῖ], with ἐκεῖνο then itself being corrupted into ἐκεῖνω = ἐκεῖνω.”

a27 οὐ missing in PCB

a28-29 εἴη ποτὲ Rowe: εἴη Spengel; εἴποι PCBL; [εἴποι] Jackson (following BF, having added εἴη after ἂν in a28). Rowe: “the delaying of εἴη and the addition of ποτε, I suggest, signal that the question being asked is a surprising one.”

I quote T19 in its entirety here because only there does Aristotle come at all close to using “god” in a way that might inform his usage in T18. Aristotle tells us that the divine in us moves everything, and he implies that the starting-point of reason is god. Perhaps this makes sense in light of T18: the service and contemplation of god should direct our action, and if it does, then we are not the starting-point of our own reason; instead, god is, or the divine in us is. This is certainly speculative, but T19 and T18 do not have any supporting texts in the *EE*.

T17, T18, and T19 are some of the most puzzling passages in the *Eudemian Ethics*. We will consider other aspects of these passages – and especially of T19 – in the next two sections, but here I remain focused on the ὄρος. What is it? And supposing it is “service and contemplation of god” (whatever that may be), what role does it play in virtue of character?

Aristotle’s use of ὄρος in T17 and T18 harks back to III.7 and especially to II.5, in the conclusion to Aristotle’s discussion of intermediate and extreme states. Both passages give examples of ὄροι; these standards serve as reference points with which to judge how one ought to act. In III.7, Aristotle compares two descriptions of how the intermediate person should act by calling them both ὄροι. He concludes that instead of taking care not to offend the target of a joke, the witty person should be sure to please the person who is a good judge of jokes.<sup>37</sup> II.5 contains a more general statement about ὄροι, sensibly so, for the term first occurs there. We read in II.5 for the first time in the *EE* about a ὄρος: Aristotle recommends that we should understand τὸ μέσον with reference to some ὄρος.

T20: The intermediate will be sometimes in pleasures, for there is both an excess and deficiency here, sometimes in pains, and

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a28-29 <καὶ νοῦ> Spengel (and Rowe); [et scientia] et intellectu BF

37 III.7, 1234a18-23

sometimes in both. The person exceeding in enjoyment exceeds in pleasure and the one exceeding in being pained exceeds in the opposite, and these either without qualification or with respect to some standard, such as when one does not act the way most people do. But the good person acts as one ought.<sup>38</sup>

T21: Now that the account has been grasped, of states relative to the affections, both excesses and deficiencies, and of the opposite states, in which people are in accord with correct reason (we must later examine what correct reason is and toward what standard we should look when defining<sup>39</sup> “the intermediate”), it is clear that . . .<sup>40</sup>

Consider T20 first. As in III.7, T20 suggests a ὅρος referencing “what most people do.” (“As one ought” might or might not be meant as another example of a ὅρος.) While “what most people do” does not come as a recommended ὅρος, it certainly makes sense in the context of III.7 (with the two standards for the witty person) and VIII.3 (both T17 and T18 above). If we lived as most people do, we would have the standard for our possession, selection, and avoidance of material goods required in T17. It would be similar in kind – but much wider in scope – than the standards listed for the witty person in III.7. (“What most people do” would certainly be an easier standard to follow than the “service and contemplation of god” recommended by T18.)

38 II.5, 1222a12-17: ἔσται δ' ἡ μεσότης ὅτε μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς, καὶ γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ὅτε δ' ἐν λύπαις, ὅτε δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέροις. ὁ γὰρ a15 ὑπερβάλλον τῷ χαίρειν τῷ ἡδεῖ ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ὁ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι τῷ ἐναντίῳ, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ πρὸς τινα ὅρον, οἷον ὅταν μὴ ὡς οἱ πολλοί· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς ὡς δεῖ.

39 On “define” for λέγειν at 1222b8, see *EE* II.1, 1219a39-b1 (ὅτι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸν ὅρον αὐτῆς λέγομεν καλῶς, μαρτύρια 1219b1 τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν: “That we have defined the genus and ὅρος of [happiness] well, what seems to be the case to all of us testifies”) and *NE* VII.4, 1148a5 (περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν σώφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον . . . : “Of the pleasures concerning bodily enjoyments, concerning which we define “temperance” and “intemperance” . . . ), LSJ s.v. λέγω (B), A.III.9.b cites the *NE* passage and *Gorgias* 494B. Note that the OCT’s line numbering is off in the *EE* II.1 passage (though I reference it here, at always).

40 *EE* II.5, 1222b4-9: ἐπεὶ δ' εἴληπται ἡ διαλογὴ τῶν ἕξεων καθ' ἕκαστα τὰ πάθη, καὶ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἕξεων καθ' ἃς ἔχουσι κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· τίς δ' ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὅρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· φανερόν ὅτι . . .

T21 goes some way toward clarifying the two passages from VIII.3 where Aristotle tells us we need a standard and then specifies the standard as the “service and contemplation of god” (T17 and T18). In T18, Aristotle explicitly connects the standard with the intermediate. Though he does not specify the standard for us in II.5, or indeed in III.7 or anywhere else before VIII.3, it is clear from II.5 and III.7 that we need a standard for how we pursue the intermediates between pleasures and pains. From Aristotle’s discussion of the intermediate and from the table of virtues in II.3, we know that all the virtues are intermediate between excess and deficiency in pleasure and pain. So the standard will not only guide us in certain matters (as in wit at III.7), but in all matters of virtue.

In fact, by the time we arrive at the end of the *EE*, we might think that Aristotle has given us not just one standard for virtue but *two*: with the introduction of the term ὄρος in II.4 (T20) comes the sentence: “But the good person acts as one ought” (ὡς δεῖ). Nowhere does Aristotle explicitly say that the ὡς δεῖ is a ὄρος: it is merely implied in T20, and then perhaps contradicted – or perhaps explained – by VIII.3. Aristotle makes extensive use of ὡς δεῖ throughout the accounts of the virtues. If this is not just a platitude but refers, for example, to how the virtuous person would act, then VIII.3 may indeed run contrary to it. Or perhaps, if we assume that the virtuous person follows the prescription set out in VIII.3, then the two may refer to one and the same standard. (As to what “service and contemplation of god” may mean in VIII.3, we can only conjecture.<sup>41</sup>)

What role does the ὄρος have in virtue, whatever exactly the ὄρος may be? I now suggest an answer, working from the account of choice developed above and from the account of goods discussed in the last chapter.

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41 Others have done this, with varying degrees of confidence. Kenny *ad loc.* suggests that the service of god refers to acts of virtue.

My suggestion begins with the everyday observation that we have multiple simultaneous desires. Suppose that I desire both the physical health of my grandmother, the psychological well-being of my sister, and my own financial stability, to name a few. When I have some free time from my studies, I often deliberate about how to use it. Should I stay at home, cognizant of my savings? Or should I visit my sister, or my ailing grandmother? I cannot do both of the latter, and either of them conflicts with my first end. While I might compromise, electing to stay home now and extend my holiday trip to my sister's place, I cannot wish simultaneously to visit my grandmother and carry out such a plan. We do not wish for things we know are impossible, Aristotle reminds us. This situation clarifies a role for a deliberative standard, as follows:

My initial set of desires cannot be completely fulfilled. When I deliberate about them and settle on some course of action, my action will be *for the sake of* my wished-for end, which will have as its object the object of one of my desires. As I have explained above, deliberation gives rise to this wish and to the belief either that my action conduces to the end of the wish or simply that I should pursue this wished-for end. In any case, when I choose the action, my choice will be *of* the action and *for the sake of* the wished-for end. So far, so good.

But in between T17 and T18, Aristotle complicates this picture with reference to god. In this passage, Aristotle likens the medical art to the soul, or perhaps to the rather mysterious θεωρητικόν.<sup>42</sup> Opposed to the non-ruling element in each (the body and the desires, respectively) are *two* types of ruling elements: one that is ἐπιτακτικὸς (order-giving), and one that is οὐ ἔνεκα. A doctor's actions are "ruled" by medicine, the order-giving ruler

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<sup>42</sup> See II.10, 1226b25-26.

in his art. But in a different way, health rules his actions, since he performs his work for the benefit of his patients' health.

Similarly, in the soul, Aristotle says, φρόνησις rules the desires, since φρόνησις gives orders as to what we should wish for. In the example above, it was under orders from my deliberation (βούλευσις) that I wished for the psychological well-being of my sister and my financial stability when I made my plan of action. Above, I indicated that my action would then be for the sake of the ends of these wishes, and indeed that is what Aristotle says throughout II.10 about choice. And yet here, we read about another *for the sake of*. Practical wisdom, Aristotle tells us, gives orders for the sake of god – not that such orders are good for god, but insofar as god is the end or the that-for-the-sake-of-which of its ordering. Thinking about the example given here, or indeed about the moral psychology of action in the *EE* in general, is it a problem that our action seems to be both for the sake of our desired ends and for the sake of god?

Given our discussion of types of goods in Chapter 3 and the first section of this chapter, we can answer in the negative: there is no conflict between these two ends. Deliberation, as we have seen, needs some standard with which it can navigate the natural goods. In VIII.3, Aristotle specifically writes that our pursuit of natural goods should be guided by such a standard, and from the discussion in the last chapter, we know that we desire the natural goods, whether we are virtuous or not. In the case of the virtuous person, then, god (or the service and contemplation of god) will serve as the οἷ ἐνεκα (the that-for-the-sake-of-which) of practical wisdom. (Thinking back to II.5, the “as one ought” might also fill this role, or perhaps as noted above the two coincide.) Because of this first οἷ ἐνεκα, the wishes of the virtuous person will be directed toward the correct natural goods, for which, *as*

fine goods, she wishes. But when she acts, she does not act for the sake of god, or for the sake of the service and contemplation thereof. She acts for the sake of the ends of her wishes: such an end is the οὐδ' ἔνεκα of her action. As we saw in the last chapter, she will act for the sake of what is fine, because her wished-for ends, though natural goods, are fine for her. Thus the standard set in VIII.3 guides deliberation, but wished-for ends guide action.<sup>43</sup>

### III Virtue as reasonable (ὡς ὁ λόγος)

In this section, I argue that the affections and desires with which virtue makes the end right (as discussed in Chapter 3) are reasonable and natural, as I go on to explain those terms. Action, too, will be reasonable and natural when it follows on such desires and affections. My argument rests on two main grounds: Aristotle's regular usage of the expression ὡς ὁ λόγος to refer to how one ought to desire or act, and his apparent naturalism in the *EE*. I discuss the two in that order.

ὡς ὁ λόγος is best translated “reasonable.” It is an evaluative standard for states of character, pleasures and pains, beliefs, and actions.<sup>44</sup> Two types of evidence support this

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<sup>43</sup> Against Lorenz 2020.

<sup>44</sup> This thesis applies to the *NE* as well, though I cannot argue so here. Outside the *EE* and *NE*, we only find the expression ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθός or a form of it in the *Magna Moralia*, at *MM* I.34.23-26, 1197b38-1198a20. According to this passage, the natural virtues are to the τελείως ἀρεταί as δεινότης is to φρόνησις. The natural virtues εἰσὶ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἔθει καὶ προαιρέσει, and they are ἄνευ λόγου χωριζομένη. On the other hand, the τελείως ἀρεταί are those μετὰ λόγον, or πρὸς τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν. They come later (ἐπιγιγνώμεναι) in the work. This passage also remarks that in contrast to Socrates, ethicists now do better: they say that virtue is τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν τὰ καλά. This still isn't quite correct, though, because the λόγος might not actually be guiding the action. “We” define virtue, the passage concludes, as τὸ μετὰ λόγου εἶναι τὴν ὀρθὴν πρὸς τὸ καλόν.

In *M Z* and *H*, Aristotle uses the phrase ὁ λόγος to refer to a formula or schema describing how something works (see *Z*, 1034b20). For example, ὁ λόγος is the formal cause of an eclipse (*H*, 1044b12). We see similar usage of the phrase (though with ὡς as in the *EE*) at *MM* II.7.6, 1204b20-22, where the author refers to the *argument* of those who oppose pleasure.

thesis: first, that the phrase is used in a wide variety of contexts, and so it cannot refer to any one specific part of Aristotle's action theory; and second, that in certain passages, Aristotle's language suggests an evaluative interpretation of the phrase rather than a psychological one. Interpreting ὡς ὁ λόγος evaluatively clarifies its important role in VIII.3 (see T17 above), where it is one of only two direct links between the remarkable *EE* VIII and the rest of the *EE*.<sup>45</sup> The likely meaning of ὡς ὁ λόγος therefore adds to our understanding of how Aristotle thinks reason interacts with virtue, our theme for this chapter.

Aristotle uses the expression ὡς ὁ λόγος and its forms in *EE* II, *EE* III, and of course in *EE* VIII.3. Consider the variety of its usage below (sometimes with the adjective ὀρθός, "correct"):

- II.3, 1220b21-35: λόγος and ἐπιστήμη order the intermediate, which produces the best state. See Appendix B.
- II.5, 1222a6-10: "Virtue is taken to be the sort of state from which people are able to effect the best things and through which they are most excellently oriented concerning the best thing. And that in accordance with correct reason (τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον)<sup>46</sup> is the best and the most excellent. And this is the intermediate relative to us between excess and deficiency."<sup>47</sup>
- II.5, 1222a34: in exercise, the slacker will be contrary to the "ὡς ὁ λόγος"
- II.5, 1222b4-14: mean states are κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον; forward reference re ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος and πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὄρον ἀποβλέποντας

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45 The other such link is Aristotle's reference to the ὄρος, just discussed in the previous section.

46 I include the one instance of the expression "in accordance with correct reason" (κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον), as Aristotle seems to use it the place of ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθός or similar.

47 ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἢ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθ' ἣν ἄριστα διάκεινται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστον τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως a10 τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς

- III.1, 1229b6: someone enduring harmless things ὡς ὁ λόγος but fearing death would be cowardly
- III.4, 1231b33: τὸ μέσον is “ὡς ὁ λόγος (ὁ ὀρθός),” “ὡς δεῖ,” and τὸ βέλτιστον
- III.5, 1233a22: τὸ μικρῶν ὄντα ἄξιον . . . is . . . ὡς γὰρ ὁ λόγος κελεύει ἔχει
- III.6, 1233b6: ὁ δὲ κατ’ ἄξιαν καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος μεγαλοπρεπῆς
- VIII.3, 1249a21-1249b6: see T17 above.

First, note the wide variety of elements that are ὡς ὁ λόγος. This variety eliminates the possibility that Aristotle thinks that the λόγος should guide one specific part of the process leading from desire to action. For example, we might think that deliberation should be so guided.<sup>48</sup> But the application of the phrase to desires, which do not follow from but give rise to deliberation, implies the contrary.

Now consider the final instance of the expression, in VIII.3. This comes from T17 above. We might read this line from VIII.3 to say that the ὄρος of the excellent person was earlier specified to *be* ὡς ὁ λόγος. If VIII.3 references a passage in the *Eudemian* special books, it most likely refers to II.5, 1222b4-14, as only there does Aristotle mention the two terms in the same breath. And yet in neither passage does Aristotle actually make an explicit connection between the ὄρος and what is ὡς ὁ λόγος. We need not assume they are one and the same; indeed, if they were, why would Aristotle speak about them separately? In VIII.3 then, Aristotle is merely drawing out an implicit conclusion from earlier in the work, that our understanding of the term τὸ μέσον should be guided by the λόγος.

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<sup>48</sup> So Lorenz 2020. Additionally, we have already seen in the previous section that Aristotle tells us we should have a standard for our pursuit of natural goods. I have argued there that this standard guides deliberation.

#### IV Reason's influence on character

The previous two sections have each offered a thesis on how reason interacts with virtue. Adding their conclusions to the outline of action in the first section produces a complete summary of Aristotle's action-theoretic picture. After I present this summary, I argue that while the rational part of the soul does not cultivate or direct virtue of character, Aristotle leaves open the possibility for deliberation to influence virtue through action.

Expanding the summary from the beginning of this chapter with the theses of the past two sections, we arrive at the following, focusing on the virtuous person. Virtuous character consists in dispositions to be affected in intermediate ways, experiencing intermediate amounts of pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain occasion non-rational desires for various natural goods. The virtuous person exercises practical wisdom to sort through these desires and endorse some of them. This endorsement leads to rational wishing for those (non-rational) desires' ends. Practical wisdom also works to determine a plan of action that conduces to the (now rationally) wished-for ends. In all its work, practical wisdom proceeds with an eye to enabling the "contemplation and service of god." Though his deliberation is excellent, it still needs a standard to guide it, and this (contemplation and service of god) is the best standard (*ἄριστος*) for taking action regarding the natural goods. Finally, the virtuous person chooses the last action identified by deliberation, which is the first in his plan to achieve the goals he desires. The resultant actions as well as his whole character – notably his non-rational desires and his affections – are both reasonable (*ὡς ὁ λόγος*) and natural.

From this picture, the rational soul might seem to be confined by non-rational desire on the one side and action on the other. That is, since the process just described begins in desire and ends in action, it seems that there can be no rational influence over a state of

character, even though rational capacities do have influence over action. However, from the first half of the dissertation we know that states of character result from repeated action. Every action, then, (as well as every movement, more generally) makes a contribution to the character of its agent. And the rational soul directs action. Thus not only *can* our rational capacities influence who we become; they *must*.

I have just offered a philosophical argument in favor of this interpretation. But it makes good interpretive sense too. I now consider two passages that bear on what I have had to say so far in this section.

First, in *EE* I.2, Aristotle writes the following:

T22: Concerning these things, noting the fact that everyone capable of living according to their own choice lays<sup>49</sup> down some end (σκοπός) for living finely, whether honor or reputation or wealth or education, looking toward which he will do all his actions, since not arranging (συντετάχθαι) life with respect to some goal is a sign of great foolishness, we should first in the matter at hand distinguish, neither hastily nor lightly, in which one of our [goods] living well [is] and without which it is not possible for human beings for this to exist.<sup>50</sup>

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49 Dirlmeier and Simpson treat b6-b14 as a single sentence. Doing so allows them to understand δεῖ (b11) as the main verb, followed by the accusative subject understood from ἐπιστήσαντας (b6) and the infinitive διορίσασθαι (b12). They thereby avoid having to supplement δεῖ or the like at this point in the text. Kenny, Woods, and Inwood and Wolf (as well as P<sup>2</sup>, in the margin) do so, changing the sentence from descriptive to prescriptive (“... should lay down ...”). Rowe follows Dirlmeier and Simpson and refers to Woods’ textual note on the matter (185-186). Kenny (1978: 191-192) wonders why Aristotle lists these candidates here instead of referring back to his distinction between the lives of wisdom, pleasure, and virtue. Reading ἐπιστήσαντας alone and leaving δεῖ for the second part of the sentence (as I do but as Kenny does not) makes his list easier to understand: these are commonly-adopted goals, not goals we “should” adopt.

Against my reading, Woods notes that both ἐπιστήσαντας with a dependent accusative-infinitive and μάλιστα δὴ introducing a main clause are unusual (185). Rowe suggests taking the noun clause in the dative: “paying attention, in relation to these things, [to the fact] that . . .” (*ad loc*); the statement that *not* setting oneself a goal for action is very foolish might be evidence either in favor (Rowe, *ad loc*) or against (Woods, 186) the declaration that everyone does this.

Here, Aristotle prefigures the distinction between the natural goods and goods that are fine that we have seen in Chapter 3. Some of the first (natural goods) are necessary conditions for happiness, but only the second (goods that are fine) are constituents of it.<sup>51</sup> The passage also makes plain just how common it is for people to organize their lives with respect to some goal. It would be a “sign of great foolishness,” in other words, for someone to use their rational faculties *only* to determine the best course of action in every circumstance. Rather, Aristotle seems to think, everyone who is able to directs their actions toward some goal. This statement may be the closest Aristotle comes in the *EE* to speaking explicitly about rational involvement in the habituation process. According to the philosophical analysis just presented, if he is indeed commenting on rational involvement in habituation here, he might be thinking of the fact that we have rational influence over our action, and that our actions develop our character. On the other hand, we could also take the comment to refer to the ὄρος defined in VIII.3: rather than thinking about how to act in order to direct her own habituation and the character that results, perhaps the σκοπός here could refer to the “service and contemplation of god,” toward which the noble person will direct her deliberative activity.

Second, when discussing courage, Aristotle writes that “[c]ourage is in accordance with reason [τῷ λόγῳ], and reason bids a person to select what is fine [τὸ καλόν].”<sup>52</sup> This thought might seem to run contrary to the conception of reason’s influence on virtue developed in this section so far. Is Aristotle saying that instead of being built up by (non-rational) habituation, states of character answer directly to reason (ὁ λόγος)? This is unlikely,

<sup>51</sup> Some confusion about the good life comes from elevating items from the first group into the second. See the following lines, especially b24-27.

<sup>52</sup> III.1, 1229a1-2: ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολουθήσις τῷ λόγῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἰρεῖσθαι κελεύει. See text T13 to Chapter 3 above.

for in the previous chapter we saw that the natural goods are fine for the virtuous person. And in this chapter, we have just seen that the excellent person has a standard, for the sake of which he deliberates. Construing τὸ καλὸν as either the natural goods or the service and contemplation of god, we can say that both are *reasonable* goals for virtuous action. When we read that “reason bids us select what is fine,” we should see in this the fact that virtuous action (and desire, etc.) is reasonable because it aims at what is fine.<sup>53</sup>

We saw in the first half of this dissertation that habituation in the *EE* does not involve active rational capacities on the part of the agent. Even here, having considered the interaction between reason and virtue, we can see that the *EE* still posits no direct influence between our rational capacities and our character, contrary to some interpreters, who would draw the *EE* into the orbit of the *NE* on this point. But in each of the ways just outlined, Aristotle does allow for agential influence on the development of our character. His theory of action and his theory of character development intersect in at least these two ways, and from their intersection we can see how he might think we can improve.

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53 We might also think problematic the idea that virtuous action is for the sake of “τὸ καλὸν,” especially if we translate τὸ καλὸν as “the fine.” For example, “[virtue] makes one select everything for the sake of something, and this ‘that for the sake of which’ is what is fine [τὸ καλόν]” (III.1, 1230a29-30: ἕνεκά τινος πάντα αἰρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὐδ’ ἕνεκα, τὸ καλόν. See text T14 in Chapter 3 above.) I have argued against such a translation, but in any case, the response to the objection in the text should alleviate concern here as well.

## Conclusion

The four chapters of this dissertation each address an aspect of either the development of virtue of character or of its functioning when mature. At the end of the final chapter, I noted a potential continuity from the beginning to the end of this dissertation. That is, there may be ways in which mature virtue and the development of virtue interact. And yet the dissertation falls naturally into two parts, the first two chapters looking forward from a state of unformed character, and the second two chapters looking inward on a state of actual virtue. These two descriptions also characterize Aristotle's various reflections in the *Eudemian Ethics*: nowhere does he effectively bridge the two perspectives, as we have seen in the Interlude. In this brief conclusion, while reviewing what we have discussed in the chapters above, I want to suggest that this bifurcation may illuminate a thoroughgoing skepticism on Aristotle's part that philosophical treatises or lectures have a role to play in everyday, practical morality.

To see why, begin by considering a passage from early in *EE* I:

From Chapter 1, T2: [W]e do not want to know what courage is but to be courageous people, nor what justice is but to be just people, even as we wish to be healthy rather than to know what health is and to be in a good state rather than to know what being in a good state is.<sup>1</sup>

As this passage seems to suggest, given its include in Aristotle's treatise, the academic subject of virtue may well interest us because we are intent on improving ourselves and on helping

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1 *EE* I.5, 1216b22-25: οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐδέ τί ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ' εἶναι δίκαιοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εἶ ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστὶ τὸ εἶ ἔχειν. On this point, see also T4 in Chapter 1, though note that an alternative reading of the end of T4 would lessen its contribution to the point. (Most manuscripts agree on the text I print and translate for T4.)

those around us to improve. If we are of an intellectual cast, we might think that in order to develop the virtues, we must first answer two questions: what is virtue, and how does it come about? And we might turn to each other, or to recognized experts like Aristotle, for such knowledge.

In Chapter 1, I considered Aristotle's perspective on T2 and on these two questions, which I called the essence question and the origin question. He insists on the greater importance of the latter, writing that it is most important to know how virtue originates. But I argued that his enterprise in this regard is intellectual and not directive in nature; the knowledge that results will be practical knowledge, in a technical sense that is opposed to theoretical or productive knowledge. In short, his practical inquiry into the origins of virtue will yield knowledge, not action. He does not in the end seem interested, at least in *EE* I and II, in the everyday question of how to improve.

But perhaps, we might think at the conclusion of Chapter 1, this initial lack of interest is merely part of his didactic strategy. The texts discussed in Sections III and IV of Chapter 1 weed out nature, learning, knowledge, the divine, and luck as candidate answers to the origin question, leaving practice, specified as habit, as Aristotle's answer. Perhaps Aristotle first needs to teach us that habit forms character before we can get to work on becoming better people.

This supposition may be partly true of Aristotle's approach to similar questions in the *NE*. After material in *NE* I similar to that in the *EE*, we learn in *NE* II.4 about a multi-step process of virtue acquisition, and Aristotle addresses common questions about how this process works. But I want to suggest that in the *EE* as a whole and not just in books I and II, Aristotle's approach is thoroughly intellectual. That is, his lack of interest in the

practicalities of how to improve may be thoroughgoing. Furthermore, I will suggest that he has good reason to adopt this approach, for he sees the process of virtue acquisition as unresponsive to direct instruction and potentially exclusive of direct rational involvement altogether. So while interest in his topic doubtless derives in part from a wish for practical direction, Aristotle does not provide it at least in part because he believes he cannot do so. Such, at least, will be my suggestion in this conclusion.

The remainder of Chapter 1, as well as Chapter 2, fits with this suggestion. Aristotle devotes a single complex sentence to habit in the *EE*, in which he seems to delight in presenting a maximally general account of the phenomenon. As I remark at the outset of Chapter 2, features familiar from the *NE* are notably absent from the theory of habit in the *EE*. But in the context of my suggestion here in the conclusion, this absence may make some sense. Suppose that Aristotle has a poor opinion of the efficacy of explicit instruction – or even of rational involvement – where character development is concerned. He would then have good reason to avoid describing habituation as a partially rational process; he would be well advised to avoid drawing an analogy to skill, where direct instruction is often of paramount importance; and he would certainly not hold forth on the importance of a teacher or a model for character development. And indeed there is significant additional evidence against the idea of rational involvement on the part of the agent, seen in Chapter 2: the theory of the development and destruction of conditions through pleasure and pain supports habit as presented in *EE* II.2 but does not suggest any directive capacity for rationality or instruction.

In the Interlude, I raised a number of problems about the maturation of character, since the theory considered in Chapter 2 does not seem powerful enough to bring a person to

a virtuous state. I concluded with a rather textually circumspect suggestion, that Aristotle leaves room for various solutions to these problems but that he does not comment on them or endorse one or another directly. I think this conclusion most warranted by the text we have, inclusive of the VII.2 passage considered in the Interlude. But the suggestion I am making at present may also be plausible: on the present suggestion, Aristotle will have left these apparent problems unanswered in part because they are not problematic and in part because the answers are obscure to philosophical and psychological theorizing. For example, an apparent contradiction between the idea that “virtue is calmness regarding pleasures” and Aristotle’s theory of pleasure-motivated development might dissolve when we consider character development as a whole instead of the development of a single virtue. And, on the other hand, if we ask how a person habituated through pleasure and pain can gain a cognitive grasp of the demands of justice, we may simply be asking a question to which only personal experience can give an answer.<sup>2</sup>

Chapter 3 presents a two-part examination of non-rational desire and virtuous ends. The second part of the chapter considers Aristotle’s classification of goods at length in preparation for Chapter 4. But the first part of Chapter 3 provides support for the idea that external instruction – and again perhaps rational capacities in general – have little work to do in the actual formation of virtuous character. In that part of the chapter, I show how virtue of character makes our ends correct. The non-rational desires of the virtuous agent give her a set of potentially specific ends that she desires to pursue. Only then do her rational capacities work to endorse and achieve those ends, as I show in Chapter 4. In the context of the

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2 If the suggestion I am making in this conclusion turns out to be correct, then we need not categorize all the questions raised in the Interlude as either poorly thought-out or unanswerable. It does seem that Aristotle needs to posit pleasures proper to virtuous activity in order to facilitate the theory explained in Chapter 2.

formation of virtuous character, non-rational desire might direct behavior to such an extent that the agent's rational capacities or her ability to listen to instruction has little influence over her development.

Such a conclusion from the content of Chapter 3 supports the suggestion at hand but disagrees with the proposals I make at the conclusion of Chapter 4. In that discussion, I quote the following passage.

From Chapter 4, T22: [E]veryone capable of living according to their own choice lays down some σκοπός for living finely, whether honor or reputation or wealth or education, looking toward which he will do all his actions, since not arranging life with respect to some τέλος is a sign of great foolishness.<sup>3</sup>

My concluding ideas in Chapter 4 suggest, partly on the basis of T22, that there *are* ways in which our rational capacities can influence the development of our character. Since repeated action habituates character, I write, we can influence our characters by focusing on acting well and even by deliberating about what sort of character will result from the actions we take. Also, earlier in Chapter 4, I argue that excellent deliberation will have as its ὄρος the contemplation and service of god, and it seems likely that this ὄρος will turn out to have something to do with virtue and virtuous activity. Thus excellent deliberation, too, would have virtue in its sights. In sum, we might say that deliberation aims at the development of virtuous character by identifying virtuous ends from among those ends supplied by non-rational desires. I consider these ideas plausible in light of the textual evidence adduced in Chapter 4 and the unanswered questions of the Interlude. That is, these proposals regarding

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3 *EE* I.2, 1214b6-11: ἐπιστήσαντας ἅπαντα τὸν δυνάμενον ζῆν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν, ἥτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν, πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ποιήσεται πάσας τὰς πράξεις, b10 ὡς τό γε μὴ συντετάχθαι τὸν βίον πρὸς τι τέλος ἀφροσύνης πολλῆς σημεῖον ἐστίν. I argue in Chapter 4 for my interpretation that the quoted part of the sentence expresses an observation and not an exhortation.

how our rational capacities might guide the development of our character have the potential, at least, to solve some of the problems that split this dissertation in two.

On the other hand, if I am right in the suggestion of this conclusion, these attempts to bridge the developmental story and the account of mature virtue may be solutions to problems that Aristotle does not have. From Chapter 1, we know that the inquiry of at least the beginning of the *EE* is practical in that it attracts and interests students aspiring to become good, but it does not direct their aspiration; rather, it merely gives them knowledge about virtue. My suggestion so far in this conclusion has been that this approach is principled in that Aristotle does not think that rational inquiry or rational direction is even able to influence character development, whether through a philosophical treatise or a teacher of virtue or even one's own reason.

What is more, the ideas I propose at the end of Chapter 4 have limitations corresponding to this suggestion. Suppose, as I do there, that Aristotle thinks the virtuous person uses her rational capacities to identify specific actions that will change her character for the better. Or again, suppose that in her endorsement of certain non-rational desires, she limits her pursuits to the most virtuous *ἔργα*: the service and contemplation of god. Even so, it might well be the case that such rational direction of character is not possible without mature virtue. And so while the virtuous agent might well experience significant interaction between her non-rational and rational capacities where the *further* development of her character is concerned, this interaction might not have been possible in her journey to virtue in the first place. Instead, the achievement of virtue might rely solely on the mechanisms of habituation, pleasure, and pain discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.

What about the many questions about how the process described in the first two chapters works? Aristotle might think it better – and so might we – to devote our energy to experiencing the answers for ourselves rather than to attempting to formulate them philosophically.

## Appendix A: Concordance of Manuscript Sigla

In the dissertation, I work primarily from Christopher Rowe's draft text of the *Eudemian Ethics* (2020). I also consult the editions of Franz Susemihl (1884) and the *Oxford Classical Text* prepared by R. R. Walzer and J. M. Mingay (1991).<sup>1</sup> The concordance of manuscript sigla presented in this appendix illustrates the manuscripts used by each of these three editions and by Immanuel Bekker in his 1831. It also indicates the sigla associated with each manuscript and the correspondence among them.

Nearly a century after Susemihl's edition was published, Dieter Harlfinger's study of the manuscripts established three manuscripts as the primary sources for the others (1971). Two of these had been used by Susemihl: the Codex Vaticanus (13th century; abbreviated P = Susemihl's Pb) and the Codex Cantabrigensis (1278; abbreviated C, Susemihl's Cc), both part of Susemihl's primary manuscript grouping, Π1. Susemihl had not included the third manuscript identified as primary by Harlfinger: the Codex Laurentianus (15th century; abbreviated L). Harlfinger's new research on the manuscripts made Susemihl's edition outdated. An Oxford Classical Text edition was prepared over the next twenty years, whose various editors were able to make use of Harlfinger's conclusions and other developments. Though the OCT edition's editors published the first apparatus criticus to consider L, the willingness with which they emended the text has rightly been the subject of some criticism.<sup>2</sup> Their edition cannot be used without Susemihl's to hand as well.

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1 W. D. Ross began the work that led to this edition.

2 Thus Barnes 1992

In Christopher Rowe's description of this history, he emphasizes the need for a new edition of the *EE*, taking a fresh look at Harlfinger's research, reconsidering emendations made in the OCT, and correcting apparently not infrequent misreadings of the manuscripts (2015). Rowe himself has started to produce such an edition, in part in preparation for the 2017 Symposium Aristotelicum, which focused on *EE II*.

| (as described in the OCT)  | Rowe | OCT                   | Susemihl* |                       |                | Bekker |                |
|--|------|-----------------------|-----------|-----------------------|----------------|--------|----------------|
| Codex Laurentianus 81.15, saec. xv   | L    | L                     |           |                       |                |        |                |
| Codex Vaticanus 1342, saec. xiii   | P    | P                     | Π         | P <sup>b</sup>        | Π <sup>1</sup> | Π      | P <sup>b</sup> |
| Codex Cantabrigiensis 1879, CE 1278  | C    | C                     |           | C <sup>c</sup>        |                |        |                |
| Codex Victorii   |      | V, fort. V            |           | C <sup>v3</sup>       |                |        |                |
| Codex Palatinus 323, saec. xv (*Romano-Palatinus 165)                                      |      | D                     |           | D <sup>c</sup>        |                |        |                |
| Codex Venetus Marcianus 213, saec. xv  |      | Marc.                 |           | M <sup>b</sup>        | Π <sup>2</sup> |        | M <sup>b</sup> |
| Codex Oxoniensis, e Collegi Corporis Christi 112, saec. xv                                 |      | Oxon.                 |           | Z                     |                |        | Z              |
| Editio Aldina, CE 1498   |      | Ald.                  |           | Ald. <sup>4</sup>     |                |        | Q?             |
| Versio Latina ab anonymo, a Bekkero (1831) edita   |      | Λ <sup>1</sup>        |           | In.                   |                |        |                |
| Versio Latina De Bona Fortuna (EE VIII.2 and EE VIII.3, 1248b8-11: see Dirlmeier, EE, 119) |      | Λ <sup>2</sup>        |           | B <sup>f</sup>        |                |        |                |
| Fragmentum Latinum (EE VIII.3)   |      | Λ <sup>3</sup>        |           |                       |                |        |                |
| Vir doctus Basiliensis (*Operum Aristotelereorum ed. Basileenses tres)                     |      | Bas. <sup>1,2,3</sup> |           | Bas. <sup>1,2,3</sup> |                |        |                |
| Codex Ambrosianus E 40 sup., saec. xv  |      | Ambr.                 |           |                       |                |        |                |
| Demetrios Chalcondyles in Ambr. E 40 sup.  |      | Chalc.                |           |                       |                |        |                |
| Constantinus Lascaris in Matrit. 4627, saec. xv  |      | Lasc.                 |           |                       |                |        |                |
| Codex Laurentianus 81.4, saec. xv  |      | Laur. 81.4            |           |                       |                |        |                |
| Codex Laurentianus 81.12, saec. xv   |      | Laur. 81.12           |           |                       |                |        |                |
| Codex Laurentianus 81.20, saec. xv   |      | Laur. 81.20           |           |                       |                |        |                |
| Codex Neapolitanus III E 5 sup., saec. xv  |      | Neap.                 |           |                       |                |        |                |
| Codex Ravennensis 210, saec. xv  |      | Rav.                  |           |                       |                |        |                |
| Codex Urbinus 45, saec. xv   |      | Urb.                  |           |                       |                |        |                |

3 C<sup>v</sup> runs through page 1214 (Susemihl, xxxi). Then C<sup>c</sup> picks up from 1215.

4 Ald. runs pages 1214 through 1218 (Susemihl, xxxi). Ald. is not explicitly included in Π.

## Appendix B: Text, Translation, and Commentary

Key passages with significant textual problems

### I EE II.1, 1220a29-37<sup>1</sup>

καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἄρα ἢ τοιαύτη διάθεσις ἐστίν, ἢ γίνεται a30 τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων περὶ ψυχῆν  
κινήσεων καὶ ἀφ' ἧς πράττεται τὰ ἄριστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν  
πῶς μὲν γίνεται, πῶς δὲ φθείρεται, καὶ<sup>2</sup> πρὸς ταῦτά<sup>3</sup> ἢ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑφ' ὧν καὶ αὖξεται καὶ  
φθείρεται<sup>4</sup> <καὶ><sup>5</sup> πρὸς<sup>6</sup> ἄ<sup>7</sup> βέλτιστα διατίθησι.<sup>8</sup> σημεῖον δ' ὅτι περὶ ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρὰ a35  
καὶ<sup>9</sup> ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γὰρ κολάσεις ἰατρεῖαι οὖσαι καὶ γινόμεναι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων,  
καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τούτων εἰσίν.

1 Cf. *NE* II, 1104b4-1105a13, esp. II.3, 1104b13-16.

2 καὶ PC: om. L

3 ταῦτα PCL; ταῦτὰ all editions, Bonitz, Rowe, Inwood and Woolf. A parallel with the τῶν αὐτῶν at the beginning of the line would be best, perhaps, but the meaning is clear enough (and, unlike at the beginning of the line, here the verb is only expressed on one side of the comparison; this might account for the ταῦτα instead of a ταῦτὰ). See also the note below, though it is unclear from Rowe or the OCT whether, the first time the phrase appears, it contains ταῦτα or ταῦτὰ. (I suspect that the manuscripts print the former both times.)

4 The editions note that PC repeat πρὸς ταῦτὰ . . . φθείρεται. Rowe adds that ταῦτὰ has no crasis mark and a circumflex and that the second time round καὶ precedes the phrase. This may be one reason to add καὶ before πρὸς (see below).

5 Rowe and the OCT, following Langerbeck, supply καὶ before πρὸς. (Susemihl does not.) See the note on πρὸς ταῦτὰ . . . φθείρεται just above.

6 πρὸς: πως PC

7 Russell supplies a καὶ after ἄ.

8 διατίθησιν PC (not M\*), OCT,: διατίθησι L, Rowe

9 καὶ missing in M\*

Therefore,<sup>10</sup> virtue is the sort of condition both which is brought about by the best movements<sup>11</sup> of the soul and through which the best works<sup>12</sup> and affections of the soul are produced,<sup>13</sup> and by those same things that it comes about in one way, in another way it is destroyed, and the use of it is toward the same things by which it is both developed and destroyed and toward which it arranges things in the best way.<sup>14</sup> We can see this because

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10 Aristotle has been investigating “those things through which [character] comes about [γίνεται διὰ τίνων]” (1220a14-15). He lays out two principles (which are clear “by induction”) and draws a conclusion: “Let us assume first that the best condition [διάρθεις] comes about through the best things, and that the best things are done in each case in accordance with the virtue of each” (1220a22-24). . . “Also, [let us assume that] every condition comes to be and is destroyed by how the same things are applied” (a26-27).

11 Dirlmeier: “[Ar.] denkt an παθήματα, πάθη . . . [die] gehören in den Gesamtbereich von Lust und Unlust (21b36).” He refers us to *EE* II.2 and II.4 for more on πάθη as a κίνησις in the soul; he also references *Rep.* 583e9 and *Pol.* VIII.3, 1337b42; and he notes that “Durch die Charakterisierung des Innerseelischen als Bewegung . . . unterscheidet sich *EE* bekanntlich von *MM* und *EN*” (ad loc). See also Dirlmeier on 1220a34 on the idea that virtue and vice have to do with pleasure and pain. The *NE* (II.3, 1104b13-16) uses this idea to show that virtue and vice are about affections and actions, since affections and actions are guided by pleasure and pain. The *EE* goes further with the idea, justifying it because “trials (i.e., assigning pain) stem from the conviction [das Strafverfahren (nämlich Unlust zu verhängen) auf der Überzeugung beruht]” that pleasure and pain are (the?) criteria by which one can tell the goodness or badness of an action, since a bad action comes from the temptation of pleasure or a good one omitted from fear of pain (239).

12 “works” for ἔργα (Dirlmeier: Werke), though the meaning seems to be parallel with the κινήσεις (“movements”) just mentioned

13 See note on πράττεσθαι ἄριστα above.

14 Arum Park has suggested this translation for πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ and on, in preference to a previous attempt on my part, which read: “. . . and it is both developed and destroyed by those things which the use of it [concerns] and toward which best things it is inclined.”

On this passage, see Kapp 1912, 34-48, esp. 39, quoted in Dirlmeier: “Ar. in *EE* die Tugend ‘durch ihre Beziehung auf ἡδοναί und λῦπαι und nicht, wie in *EN*, auf πάθη und πράξεις definierte.’ Der Lust-Unlust-Komplex aber ist platonisches Erbe [inheritance], auch in *EN*; aber Kapp gelingt [works . . . to show] es, nicht nur durch platonische Texte, sondern auch durch Einbeziehung [interrelationship] von Partien aus der aristotelischen *Politik* und *Physik*, zu zeigen, daß *EE* gegenüber *EN* 1104b4-1105a13 die größere ‚Ursprünglichkeit‘ verrät [that *EE* shows the greater natural authenticity when compared with *EN* 1104b4-1105a13].” (Dirlmeier 237). Dirlmeier thinks that Kapp was (“in the main”) successful in showing this, but notes that “nach 1912 nicht mehr vorstellbar war, wie eine Vorlesung vom Typus *EE* nach *EN* hätte gehalten werden können” (237).

both virtue and vice are concerned with pleasures and pains. For punishments happen through these means, since they are treatments and are brought about because of opposites, just as in other cases.

## II EE II.2, 1220a39-b7

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει 1220b1 ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ' ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πῶς, οὕτως ἤδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις<sup>15</sup> οὐχ ὀρώμεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις ῥίψης ἄνω τὸν λίθον οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ b5 βία.<sup>16</sup> διὸ ἔστω ἦθος τοῦτο, ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον<sup>17</sup> δυναμένου<sup>18</sup> δ' ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης.<sup>19</sup>

15 καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις PCB (Rowe *ad loc.*: “B with mark indicating doubt?”), Ferreira; ὁ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς L; ὁ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις Rowe, OCT, Susemihl, Simpson 2012.

The reading adopted by Rowe, the OCT, and Susemihl requires mixing the ὁ of L with the τοῖς ἀψύχοις of PCB. ταῖς ψυχαῖς is nonsensical: ὁ λίθος is clearly the contrast case for the (ensouled) human being. I punctuate with Ferreira before and after this clause. Ferreira remarks that “ὁ is not strictly necessary since transitive verbs may well have their objects omitted” (129).

16 My punctuation differs from Rowe’s here (he has a full stop) and in a39 (comma after σημαίνει). I discuss both choices later in this section of Appendix B; the full stop is particularly consequential.

17 ἦθος τοῦτο ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον PCL: τοῦτο ἦθος ψυχῆς καὶ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγων B.

Only Rowe’s B has the variant καὶ . . . λόγων, though M<sup>b</sup> also (Bekker and Susemihl) transposes ἦθος and τοῦτο. The transposition makes no difference to the sense; elsewhere, Aristotle uses both the printed text (καὶ ἔστω ἀντίφασις τοῦτο, κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἰ ἀντικείμεναι: *De Int.* 6, 17a33–34, cited in Ferreira 2017:130) and the transposed text (τοῦτο κύριον ἔστω: *Politics* VI.3, 1318a33). B’s text would define ἦθος as something like “the quality of the soul and of commanding reason, but (and?) of that which is able to follow reason.” Perhaps we can construe B’s text differently, but at any rate δυναμένου δ’ . . . does not make much sense if we have not already seen one way in which ἦθος has to do with λόγος.

18 A marginal note in a second hand in P reads δυναμένη. adopted by some editors (see Ferreira 131 and Susemihl’s “Addenda et Corrigenda,” 123).

But as Ferreira observes, “it is a part of the soul, not a quality of a part of the soul, that is capable of following reason” (*ibid.*). Thus the differing genders make sense: a part (neuter) of the soul (feminine) is able (neuter) to follow reason. Dirlmeier (240-241) and especially Chamberlain (181) discuss the striking parallel definitions in Stobaeus from which this emendation comes.

19 For textual variants and emendations of this final phrase see my discussion just below.

But since character (ἥθος) is [possibly: what it is] as even its name indicates<sup>20</sup> because it is capable<sup>21</sup> of development through habit (ἔθος),<sup>22</sup> and that [which becomes habituated] becomes habituated<sup>23</sup> by a non-innate pattern of behavior by moving [or being moved] many<sup>24</sup> times in a certain way, eventually<sup>25</sup> in this way [becoming] the thing able to be active [or able to activate], and we do not see [this] in inanimate things, for though you throw a stone up countless times, you will never do this without force, let character therefore be this, a quality of that<sup>26</sup> in the soul which is able to follow reason in accordance with commanding reason.<sup>27</sup>

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20 Perhaps with Ferreira's suggestion to take ὡσπερ with ἐστί (2017: 124-126).

21 LSJ *s.v.* ἐπίδοσις A.IV: ἐ. ἔχειν: “to be *capable* of progress or improvement” (emphasis mine), citing *Tht.* 146b and *Smp.* 175e. Since the definition of character (b5-7) clearly relies on this discussion, it is unlikely that the potentiality here implies the possibility of another way for character to develop. Ferreira suggests we read it to imply that habit might not lead to *stable* character (2017: 126).

22 ἔθος could be “custom” (Simpson) or “habit” (most others), and perhaps also “habituation.” For ἐθίζω, LSJ has “accustom” or “become accustomed.”

23 With Ferreira, “[t]aking the substantiated prepositional phrase as subject of the main verb in the clause . . . ἐθιζόμενον may be mentally supplied after μὴ ἐμφύτου” (127). Rowe agrees.

24 Ferreira has “several times” (124), but surely habituation requires more than several repetitions.

25 See LSJ *s.v.* ἤδη 4.d.

26 My translation “that” stands in for the understood subject of δυναμένου. As footnoted *ad loc.* in the text I have printed above, the gender of δυναμένου indicates that ποιότης is not its subject. Instead, its understood subject will be a part or aspect of the soul. This understood subject “is able to follow reason.” And this makes sense: character is specifically in the *non-rational* part of the soul.

In a rare article dedicated to this passage, Chamberlain misses the chance to use δυναμένου to specify the non-rational part of the soul. He imports Fritzsche's τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν instead, because “it is appropriate to state in the definition that [ἥθος] is located in the irrational soul.” Then, δυναμένου δ' ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ “is not to the point” because “it seems strange that Aristotle should be reminding us that the irrational soul ‘can nevertheless follow reason’” (180). With δυναμένη, he translates: “. . . a quality which, though located in the irrational soul, can nevertheless follow the orders of reason, in accordance with commanding reason” (179-180).

Chapter 1 involves substantial discussion of the philosophical issues raised by this passage. Footnotes to the text and translation above address textual issues and choices I have made in translation. In neither of these two places have I been able to address what I will call the “κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον problem.” This problem must appear insignificant to editors and translators, for there is no commentary on it, even in the cases of the few translations that avoid the problem.<sup>28</sup> For the topic of this dissertation, however, the κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον problem must be addressed. It is raised by the text and translation of the final phrase of this passage (ψυχῆς . . . ποιότης).

#### A The κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον problem

We can start to see the problem by looking at the text agreed upon by all but one<sup>29</sup> manuscript (and which I have printed above). In that text, κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον seems to describe either (a) ψυχῆς . . . ποιότης (“a quality of soul”),<sup>30</sup> (b) the understood subject of

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27 Compare *NE* II.1, 1103a14-23 and *MM* I.6, 1185b37-86a8. For a fairly exhaustive list of interpretations of this passage, see Ferreira (2017).

28 As far as I am aware, only Donini notices the κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον problem (1999: 203), though perhaps due to the brevity of his commentary he does not discuss its implications.

29 In what follows, I will simply refer to the text I have adopted as the MSS text. See my note to λόγον above for the alternative text, found only in B.

30 We may think this because δυναμένου δ' ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ is perhaps most natural as an embedded clause. If we remove it, our phrase simply reads ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον ποιότης, in which case κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον seems to describe a “quality of soul.”

Kenny (with the OCT's text) takes this route: “. . . a quality governed by the prescriptions of reason, which inheres in that part of the soul which, although non-rational, is capable of obedience to reason.” Similarly Simpson's odd “. . . a quality of soul in accord with a reason in command of a being-able to follow reason” (46). Simpson explains: “moral character . . . is a quality of soul . . . that is in accord with a reason that gives commands (the custom comes about through extrinsic guidance)” (247). Also Ferreira: “a quality of the soul in accordance with command-giving reason, but of that which is capable of following reason” (124).

δυναμένου, or (c) the soul itself,<sup>31</sup> instead of (d) the following of reason that a part of the soul is able to do (as in my translation).<sup>32</sup> Now (b) and (c) make at least conceptual sense: the soul, or a part of it, might be in accordance with commanding reason. We have to work harder to imagine, as in (a), that a quality of the soul (or indeed ἦθος itself,<sup>33</sup> since ἦθος is here defined as a quality of the soul) could be κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον. In any case, all three possibilities are unacceptable on philosophical grounds. In the sentence as a whole, Aristotle is defining character in general, not specifically virtue of character (as in the *NE*). Surely Aristotle is not saying that *every* state of character is in some way κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον.<sup>34</sup>

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31 If we do not take κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον with ψυχῆς . . . ποιότης (as suggested in option (a)), it might describe either this understood subject (option (b)) or the soul itself (option (c)). Chamberlain (179n15) points to the difference between (a) and (b)/(c), citing older examples of (b) or (c).

32 As I note in more detail on page 178 below, both Inwood and Woolf and Woods tack κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον on to the end of their translation of the phrase following a comma. It seems possible to construe their translations with any of the four interpretations offered here.

33 Donini seems to take the phrase in this way in his main translation: “perciò resti stabilito che il carattere è, conformemente a una direttiva razionale, una qualità della parte dell’anima irrazionale, ma capace di seguire la ragione” (35). He follows the text of the OCT, but also translates Dirlmeier’s text, to much different effect (203-204). I discuss his second translation in a note on page 178 below.

34 Here is Di Basilio’s conclusion to his argument that only when reason has developed – or, stronger, only when reason has developed *and* when the non-rational part of the soul listens to it – do we have character. As I discuss in Chapter 1, Di Basilio interprets II.2’s ἀγωγή as one’s own λόγος.

Full activation of reason . . . is momentous because it enables one to form one’s character. Indeed, the *EE* conceives of character as the quality of the non-rational part of the soul in so far as it can follow reason’s precepts ([II.2.] 1220b5-6); this means that strictly speaking character cannot be acquired before one is finally active in a certain way as the result of the guidance provided by such a non-innate principle to act accordingly. Aristotle seeks to mark out what ethical character is so as to set it apart from other qualitative states of the non-rational part of the soul, and does so by saying that following habituation the non-rational part of the soul is qualified in so far as it can follow reason’s precepts. That is why, for instance, having a sweet tooth or being fond of bitter foods fail to describe a certain ethical character ([II.10.] 1227b10-11). (14)

But this is the result of reading *κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον* with interpretations (a), (b), or (c).

On the contrary, it seems that most states of character are *not* in accordance with commanding reason.<sup>35</sup> So, the only plausible reading of the passage seems to me to be (d), as in my translation. A part of the soul is able to follow reason, and *κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον* tells us more about how that following happens. Namely, the part of the soul is able to follow reason “in accordance with commanding reason.” Whether or not the part of the soul of

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Di Basilio’s perspective raises several questions in addition to the main problem I see with this type of view – viz., it seems that many types of character do *not* require the non-rational part of the soul listening to the rational part, or even the presence of fully-developed reason at all. Here are other problems for Di Basilio’s argument:

1. What are examples of “other qualitative states of the non-rational part of the soul”? Aristotle mentions qualities of the soul in only this context.
2. What are we to do with passages that seem to locate the impulse for character formation outside the soul, most notably VII.2, 1236bb39-1237a3? Though Di Basilio allows that factors other than one’s own reason may play a role in character formation, his thesis seems to require that political character formation (as in VII.2) could only take place once citizens’ own reasoning was already guiding their development.
3. At II.10, 1227b10-11, Aristotle tells us that certain pleasures and pains (e.g. being fond of bitter foods) do not have to do with character. Di Basilio cites this remark as evidence for his idea that all character traits require rationality. But if all inclinations to pleasure or pain that do not involve reason are not character traits, then the intermediates and extremes mentioned at III.7, 1234a23-30 would also not qualify as character traits. This seems problematic: inclination to spite (*φθόνος*, 1234a30) does give a person a certain sort of character (*ποῖός τις τὸ ἦθος*, 1227b11).

As for the remark at II.10, 1227b10-11, it seems instead to be a consequence of Aristotle’s definition of the intermediate in terms of pleasures and pains (Woods 151). Having defined the intermediate in this way, Aristotle needs to clarify which pleasures and pains – and so which intermediates – indicate character. He does not do this satisfactorily here or elsewhere. Note also that it is not clear from the context of II.10, 1227b10-11 that the excluded tendencies do not involve choice. So perhaps the criterion lies in the types of pleasures and not in rationality.

Finally, Charles Chamberlain, whom Di Basilio cites, considers the stronger version of Di Basilio’s thesis, namely that character may only arise when reason has developed *and* when the non-rational part of the soul listens to it. Chamberlain asks “the question [of] whether all souls possess ἦθος or only a lucky few [whose desires have been sufficiently modified].” He answers in the negative: “though the actual achievement of virtue is rare, the potential for it is present in all human souls in the form of ἦθος . . . [but] even the presence of ἦθος cannot guarantee that all humans will reach that goal” (183, citing *NE* II.9, 1109a29-30 and *NE* VI.13, 1144b4-6).

which character is a quality actually *does* follow reason for any given quality of character, it is at least *able* to do so.

I propose that we can read (d) from the MSS text, as my translation shows. But would it be better to emend the MSS text? Some editors and translators have chosen to emend the MSS text by bracketing δ' alone or both δ' and τῷ λόγῳ. They give various reasons for doing so, none of which I find compelling.<sup>36</sup> On their grounds, I do not think such bracketing necessary. However, bracketing δ' or τῷ λόγῳ may be justified to avoid the κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον problem, if we do not think that interpretation (d) can be delivered by the MSS text. I now consider these possibilities.

Suppose we bracket both δ' and τῷ λόγῳ. Rowe does so and sees ὡς ὁ λόγος completing ἀκολουθεῖν, as I suggest without bracketing in construal (d). Rowe does not mention the ὡς ὁ λόγος problem, but his emendation does avoid it.<sup>37</sup> Setting aside δ' for the moment, Rowe's bracketing of τῷ λόγῳ seems unnecessary. We can see this from Dirlmeier,

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35 See my discussion in Chapter 4 of the role of the phrase ὡς ὁ λόγος in virtue. If virtue is in accordance with reason, any other state of character will not be in accordance with reason.

36 In what follows, I discuss these editors and translators: Rowe, Dirlmeier, and Donini, in an alternative translation in his commentary.

37 Rowe complains that keeping τῷ λόγῳ results in “odd repetition”; he does not mention the κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον problem. My translation sees the two instances of λόγος playing different roles in the sense of the phrase. As I discuss alongside the introduction of this passage in Chapter 1 (T5), τῷ λόγῳ tells us what a part of the soul is capable of following and κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον tells us more about the following.

Rowe writes *ad loc.* that “[t]he proposed reading strips back the account of ἦθος to the bare essentials, as well as avoiding the anyway odd repetition of λόγος, and the partial reduplication involved in κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον . . . ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. We end up, on this reading, with just ‘a ποιότης of [that part] of soul that is capable of following according to reason’ (for ἀκολουθεῖν used without a following dative and with a prepositional phrase, see [III.6.] 1233b2-3).” I do not see Rowe’s ἀκολουθεῖν at 1233b2-3; perhaps he means II.8, 1224b31 (with no dative and with ἐκ: ὅτι εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ἔνεστι).

who brackets only δ'.<sup>38</sup> Like Rowe, he does not mention the κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον problem in proposing his text, instead arguing that on the basis of the parallel definition in Stobaeus, only the δ' should be omitted.<sup>39</sup> As in the case of Rowe's text and suggested translation, Dirlmeier's translation avoids the κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον problem without addressing it head-on.<sup>40</sup> So there is certainly no reason to bracket τῷ λόγῳ, since Dirlmeier produces a completely sensible translation without doing so. Indeed, bracketing τῷ λόγῳ deprives the passage of the two different specifications of the relation of character to reason that I have already explained.

So far as I am aware, no translation prior to my own avoids the κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον problem while keeping the δ'.<sup>41</sup> Perhaps we ought to translate: "a quality of the soul,

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38 I do not address the other emendations Dirlmeier makes, as they do not pertain to this particular point. Nor are they particularly compelling, since we can make sense of the MSS text without them.

39 Though Dirlmeier looks to Stobaeus to delete the δ', he maintains that the definition in Stobaeus is a deterioration of that here in *EE* II.2, at least where *EE*'s δυναμένου is concerned: "In [Stobaeus] ist δυναμένη Verschlechterung der Vorlage, denn es ist unaristotelisch zu sagen ἡ ποιότης δύναται ἐπακολουθεῖν. . . . Im folgenden muß dann nur noch das δ' entfallen (s. Stob.)" (241).

Besides bracketing δ', Dirlmeier follows Fritzsche's supplemental τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν after λόγον. He translates ". . . der Charakter ist eine Beschaffenheit des irrationalen Seelenelements, das in der Lage ist, nach Maßgabe des befehlenden Rationalen dem Rationalen zu folgen" (22).

40 Though not happy with Dirlmeier's text, Donini deems it better than the OCT, which his main translation follows. Here is Donini with Dirlmeier's text: ". . . resti perciò stabilito che il carattere è una qualità della parte dell'anima irrazionale capace di seguire la ragione *conformandosi* a una direttiva razionale" (1999: 203-204; emphasis mine). The gerund "conformandosi" might make even more explicit than my translation does the place of κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον: character is a quality of the non-rational part of the soul that is capable of following reason *by conforming* to a rational directive. It is additionally noteworthy that Donini uses "conformarsi" instead of "conformar."

41 Inwood and Woolf and Woods produce translations that can be read to avoid the κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον problem, but both use a comma before δυναμένου, making my interpretation less likely on their readings.

Inwood and Woolf follow the OCT, translating "a quality of the part of the soul that is irrational, but capable of following reason, in line with reason's ability to command" (19). The OCT does not bracket either δ' or τῷ λόγῳ (though it does adopt Fritzsche's supplement). Woods translates ". . .

*but* (δέ) of that in the soul which is . . .” In any case, I do not think my translation too much of a stretch for the *EE* given the MSS text. But as an alternative, I suggest bracketing the δ’ – again, solely for the purpose of avoiding the κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον problem.<sup>42</sup>

## B The parallel passage in II.1

Before I turn to the punctuation of the text, consider II.1, 1220a10-12, a close parallel to the text under consideration.<sup>43</sup> Aristotle tells us that “the virtues of character belong to the non-rational [part], but to that which by nature is capable of following the part having reason. For we do not say that someone is a certain sort with respect to his character (ἦθος) because he is wise or clever but because he is gentle or bold.” The text reads αἱ δ’ ἠθικαὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν ἀκολουθητικοῦ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι· οὐ γὰρ λέγομεν ποῖός τις τὸ ἦθος ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ δεινός ἀλλ’ ὅτι πραῖος ἢ θρασύς.<sup>44</sup> Here, as in the II.2 passage, character belongs to the non-rational part specified as that which can follow (the part having) reason. Including the δ’ (with L) seems to result in a pinpointing of the aspect of the soul to which the virtues of character belong. They do not belong simply to the non-rational part of the soul but rather to that aspect of the non-rational part of the soul that “by nature is capable of following the part having reason.”<sup>45</sup> This makes good sense: the *θρεπτικόν*, for

a quality of the part of the soul that is non-rational, but capable of following reason, in accordance with a prescriptive principle” (16; see 189), following Ross (1915: 156) in this section. The OCT takes up Susemihl’s printed text, though see Susemihl’s “Addenda et Corrigenda” (123) for more on the passage.

42 With Dirlmeier’s commentary (240-241), Chamberlain states that keeping δ’ would imply “a lost contrast” (179). If this is so, Dirlmeier’s bracketing will be preferable to Chamberlain’s adoption of Fritzsche’s supplement.

43 I also discuss this passage as part of T5 (Chapter 1).

44 The MSS are in agreement here, except that PCB do not have L’s δὲ following ἀκολουθητικοῦ.

45 This reading of the current (II.1) passage gives us for free one of the results for which Chamberlain emends the II.2 passage. He says in support of his emendation that “ἦθος seems to be . . . the part

example, cannot follow reason (pace Buddensiek 2019), or at least not at all in the sense that the ὀρεκτικόν can.<sup>46</sup>

The fact that II.1 seems to parallel the current (II.2) passage has made the former a ground for various emendations of the latter. Rowe, for example, thinks that his bracketing in the II.2 passage was introduced to match the II.1 passage.<sup>47</sup> Though I have argued against such bracketing above, it is worth noting that the occurrences of δ' in the two passages might well be related, at least in sense. That is, because only L has δ' and PCB do not in II.1, if we bracket δ' in II.2, we should adopt PCB's text in II.1.

### C A syntactic argument for my construal of the passage

Let us return to the II.2 passage, with which I began this section of Appendix B (EE II.2, 1220a39-b7). I now discuss its syntax, both as the manuscripts deliver it to us and as various translators<sup>48</sup> emend it. In my analysis of the various texts adopted, I include

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of the irrational soul which can listen to reason" (180-181). (Perhaps he means that ἦθος is a *quality* of this part of the non-rational soul, though he does not make this explicit; he seems not to mark the difference in his own translation, though he does in his discussion of Stobaeus.)

46 Buddensiek is much more certain that the θρεπτικόν cannot be subject to habituation than I am, but he does not seem to think that Aristotle is doing as much here as I do. Buddensiek translates “. . . eine dem anordnungsfähigen logos-entsprechende Beschaffenheit des Teils der Seele, der in der Lage ist, dem logos zu folgen” and remarks that “[Aristoteles] führt nicht aus, was es im Fall der formbaren Teile ist, dem sie ihre Formbarkeit verdanken” (2019).

47 Rowe *ad loc.*: “Fritzsche’s supplement of τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν after λόγον makes this account of ἦθος mimic the description of the ethical aretai, only a few lines before [here in II.1, 1220a10], even more closely than the patently corrupted text in the MSS (ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικόν λόγον δυναμένου δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης) already does. I speculate that the transmitted text has its origin in a gloss referring back to those lines (a process that Fritzsche’s supplement would in effect complete).” As I have argued above, the MSS text reads well enough, so I do not see why Rowe asserts that it is “patently corrupted.” Nor does Ferreira, whom Rowe refers to earlier in his discussion of this passage.

48 I do not consider editors’ texts in their own right in this section. Susemihl adopts the manuscripts’ text for the crucial lines (a39-b3, except reading ὁ for καί in b3), so his text could give construal (a) or (b). The OCT contains significant emendations; I consider a few translations of it.

consideration of the spacing and punctuation printed with the text.<sup>49</sup> In an attempt to make the run of my argument a bit less murky, I distinguish five different syntactic construals of the passage. Each of these construals is dependent on several choices: the text translators adopt, how they punctuate and space that text, and how they read the resultant Greek. I then use these five construals to argue for my own choices in each of these respects.<sup>50</sup> I shall expect any syntactic ambiguities in the texts translators adopt to be preserved in their textual punctuation and spacing and reproduced in the translation they produce.<sup>51</sup> I have tried to accomplish this in my translation, which is printed identically at the beginning of this section of this Appendix and in Chapter 1.

To set construals apart from one another, we may divide the unpunctuated text of the manuscripts as follows:<sup>52</sup>

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Rowe's text deserves its own mention here, since no one has yet translated it. (Buddensiek (2019) works from Rowe's text but does not adopt it completely.) In a39-b3, Rowe prints the manuscripts' text, with  $\delta$  for  $\kappa\alpha\iota$  in b3. He punctuates notably in two places: a comma after  $\sigma\eta\mu\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota$  and a full stop after  $\beta\acute{\iota}\alpha$ . Finally, he suggests the following sense for (5): "that is how [we] already [get] the [whatever it may be that is] capable of acting [in accordance with the acquired  $\tilde{\eta}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ]." From this information we clearly cannot construe Rowe's text as any of (a)-(e). It seems closest to Ferreira's (a), but I am not sure what we would do with the  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ , since Rowe separates (1)-(7) from (8).

49 It may of course be the case that without punctuation and spacing, the manuscripts' text (or some emendation of it) contains important ambiguities. I lay on the editors and translators (and on myself as well) the burden of spacing and punctuating the Greek to reflect these ambiguities, or at least of bringing them to the reader's attention.

50 Having presented the five possibilities, I argue eliminatively for my interpretation. It is of course possible that I have missed some better interpretation of the manuscripts' text, or some unobjectionable emendation that should be adopted because of the perspicacity of its syntax.

51 And so I shall not focus on the translations themselves except where they go beyond what I take to be the least precise interpretation of the syntax of the text on which they are based. Also, in some cases I have been forced to rely on translations to determine punctuation of the Greek, since many translators do not print a (punctuated) text and some do not make clear that they follow their edition's punctuation.

52 I add the spaces upon which all manuscripts agree. Editors and translators have only made one change in the spacing – viz. Jackson's reading of  $\delta, \tau\iota$  for  $\delta\tau\iota$  (reported in Ross 1915: 156).

a39 (1) ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος (2) ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ση-  
 b1 μάλινει (3) ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν (4) ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ'  
 ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πῶς (5) οὕτως ἦδη  
 τὸ ἐνεργητικόν (6) καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οὐχ ὁρώμεν (7) οὐδὲ γὰρ  
 ἂν μυριάκις ῥίψῃς ἄνω τὸν λίθον οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ  
 b5 βία (8) διὸ ἔστω ἦθος τοῦτο ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν  
 λόγον δυναμένου δ' ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ  
 ποιότης (*EE* II.2, 1220a39-b7)

First, (6)-(7) is quite clearly parenthetical. If we read καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις as I have done, then there need be no syntactic relationship between (6)-(7) and the remainder of the passage.<sup>53</sup> If we read ὁ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις, (6)-(7) will tell us more about something in (1)-(5), but unobjectionably so, from a syntactical point of view. Either text provides a contrast with the case of a stone, which implies perhaps that having a soul is a necessity for habit to result in character. But this is a matter for my discussion of the semantics of the text in Chapter 1.

The other parts of the sentence (or sentences, if we punctuate with some commentators) are rather less clear than (6)-(7). Buddensiek (2019) helpfully presents several alternative construals, working from various translations and their text. I expand and reformulate his list here, noting who adopts which construal and on the basis of which textual emendations they do so.<sup>54</sup> Note that in the cases where translators split the passage into multiple independent clauses we may well infer logical relations between these clauses that go beyond the syntax itself.<sup>55</sup> But in presenting the five possibilities below I remark only

53 Ferreira comments on the ἐπεὶ δέ . . . δέ . . . καί structure in Aristotle (2017: 129-130). I consider his comment at the end of this section.

54 Emendations of the *text* seem to form the basis for all construals; that is, punctuation and spacing do not play an important role. Jackson's reading of ὅτι is the single exception. In each construal, I note deviations in lines a39-b3 from the near-univocal manuscript text, which I have printed. After b3, the text is less problematic in (6) and (7), and in (8) the textual problems do not affect the syntax of the passage as a whole.

55 In the cases where translators do divide the text into multiple independent clauses, I do not think that there are any grounds for drawing specific conclusions about the syntactic structure of the

on the logical relations that each translator sees in the syntax, punctuation, and spacing they adopt.<sup>56</sup> In Chapter 1, I discuss the semantics of my own text, spacing, and punctuation.

Here are the five construals of our text, with my division into sections (1) through (8):

(a) (1)-(3) are a dependent clause, explaining the main clause (8). (3) explains (1) (my main construal), or (3) explains (1)-(2) (Ferreira). (4)-(5) is parenthetical.<sup>57</sup>

(b) (1)-(5) are a dependent clause; (8) is the main clause. (3) (followed by (4)) explains the way in which (2) gives reason for the thought expressed in (1) and (5). (5) then follows on (1), the two explaining (8).<sup>58</sup>

(c) (1)-(3) are a dependent clause, explaining the main clause (8). (3) completes (1) with (2) parenthetical. (4)-(5) is also parenthetical.<sup>59</sup>

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whole. For example, what the *διό* that begins (8) refers back to, if it is syntactically separate from the *ἐπεὶ* in (1), is rather unclear.

56 Only in the case of the manuscripts' text (with or without the *ὅ* for my *καί* in b3, which Simpson and Buddensiek read), do multiple translators interpret the syntax of the text differently, yielding (a), (b), and Buddensiek's (c). In two other cases, translators arrive at the same syntactic structure with different texts (as I explain in my footnotes to (c) and (e)).

I do not remark on Di Basilio's construal. He translates and prints Dirlmeier's text, but leaves out (6)-(7) entirely, working with (1)-(5) and (8) in two separate parts of his paper (4, 14 respectively). I do not see why Di Basilio curtails the passage after *ἐνεργητικόν*, printing but not translating *ἐπεὶ* as in Woods and Kenny. Because Di Basilio's translation misses out *ἐπεὶ*, he ends up with construal (e) instead of Dirlmeier's (d), despite following Dirlmeier's text (and Jackson's *ὅ, τι*).

57 Ferreira (124), with no emendation, and my own construal (also with no emendation)

58 Simpson (both 2012: 546 and 2013a: 26), with *ὅ* for *καί* in b3

As Buddensiek (2019) remarks regarding Simpson's text, while (3)-(4) could be explaining (5), this would separate (2) from what seems to be an explanation of it in (3) and leave (2) instead nonsensical.

59 Buddensiek, with no emendation, but Rowe's *ὅ* for *καί* in b3 and reading *ὅ, τι* for *ὅτι* with Jackson; and Donini (34-35), with the text of the OCT, which brackets *ἐστὶ* in a39, *ὅτι* in b1, and *τό* in b3 (Donini manages this complex construal of the OCT's text because, unlike Woods and

(d) (1)-(5) is an independent clause, and (8) is another. (3) follows on (1) with (2) parenthetical. (1)-(3) explains (5), with (4) parenthetical.<sup>60</sup>

(e) (1)-(3), (4)-(5), and (8) are independent clauses. (3) completes or explains (1) with (2) parenthetical. (5) follows on (4).<sup>61</sup>

I now consider each of these construals in turn, working generally backwards, from (e) to (a).

I end by arguing that we have good reason to prefer (c) or (a) to the other construals, and that the best translation will focus on (a), allowing for two variants of it.

As the punctuation in my text should make clear, I think that the overall structure of the sentence is ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος . . . διὸ ἔστω ἦθος τοῦτο.<sup>62</sup> Taking (8) as an independent clause separated from (1) with a full stop – as in (d) or (e) – deprives ἐπεὶ of its role in explaining the definition of character in (8) via the ideas in the first few phrases. If (8) is indeed separate in this way, ἐπεὶ must instead introduce a clause dependent on either an understood ἐστὶ in (5) or on (3)'s ἔχει. These are the strategies of construals (d) and (e) respectively.

Start with (e). To make (e) work, Woods and Kenny bracket ἐστὶ in a39 with the OCT, and Inwood and Woolf keep ἐστὶ and translate it existentially: character “exists.” If the

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Kenny, he actually translates ἐπεὶ.)

60 Dirlmeier (22, 239-241), with Jackson's ὅ, τι for ὅτι and [τό], both in b1; Donini (203-204), following Dirlmeier's text

61 Inwood and Woolf (19), bracketing only the τό in b3; Woods (15-16, 99, 188-189), following the text of the OCT; and Kenny, following the text of the OCT but with αὐτό instead of [τό] in b3

By bracketing ἐστὶ, Woods and Kenny see (3) completing (1). Inwood and Woolf translate ἐστὶ existentially, so (3) explains why character “exists.” Thus for Inwood and Woolf, the dependent ἐπεὶ-clause is simply (1), but Woods and Kenny have to leave ἐπεὶ out of their translation, even though the OCT includes it, to yield (d). (Perhaps they see ἐπεὶ and διὸ as redundant?)

62 Ferreira remarks that “[t]he anacoluthon in the period, with διὸ opening the conclusion, will not result unfamiliar to any reader of Aristotle” (2017: 130).

OCT's emendations are necessary for (e), as Woods and Kenny must think, we should not prefer (e), since (a) or (b) can be read from the manuscript text, or so I argue. (c) is dispreferable for the same reason, if with Donini we achieve it with an emendation (the OCT's bracketing of ἐστί, which makes (3) complete the thought of (1)). As for Inwood and Woolf's existential ἐστί, I think it much more likely that ἐστί has a more informative role, as every other construal. At any rate, (e)'s dividing of the passage into three independent clauses ignores the syntactic possibility that ἐπεὶ in (1) provides reason for the definition in (8).

Next consider (d), which results from Dirlmeier's text. Dirlmeier brackets τὸ in b1 but otherwise follows the manuscripts, with Jackson's ὁ, τι for ὅτι also in b1. From this text Dirlmeier and Donini construe the passage as in (d). This construal puts (1) and (3) together to explain (5), but it is not at all clear why we should think that (1) and (3) provide any support for (5). I would translate as follows: "Since character . . . is something that develops from habit . . . [it is] in this way eventually the thing able to be active [or able to activate]."<sup>63</sup> We seem to get *new* information in (5), not information that can in some way be justified even in part by (1) and (3). There is no hint of *activating* (or of *activity*) in (1) or (3) (or indeed in all of (1)-(4)). Since other construals avoid this problem, I suggest we abandon (d).

This leaves us with three possibilities: (a), (b), and (c). All follow the text of the manuscripts, in contrast to (d) and (e).<sup>64</sup> *Ceteris paribus*, reading the manuscript text is preferable to emending it, so if we find a decent candidate in (a), (b), or (c), we should prefer

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63 Here is Dirlmeier: "Indem aber der Charakter (ēthos) . . . etwas ist was sich von der Gewöhnung (ēthos) her ausbildet . . . ist er auf diese Weise letzten Endes das aktivierende Element" (22).

64 Buddensiek reads Jackson's ὁ, τι for ὅτι to produce (c). Both Buddensiek and Simpson read ὁ instead of καί in b3. But Jackson's reading does not change the text, and the ὁ/καί dispute does not concern the difference between construals (a), (b), and (c), since it does not occur until (6).

it. According to all three of these construals, ἐπεὶ introduces a clause explaining the definition of character in (8). The three construals differ primarily regarding *what* forms a part of the ἐπεὶ clause, and therefore also regarding what reasons the syntax provides for (8)'s definition. In this respect, (b) stands out from (a) and (c).

So, consider (b). According to (b), (5) follows on (1), so that (5) has a syntactic role in explaining (8). I would translate as follows: “But since character . . . is eventually in this way the thing able to be active [or able to activate], . . . therefore let character be this, . . .” However, the syntax of this construal raises two problems. First, why would the fact that character “is eventually in this way” τὸ ἐνεργητικόν support the definition of character as a quality of the non-rational part of the soul and with some relation to λόγος in (8)? I italicize “τὸ ἐνεργητικόν” in the previous sentence because on construal (b), the basic structure of the sentence cites ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος . . . τὸ ἐνεργητικόν as a reason for (8). This emphasis need not be so prominent, as I explain in my consideration of (a) below. Here is the second problem: why would the fact that ἦθος comes from ἔθος (cited in (2) and explained by (3) and (4)) give us additional (καί) reason to think that character is eventually τὸ ἐνεργητικόν (as we learn from (1) and (5))? As in the first problem I posed for this construal, we need to pay close attention to what exactly is syntactically a reason for what. Here, the intervening material in (3) and (4) may indeed be a reason to think that character is eventually τὸ ἐνεργητικόν. But the structure of (1)-(5) in (b) is simply ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει . . . τὸ ἐνεργητικόν. So the syntax of construal (b) has it that the fact that ἦθος comes from ἔθος gives us reason to think that ἦθος is eventually τὸ ἐνεργητικόν, whereas it seems instead that the main reason for thinking that ἦθος is τὸ ἐνεργητικόν must have something to do with the

explanation of τὸ ὄνομα in (3) and (4). And we can achieve that more precise logical structure syntactically with a different construal – namely, with (a) or (c).

On to the final two possibilities, (a) and (c). These differ only in their understanding of the connection of (3) to (1) and (2). In both of them, (4)-(5) is parenthetical and, syntactically, only the thought in (1)-(3) supports the definition in (8). This route avoids the first problem with construal (b) because the thought about τὸ ἐνεργητικόν in (5) is not connected directly to the definition in (8). Of course, the presence of (5) – and indeed all of (4)-(7) – will factor in to our understanding of (8), but there is no special syntactic emphasis on τὸ ἐνεργητικόν. (a) and (c) also avoid the second problem just raised in consideration of (b). Whereas (b) construes an abstruse syntactic connection between (2) and (5), (a) and (c) treat (4)-(5) as parenthetical, and their syntax does not imply such a connection. So, since (a) and (c) avoid both of the problems with (b), if they are sufficiently clear themselves, we should prefer them to (b). I now argue that they are indeed sufficiently clear.

Following Buddensiek’s (c), I would translate as follows: “Since character is . . . something that is capable of development through habit.”<sup>65</sup> Here, (3) completes (1), and (2) is parenthetical. Following Ferreira’s (a), on the other hand, we would take ὥσπερ with ἐστὶ: “since character is as [even?]”<sup>66</sup> its name indicates because it is capable of development through habit.” In this case, (1)-(3) is a single thought, with (3) explaining (1)-(2). Finally, as an alternative to Ferreira but still on construal (a), we might take ἐστὶ veridically, translating “character *is what it is* as even its name indicates because it is capable of development

65 Buddensiek: “Da . . . der Charakter etwas ist, das von Gewöhnung her sein Wachsen hat” (2019). I rejected Donini’s (c) above, on the grounds that it unnecessarily emends the text. Only by emendation can Donini produce his attractive translation of these lines: “poiché il carattere . . . ha il suo sviluppo dall’abitudine” (35).

66 Ferreira leaves the καί in a39 untranslated (124), which does indeed seem best for Ferreira’s version of construal (a).

through habit.”<sup>67</sup> Again, as in Ferreira’s construal, (3) does explanatory work: it explains (1), with (2) parenthetical.

Each of these three construals seems reasonable to me. Each keeps the manuscript text, with reasonable punctuation and spacing. Each boasts a syntax that avoids esoteric connections between parts of the passage. And each draws the passage together into one complex thought. I think (a) slightly preferable to Buddensiek’s (c), though, for the following reason. Buddensiek reads ὁ, τ in b1 with Jackson. This requires understanding ἐστὶ in a39 as (at least)<sup>68</sup> copulative, but the intervening etymological observation in (2) then separates ἐστὶ from its subject complement (τ). This separation makes Buddensiek’s (c) marginally less attractive than either of the construals I have mentioned in connection with (a), neither of which see (2) as intervening in this way.<sup>69</sup> Because either of the construals of (a) seems to me quite possible, and because both adopt the same punctuation and spacing, I have attempted to allow for both in the dissertation. I print the text they have in common, and I have added “[possibly: what it is]” in my translation of (1).

In this final section on 1220a39-b7, I take myself to have produced a comprehensive consideration of the syntax of the passage. It will be clear from my argumentation that I prefer something of a minimalist approach where syntax is concerned. That is, I prefer syntactic construals that leave ambiguous controversial logical connections between parts of

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67 Julia Annas suggested I consider this possibility, which is not perhaps quite as awkward as Buddensiek’s “is something” for ἐστὶ . . . τ, but does not commit us to taking ὡσπερ with ἐστὶ, as in Ferreira. Inwood and Woolf also treat ἐστὶ absolutely, as existential. See Kahn (1965) on εἶναι.

68 If we do not separate ὁτ, ἐστὶ could either be translated as predicative (as copulative, with Ferreira’s reading of (a)) or as absolute (as veridical, with my reading of (a), or as existential, with Inwood and Woolf). But in any of these cases, we need not try to pin down a specific translation of ἐστὶ. Kahn (1965) argues that in most cases, syntax tells us little or nothing about εἶναι. I take my vocabulary in this note from his article, where he describes various semantic features of the verb.

69 Thus I object more broadly to Jackson’s ὁ, τ, as I do not see any other way to read it.

the passage. Those logical connections are then semantic matters, and the reader can weigh for herself the evidence for and against each of them. Therefore, some of the implications (of the syntax of certain construals) cited above as reasons against those construals may indeed find warrant in the text, but it would be a mistake to adopt a syntax that requires or implies them.<sup>70</sup> Construals (a) and (c) are in part superior to the other construals because they transit the syntactical ambiguity of the unpunctuated manuscript text most completely.

As a final observation, I will draw attention to a comment of Ferreira's on the *καί* of b3, which begins (6). Here is Ferreira:

PC[B]'s<sup>71</sup> *καί* . . . deserves scrutiny. In Aristotle's works one finds passages where *καί* introduces a third premiss after a first premiss introduced by *ἐπεὶ δέ* and a second premiss introduced by *δέ*: *EE* III.5, 1232b27–31 [*δέ* l. 29, *καί* *ibid.*], *Phys.* IV.12, 220b32–221a9 [*δέ* l. 1, *καί* l. 4], *M* Θ.2, 1046a15–20 [*δέ* l. 16, *καί* l. 17]. Seen from that perspective, PC[B]'s *καί* results not only acceptable, but even preferable to L's *ὃ*, contrary to what all editors except Manuzio (who knew only the lesson *ὃ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς*) seem to think. (Ferreira 2017: 129-130)

If this is compelling (and I have no reason to think it should not be), then the syntax of the entire passage has more structure than any of (a)-(e) makes explicit. Three premises would support (8): (1)-(3), (4)-(5), and (6)-(7). Ferreira comes the closest to making this argument structure apparent in English, but he no doubt intentionally refrains from making the syntax of his English require it: after “since” for *ἐπεὶ* in a39 and “and” for *δέ* and *καί* in b1 and b3,

70 Here is an example: I have argued that *ἐπεὶ* introduces a dependent clause that provides reason for the definition at the end of the passage, in (8). Simpson (with construal (c)) may be correct first that (5) follows on (1) and second that the pair explains (8). But we can draw these two conclusions semantically if we start with construal (a) or (c). (a) or (c) would be preferable in this case because their syntax does not *require* that (5) follows on (1) or that (5) and (1) help to explain (8), but they leave that possibility open. Similarly with (d), which agrees with the first point Simpson makes here.

71 Ferreira did not have Rowe's edition. Rowe attributes *καί* here to PCB (Rowe *ad loc.*: “B with mark indicating doubt?”)

he translates διὸ ἔστω ἡθος τοῦτο in b5 with “given that, be character this, . . .” This translation allows for the complex ἐπεὶ . . . δέ . . . καὶ structure without forcing it on the reader. I hope that my translation (“therefore” for διό) achieves the same result.

### III EE II.3, 1220b21-35

ἐν ἅπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ ἐστὶν ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μέσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οἷον ἐν γυμναστικῇ, ἐν ἰατρικῇ, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ, ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, καὶ ἐν b25 ὁποιαοῦν [sic] πράξει καὶ ἐπιστημονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστημονικῇ καὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ ἀτέχνῳ. ἢ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχές, ἢ δὲ πράξεις κίνησις. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς βέλτιστον, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος. πανταχοῦ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν βελτίστην ἔξιν. καὶ τοῦτο b30 δῆλον διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ τοῦ λόγου· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία φθείρει ἄλληλα, τὰ δ' ἄκρα καὶ ἀλλήλοισι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ ἐναντία· τὸ γὰρ μέσον ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ ἴσον τοῦ μὲν ἐλάττονος μείζον τοῦ μείζονος δὲ ἔλαττον. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν περὶ μέσ' ἄττα εἶναι καὶ b35 μεσότητά τινά.

In every divisible continuum there is excess and deficiency and intermediate, both relative to each other and relative to us. For example in gymnastics, in health, in building, in navigation, and in any action whatever, both scientific and unscientific, both skilled and unskilled. For movement is continuous, and action is movement. In all cases the intermediate relative to us is best, for this (τοῦτο<sup>1</sup>) is as knowledge and reason order.<sup>72</sup>

72 Cf. *EE* II.1, 1219b26-31 and 1220a8-11, and II.2, 1220b5-7: Aristotle suggests that – since we are looking for human virtue – we assume that there are two parts of the soul that share in reason (μετέχει λόγου) by nature (τῷ . . . πεφυκέναι; τῆς ψυχῆς and κατὰ φύσιν in 1220a9-11). It falls by nature to one “to give commands” (ἐπιτάττειν in all three passages) and to the other “to obey and listen” (πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν at 1219b30) or “to follow” (ἀκολουθέω at 1220a10-11 and 1220b6). Here, knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and reason (λόγος) “order” (κελεύει at 1220b28).

On parts of the soul, see *EE* II.1, 1219b32: divisibility into parts makes no difference, and Aristotle does not take a position. Similarly, Aristotle writes at *EE* II.4, 1221b31 that not every part of the soul has desire, “if the soul has parts” [εἰ μεριστὴ ἐστίν].

In every case this (τοῦτο<sup>2</sup>) also produces the best state. And this is clear from induction and from reason: for opposites destroy each other, and extremes are opposite both to each other and to the intermediate, for the intermediate is each opposite relative to the other, just as the equal is greater than the lesser and less than the greater. So virtue must be concerned with certain intermediates and be some intermediate.

This passage begins *EE* II.3. In it, Aristotle introduces his Eudemian<sup>73</sup> idea of the intermediate<sup>74</sup> relative to us, which occupies a key role in the account of virtue developed throughout *EE* II. This introduction of the intermediate contains comments on knowledge and reason; thus it is especially important for my consideration of the relationship between virtue and reason in Chapter 4.

The key lines of this passage are 1220b27-29 (“In all cases . . . best state.”). By beginning a new paragraph with the sentence at 1220b27-28 (“In all cases . . . order.”), some translations<sup>75</sup> imply that this sentence begins a new idea, and that the two sentences in 1220b27-29 follow one upon the other. Reading these two sentences in context allows us to see that the passage comments on an important difference between the role of reason in virtuous action and the role of reason in virtuous character: virtuous action is “as reason

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73 “Eudemian” because, among other differences, in the *EE*, virtue “concerns (περί) certain mean points and *is* some mean point (μεσότητα πινά),” (II.3, 1220b34-35) whereas in the *NE*, virtue is a mean disposition (διάθεσις; II.8, 1108b11-13) or “lies in” a mean.

74 I follow Lorenz (2020) in translating μέσον as “intermediate.” The concept of a mathematical mean does not fit well with Aristotle’s idea in II.3, and while he attempts to rectify the situation (e.g. II.5, 1222a22-b4), the precise denotations of “mean” cause more confusion than they are worth, especially when the vaguer “intermediate” allows for more specification in context. (For criticism of the concept as Aristotle introduces it, see Woolf 102.)

75 Notably Inwood and Woolf and Woods (though see next note)

order[s],” but reason only interacts with virtuous character because virtuous action (which is as reason order[s]) *produces* virtuous character.<sup>76</sup>

I have paragraphed the passage to indicate this difference. The sentence beginning with “In all cases” (at 1220b27-28) tells us about actions, in a continuation of what Aristotle has been writing since 1220b21. The next sentence (in 1220b29) introduces a discussion of states, which Aristotle continues through II.3 with the table of vices and virtues, all of them states. The “In all cases” sentence, then, tells us that in everything that involves action, the intermediate action (the referent of  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^1$ , at 1220b28) is as knowledge and reason order. And the “Also, in every case” sentence begins a new thought (notice the  $\kappa\alpha\iota$ ) with the idea that the intermediate action (also the referent of  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^2$ , at 1220b29) always produces the best state of character. The first idea supports my argument in the second section of the fourth chapter; the second idea should be familiar from Chapter 2.

The philosophical considerations presented in those two chapters help to show that  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^1$  and  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^2$  most likely both refer to the intermediate action, as I have just said. But there are also good contextual grounds to take these two pronouns in this way. I now discuss their referents at some length, as they have sparked some debate in the literature on this passage.

Context suggests that  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^1$  might refer to (1) the intermediate action or (2) the best,<sup>77</sup> and  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^2$  to (i) the intermediate action, (ii) the best, or (iii) the orders of knowledge and reason. I have adopted (1) and (i), though some more general referent of  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^2$  is

<sup>76</sup> Woods makes a suggestion in the direction of what I propose here, namely that separating the sentences at 1220b28 and 1220b29 can help to settle the “pervasive uncertainty” of whether Aristotle is discussing choices or actions on the one hand or states on the other (104). I do not see why  $\pi\rho\omicron\alpha\iota\rho\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$  should enter the picture here, but otherwise, the point is a useful one.

<sup>77</sup> The latter suggested by Dirlmeier: “Wenn das Mittlere verwirklicht ist, hat man die beste  $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ , d.h. nach 18b38 die Tugend” (245).

possible, for example (iv) the intermediate action as best and ordered by knowledge and reason (partly following Simpson, 250).

Other proposals for the referents of the two instances of  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$  seem to fit poorly with the topical context of the two sentences. Simpson settles for both the intermediate (1) and the best (2) for  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^1$  in order to have Aristotle making an explicit argument that “the intermediate relative to us is best” (249-250).<sup>78</sup> But surely, especially in the *Eudemian Ethics*, we do not need to see every step of Aristotle’s arguments spelled out. Simpson then explains  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^2$  as “the mean as best and commanded by science and reason” (250). My objection here is that Aristotle has just explicitly generalized his examples to the sphere of action in particular. Yet Simpson reads  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\iota$  in 1220b27 to refer to not just actions, but also affections and states.<sup>79</sup>

Woods, unlike Simpson, distinguishes between the intermediate as action and the intermediate as state. But Woods then takes  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^2$  to refer to the intermediate state, which Aristotle has not yet mentioned.<sup>80</sup> Perhaps these commentators feel that more argument would be needed in order for both pronouns to refer to “the intermediate action.” Likewise,

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78 If  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^1$  refers more narrowly to the intermediate, we will indeed need to assume something along the lines of “the best is as knowledge and reason order” to make the argument go through (as Woods notes).

79 Since he sees  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\iota$  quite generally, Simpson does not recognize any specification of the intermediate here or elsewhere, that is, as intermediate action, intermediate affection, or intermediate state. When explaining the conclusion at 1220b34-35, Simpson makes use of this generality of interpretation, since Aristotle has then already told us that in actions, affections, and states, the intermediate is best. I argue below (two notes hence) that we do not need to rely on such a general point in the first half of the passage in order to see the conclusion at 1220b34-35.

80 Woods makes two suggestions for  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^2$ ; this is the second (105). Woods treats  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^1$  as “the intermediate choice or action” and (in his first suggestion) writes that  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^2$  refers vaguely to “the guidance of the rational part of the soul” (104). The first imports the idea of choice into the passage, and with the second he seems to ignore the simpler possibility, that  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron^2$  refers to the intermediate relative to us, as I have suggested.

perhaps Woods translates *ποιεῖ* at 1220b29 as simply “is” in order to free Aristotle from the more substantial claim suggested by “produces.”<sup>81</sup> In fact, the more natural renderings, of *τοῦτο* in both cases as “the intermediate action” and of *ποιεῖ* as “produces,” make good sense once we understand Aristotle’s *Eudemian* views on the development of virtue and its relationship with reason (Chapters 2 and 4).

Finally, notice that all of Aristotle’s practical examples in the first part of this text concern action.<sup>82</sup> This might come as a surprise. Why the shift immediately to action, instead of including affections, or states? But when we arrive at *EE* II.6, Aristotle makes it clear that of all the animals only human beings can properly be said to act, in virtue of their use (for such action) of their rational capacities. The connection between II.3 and II.6 thus serves to support both the idea that Aristotle’s focus in II.3 rests on action (for action is uniquely human) and the idea that the phrase “ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος” refers to the determination of actions, and not to the development of states of character.

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81 That is, that the intermediate action produces the best state. But this claim does make sense, if we think back to II.2. From II.2, we know that repeated movement of a certain sort results in corresponding character. Thus action that is in some respect intermediate results in character that is in that respect also intermediate (at least where that type of action is concerned).

In short, II.2 tells us that (1) intermediate action produces an intermediate state. The first part of the passage here establishes that (2) intermediate action is always best. Aristotle now connects (1) and (2) by telling us that the intermediate action, besides being best itself, also produces the best state. To see the point, we need neither Simpson’s recourse – to thinking that *ἐν πᾶσι* in 1220b27 refers to “actions, passions, [and] habits” (249) – or Woods’ importation of the idea of the intermediate state via *τοῦτο*<sup>2</sup> (104). From (1) and the fact that the best state is virtue, we can conclude as Aristotle does here that “virtue must be concerned with certain intermediates and be some intermediate.”

82 Dirlmeier translates “καὶ ἐν ὁποιαοῦν πράξει” (II.3, 1220b24-25) as “und in Tätigkeit beliebiger Art” (23), but remarks that “Der Begriff *πράξις* ist ja in diesem Abschnitt außerordentlich weit gefaßt. Darauf macht Walzer (55) mit Recht aufmerksam; daher die Illustrierung durch die vielen Beispiele” (245). II.6 uses *πράξεις* to mark off a specifically human sphere of activity, but then seems to lump some *κινήσεις* in with *πράξεις* as the results of “controlling starting-points.” Perhaps Aristotle uses *πράξεις* here to mark a connection to rationality, which is at any rate the main point in the first half of the passage.

IV EE II.4, 1221b39-1222a1<sup>83</sup>

πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς<sup>84</sup> ὅφ' οἴων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων<sup>85</sup> πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἡ a1 ἡδονή<sup>86</sup>

For the pleasure of every soul is related to and concerns those sorts of things by which it naturally becomes worse or better.<sup>87</sup>

83 We find a passage almost exactly parallel to *EE* II.4.3, 1221b39-1222a1 in the context of Aristotle's discussion of the relationship between virtue and pleasure in the *NE*, at II.3, 1104b3-28. This parallel *NE* passage, however, does not suggest a solution to the problems in the *EE* manuscript: the *NE* may be a copy of the *EE*, or L may be a copy of the *NE*, the extra text perhaps having been added back in to the *EE*. There is no way to tell.

84 The OCT has *πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχῆ* with PCM\*, and Rowe prints *πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχῆς*, noting “*πάσα (?) γὰρ ψυχῆς* L<sup>1</sup>.” Rowe also notes *πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς* L<sup>2</sup>.

Rowe inserts *ἔξις* after the phrase. Rowe's interpretation, as well as Fritzsche's *πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς* <*ἔξις*> and Allan's *πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχῆς* <*ἔξις*>, makes the assumption that Aristotle is talking about the state of the soul. Comparison with the parallel *NE* passage no doubt prompts such emendations. Bonitz creates the same problem by substituting *ἔξις* for *ἡδονή* at the end of the line (and following PC here).

85 *πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων* om. PCM\*. The OCT and Rowe include the phrase, as does the Teubner, presumably with reference to the *NE*, since the Teubner edition was compiled without access to L, *πέφυκε γίνεσθαι* occurs elsewhere only at *NE* VIII.6, 1158a13 and X.4, 1175a3. The expression can always mean “is/becomes naturally,” as here.

86 Rasso, Rowe, and the OCT leave out *ἡ ἡδονή*, which all the manuscripts have. Dirlmeier substitutes *ἡδὴ* (only marginally better than omitting *ἡ ἡδονή*), Dodds replaces it with *ἡδομένη* (clearly with the OCT's combination of PC and L for the rest of the phrase), and Allan unhelpfully writes *ἡ φύσις*, thinking of the parallel *NE* passage. I have tried to make sense of its inclusion.

87 I have ended up following L<sup>2</sup> consistently in my text and translation of this sentence. A translation of PCM\*'s text might be: “Every soul is [what it is] concerning these things. Pleasure also concerns those things and is about those things.” If this were the translation, would presumably refer to the pleasures and pains just discussed. But the sense of the second sentence would be quite unclear. Other translators mix the manuscripts together or rely on additions. For example, Inwood and Woolf, following the OCT: “For every soul is related to and concerns those sorts of things that naturally make it worse or better.” Rowe's edition, on the contrary, makes the subject “each of the soul's character traits,” or something of the sort.

In the 5<sup>th</sup> draft of his edition of *EE* II, Christopher Rowe writes the following about this sentence: “*ἡ ἡδονή* is bracketed by Rasso. I surmise that the problems with this sentence started with the omission of *ἔξις* after *πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχῆς*, perhaps because it looks as if the subject of the relative

V EE II.6, 1222b15-20

λάβωμεν οὖν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐπιούσης σκέψεως. εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ οὐσίαι κατὰ φύσιν τινές<sup>88</sup> ἀρχαί, διὸ καὶ ἐκάστη πολλὰ δύναται τοιαῦτα γενεῶν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῶον [ὄν] ὅλως<sup>89</sup> ζῶα καὶ φυτὸν φυτά. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁ γ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ζώων: τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων οὐθὲν εἴποιμεν ἂν πράττειν.

Let us then take another starting-point for the following investigation. All substances<sup>90</sup> are by nature starting-points of some sort; this is why each being<sup>91</sup> can generate many others of the same kind, just as a human can generate humans, a creature can usually<sup>92</sup> generate creatures, and a plant can generate plants. But in addition to this, a human being is alone among the animals a starting-point of some actions: we would not say that any of the other animals acts.

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clause should be ψυχῇ (it's the soul that one would naturally think of as becoming worse or better), which I think it still is, though it looks as if it's ἔξις; with ψυχῆς then altered to ψυχῇ, and πᾶσα ψυχῇ becoming acquired exclusively by the relative clause, as its subject, that then leaves the main clause apparently without one (it can hardly be soul) – and pleasure, in the context, is a natural if unhelpful choice by way of supplement to complete the sentence.”

88 Allan emends τινές to κινήσεως, citing the discussion in *EE* VIII.2, 1248a25 about the starting-point of motion and change in the soul. More convincingly, we could just look later in the passage at hand (*EE* II.6), where Aristotle goes on to consider starting-points that do not bring about movement. There is no need to emend, however, as 1222b20 sufficiently clarifies the contrast between the two types of starting-points. Rowe also does not emend the text.

89 Casaubon suggests ζῶον ὁμοίως; The OCT and Dirlmeier omit ὄν. The sense is clear; I prefer the latter. Rowe does not emend, though I do not see how he can then translate here.

90 Dirlmeier provides references for Aristotle's use of “substances” (αἱ οὐσίαι) in the *Eudemian Ethics*: *M* Δ.1 and Δ.8, *DA* 402a6, and *DA* 415b8-14.

91 With Dirlmeier: “Wesenheiten,” instead of Inwood and Woolf: “substance.”

92 LSJ on ὅλως: Plato, sometimes, “on the whole.”

VI EE II.11, 1227b34-38 and 1228a1-3

A pair of textual problems at 1227b38 affect our interpretation of a key question in the first half of the text: how exactly does virtue relate to the *προαιρεῖσθαι* and the end? Five possible readings of the text give different answers to this key question:

Readings of the text at II.11, 1227b38 and translations of 1227b37-38:

- |                                 |  |
|---------------------------------|--|
| 1. τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι οὗ ἕνεκα δεῖ | Rowe   |
| 2. τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι οὗ ἕνεκα δεῖ | -- (only considered – and rejected – by Rowe)                            |
| 3. τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι οὗ ἕνεκα     | IW, Woods <sup>93</sup>  |
| 4. τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι οὗ ἕνεκα     | Dirlmeier, <sup>94</sup> Simpson, <sup>95</sup> examined by Kenny (86n1) |

93 IW: “Now that for the sake of which is the mean, and virtue is the cause of this, in that it decides what we act for the sake of.” Woods: “The mean is the thing-for-the-sake-of-which, of which virtue is the cause, by choosing with a view to that.”

94 “‘Das, worumwillen’ (man handelt) ist aber das Mittlere und davon ist Ursache die Tugend, das Sich-entscheiden für das Worum-willen,” which I translate as “But ‘that for the sake of which’ ([i.e., that for the sake of which] one acts) is the mean and the cause of it is virtue, the deciding for that for the sake of which” (or possibly “. . . the decision process itself, [which is] for that for the sake of which”).

95 Simpson translates the same text as Dirlmeier (as is clear from 285n3) but less literally: “What it is for the sake of, then, is the mean (what virtue is cause of is choosing for the sake of which), . . .”

Simpson seems not to recognize a difference between interpretations (i) and (ii). My reading of Simpson’s translation suggests (ii): virtue has a role in *προαίρεσις* itself and is not confined to a relationship with the end. By making the remark about virtue parenthetical, Simpson separates virtue from the mean and seems thereby to tie it closer to *προαίρεσις*. Indeed, Simpson paraphrases his translation in ways that make (ii) seem likely: “virtue makes choice to be right about what it is for the sake of but not about what it is of” (283); “what virtue is cause of is choosing for the sake of which” (proposition 4 on 283); and “virtue gives choice its essential form (because it gives it is [sic] end), and choice gives virtue its concrete expression (because it realizes it in concrete actions)” (284).

However, Simpson’s commentary as a whole seems to tend instead toward (i). He concludes that “virtue is cause of what the end is that choice is for the sake of,” (284) and yet again (supposedly in a rephrasing of proposition 4) that “virtue determines what choice is for the sake of” (284). In general, the argument seems to be that Aristotle here establishes a clear distinction between the role of virtue and “some other power” in *προαίρεσις*: virtue is *only* concerned with the end that *προαίρεσις* is for the sake of and not also of with what *προαίρεσις* is of (283-284). Simpson does

5. τοῦ προαιρεῖσθαι οὐ ἔνεκα Kenny<sup>96</sup>

Text (1): accepting Fritzsche's emendation of τὸ to τῷ and keeping the manuscripts' δεῖ.<sup>97</sup> This is the text for the translation quoted above if we include the queried "through." Virtue "causes" the mean "through (τῷ) the προαιρεῖσθαι." What could this mean – that is, how do we answer the key question posed above? Perhaps (i) virtue sets the mean as an end, and that end is later adopted as the "that for the sake of which" in προαίρεσις. Or perhaps there is a closer relationship between virtue and προαίρεσις; (ii) virtue might be responsible for the fact that προαίρεσις adopts the mean as the "that for the sake of which."

Text (2): keeping τὸ and δεῖ: This is the text for the translation quoted above if we leave out the "through." This text seems to identify virtue and the προαιρεῖσθαι, suggesting that (iii) virtue at least partly *consists in* the προαιρεῖσθαι, which adopts the mean as its "that for the sake of which." We should take this possibility seriously because of its basis in the text: τὸ appears in all manuscripts, and τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι could certainly be read appositively to ἡ ἀρετή.

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not bring up the possibility that there might be a causal relationship between virtue and προαίρεσις itself.

96 In *Aristotle's Theory of the Will*, Kenny translates, "It is the mean which is the wherefore which virtue is the case [sic] of the purposive choice being for the sake of" (85), though he argues that "[Aristotle] wants to say: 'Virtue is the cause of the choice's being for the sake of the mean'" (86). In his 2011 translation, Kenny chooses to avoid the awkwardness of his 1979 translation while also resolving the ambiguity of the Greek: "Now, it is the mean that is the purpose, and what virtue does is to cause a choice to be made for the sake of the mean."

97 Rowe notes that Susemihl omits δεῖ not only from his text but also from his apparatus criticus. The OCT omits δεῖ in the text, noting that it appears in C and L. According to Rowe, all manuscripts have it: P, C, and L, as well as B. In addition to the manuscript evidence for the δεῖ, 1227b14 attests to its place here, for Aristotle is directly answering the question posed at 1227b14. Rowe suggests the following translation: ". . . through [a person's] προαιρεῖσθαι [for the sake of] what [they] should [προαιρεῖσθαι] for the sake of"; cf. 1227B13-14" (ad loc.).

Texts (3), (4), and (5) are unacceptable on textual grounds, since they omit the ubiquitous δεῖ, which all of the manuscripts have. Nevertheless, commentary regarding these texts helps to establish what is at issue in the choice between (1) and (2).

Kenny's arguments in *Aristotle's Theory of the Will* are particularly stimulating. Kenny answers the key question posed above ("how exactly does virtue relate to the προαιρεῖσθαι and the end?"), and his conclusions address the solutions that I have listed so far (i, ii, and iii). According to Kenny, Aristotle's point in the passage is that virtue "is the cause of *the mean's being the goal of the choice*, of the mean's being the οὐδ' ἔνεκα of the προαίρεσις" (1979, 86, Kenny's italics). Thus Kenny argues for the answer I have labeled (ii) above. Rather than interpret (ii) from text (1), though, Kenny presents a long argument for text (5). I consider this extended argument in the next section.

Kenny also addresses (i), via his objections to Dirlmeier and von Fragstein. He attributes to them the idea that "virtue is the cause of the mean, of the mean being realised in action" (86). But in his commentary, Dirlmeier does not address the relationship between virtue and mean. He focuses instead on the import of the τὸ: "[i]m Zusammenhang des 11. Kap. kann man ja ἀρετὴ und προαίρεσις geradezu gleichsetzen. Wir haben also eine Apposition vor uns. So wie etwa [*Magna Moralia* (MM) II.5.] 1200b18 . . ." <sup>98</sup> I believe Dirlmeier alone suggests such an apposition here. <sup>99</sup>

98 Text (as printed in the Loeb): ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἡ κακία ἢ θηριότης ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπὸν ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἀντικειμένη; translation (Armstrong): "For even as the vice of Bestiality is beyond human measure, so is its opposing virtue" (586-587). Dirlmeier also cites *Euthydemus* 274e2 and Eudemus fragment 127, 12 for similar instances of an appositive being used with virtue.

99 Kenny also considers this textual reading, but in his note explains that he takes the possibility to be "a rather clumsy accusative and infinitive after αἰτία, with the infinitive εἶναι left understood" (86n1). Kenny's discussion of the text indicates that he might render this text as, "It is the mean which is the wherefore of which virtue is the cause, [the cause] that the choice [is] for the sake of [the mean]." But the ambiguity of οὐδ' ἔνεκα (discussed in the text) gives other possible meanings to this option, and so we would need an argument for such an interpretation.

Three possible interpretations run as follows:

- i. Virtue sets the mean as an end, and *προαίρεσις* adopts that end as the “that for the sake of which.” (Simpson)
- ii. Virtue is responsible for the fact that *προαίρεσις* adopts the mean as the “that for the sake of which.” (Kenny, perhaps von Fragstein<sup>100</sup>)
- iii. Virtue at least partly *consists in* the *προαιρείσθαι*, which adopts the mean as its “that for the sake of which.” (Dirlmeier)

At 1228a1-3, Aristotle repeats his point that virtue is the cause of the correctness of the end of *προαίρεσις*. A pair of textual problems here too are worth noting. First, beginning with Fritzsche, every editor and most translators omit οὐδ in 1228a1. Despite a variety of conjectures, I do not think the thought can follow on 1227b34-38 if we keep οὐδ.<sup>101</sup> Second, PCB omit αἰτία, but it is clearly required. Both textual problems are thus cleared up with reference to 1227b34-38, since 1228a1-3 appear to repeat the ideas in those earlier lines.

#### A Against Kenny’s interpretation of this passage

At *EE* II.11, 1227b38 (part of the passage considered above), Kenny reads τοῦ προαιρείσθαι οὐδ ἔνεκα.<sup>102</sup> He interprets his text to mean that “virtue is the cause of *the*

100According to Kenny, von Fragstein argues that virtue is the cause of “the fact that the *προαίρεσις* can really achieve the rightness of the end: the *προαίρεσις* can only do this if virtue stands behind it.” Von Fragstein: “Die *orthotes* des Telos aber zu erweisen ist Sache der Proairesis, hinter der die Arete stehen muss“ (1974, 121, quoted with italics in Kenny 1979, 87n1).

101Rowe suggests it was inserted by someone thinking that Aristotle meant to attribute the cause of the correctness of the end to *προαίρεσις* and not to virtue (ad loc). Dirlmeier points to the οὐδ αἰτία at 1227b38 as a possible cause of the οὐδ appearing here (306). Dirlmeier and Kenny suggest keeping the οὐδ and changing 1228a1’s τοῦ to τὸ, but this seems (with Dirlmeier) to result in *προαίρεσις* being responsible for the τέλος (306 and 1979: 87). Both Dirlmeier and Kenny settle on omitting the οὐδ (44 and 2011 ad loc). Simpson appears to follow von Fragstein, who reads 1227b39-1228a2 as one extended thought in an attempt to keep the οὐδ (see Kenny 1979: 87).

102In the list of textual variations I present in the previous sub-section, Kenny’s is text (5).

*mean's being the goal of the choice*" (86).<sup>103</sup> In this section, I argue that we should adopt neither Kenny's text nor his interpretation of the meaning of the passage, even on the basis of some other text.

Start with Kenny's text. As mentioned above, text (5) ignores the *δεῖ*. Until Rowe, the only mention of the *δεῖ* that I find is in the OCT, which notes it appearing in only C and L. But (with Rowe), *δεῖ* appears in all the manuscripts. We might thus emend Kenny's text to *τοῦ προαιρεῖσθαι οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ*. The *δεῖ* would of course alter Kenny's translation,<sup>104</sup> but I do not think that it would affect his arguments regarding the remainder of the text and its interpretation.

Kenny's change of the *τό* to *τοῦ* is not so easily defended.<sup>105</sup> There is no manuscript support for any emendation of the *τό*, whether to *τοῦ* or to *τῷ*. Kenny attempts to provide us with sufficient reason for his change by reconstructing the thinking by which Aristotle may have arrived at text (5). Kenny presents two simpler potential precursors of the sentence as he reads it, suggesting that the complexity of the sentence derives from progressive rewordings (86-87). The difficulty of justifying the *τοῦ* results in a complex argument, the improbability of which, I think, should prompt Kenny to defend his interpretation using a more natural reading of the text, namely (4).

I now consider Kenny's argument itself. I will focus my criticism on the dialectic of the passage: Kenny argues that Aristotle "wants to say" *ἡ ἀρετή ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῦ προαιρεῖσθαι*

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<sup>103</sup>In the list of possible interpretations I present in the previous sub-section, this is interpretation (ii).

<sup>104</sup>As noted above, in *Aristotle's Theory of the Will*, Kenny translates, "It is the mean which is the wherefore which virtue is the case [sic] of the purposive choice being for the sake of" (85). He argues that "[Aristotle] wants to say: 'Virtue is the cause of the choice's being for the sake of the mean'" (86). I am not sure how he would render the sentence with the addition of *δεῖ*.

<sup>105</sup>Kenny considers *τό* but does not adopt it (86n1).

τοῦ μέσου ἕνεκα (“Virtue is the cause of the choice’s being for the sake of the mean.”), but he “wishes to stress the importance of the mean, and so brings it forward” to produce τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὗ αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῦ προαιρεῖσθαι οὗ ἕνεκα (“It is the mean that virtue is the cause of the choice’s being for the sake of.”).

Why would Aristotle want to emphasize the mean in this hypothetical intermediate rewording? In the context of Aristotle’s argument in the passage, the mean would come to mind primarily in relation to the previous sentence. There, προαίρεσις is of something and for the sake of something. Thinking about what προαίρεσις is for the sake of, we arrive at the mean. In other words, in the dialectic of the passage, the idea of the mean arises directly from προαίρεσις.

Kenny claims, on the contrary, that Aristotle first had a new thought about virtue (that virtue causes προαίρεσις to be for the sake of the mean), and then “brought it forward” in the sentence. No doubt Aristotle should have separated his thoughts better here, but the flow of argument comes upon the mean first in connection with the remark about προαίρεσις. Only when the mean has entered the picture via προαίρεσις would it make sense to connect it with virtue. Kenny’s argument has reversed these two steps.

Now turn to Kenny’s interpretation, supposing we dispense with his text. Kenny finds in the text what I have labeled interpretation (ii): virtue is responsible for the fact that προαίρεσις adopts the mean as the “that for the sake of which.” Specifically, as mentioned above, Kenny argues that Aristotle’s point in the passage is that virtue “is the cause of *the mean’s being the goal of the choice*, of the mean’s being the οὗ ἕνεκα of the προαίρεσις” (86, Kenny’s italics). In Kenny’s reconstruction, Aristotle’s might have written simply ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐστίν αἰτία τοῦ προαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ μέσου ἕνεκα. Above, I suggested that such an

interpretation might follow from text (1). Suppose we adopt (1). Why not interpret the text as Kenny does anyway?

We have already rejected Kenny's argument that (ii) could have given rise to the text that Kenny reads. And apart from Kenny's proposed text, there does not seem to be any evidence corroborating this particular connection of virtue and *προαίρεσις*. An exception may be *EE* III.1, for which see my discussion earlier in this chapter.

## Appendix C: The Disputed Books

### A brief overview

Throughout the dissertation, I take the *EE* to consist of five books, what we know as *EE* I, II, III, VII, and VIII. I now address the question of how we ought to read *NE* V, VI, and VII<sup>1</sup> – the disputed books – insofar as it is relevant to the dissertation. Several considerations have convinced me to treat the three disputed books as non-*Eudemian* material:

- Philosophical analyses disagree as to whether the disputed books belong with the *EE*, with the *NE*, or with neither one nor the other. Dorothea Frede (2019) argues that the treatments of a variety of subjects in the disputed books (akrasia and enkrateia, justice, practical and theoretical reason) accord better with the *NE* than they do with the *EE*'s undisputed books. Kenny presents philosophical and stylometric conclusions to the contrary (*TAE*). Rowe writes that “*AE* B [is] wholly Nicomachean, whereas A and C . . . have a *Eudemian* base” (Rowe 90-114, cited in Kenny 1978, 90n1). Perhaps if the evidence points to any conclusion, it suggests that *NE* VI, at least, should not enter the current discussion. Indeed, my own stylometric evidence supports the idea that *NE* VI stands out from the other disputed books; however it does not go further than that. *NE* VI does exhibit stylometric differences from the other two disputed books. These tie it closer to neither the *EE* nor the *NE*.<sup>2</sup>

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1 I shall call the disputed books *NE* V, VI, and VII, as they are best known, though others refer to them as CB A, B, and C (e.g. Rowe), or AE A, B, and C (Kenny).

2 I will not here address the larger question of the relationship between the *EE* and the *NE*. Commentators' opinions run the gamut. Probably the prevailing opinion has it that the *EE* is earlier, and that the two treatises represent progressive stages of Aristotle's ethical thinking (contrast Di Basilio 2018: 2)

- Stylometric<sup>3</sup> analyses of the disputed books show that their differences from the *EE* special books significantly exceed the differences internal to the special books. Also, contrary to Kenny’s stylometric conclusions, my own indicate that the disputed books are just as stylistically foreign to the *EE* as to any of the other *Nicomachean* books.
- Manuscript evidence indicates that the end of *EE* III may fit less well with *NE* V than is commonly assumed.<sup>4</sup> Of the four major manuscripts Rowe considers in his edition of the text (P, C, L, and B), only L includes the final phrase adopted by recent translations and editions: *περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λέξεται* (in *EE* III.7, 1234b14).<sup>5</sup> Moreover, editors appear to have changed L’s *λέξεται*<sup>6</sup> to *λεκτέον* without any basis for the change in the manuscripts (Rowe, *EE* III, note 386).<sup>7</sup> See also Primavesi on the number of the books in various manuscripts (2007).

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3 As Anthony Kenny did in his pioneering work (1978), I have run stylometric tests on the Eudemian, Nicomachean, and “common” books. In part, these tests examine and compare frequencies of particle and connective usage within each book. By “stylometric” evidence, I simply mean the outcome of these and other tests commonly used in the digital humanities (though almost entirely outside of philosophy) to establish authorship and the like.

4 Traditional interpretation of the *NE* has assumed this. For an argument, see Kenny, who holds that similarities between the *EE*’s exposition and that of the first chapter of the first common book are evidence that the common books belong in the *EE* (*TAE* 1978, 60-69; 2016, 277-9).

5 The OCT and Susemihl print this phrase; Dirlmeier, Inwood and Woolf, Kenny, and Simpson translate it. Woods does not translate *EE* III.

6 Rowe writes that the presence of *λέξεται* is reason enough to consider the phrase suspect: “*λέξεται* would be a distinctly odd way for Aristotle to say ‘will be spoken about’, and an emendation to *λεκτέον* looks arbitrary by any measure, unless one has already decided that a discussion of justice must have followed in the *EE*” (Rowe, *EE* III, note 386).

7 Indeed, the OCT prints *περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λεκτέον*, noting the omission of the phrase in PC and the presence of *λέξεται* in L. Susemihl prints the same phrase, and his *apparatus criticus* only indicates that P<sup>c</sup> omits *περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λεκτέον* and that Ald. reads *λέξεται* instead of *λεκτέον*. Since Susemihl’s main manuscripts are P and C (labeled P<sup>b</sup> and, here, C<sup>c</sup>), the implication is that C<sup>c</sup> has the printed phrase, which, according to Rowe, it does not.

- In addition to the previous point, Rowe suggests that *EE* III was – at least in one manuscript – connected directly with *EE* VII. The manuscript “B” (considered by Rowe in addition to P, C, and L) labels what we know as *EE* VII and VIII as δ’ and ε’, and starts book δ’ with *περὶ δὲ φιλίας*, thereby transitioning from *EE* III to *EE* VII. PCL do not start *EE* VII with *περὶ δὲ φιλίας* but pick up with B thereafter.
- An additional consideration: to the extent that my arguments in this dissertation are successful, the special books of the *EE* constitute a complete treatise on the topics I address. I am treating them as such, and were this the wrong approach, one would expect the resultant lacunae (especially to the tune of three entire books) to be painfully obvious.

Recent years have seen a flurry of arguments that run contrary to the evidence just presented. While none of these arguments considers all of the points assembled here (and doubtless I have missed some important ones), there are indeed reasons to consider the disputed books as Eudemean. I believe that the balance of the evidence points instead toward the conclusion I have adopted. At the very least, when we cannot be reasonably sure as to whether the disputed books as we have them belong in the *EE*, it is safest to treat them separately.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The recent and novel attempts to “put the *EE* back together” disrupt a long interpretive tradition that includes the “common books” with the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Even if we exclude the “common books” from the *EE*, I believe much more extensive argument would be required before they could be treated as part of the *NE*.

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