

AN ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL SHOCKS:
CONSIDERING THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES

by

Kelly Marie Gordell

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As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Kelly Gordell, titled **An Assessment of Political Shocks: Considering the Domestic and International Consequences** and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Thomas J. Volgy

Thomas Volgy

Date: 4/21/2021

Faten Ghosn

Faten Ghosn

Date: 4/21/2021

John P. Willerton

John P. Willerton


Date: 4/21/2021

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.

Thomas J. Volgy

Thomas Volgy
Dissertation Committee Chair
School of Government & Public Policy

Date: 4/21/2021 

ARIZONA

Signature: *Thomas Volgy*

Email: volgy@email.arizona.edu

Signature: *Faten Ghosn*

Email: fghosn@email.arizona.edu

Signature: *John P. Willerton*

Email: jpw@email.arizona.edu

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DEDICATION

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this dissertation is to produce a systematic assessment of political shocks and their potential consequences. Political shocks are important and significant phenomena within international politics. However, no overarching study of shocks currently exists and consequently the topic has remained underdeveloped relative to other important concepts within international relations. Despite their importance, what qualifies as a political shock and whether the dynamics associated with the concept are generalizable remains unclear. As such, I ask how can political shocks be observed taking place and what are the potential domestic and international consequences?

To address these questions, I develop a framework of political shocks which centers on acute periods of state instability to reflect when states have experienced political shocks. When such destabilization is present, path dependencies are disrupted creating new environments in which states and their communities operate within. As such, political shocks serve as challenges to the existing status quo while states must continue to manage as effectively as possible in the face of such challenges. I also incorporate elements of opportunity and willingness to understand the different dynamics within these complex environments in terms of domestic and international security dimensions and outcomes.

I pursue a dual empirical assessment of both outcomes by evaluating whether international conflict in the form of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) as well as the level of human rights abuses, specifically physical integrity violations, are affected via a series of negative binomial and ordered logistic regressions. Overall, I find that *both* domestic and international outcomes are impacted by political shocks. When states experience shocks, both the extent of international conflict experienced, and level human rights abuses that take place increase. I also observe similar effects when taking into consideration additional interactive factors of domestic and neighboring unrest. The outcomes of this project suggest that political shocks pose a significant threat across security domains and to various outcomes of interest.

The work produced is also relevant for our present-day dynamics. Critical events that have the capacity to destabilize domestic conditions and politics and which potentially have regional and global reach continue to take place. As such, it is not only pertinent but also necessary to establish a way in which to study these events and their dynamics in a systematic manner. By doing so, we not only can better understand the potential effects of such critical events but also work toward identifying strategies and forming policies to address them in the future.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

If asked to identify the most critical, influential event or period in recent years, it would come as no surprise that many would find themselves at a loss of what to choose. A countless number have taken place in just the last few decades alone and with a wide amount of variation. It has been nearly 20 years since the terror attacks of 9/11 took place within the United States.¹ Terrorism in general has also persisted globally with more recent years seeing some of the deadliest attacks in history. Such attacks include the suicide truck bombings in Mogadishu, Somalia by the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, as well as the Sri Lankan Easter bombings perpetrated by terrorist groups National Thowheeth Jama'ath (NTJ) and the Islamic State (IS).² In the Horn of Africa, historic agreements were reached which ended the conflict between the warring states of Eritrea and Ethiopia

¹ Referring to the attacks on September 11th, 2001, which have been argued as not only changing America in various fundamental ways, but also causing upheaval on an international level. In particular, the overwhelming dedication to combatting terrorism on a global scale followed the attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda (The Guardian, 2011).

² One attack in Mogadishu took place on December 28th, 2019. It resulted in nearly 100 deaths and an unknown amount injured, though the total is likely to be over 150 (Reuters, 2019). In addition to the December 2019 attack, Mogadishu also experienced previous bombings in October 2017, where nearly 600 people were killed, and over 300 were injured (Guled, 2017; Nor, 2017).

The Sri Lankan attack took place April 21st, 2019, and included the targeting of three separate churches, which resulted in more than 250 deaths and over double that number injured (Sri Lanka Brief, 2019).

as Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali brokered talks between the countries at the Eritrea-Ethiopia Summit in 2018.³

The electoral results of 2016 also stand out to many as highly critical. The Brexit Referendum where 52% of Britain voted in favor of leaving the European Union, as well as Donald J. Trump becoming the 45th President of the United States, surprised not only those residing in the United Kingdom and the United States respectively but leaders and populations across the world.⁴ Haitians experienced a devastating 7.0 earthquake in 2010, which killed upwards of 250,000 people and impacted over roughly 3 million more.⁵ The following year the world watched as pro-democracy uprisings took place in the Middle East – come to be known as the Arab Spring – which led to calls for transformative political and social change.⁶ Even in the most recent of years, countries, and the world collectively have experienced the COVID-19 pandemic, which continues to upend conditions for populations globally.⁷

³ The countries had been at war for 20 years, as the Eritrean-Ethiopian border war took place from May 1998 until July 2018. Both parties agreed to an official end of hostilities and the agreement remains a historic event despite deterioration of the conditions which followed as electoral challenges and disputes with regional leaders increased (Anna, 2020; BBC Ethiopia, 2018).

⁴ The 2016 U.S. election saw Donald J. Trump win the presidency with 304 electoral votes despite having only received 62,984,828 votes (46.1%) compared to Hillary Clinton, who received 65,853,514 votes (48.2%) but only 227 electoral votes (Federal Elections Commission, 2017).

⁵ The earthquake in Haiti devastated its community as it exacerbated the already extremely poor conditions that existed, as the country is considered one of the poorest of the Western Hemisphere (Massive, 2010).

⁶ While largely occurring during 2011, the Arab Spring began in Tunisia where the Jasmine Revolution took place in December 2010. The movement led to democratic elections being held and inspired other countries to follow, including Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Syria. Some of the participating countries experienced degrees of success from their demonstrations while others did not fare as well (BBC Arab Uprisings, 2014; Naar, 2013).

⁷ In reference to the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, or COVID-19, which was first reported in December 2019 following a cluster of cases of what was termed at the time of ‘viral pneumonia’ (WHO2, 2021) At the time of completing this project, the COVID-19 health pandemic is still ongoing with global numbers reaching: 147,539,302 confirmed cases and 3,116,444 confirmed deaths as of April 2021 (WHO1, 2021).

From conflict to elections to natural disasters to social movements and everything else in between, states come to potentially experience a wide variety of new and varying challenges each year. Such challenges, all quite different as one can observe, are important in their occurrence and are often detrimental to a variety of existing conditions and processes. These challenges, in whichever form, can be broadly characterized as disruptions to the status quo of states and their communities. They can take place quite suddenly, can be short in their occurrence, and are often unexpected. Such critical challenges fall under the notion of *political shocks* within international relations and other relevant political studies.

Political shocks are considered to be important and significant phenomena. Goertz & Diehl (1995: 31) define political shocks as “a dramatic change in the international system or its subsystems that fundamentally alters the processes, relationships, and expectations that drive nation-state interaction.” Political shocks tend to stand apart from other events and processes in part due to the massive impact and influence they are thought to carry. However, many of these other events are critical just the same, so how can we know shocks when we see them? And what are the consequences for such supposedly influential phenomena? As Krebs (2015: 141) points out, critical events, and shocks overall are often clearer in retrospect than in prospect, meaning that the answer is not so straightforward as they are taking place. It is not until we look back and review the narrative, that we sometimes see the significance and severity of such processes.

This dissertation is exploratory in nature. No overarching study of political shocks currently exists but indeed should considering the importance and criticality of the phenomena. As such, the topic of political shocks remains relatively underdeveloped in

the face of other important concepts and trends among political science research. In this dissertation, I contribute to our understanding of international politics by asking how can political shocks be observed taking place and what are the potential domestic and international consequences of political shocks? To address these questions, I develop a framework that centers on dramatic changes to political stability, and which has two aims. The first aim is to conceptualize political shocks and identify how and when we can observe political shocks taking place on a broader scale. The second aim, given this information, is to develop a broader framework for understanding the primary impact of political shocks as well as the potential domestic and international security dynamics that are associated and assess the outcomes accordingly.

1.2 Chapter Breakdown

In order to accomplish these different aims, this dissertation proceeds in the following manner. Chapter 2 begins by overviewing what we know about political shocks, both conceptually and substantively by discussing the relevant literature. Because the effects of shocks are often combined in discussion with events of interest, I also highlight which types of events have been conceptualized as political shocks thus far within international relations research. Given this information, I suggest modifying the approach we take in evaluating political shock dynamics. In doing so, I start with a simplified understanding of political shocks, focusing on the actors first, and defining the concept according to significant changes in actors and their environments. I build a framework centered on this approach that illustrates when significant changes in state stability are observed, we can associate that with political shocks taking place. By

focusing on the actor within this framework, we can also identify who is experiencing these political shocks as well.

Chapter 3 expands on the dynamics discussed in Chapter 2. While Chapter 2 primarily focuses on what political shocks are, who has experienced them, identifying a way in which we can observe this, and how critical events can also be recognized, Chapter 3 focuses on the potential secondary consequences or effects of political shocks across different domestic and international outcomes. I build a framework to better understand the broader dynamics associated with political shocks, as well as the potential secondary security consequences for actors within the international political system. As political shocks are observed via significant changes in stability levels of actors, this in turn contributes to the degree of instability and uncertainty for states operating within that type of environment. For each security dimension, I outline the research focus and subsequent hypotheses for empirical assessment.

Next, Chapter 4 serves as the empirical portion of the dissertation. In this chapter, I conduct a series of tests to evaluate my primary research questions and hypotheses as presented in Chapter 3. However, I first review the measurement of the key concepts from the project framework. I discuss the construction and data sources of how political shocks can be captured. As I will elaborate in this project, political shocks understood as significant disruptions in state stability can reflect a wide range of different effects. Not only is stability a multidimensional concept, but there are also a wide variety of shocks that can and do take place, in particular economic-related ones. Economic factors are critical for a variety of other dynamics when it comes to states and their security, and arguably shifts in the economic conditions of actors may quite possibly be the most

important to consider. Therefore, as part of the exploratory nature of this project, I speak to the collective dynamics and effects thought to be taking place but focus on the political consequences of economic shocks to start.

Next, I focus on the empirical assessments of the project. I first focus on the external dynamics and evaluate whether they are fundamentally altered by political shocks. Specifically, I evaluate whether the extent of international conflict, measured by the occurrence of and ongoing involvement in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), fluctuates within the context of political shocks. I also consider whether additional factors come to influence the effect of political shocks by incorporating conditional effects capturing the degree internal and external unrest already present. In the last section, I focus on the internal dynamics assessing whether domestic conditions are also impacted when it comes to political shocks. In particular, I evaluate whether the level of human rights and likelihood for repression, a proxy for human security, increases or decreases in states. I also incorporate the additional factors used within the conflict analysis to evaluate whether effects of political shocks are altered given existing internal and neighborhood unrest.

Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation. In this last chapter, I summarize the key findings and takeaways of this project and acknowledge what contributions they make to the literature on international politics. Given that this dissertation is exploratory in nature, I highlight the current limitations of the project, as well as discuss future paths to explore. I conclude by briefly addressing why the work of this project is important, especially considering the occurrence of critical events even in our present day. I

illustrate with health pandemics and briefly discuss the potential consequences for global, regional, and state communities alike.

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review and Focus of Stability

2.1 Introduction

Political shocks have come to be considered an important concept among researchers. Such phenomena are found within a wide range of studies across various economic, political, and sociological topics and are thought to play a role in numerous outcomes. However, despite such inclusion, political shocks as its own topic of study remains relatively underdeveloped. Such characterization is apparent when comparing political shocks against other significant concepts familiar to the field of international relations and the broader assessment of political dynamics. No overarching study of political shocks currently exists, and what we do know primarily comes from academic exercises incorporating the concept into a researcher's existing topic of study. A couple of points speak further to this characterization of political shocks.

First, there fails to be a clear distinction as to whether many studies are referencing political shocks or the effects of political shocks. This issue largely stems from how the phenomena is conceptualized. The often go-to approach among international relations studies is identifying shocks by their ex-post impact on various political processes within specific (and often narrow) research contexts. Often shocks end up being defined by their effects within existing research studies. By taking this

approach, researchers have then designated specific events to be political shocks, presuming those events have exerted the impact identified within their studies accordingly. By following this process, a default view of sorts has formed equating events as being political shocks. Numerous different events have then been classified as shocks due in part to this line of thinking.

Such a large number of events have also ended up being classified as there is no standard process in determining which events actually qualify, nor is there a set of criteria by which to compare events and their attributes. Scholars have reached some consensus when it comes to certain standout events, such as large-scale wars (e.g., World War I and II) and the end of the Cold War, both of which have been consistently identified as substantive examples of political shocks across studies.⁸ In general, there has also been some agreement and overlap when it comes to other events and event types, but wide variation also remains.⁹ And while the list of “qualifying” events has explicitly grown, the actual process behind defining and identifying political shocks in a consistent and replicable manner has not. Establishing a set of explicit criteria or detailing a more straightforward process of identification is a necessary part of differentiating and evaluating this phenomenon but is still mostly absent for pursuing larger-scale analysis.¹⁰

⁸ There is a wide range of studies that have considered major war, including the world wars, and the end of the Cold War as shocks, including but not limited to Carson et al., (2011); Collins (2007); Fettweis (2004); Finkel (2015); Florea (2012); Fordham & Kleinberg (2012); Goertz & Diehl (1995); Holmes & Traven (2015); Hudson & Vore (1995); Iversen & Soskice (2009); Kalyvas & Balcells (2010); King & Lieberman (2009); Krebs (2015); Maoz & Siverson (2008); Sinha (2018); Streeck & Thelen (2005); Thies (2004); White (2017).

⁹ Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 overviews the various types of events often found among international relations literature.

¹⁰ I explicitly mention large scale analysis as smaller scale studies can pursue more in-depth analysis of specific events while large-n studies such as this project, cannot. The assessment by smaller scale or more

As an additional consequence of this approach, there has also been a uniformity assumed of political shocks that is followed across many studies. Once an event is labeled a political shock, it is often assumed that every occurrence of said event is a political shock (i.e., wars are argued to be political shocks; therefore, *all wars* are political shocks). Similar logic has also been made that every instance of an event is a political shock for every actor (i.e., wars are political shocks; therefore, each state involved in war has experienced a political shock). Given the often-complex nature of politics, especially across national, regional, and international levels, assuming such uniformity may, in fact, be too limiting. As a result, important factors with regard to the actors involved, the broader environment, or perhaps both are at risk of being overlooked.

Second, whether an overarching mechanism behind the influence or impact of political shocks exists is still unclear. The focus and use of events as shocks within just international relations alone have resulted in a wide variety of dynamics and effects being argued. Often, a specific event is identified as a shock within a researcher's existing topic of study, typically requiring adaption to the specific context of the research at hand. Taking this route has led to not only the wide range of different events being classified as political shocks, as previously noted, but also varying mechanisms accompanying these events being argued despite the dynamics observed being grouped together under the same broader concept.

As a result, the literature appears to suggest that political shocks are responsible or at least partially influential when it comes to a whole host of different situations. And

qualitative studies has provided information from which we have generally built upon, however, large-n endeavors also require an alternative approach.

that may very well be the case; however, ambiguity remains regarding the generalizability of both the concept and its effects.¹¹ Questions such as 1) whether the effects observed are those of political shocks, or merely the effects of wars, or state collapse for example, and 2) whether what has been identified as a political shock within the context of a particular study can also be considered a political shock outside of that specific study speak to broader issues concerning conceptualization. Consequently, it becomes questionable whether political shocks are indeed a separate phenomenon of their own and whether shock-related dynamics are actually generalizable.

This dissertation aims to address these areas of uncertainty which will contribute to further developing political shocks into an independent topic of study. In order to accomplish this aim, I take an approach that focuses on both the actors and broader environmental dynamics in order to establish a systematic process of conceptualizing and observing political shocks as a whole. This chapter encompasses these efforts and proceeds in the following manner.

First, I present the relevant literature on political shocks. This review begins by summarizing how political shocks are discussed conceptually and how they are often conceptualized according to a combination of information regarding certain phenomena and their effects. Because the perceived effects of shocks are also typically combined with associated events of interest to describe and define the concept, I also highlight which types of events have been referred to as political shocks thus far within

¹¹ A critique also noted by Maoz & Joyce (2016: 294) in their study of international alliance networks. The authors make two key points, “First, the causal mechanisms underlying shock-related effects are poorly understood. Second, it is unclear whether these effects are generalizable across different types of shocks (e.g., wars versus economic crises, empire collapse versus revolutions).”

international relations research. The resulting list of different substantive events that have been used by researchers is presented along with a brief discussion of certain issues that exist with focusing on events directly and why further scrutiny is warranted.

Second, given this background, I suggest modifying the approach taken since political shocks are the primary focus of which the subsequent assessments are framed around. To do so requires addressing political shocks *without* incorporating events from the start. Detaching the broader concept (political shocks) from the use of substantive examples (explicit events), at least at the outset, allows for reconceptualizing political shocks without bias or unnecessary restriction. The goals of this chapter center on reconceptualizing and redefining political shocks while avoiding the trend of too narrowly restricting how shocks are approached. This trend among studies can influence what is assumed to be relevant factors for latter theories and evaluations.¹²

I start with a simplified understanding of political shocks, one which concentrates on the actor first. Political shocks are understood according to significant changes in the actor and its environment. To demonstrate this, I follow a framework that first focuses on changes to the broader concept of actor stability as the primary way in which political shocks can be observed and understood. For the purposes of this project, what ultimately defines a political shock as having occurred is a sudden and significant enough change in

¹² Such narrowed restrictions refer to intentional, or unintentional, restriction of the overall research plan. For instance, conceptualizing political shocks exclusively in terms of violence and then subsequently considering only violence-related dynamics. Or the common approach of defining political shocks according to only economic dynamics, essentially making political shocks inherently an economic concept. As the intended focus of this project is a broader understanding of *political* shocks, rather than *economic* or *conflict/violent* shocks for example, I avoid focusing on any particular type of substantive event when discussing conceptualization or definition.

an actor's level of stability, or the observation of severe destabilization in a state. By considering shocks in this manner, I move away from event attributes and overall event occurrence as primary indicators of "if and how" a shock is observed and instead center on the broader characteristic (its destabilizing nature) of the actual concept.

However, in taking this approach, it is not to suggest that events do not have a place in the processes taking place, nor that we should not discuss or attempt to identify relevant ones. In fact, quite the opposite is true. In addition to assessing the extent of change taking place to levels of actor stability, the how and why behind such changes should also be factored into this approach. To do so requires the consideration of other relevant processes. While the framework ultimately centers on changing stability as the primary determinant in distinguishing shocks, the destabilization of conditions is still associated with some sort of action or process that has taken place.

Various types of events are typically argued as responsible to some degree for the destabilization being experienced. As such, I incorporate events back into the picture when discussing the initial portion of the chapter framework. However, I suggest taking a closer look at these events is necessary before including them into any subsequent analysis. In order to accomplish this task, it is necessary to parse out events into different categories of significance and evaluate them accordingly. The multitude of interactions that take place within international politics can be visualized as one large collective pool of differing events, which are all candidates for possible consideration. Given the diversity and size of the pool, it is unlikely, and should also not be assumed, that all are relevant, nor should they automatically be associated with the changes taking place;

changes here refer to large fluctuations in the levels of actor stability. Instead, it is more accurate to consider the pool being comprised as a mix of what I term to be *actual political shock events* and *potential political shock events*.

As states experience a range of varying actions and interactions within international politics, we can initially refer to them as potential political shock events or PPSEs. Whether these PPSEs are indeed actual political shock events or APSEs is determined according to the primary changes within the actors and their environments as identified. So while events are not the main determinants in distinguishing shocks, they do remain relevant to the dynamics at hand. With this added consideration, all different types of events thought to be critical can be considered for potential review. In theory, there is no restriction to types more typically thought to be related to international relations and conflict studies, for example. Instead, the incorporation of other events such as health pandemics, natural disasters, and so on, are also possible. It then becomes possible to distinguish between events that are simply events and events that are also far more critical within the context of political shocks.¹³

To demonstrate the dynamics as I have discussed them, I combine elements from international relations theory with evolutionary models from paleontology, specifically incorporating the Punctuated Equilibrium model (Gould & Eldredge, 1977; Eldredge &

¹³ Which can also be accomplished on a larger scale. Attempting to determine which events qualify by looking at them individually requires much more of a qualitative assessment in order to go in-depth as to why, for example, one war qualifies as a political shock while another one does not, despite both appearing quite similar.

The consideration of events is an important and relevant aspect, but the approach taken here still emphasizes the broader impact to the state as the primary determinant of whether a political shock has occurred, regardless of which events have or have not taken place.

Gould, 1972; Eldredge, 1971). I discuss how the environment of states within the international system can be altered in a rapid and localized manner. Such alterations can be understood as disruptions in the status quo of states, which I suggest can be most directly observed via sudden and significant changes in **state stability**. Whether such changes in state stability take place distinguishes whether those states have experienced political shocks and as a secondary part, also enable the identification of when critical events among international politics are associated with these dynamics and for which states. Finally, I conclude the chapter by briefly discussing the necessity of this process when wanting to distinguish political shocks and the potential evaluation of events consistently on a larger scale. I also discuss how the work of the chapter serves as the initial step toward developing a broader evaluation of political shocks and secondary political shock consequences.

2.2 Reviewing the Literature on Political Shocks

To better understand what we know about political shocks, I conducted a review of the literature across 14 academic journals.¹⁴ From this endeavor, I evaluated just over 1500 potentially relevant articles, primarily between 1990 and 2020, that included the term “shock.”¹⁵ Over half of these articles either very casually referred to shocks, often in

¹⁴ This review includes the following journals, which are consistent with TRIP’s evaluation of primary IR research sources: American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, British Journal of Political Science, Conflict Management and Peace Science, International Interactions, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, International Studies Review, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Politics, Security Studies, and World Politics.

¹⁵ The timeframe of 1990-2020 provides enough material to complete a thorough evaluation of the literature while also ensuring a contemporary understanding of the topic. Additional resources were also

closing remarks, or included them by default in methodological decisions (e.g., the specification of capturing shocks via yearly fixed effects in quantitative models). These articles, more often than not, made no explicit identification nor included any substantive discussion of the concept. The remaining articles, on the other hand, discussed or identified political shocks in further detail, often including the elaboration of events, operationalization for empirical testing, detailed steps for process tracing among qualitative and mixed-method designs, or some combination of such.¹⁶ The following discussion primarily draws from this second half of the literature highlighted.

Studies have overlapped in their reference to and understanding of political shocks; they and similar concepts can be found across multiple disciplines. The concept of shocks, in the most basic sense, is one emphasizing significant change. Scholars across various traditions distinguish between what are viewed as “normal times” versus times deemed critical junctures, shocks, or crises (Legro, 2000).¹⁷ Historic institutionalism specifically incorporates the similar concept of critical junctures when it comes to continuity, path dependence, and attempting to account for substantial change. Critical junctures have been described as a “period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis)” (Collier & Collier,

consulted outside of both the academic journals listed and the timeframe specified whenever relevant. Also, the use of “shock” rather than “political shock” is intentional, as many relevant studies use only the generic term in their discussions.

¹⁶ However, to be clear, a large portion of these articles, while more detailed in their discussion and general use of political shocks, were still typically focused on some other overarching concept or process as the main topic of their papers.

¹⁷ Further discussion of the difference between crises and political shocks can be found in footnote 23.

1991: 29), that also “shape the basic contours of social life” (Pierson, 2000: 251).¹⁸

Exogenous shocks according to a historical institutionalism framework are viewed as having a major role in the process of change (Irondele, 2003).

Large crises, critical junctures, and punctuations are all deemed to generally be familiar, both conceptually and with the processes associated with the concepts as they all fundamentally disrupt path dependence (Kahl, 1998). When it comes to reshaping existing dynamics, critical junctures, also referred to as punctuated equilibria, essentially represent windows of possibility where major change can occur (Kingdon, 1984; 1995). According to Kingdon’s (1984: 210) policymaking model, the speed at which policymaking occurs is uneven, with items coming on and off the agenda much more quickly than the incremental processes that are in place to address them. As such, policy solutions are viewed as changing incrementally, while the windows of opportunity to set the agenda open and closes relatively quickly by comparison.

The notion of punctuated equilibria has been used across fields, some of the most prominent in addition to Kingdon (1984; 1995) include the incorporation by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) with their evaluation of policy change, as well as the work by Diehl and Goertz (2000) and Goertz and Diehl (1995) on the initiation and termination of international state rivalries.¹⁹ Both sets of authors argue that punctuation or interruption

¹⁸ Critical junctures were first introduced as a concept by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in their assessment of party systems and voting alignments.

¹⁹ Also further incorporated into policy evaluation by Jones, Baumgartner, and True (1998).

via shocks is necessary in order to break the existing continuity when it comes to policy lifespans and rivalry relationships accordingly.²⁰

Shocks are most easily understood in the extant literature in terms of representing a specific type of change to the status quo, or a particular type of disruption to the current state of conditions. Shocks have been viewed essentially as an erosion of the present continuity among various political actors and processes (Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000; Thelen, 1999). While change occurring within international politics is nothing new, change in the form of shocks stands apart from the broader changing dynamics as it is emphasized as rapidly or suddenly occurring. Simply put, shocks do not reflect evolving or slow-moving processes.

Additionally, the occurrence of shocks is also often characterized as unanticipated or unexpected by various observers as well as to the actors involved. Such unexpected change is also considered likely to be transitional. That is, shocks are more likely to be observed during a shorter time period and be envisioned as a temporary phenomenon rather than a long-observed one.²¹ However, this likelihood is not to suggest shocks take on any default in terms of design. Political shocks have often failed to follow any consistent pattern, as some have described them as episodic and nonlinear, with such change being observed as a single occurrence or even a clustered pattern or series taking place (Meierding, 2013; Knight, 1998; Goertz & Diel 1995).

²⁰ I discuss punctuated equilibria in greater detail later in the chapter.

²¹ There are numerous authors who have characterized the phenomena in terms of anticipation and transition. See Table 2.1 for sources on the characterizations discussed here.

Political shocks are also thought to have relevance across different levels within the political system. The distinction is made across different levels regarding the *occurrence and effect* of political shocks, but reference to *international/global/systemic* dynamics is arguably the most specified among the literature (examples include Mironova & Whitt, 2020; Petrova, 2019; LeVeck & Narang, 2017; Linebarger, 2016; McDonald, 2015; Weinberg & Bakker, 2014; Arriola, 2013; Florea, 2012; Akturk, 2011; Morey, 2011; Bawn & Rosenbluth, 2006; Fettweis, 2004; Scruggs & Lange, 2002; Herd, 2001; DeRouen Jr., 2000 (*worldwide*); Diehl & Goertz, 2000; Arfi, 2000; Bennett, 1998; Cronin, 1998; Bennett, 1997; Goertz & Diehl, 1995).

However, even with the prevalence of international/systemic levels, additional levels are also mentioned including, but not limited to the *domestic/individual/local* Tollefsen, 2020 (*local/subnational dynamics*); Koren, 2019; Koren, 2018; Kosmidis, 2018; McGuirk & Burke, 2017; Costalli et al., 2017; Harding & Stasavage, 2013; Serneels & Verpoorten, 2013; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996), as well as the *neighborhood/regional* (Narang & LeVeck, 2019; Zhukov & Stewart, 2013; Desai & Vreeland, 2011 (*extra-regional shocks*); Bozzoli & Bruck, 2009; Richter, 2006; Bennett, 1998). And finally, others are also generally mentioned including broad reference to *transnational* dynamics (Bartusevicius & Gleditsch, 2019), distinguishing at a continent-region level like with the *Europe-level* (Gray, 2009), general reference to *outside the domestic polity* (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1999), as well as *outside the national borders* (Broz, 1998), to name a few examples.

Beyond levels, there is a range of different descriptors associated with political shocks. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the various characteristics often used when defining and describing shocks and shock-related dynamics.

Table 2.1: Characteristics of Political Shocks Across the Literature.²²

Discussed as:	Sample Citations:
rapidly occurring; sudden	Salehyan, 2018; Koren & Bagozzi, 2017; Haim, 2016; Mansfield et al., 2016; Jenkins et al., 2014 (<i>rapid change</i>); McDoom, 2013; Grigorescu, 2010; Carment et al., 2008; Dewan & Shepsle, 2008; Voeten & Brewer, 2006; Collins, 2004; Yang, 1996
unanticipated; unexpected; unpredictable ²³	Barbera et al., 2019/Birkland, 1998; Benton & Philips, 2019; Lyall, 2019; Imerman, 2018; Johnson & Tierney, 2018/2019; Hafner-Burton et al., 2017; Jones, Mattiacci, & Braumoeller, 2017; Haim, 2016; Wood & Wright, 2016; Allee & Peinhardt, 2014; Renshon, 2008; Duffy Toft, 2007; Elhefnawy, 2004; Levy & Gochal, 2001
temporary; transitory; transitional; short run; short-term	Frye & Borisova, 2019; Colgan & Lucas, 2017 (<i>finite-duration events</i>); Houle & Bodea, 2017; Zakharov, 2016; Little, 2015; Arbatli & Arbatli, 2014; Enns et al., 2014; Pfutze, 2014; Rasler & Thompson, 2011; Iversen & Soskice, 2010; Busby, 2008; Ehrlich, 2007; Fearon, 2004; Krause, 2003; Nicholson et al., 2002; Rasler, 2000; Wallerstein, 1999; Green et al., 1998; Segura & Nicholson, 1995; Meernik & Poe, 1996
being negative or positive	Tollefson, 2020; Beber et al., 2019; Braithwaite & Licht, 2020; Lundgren, 2018; Rooney, 2018; Bagozzi et al., 2017; Knutsen et al., 2017; Betz & Kerner, 2016; Weintraub, 2016; Zakharov, 2016; Brooks, 2014; Pfutze, 2014; Bausch et al., 2013; Hall & Shepsle, 2013; Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013; Bateson, 2012; Blomberg et al., 2011; Bohmelt, 2011; Nielsen et al., 2011; Murshed & Mamoon, 2010; Pop-Eleches, 2007; Rasler, 2000; Tussie, 1998

²² I do not include the specification of external/internal or exogenous/endogenous in this table. While these are important distinctions, they require more context than is being presented here. Instead, I focus on the broader descriptors used to convey the significance and to distinguish shocks as different phenomena from other concepts, as well as other commonalities from the literature, rather than focusing on the origins of the shock (or change) itself.

²³ The unexpected nature can also be thought of as reflected via reference among studies to common events occurring and the associated dynamics as “shocking.” While such studies may not be referring to political shocks in an intentional manner, referring to events as shocking has arguably provided support to justify those same events as political shocks, a point which I acknowledge further.

Table 2.1: Characteristics of Political Shocks Across the Literature, Continued.

occurring repeatedly; successive occurrence; clustered; discrete; discontinuous; discontinuities	Ahmad, 2019; Drezner, 2019; Grieg et al., 2018; Byman & Kroenig, 2016; Miller et al., 2016; Menaldo, 2012; Bozzoli & Bruck, 2009; Paul, 2008; Duffy Toft, 2007; Reuveny & Thompson, 2007; Creswell, 2002; Nincic & Nincic, 2002
a matter of size: large; small	van der Maat, 2018; Thurner et al., 2018; Philips et al., 2016; Bausch et al., 2013; Serneels & Verpoorten, 2013; Aksoy et al., 2015; Dancygier & Donnelly, 2012; Callander, 2011; Bendor & Swistak, 1997; Bercovitch & Diehl, 1997
critical; catalytic; major; massive	Demirel-Pegg, 2017; Hall & Ross, 2015; Parkinson, 2013; Akturk, 2011; Morey, 2011; Beardsley & McQuinn, 2009; Cohen, 2009; Iversen & Soskice, 2009; Paul, 2006; DeRouen Jr., 2000; Hampton, 2000; Liberman, 2000; Hudson & Vore, 1995
momentous	Meernik & Poe, 1996
profound; significant	Imerman, 2018; Lavelle, 2011; Murshed & Mamoon, 2010; Hampton, 2000; Meernik & Poe, 1996
extreme; radical	Linebarger, 2016; Broz & Plouffe, 2010; Bozzoli & Bruck, 2009
catastrophic; traumatic	Whitlark, 2017; Renshon, 2008; Farrell, 2005
dramatic	Renshon, 2008/Tetlock, 2005; Nincic & Nincic, 2002
crises ²⁴	Fettweis, 2004; Haas, 1992 (<i>referring to crisis and shock interchangeably</i>)

²⁴ While crises may be viewed as similar to shocks, their conceptualization has changed over the years resulting in a distinction among concepts. A crisis according to Hermann (1969a; 1969b: 414) is defined as a “situation that (1) threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit, (2) restricts the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed, and (3) surprises the members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence...”

A key contemporary approach by Brecher & Wilkenfeld (2001) with the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project follow Hermann’s definition, but stress that there is also a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities, translated to mean a heightened probability of war as a necessary condition of a crisis. This condition is unnecessary for political shocks as political shocks here reflect a broader concept which encompasses more than military or war criteria, or reference to those related resource types.

The diversity of conceptual meanings in the literature reflects a substantial degree of uncertainty on the part of researchers who seek to utilize the concept of political shock in their investigations. While the characteristics listed in Table 2.1 are used to describe and define shocks themselves, they are also often used in reference to the perception of them as well as the perception of their effects too. A common trend from the literature in determining shocks is the combination of the more observable or measurable characteristics with commentary regarding how they are perceived or viewed by researchers. How change, or oftentimes individual events are perceived, for instance, influences the way in which scholars characterize and/or refer to the specific phenomenon.²⁵

In reference to the end of the Cold War for example, which has been overwhelmingly identified across the literature as a political shock, is also referred to as shocking in its actual occurrence.²⁶ Similarly, we can observe the same type of language

²⁵ This logic follows the assessment of objective and subjective dimensions when it comes to concepts. Knight (1998: 32), points out that in order to determine the criticality of supposedly critical events, or crises, requires distinguishing between objective and subjective dimensions.

Two assessments are done when it comes to critical events: the first being retrospective and objective, the second being subjective. The subjective dimension refers to the orientation or perception of an event by others – and whether they perceive such an event as genuinely critical becomes relevant to how events may be subsequently classified (Harris, 1979: 32).

²⁶ “In 1989 the Berlin Wall was dismantled. A few months later the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe dissolved. By 1991 the Soviet Union itself had disintegrated. Amidst the euphoria and surprise that surrounded these shocking events, many observers were sure that this *new* new world order, even as it evolved, would be inordinately stable” (Zagare, 1996: 366).

when referring generally to terrorism, as well as in reference to specific instances of terrorist events, such as the 9/11 terror attacks.²⁷

As these examples begin to illustrate, there is often reference to substantive events that is also combined with the descriptive characteristics listed in Table 2.1. A political shock is ultimately best considered to be an abstract concept, so less certainty is present as to understanding what it is and whether it can be definitively identified. As such, many of the descriptive characteristics in Table 2.1 are of only partial usefulness on their own but are arguably more effective when combined with the elaboration of substantive events. The combination of descriptors and events results in better illustration of the broader concept and the type of change associated with the term political shocks.

However, as a result of this approach, it has become somewhat of a norm to equate events as shocks. Without criteria or a process specified as to what qualifies and why, justification has mostly leaned on prior consensus. Rationale has also stemmed from the context or the role that the event, or “shock” is assumed to have within the stipulated research. As a result, conceptual uncertainty remains in part due to whether studies are describing and focusing on shocks as the change taking place, shocks as the perceptions involved, possibly the effects of a shock, or whether they are simply referring to events under the label of political shocks by default.

²⁷ “All things equal, terrorism is advantaged... because it is dramatic and shocking and often poses a challenge to the established order” (Asal & Hoffman, 2015: 386).

“The 9/11 attacks might well have been needed to shock the government and the public into a drastic change of policy, as many Bush administration officials argued” (Coe, 2018: 1209; Jervis, 2003).

“Some cognitive or ideational tendencies may have affected the comparison between invading with a light footprint or staying out, especially after the shock of 9/11.” (Saunders, 2017: S233).

Ultimately, if one were to agree to equate events as political shocks, it is important to make clear that not *all* events could possibly be political shocks. In general, shocks are considered to be reasonably common occurrences.²⁸ While they are not a unique phenomenon as they take place with some regularity, this generalization has largely opened the door to evaluating and/or incorporating nearly most events, regardless of detail or type. Extant research over the past 30 plus years reflects a wide range of different events that have come to be deemed political shocks. While quite diverse, there has also been a fair amount of overlap, showing that partial consensus has been reached among scholars. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the more frequently observed events within the literature that researchers have identified to qualify as political shocks within the context of their existing studies.

²⁸ A conclusion also explicitly drawn by Hensel (2001: 206) in evaluating the events and logic put forth in Diehl & Goertz (2000), as well as in Goertz & Diehl (1995) with their work on political shocks and enduring rivalries. He comes to this characterization as he refers to political shocks as dramatic changes in the internal or external environment between 1816 and 1976 which include civil wars, political independence, and world wars.

Additional authors also explicitly refer to shocks as common: McNamee & Zhang, 2019; Olar, 2019; Weber, 2019; Miller et al., 2016; Philips et al., 2016; Baccini & Koenig-Archibugi, 2014; Chwioroth, 2014; Davis & Meunier, 2011; Leblang, 2010; Neumayer & Plumper, 2010; Pepinsky, 2008; Elkins et al., 2006; Simmons & Elkins, 2004. Commonality is also referenced in studies when methodologically accounting for what is often only referred to as “common political shocks” by using fixed effects, however there are far too many to list here.

Table 2.2: Examples of Shocks Within International Relations Research.²⁹

General Topics:	Sample Citations:
Conflict & Violence	
General reference	Reuveny & Li (2003) (<i>conflict as a social shock</i>)
Battle dynamics Military defeat unexpected losses/wins	Lavelle (2011) (<i>end of Vietnam War</i>); Maoz (2009); Verdier (1998)
Interstate/Intrastate War Civil War Wars (in general) World War I/II	Bruck et al. (2012); Carson et al. (2011); Collins (2007); Finkel (2015); Fordham & Kleinberg (2012); Goertz & Diehl (1995); Hegre et al. (2017); Holmes & Traven (2015); Iversen & Soskice (2009); Kang & Meernik (2005); King & Lieberman (2009); Krebs (2015); Maoz & Siverson (2008) (<i>wars and their effects</i>); Morey (2011); Sears & Funk (1999); Sinha (2018); Streeck & Thelen (2005); Thies (2004); White (2017)
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs)	Arbatli & Arbatli (2014); Crescenzi & Enterline (2001); Crescenzi et al. (2008); Rooney (2018)
Terrorism General reference Specific events; 9/11 attacks	Byman & Kroenig (2016); Koch (2009); Larsen et al. (2019); Snyder et al. (2009)
Coup d'états	Mattli (2000); Thyne (2017) (<i>coups within a civil war</i>)
Economic & Resource Related	
Depressions General reference 1930s Great Depression	Carson et al. (2011); Iversen & Soskice (2009); Morin & Orsini (2013)
Economic Reform Economic liberalization Liberalism Shock Therapy	Arbatov (1998); Barnett (2006); Barnett et al. (2014); Betts (1992); Bunce (2003); Chandra & Rudra (2013); Chwioroth (2008); Fang & Stone (2012); Horowitz (2004); Paris (1997) (<i>rapid economic & political liberalization</i>); Schimmelfenning (2005); Solingen (1994) (<i>shock economic programs</i>)
Financial Crises & Recessions General reference to financial crises; recessions; debt crisis; economic crises; global economic recession Specific events: 1997 Asian financial crisis; 2008 financial crisis; US collapse of housing prices	Brooks & Kurtz (2012); Broz (1998); Drezner (2009); Florea (2012); Hafner-Burton et al. (2017); Koga (2018); Krebs (2015); Nelson & Katzenstein (2014); Verdier (1998); Welch Larson (2018); Zhang (2020)
Foreign Aid “aid shocks” Aid provision and termination bilateral aid dynamics	Alexander & Rooney (2019); Karell & Schutte (2018); Narang (2015); Sobek & Payne (2010)

²⁹ This is not an exhaustive list of authors nor types, rather it is meant to provide a snapshot of both the diversity and overlap among the literature.

Table 2.2: Examples of Shocks Within International Relations Research, Continued.

Price/Supply Changes General reference Oil Shocks (1970s; 1980s)	Bennett et al. (1994); Betz & Kerner (2016); Clark et al. (1998); Colgan (2010); Crisp & Kelly (1999); Darnton (2014); Fordham (2007); Garrett (1992); Goodman et al. (1996); Kang (1997); Kaufman (1997); Lavelle (2011); Nayar (1995); Talmadge (2008) (<i>supply shocks</i>); Tilton (1994); Verdier (1998); Wigley (2018)
Natural Disasters	
General reference extreme weather events “shocks of nature” natural catastrophes Climatic shocks climate related shocks Specific events Cyclones; drought based/water shortages; excessive heat; floods; rainfall; rising sea levels; storms; tsunamis; wildfires	Bagozzi et al. (2017); Bhavanani & Lacina (2015); Beardsley & McQuinn (2009); Busby (2008); Carson et al. (2011); Hafner-Burton et al. (2017); Krebs (2015); Lazarev et al. (2014); Meierding (2013); Raleigh & Kniveton (2012); Reuveny & Thompson (2007)
Policy Related & Miscellaneous	
General reference Policy failures (e.g., Iraq) Controversial, Negative, Unexpected Electoral outcomes Brexit victory; Trump victory Immigration flight; refugee influx; Demographic shocks Interventions Invasions General reference Napoleon taking of Spain; Falklands Invasion; Israeli Defenses in Lebanon 1982	Allen (2010); Anievas & Saull (2019); Byman & Kroenig (2016); Duffy Toft (2007); Hafner-Burton et al., 2017 (<i>unexpected policy/political events</i>); Hagen (2001); Johansson & Sarwari (2017); Kahler (2018); Knutsen et al. (2017); Koch (2009); Linke et al. (2015); Parkinson (2013); Peters (2019); Reus-Smit (2011); Sambanis & Shavo (2013); Sobek & Payne (2010)
Power/State/System	
General power distribution changes End of the Cold War State collapse/formation; independence Milosevic regime; Soviet collapse; territorial changes Regime Change Dramatic political & leadership change Death of leaders (incl. assassinations) Executive turnover	Carlin & Love (2016); Christensen (2006); Fettweis (2004); Florea (2012); Goddard (2006); Goertz & Diehl (1995); Hudson & Vore (1995); Iqbal & Zorn (2008); Kalyvas & Balcells (2010); Licht & Allen (2018); Maoz (2009); Maoz & Somer-Topcu (2010); Sinha (2018); Streeck & Thelen (2005)

Clearly, there is a wide range of different yet critical and often well-studied events across international politics included on the list of political shocks. These and additional events have been conceptualized, incorporated, or at the very least referenced in some context as relating to political shocks within the existing literature. While studies have continued to lean on identifying and illustrating the concept with events, it remains debatable whether all of these different event types and all instances of such events are indeed political shocks, and if all of these events have a uniform effect on the states experiencing them. Krebs (2015: 141) argues that in the context of large exogenous shocks, which he classifies as wars, natural disasters, and economic recessions, are clearer to understand as shocks in retrospect, as these events, while in the midst of them, may appear to be more manageable. It is not until we look back and review the narrative that we sometimes see the significance and severity of such dynamics.

The overarching commonality shared by most of these events is their ability to be highly disruptive to whatever outcome or process being researched. War and conflict in general are typically viewed as highly disruptive, as are revolutionary events which are all regarded as influential to a variety of different processes.³⁰ The disruptive nature of these and other events is undoubtedly a common theme among them, but ultimately such

³⁰ Conflict in particular is thought to disrupt many different processes, including the disruption of preexisting forms of social control (Lazarev, 2019), as well as diverting and undermining potential momentum for democratic reforms (Horowitz, 2006). Imerman (2018: 82) points out that “punctuated shocks disrupting the material and/or social equilibrium, such as war or sudden shifts in social understandings, [tend toward] producing acute periods of uncertainty...” effectively leading to potential alterations in the status quo.

Additionally, revolutions have also typically been viewed as disruptive, as Colgan & Lucas (2017) highlight in reference to their ability to disrupt or shock the interactions of actors in nearly all types of relationships. Such dynamics also take place in conjunction with other disruptive events as was the case of the Iranian revolution coupled with the 1979 oil shock (Kaufman, 1997).

disruption is still determined by the context of the specific research study. If political shocks are indeed a phenomenon of their own, then arguably they should have a ‘generalized’ dynamic, in this case disruption, that can be observed; secondary outcomes (those determined by the researcher’s interest or study) may differ, but there should be an overarching impact that can be determined. It is then reasonable to question whether all these different events would still qualify to be political shocks without that context. What is far more likely, and arguably more appropriate to assume is that not all events are automatically critical and relevant when it comes to the concept of political shocks.³¹³²

As studies have generally leaned on previously established consensus to classify events as political shocks this approach becomes problematic as contradictions occur given there is not only wide variation across event types but also within the events themselves. Intrastate or civil war, for example, has been identified to be a political shock among various studies (Hegre et al., 2017; Bruck et al., 2012; Morey, 2011; Kang & Meernik, 2005; Sears & Funk, 1999). However, historical accounts and existing data tell us not all civil wars are the same. Some intrastate conflicts are protracted, some carry higher death tolls, others experience increased involvement of non-state actors, and so on.

For instance, the years which comprised the First Liberian Civil War during the 1990s were marked with lower levels of intensity relative to the Second Liberian Civil

³¹ Koch (2009) explicitly points out a basic truth that some events are just more critical than others, and that is a point to consider when evaluating the relevance of events.

³² Rather than automatically lean on events to reflect shocks, a more useful strategy is to develop a broader way to observe the phenomena independent of the specific context of an event.

Given this statement, a process by which events can be evaluated in terms of whether they are indeed relevant to the incidence of political shocks is needed and is elaborated on later in the chapter.

War, which took place during the early 2000s. Additionally, while Liberia experienced separate periods of intrastate war, averaging three to four years each, elsewhere intrastate war has been ongoing. For example, in the case of Colombia the country has been in a continual state of war since 1964 (Pettersson, 2020; Pettersson & Oberg, 2020; Gleditsch et al., 2002).³³ The civil war of Colombia would not qualify in its entirety as their experience, decades of ongoing war, does not follow the short, often rapid, and disruptive nature that characterizes political shocks. As such, within-event variation is necessary to take into consideration but is technically overlooked when labeling all events as shocks.

Additionally, some events or processes appear to contradict the characteristics that have been used to set political shocks apart from other phenomena. Economic depressions and declines, for example, have been argued as both crises and political shocks within the literature. Enterline (2010: 412) makes the point that “crises might not necessarily reflect a shock, one marked by *a sudden change in domestic conditions*, but they might be *long-term processes*, such as economic depressions or declines.” While obviously critical when they occur, economic depressions or declines are often thought of as longer-term processes, not shorter-term phenomena. Arguably, event-type contradictions such as this, as well as within-event type variation as described above, suggests that perhaps we should not lean so heavily on events by default to begin with, nor focus solely on the critical or disruptive nature of events on their own to

³³ According to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 20.1, Liberia experienced intrastate conflict primarily between 1989-1991 and 2000-2003, while Colombia has been involved in civil war since December 1964, with only a brief break in the violence during 2017. Colombia’s civil war had a brief end at the end of 2016 but has been documented as again active since February 2018 (Pettersson, 2020; Pettersson & Oberg, 2020; Gleditsch et al., 2002).

conceptualize political shocks. Rather, additional factors are not only relevant but also crucial to consider.

2.3 Back to Basics: Defining Political Shocks and Stability

2.3.1 Defining Political Shocks

As studies have taken to focusing on and subsequently including events thought to be highly disruptive within international politics, this has led to identifying and inadvertently defining shocks according to the observation of such events taking place. However, this is problematic for numerous reasons, including the issues of within-event variation and event-type contradictions, as previously mentioned, as well as the lack of clarity as to whether scholars are capturing (intentional or otherwise) the effects of a political shock, the political shock itself, or perhaps something else entirely, an important and necessary distinction.

To avoid following a similar path, I opt to remove events from the initial process of reconceptualizing the phenomenon and suggest using a simplified definition of a political shock. For the purposes of this project, ***a political shock is defined as a short-term yet significant break in the existing equilibrium.*** I intentionally remain broad and opt not to include many of the various descriptors highlighted by previous studies as I believe they tend to take away from conceptual clarity rather than add to it. Instead, this simple, straightforward definition encompasses two primary aspects to expand on, *short-term and significant breaks* and *existing equilibrium*.

The first aspect is the specification of the timeframe at which we observe the change. I include the *temporary* or *short-term* nature of the phenomena as it is one of the, if not the most distinctive characteristics presented across studies.³⁴ The transitional aspect is a crucial detail in distinguishing it from other potential processes that occur with some regularity within international politics. By specifying political shocks in this manner, I am then only looking at temporarily occurring changes in the equilibrium, I am not considering change that takes place over time. The second aspect is the specification of what *existing equilibrium* is referring to. For the purposes of this project, I focus on the existing equilibrium of states within the international political system. The existing equilibrium of states can also be translated into the existing status quo or existing conditions of states. The focus then is simply on the actual break in equilibria, or break in conditions, and not on any secondary effect or impact, which requires separate consideration.³⁵

In order to identify political shocks according to this logic, I suggest establishing a process of evaluating significant change that is state-centered. Specifically, I suggest that political shocks, as I have defined the concept, can be identified by observing a significant change in the internal conditions of states directly. The choice to take a state-centered approach is largely due to the variety of ways in which we can observe the

³⁴ The temporary or transitional characteristic has been explicitly noted across numerous analyses including but not limited to, Frye & Borisova (2019); Colgan & Lucas (2017); Houle & Bodea (2017); Zakharov (2016); Little (2015); Arbatli & Arbatli (2014); Enns et al. (2014); Pfitze (2014); Rasler & Thompson (2011); Iversen & Soskice (2010); Busby (2008); Ehrlich (2007); Fearon (2004); Krause (2003); Nicholson et al. (2002); Rasler (2000); Wallerstein (1999); Green et al. (1998); Segura & Nicholson (1995); Meernik & Poe (1996).

³⁵ Such consideration of the secondary effects or outcomes are addressed later within the chapter as well as in Chapter 3.

continued primacy and influence of states among politics, domestically and internationally. The focus of states is nothing new for international relations studies. States remain the primary actor across theoretical arguments while empirical studies continue to design country-time specific models. States continue to be central to political dynamics as interactions take place among them, and events involve states in some manner, be it that events are initiated by them, or such events come to affect the states themselves. As such, it is reasonable to suggest states remain highly important across political science dynamics, including the assessment of political shocks as well.³⁶

With the specification of states as the primary focus, I further suggest that *political shocks can be determined according to changes in states, specifically via short, significant disruptions to existing state stability*. Initially defining shocks according to a broader impact directly on the actor, or state in this case, accomplishes the following. First, it acknowledges and reinforces the idea that there are multiple processes taking place, with one being the actual change or impact that distinguishes a shock versus other effects or impacts which distinguish secondary dynamics. The language of this definition does not speak to the perception or effects, rather just an initial observable change.

Second, it avoids what many previous studies have done in leading with events in both the conceptualization and subsequent identification or measurement of their variables. This approach allows us to avoid falling into the trap of equating specific events and event characteristics as political shocks, with their absence or occurrence

³⁶ By focusing on the state level, I do not mean to suggest other potential actors or levels are irrelevant. However, I believe political shocks themselves are best captured according to changes with the state in terms of internal conditions, while the subsequent effects of shocks could potentially be observed at other levels in addition to the state level.

determining whether political shocks have taken place. Additionally, we are also able to assess the potential dynamics of shocks on various aspects of world politics further, without the added restriction of event-type specifications. Events, instead, are considered as an optional part of the overall framework outlined later in the chapter and in Chapter 3.

2.3.2 Incorporating Stability

In order to capture potential breaks in the equilibrium of states, I suggest focusing on changes in state stability. However, stability itself is an abstract concept for which there is no single understanding that has been agreed upon within the literature. As such, there are various ways in which the extent of stability has been defined and measured.³⁷

A review of the existing literature suggests that approaches to stability tend to fall into two broader categories. The first being a focus of the government, or broadly understood as the general structure that is in place, where emphasis has been placed on the absence of change and/or specific attributes of the government to distinguish the presence of stability. The second focuses on the nature of the relationship between society and the government, where emphasis has been placed on the absence of violence as well as on specific societal attributes to distinguish the existence of stability.³⁸ These

³⁷ The concept of stability is already well-recognized at the core of international relations, especially with regard to the stability of the international system. Stability is at the center of power distribution arguments within international relations with different views arguing for unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity as producing more stable and peaceful outcomes (Wohlforth, 1999; Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001; Deutsch & Singer, 1964).

³⁸ Hurwitz (1971: 42) also summarizes the literature at that time on stability in terms of democratic political stability indicating three general elements: 1) the ability of the political system to *persist* (endurance/persistence), 2) the existence of a *legitimate* political system, and 3) the presence of *effective decision making* by the political system.

general categories are not mutually exclusive, as researchers typically overlap in their conceptualization and subsequent measurement of stability. Such efforts toward measurement also include the identification of indicators that speak to these and similar categories individually and collectively.

In terms of the first category – where focus is on the government or existing general structure – stability is thought to exist so long as there is an absence of governmental or structural changes. Lipset (1960) and others that follow his general understanding (*see Sanders 1981 for example*) defines political instability simply as a lack of continuity or the persistence of a certain type of political system.³⁹ While stability reflects an absence of change in the type of political system present, changing that existing political system then logically equates to destabilization for that particular state. The type of change taking place is ultimately non-specific. Other various researchers that have focused on stability in terms of governmental change consider both irregular and regular changes that take place. For example, changes have been distinguished as “regular or irregular (i.e., coup) transfers of executive power” (Alesina et al., 1996: 13),

Hurwitz’s (1973: 449) later overview of stability expanded into contemporary approaches to the topic of stability which included 1) the absence of violence, 2) governmental longevity/duration, 3) the existence of a legitimate constitutional regime, 4) absence of structural change, and 5) multifaceted societal attributes, which collectively reiterate the categories as I have mentioned here.

³⁹ Similarly, Sanders (1981) follows Lipset’s understanding of political stability, however, he also specifies that in order to actually capture the extent of state stability, it must be measured relative to others. That is, to understand a state’s own level of stability, it must be compared to others or itself over a period of time to assess how it truly stacks up.

also framed as “constitutional i.e., take place within the law or unconstitutional, i.e., they can be coups d’état” as examples (Alesina & Perotti, 1996: 3).⁴⁰

In addition to potential changes, specific attributes regarding the existing governance have also been argued as indicative of stability. Goldstone (2008) discusses two general qualities that states must possess in order to ensure they remain stable: effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness and legitimacy can also be viewed as somewhat general concepts for which there are different understandings within the literature. Goldstone (2008: 285) defines effectiveness by “how well the state carries out state functions such as providing security, promoting economic growth, making law and policy, and delivering social services” while legitimacy “reflects whether state actions are perceived by elites and the population as “just” or “reasonable” in terms of prevailing social norms.” Having both of these qualities is argued not only as reflecting stability in states, but necessary to avoid potential crises, including state failure.⁴¹ In terms of evaluating the democratic polity in particular, numerous authors concur with the qualities of both effectiveness (Almond & Verba, 1965; Eckstein, 1966; Lijphart, 1968; Lipset, 1960; Russett et al., 1964) and legitimacy (Almond & Verba, 1965; Eckstein, 1966; Lijphart, 1968; Lipset, 1960).

In terms of the second category – where focus is largely on the relationship between society and the government – the overarching view is that stability exists so long

⁴⁰ Also related to the notion of government continuity is longevity and endurance. Russett et al.’s (1964) index of political stability reflected the rate of turnover in office of the designated leadership, effectively equating the concept of stability to a measure of longevity.

⁴¹ Goldstone (2008: 286) argues that failed states have lost *both* effectiveness and legitimacy, while losing one or the other can allow for survival but ultimately states will remain unstable.

as there is an absence of violence.⁴² An existing lack of conflicts, protests, and other types of political and social unrest indicates that the state appears to be stable. Social unrest and violence in general are emphasized to represent political instability. It can be the type of social unrest and violence that is of focus, other times it is simply the occurrence of such. Sometimes political instability is conceptualized as a combination of sorts, reflected by the *frequency* with which certain socio-political events *occur* (Siermann, 1998: 30, *with emphasis*). Such socio-political events can include multiple forms of armed violence. Political instability in the form of governmental takeover attempts (coup d'états), as well as internal civil war have largely been found to be significant (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Londregan & Poole, 1990; Miguel et al., 2004; Collier & Hoeffler, 2000).

The occurrence of violence or unrest in general also reflects a degree of active disfavor or perhaps even organized opposition by society, essentially defining the present state of society. Often any form of social unrest could be a reflection of declining conditions when it comes to the relationship between the government and its population. A broader approach comes from Gurr (1970), who focused on whether the expectations of society are met, specifying that when societies expectations are not met, instability will grow as a result. Gurr does not specify any particular type of expectation as necessary, so violence is possible as a result, but so are other forms of dissent to address issues. Society signaling discontent with policy and having it changed could even qualify as political

⁴² Change of the government in terms of regime transitions also speaks to the relationship between citizen and government, as uncertainty increases disrupting the existing equilibrium, leading to questions about the use of force and extent of resolve of the new leadership (Licht & Allen, 2018).

instability in certain cases, so violence is not always necessary to observe in order to consider a state to be unstable.^{43,44}

However, there are potential issues in approaching stability in these ways. In particular, conceptualizing stability in terms of the absence of governmental or structural change basically follows a binary understanding. The absence of change essentially means an entity is considered stable to the extent it does not change from its original design. This logic lacks consideration when it comes to the possibility of “build up” toward such a change that could also be taking place. Growing societal unrest, for example, would not be captured according to this understanding, but would still logically indicate changes to the overall level of stability for a state. There are also limitations when conceptualizing stability according to violence. By focusing on unrest, be it the type, the severity, the frequency in which it occurs, or even its general occurrence, we determine stability by violence. This can be problematic in reasoning, just because violence indicates a lack of stability, the lack of violence does not necessary indicate stability. Russett et al. (1964) explicitly critiqued the use of violence when conceptualizing stability, deeming stability to be too complex to exclusively use a measure of violence.⁴⁵

⁴³ Gurr’s (1985) related notion of relative deprivation also speaks to the likelihood for contention.

⁴⁴ By thinking of stability in terms of armed violence, we equate it to violence. However, if we generalize social unrest like protests or disputes – those are forms of acceptable and regular discontent in countries like developed democracies, so is this really instability?

⁴⁵ In terms of capturing stability according to specific attributes of the government or society, one likely runs into the exercise of having to define one abstract concept by another. In terms of this project for example, there would be three levels of abstraction: attempting to define the abstract concept of political shocks with the abstract concept of stability, which is then potentially defined by another generalized or abstract concept of effectiveness, for instance. While this not an impossible task, it is worth considering

Researchers have also taken to identifying indicators that are thought to contribute to stability, either individually or collectively. These indicators tend to follow the broader categories of government and society found among the literature. The range of different indicators have essentially come to serve as proxies for political stability, or instability across various studies.

In attempting to forecast the onset of political instability, Goldstone et al. (2010) emphasize the importance of political institutions above all other possible indicators in determining political stability. Political institutions were argued as more important a predictor over various economic and social conditions such as infant mortality rates, conflict-ridden neighborhoods, and measures of state-led discrimination when it came to the likelihood for an onset of political instability (Goldstone et al., 2010: 190).⁴⁶ To potentially counter adverse actions of society, Huntington (1968) also leans on political institutions, relating their strength as key to the degree of political stability states experience. Higher levels of social frustration will lead to populations being motivated to rise up against their governments; if the government is weak (indicated by weaker political institutions), then the situation is far more likely to decline as conflict risk increases.

However, in a response to Goldstone et al., Bowsby et al. (2020) find that only during specific time periods do political institutions correctly predict onsets of

alternative or a combination of approaches, including measuring those more immediately observable dynamics, like conflict and instances of governmental change.

⁴⁶ The authors consider these different measures against different types of instability including civil wars, both ethnic and revolutionary conflicts, adverse regime change, and genocides/politocides.

instability.⁴⁷ Political institutions appear to not carry the same influence consistently as others have suggested. Instead, Bowlsby et al. (2020) do not discredit the degree of influence alternative measures may also be carrying pointing out that it is likely more accurate to consider political instability and what drives or deters it as time-variant rather than a constant.⁴⁸

In comparing and testing different factors used within the literature on civil war onset, Hegre & Sambanis (2006) include multiple conceptualizations of political instability. The authors primarily focus on characteristics of both the *government* and *state* and do so via a number of similar concepts and indicators as have been identified in earlier approaches. First, they consider the longevity of both the state in terms of the independence of states as well as the age of the current leadership or regime, which translates to the number of years the current regime has been in place. They also consider the length of time since the last regime transition as well. In considering changes to the government or regime, they do so according to annual changes to the regime, as well as whether the regime experienced change within the last three years. Such evaluations were applied for both democratic and autocratic systems alike (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006: 517-

⁴⁷ The authors find peak prediction during the earlier 1995-2004 timeframe while finding relatively poor performance during the later timeframe of 2005-2014.

⁴⁸ The authors conclude that “the GEA [Goldstone et. al] model was designed to predict political instability in the decade after the end of the Cold War and emphasized factors like infant mortality and neighboring conflict that are typically higher in developing countries with comparatively weak political institutions...[such] states experienced both partial democratization and political instability at significantly higher rates in the post-Cold War” (Bowlsby et al., 2020: 1416), which explains, in part, why institutions appear so integral to conditions during the original period of evaluation.

518). Ultimately, they find that within the context of civil war, recent political instability and inconsistent democratic institutions make intrastate violence more likely.⁴⁹

While Hegre & Sambanis (2006) primarily focused on (in)stability reflected via changes regarding the government in the context of civil war onset, Jong-A-Pin (2009) turns the focus to the economy in comparing a range of different political stability indicators. He compares 25 different indicators, leaning primarily on *conflict-related factors* and assesses the dynamics within the context of economic growth. He establishes four different dimensions of political instability using Exploratory Factor Analysis including: politically motivated violence, mass political violence, instability within the political regime, and instability of the political regime.⁵⁰ Ultimately, he finds that the fourth dimension, instability of the political regime has a robust and significantly negative effect when it comes to economic growth.

Additionally, indices have also been established to measure socio-political (in)stability. Often such indices summarize a series of indicators that capture different types of social unrest as is the case of Hibbs (1973), Alesina & Perotti (1996), Barro (1991), and Gupta (1990), among others. Alesina & Perotti (1996) emphasize the use of a Socio-Political Index of Instability (SPI) while assessing stability within the context of

⁴⁹ The authors conclude there is a robust relationship between political instability and civil war as multiple versions placed among their top 18 most robust variables, in particular whether a state's polity score had a coded change of -77/-88 in the previous three years (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006: 526).

⁵⁰ The dimensions are not immediately intuitive and not always clear, in addition to overlap that appears across three of the four areas. Factor 1/politically motivated violence includes guerilla warfare, revolutions, civil war, assassinations, and so on; Factor 2/mass civil protest includes riots, strikes, and demonstrations. Factor 3/instability within the regime focuses on fractionalization, polarization, changes in the chief executive, the number of elections, and so on, while Factor 4/instability of the regime includes changes in the polity, which also encompasses chief executive changes, as well as coups and generalized reference to phenomena like "major government crises" and "political regime change" (Jong-A-Pin, 2009: 18-19).

property rights. The index focuses on a number of different types of violent events and was constructed following Hibbs' (1973) method of Principal Component Analysis, or PCA. Their index includes politically motivated assassinations, domestic mass violence, successful and unsuccessful coups, as well as regime characteristics regarding democracies and full and partial autocracies (Alesina & Perotti, 1996: 4-5).⁵¹ Several key institutions have also created indices which contain composite measures and are widely utilized by researchers attempting to capture (in)stability and other related dynamics.

Of those available, the World Bank, the Fund For Peace, and the Economist Intelligence Unit, among others have established projects with relevant concepts, data, and measures. The World Bank's World Governance Indicators (WGI) project includes six different dimensions of governance for over 200 countries and territories between 1996-2019 (WGI, 2020). These indicators include: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.⁵² In particular, their Political Stability and Absence of Violence indicator reflects the "perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism" (WGI – Political Stability, 2020), which is seemingly most relevant for the purposes of this project.

In addition to the World Bank's World Governance Indicators, is the Fragile States Index through the Fund for Peace. The Fragile States Index (FSI) measures the

⁵¹ Hibbs' (1973) indices were created to assess violence and mass civil protest. Barro (1991) and Gupta (1990) used various indices of socio-political instability, with varying approaches including the sum of political revolutions, coup d'états, and political assassinations, as well as a generalized concept of politically motivated violence.

⁵² Further detail and information on each indicator can be found at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>.

extent of fragility, or risk and vulnerability for 178 countries utilizing a Conflict Assessment Framework, or CAST (Fragile States Index, 2020). This framework incorporates 12 different risk indicators intended to measure the conditions of a state and assess the extent to which states are vulnerable to collapse.

The 12 different indicators capture attributes of a country's conditions and are grouped into four categories which include cohesion, economic, political, and social & cross-cutting indicators. Breaking these down, **cohesion indicators** include security apparatus, factionalized elites, and group grievance; **economic indicators** include economic decline, uneven economic development, and human flight and brain drain; **political indicators** include state legitimacy, public services, and human rights and rule of law; and finally, **social and cross-cutting indicators** include demographic pressures, refugees and IDPs, and external intervention.⁵³

A similar index was also constructed by the Economist Intelligence Unit with their work on the Political Instability Index. The Political Instability Index incorporates 15 total indicators intended to reflect the degree of **underlying vulnerability** of states as well as the extent of **economic distress** they are facing (EIU, 2021). The different indicators are grouped into two categories which include *underlying vulnerability* and *economic distress*. Broken down, underlying vulnerability includes 12 total indicators such as, inequality, state history, corruption, ethnic fragmentation, trust in institutions, status of minorities, history of political instability, proclivity to labor unrest, level of social provision, a country's neighborhood, regime type, and regime type and

⁵³ A more detailed overview of the Fragile States Index is located in the Appendix.

factionalism. The remaining three indicators of the total 15 that comprise this index fall under the economic distress category and include growth in incomes, unemployment, and level of income per head.⁵⁴

While these indices all appear to provide different but related approaches to stability and other somewhat related concepts, there are a number of potential issues as well. In terms of the World Bank's World Governance Indicators, in particular their *Political Stability and Absence of Violence* measure appears to be inherently a measure of political violence. In reviewing the different data sources used to construct the measure for the World Bank, many of the ones included are conflict heavy.⁵⁵ While this fact on its own is not necessarily problematic, however, if one were to presume stability reflects more than overt armed violence, this measure may fall short. Additionally, the WGI project has ample spatial coverage but does lack a bit in temporal coverage. However, it provides enough for a contemporary evaluation of dynamics for a couple of decades.^{56, 57}

While the Fragile States Index has ample enough coverage spatially, temporally the data is limited as 2006 is the first year of data available. It allows for one to go quite

⁵⁴ A more detailed overview of the Political Instability Index is located in the Appendix.

⁵⁵ Data sources focus on orderly transfers, armed conflict, violent demonstrations, social unrest, international tensions, terrorist threat, political terror scale, security risk rating, intensity of internal conflicts, intensity of violent activities, intensity of social conflict, government stability, internal conflict, external conflict, ethnic tensions, protests and riots, and civil war (WGI – Political Stability, 2020).

⁵⁶ The WGI project only provides data between 1996-2019 (with the following years also missing: 1997, 1999, and 2001).

⁵⁷ While the Political Stability indicator is very conflict heavy, possibly combining this measure with another one from the WGI project is a possible workaround. Another indicator that may be useful is their *Government Effectiveness* one. It is intended to capture “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies” (WGI – Government Effectiveness, 2020).

in-depth from 2006 on, but for purposes of longer evaluation timeframe, or more than one complete decade, it is not as sufficient.⁵⁸ The FSI has also been criticized regarding its utility, as various researchers have denounced the work as predominantly reflecting “state-building,” with the focus of the index largely on the symptoms of states struggling with fragility or failure, while simultaneously ignoring the underlying causes as well as how to rectify the ongoing situations (Leigh, 2012).⁵⁹

Finally, in terms of the EIU project, while the Index assesses 165 countries on how susceptible they are to social unrest, the key issue with the Political Instability Index is the lack of temporal coverage. While the Fragile States Index provides data for at least a decade, the EIU Index was established to cover the 2009-2010 timeframe and has not been updated in a similar format since. Clearly there are pros and cons to all of the various approaches to stability. From across the decades of literature, as one can see, there are different ways in which to approach about the concept, different factors thought to contribute to stability, and ultimately different ways to capture the degree of instability, or stability that is present. Table 2.3 summarizes the approaches overviewed regarding conceptualization and measurement of stability.

⁵⁸ A similar concept can be found with the OECD’s Fragile States Report, *States of Fragility*. Fragility is understood according to five areas: economic, environmental, political, security, and societal. As such, the Crises and Fragility team with the OECD identify the extent of fragility in states, however, they only identify those fragile and extremely fragile states rather than provide an assessment of fragility for all states. See the OECD States of Fragility website for additional information. <http://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/overview/0/>.

⁵⁹ This type of criticism is not limited to the Fragile States Index. Various sources of aggregate and individual composite measures have been critiqued as to the extent of their usefulness and/or applicability, in part due to the mystery behind their measure construction.

Certain entities that construct composite measures do list their individual data sources, however, despite this fact, numerous sources are generally not available and the actual methodology behind their measure construction is not clear.

Table 2.3: Summarizing Approaches of Concept to Measurement of Stability.

Absence/Presence of Governmental Change & Government Focus	
Discussed as:	Sample Citations:
<i>Effectiveness & Legitimacy</i>	Almond & Verba (1965); Eckstein (1966); Goldstone (2008); Lijphart (1968); Lipset (1960); Russett et al. (1964) (<i>effective decision making</i>)
<i>Endurance & Persistence</i>	Blondel (1968); Lijphart (1968); Lipset (1960); Russett et al. (1964)
<i>Continuity & Longevity</i>	Hegre & Sambanis (2006: 517-518) (<i>regime longevity; state longevity</i>) ⁶⁰ ; Jong-A-Pin (2009: 27) (<i>years of ruling party in office</i>); Lipset (1960) (<i>political system discontinuity</i>); Russett et al. (1964) (<i>longevity of the office</i>)
<i>Irregular & Regular Changes to Government</i>	Alesina et al. (1996); Alesina & Perotti (1996) (<i>constitutional or unconstitutional</i>); Hegre & Sambanis (2006: 517-518) ⁶¹ ; Jong-A-Pin (2009: 27) (<i># of times per year for executive changes; regime changes</i>) ⁶² ; Siemann (1998)
<i>Additional Regime Characteristics</i>	Alesina & Perotti (1996) (<i>full/partial autocracies & democracies</i>)
Absence/Presence of Violence & Society Focus	
<i>General Understandings</i>	Gurr 1970 (<i>meeting societal expectations</i>); Hurwitz 1973 (<i>as a “multifaceted societal attribute”</i>)
<i>Range of types of violence</i>	Alesina & Perotti (1996) (<i>social unrest including politically motivated assassinations, domestic mass violence, successful and unsuccessful coups d'état</i>); Alesina et al. (1996) (<i>coups d'état</i>); Barro (1991) (<i>political revolutions, coups d'états, political assassinations</i>); Fearon & Laitin (2003) (<i>civil wars and coup d'états</i>); Hibbs (1973) (<i>general reference to violence; mass civil protest</i>); Jong-A-Pin (2009: 27) (<i>armed & unarmed violence, including assassinations, civil war, coups d'état, demonstrations, ethnic tensions, fractionalization, guerilla warfare, internal conflicts, medium civil conflicts, minor civil conflicts, purges, religious tensions, revolutions, riots, strikes</i>); Londregan & Poole (1990) (<i>civil wars and coup d'états</i>); Miguel et al. (2004) (<i>civil wars and coup d'états</i>)

⁶⁰ Regime longevity refers to the age of the regime in years (Przeworski et al. 2000); state longevity refers to whether a state is a new state/newly independent and general reference to when a state was established (Fearon & Laitin 2003).

⁶¹ Hegre & Sambanis (2006: 517-518) consider numerous versions of change to government including, years since the last regime transition (Polity IV – Marshall & Jaggers, 2000), annual changes in autocracy and democracy scores (Gurr & Jaggers, 2000), annual changes in modified polity scores (Marshall & Jaggers, 2000), and the change in polity score within a set amount of time (e.g., past 3 years) (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

⁶² Jong-A-Pin (2009: 27) considers regime changes using the “durable” variable of Polity IV.

Even with the limitations of composite measures, composites often attempt to capture a variety of different factors thought relevant to a concept or process. In that sense, they are quite beneficial because complex concepts likely have a variety of potential factors to acknowledge, as well as numerous ways in which to do so. As an alternative to the construction of composite measures, there is also the logic and process of Englehart (2009). Englehart's (2009: 167) approach to the similar concept of state capacity focuses on the state's ability to police territory and control the agents of a state. He argues that these elements of the state apparatus have a major impact for human rights. He notes that state capacity is a complex concept, and just like with stability, there is no universal way to measure it. The challenges with state capacity mirrors stability to a certain degree. Both are complex concepts with no universally accepted measurement. They are both likely to be multidimensional, so single summary measures are likely not sufficient. Given this, Englehart (2009: 167-168) opts to use three different measures, each of which he states, "taps a different aspect of state capacity." He then performs tests for his hypotheses with these three measures individually, not as one composite measure.

His approach is beneficial for at least two reasons. First, his choice to test measures of state capacity as individual ones, rather than combining them into a composite measure, leaves no question as to what is actually being captured with the data he uses. He utilizes three measures capturing the extent of law and order, corruption, and tax extraction.⁶³ Second, his use of three different indicators enables him to have

⁶³ Specifically, Englehart (2009: 168) uses the Political Risk Service's (PRS) Law and Order measure (PRS, n.d.); the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Transparency International, 2007), and a measure of tax as a proportion of gross domestic product (Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; Lieberman, 2002). As alternative measures he also mentions Fearon and Laitin (2003) and their

essentially three different views into a complex concept like capacity, which can provide valuable insight if there are significantly different outcomes across the different measures.

Ultimately, it is clear from the data and literature that there are multiple approaches to stability and various related concepts and dynamics. As such, it is also likely that stability should and would be thought of as more than a singular dimension (e.g., the absence of violence). After Hurwitz's (1973: 461) comparison of approaches, he concludes that political stability, "...must be approached as a multi-faceted societal attribute, composed of the various sub indicators, rather than as any one particular monomeasure"⁶⁴ and he is not the only researcher to suggest that political instability or stability is likely multidimensional (Jong-A-Pin, 2009; Hibbs, 1973; Morrison & Stevenson, 1971; Rummel, 1966).

What appears to be the more appropriate path to take is the use of various factors when attempting to capture an abstract concept such as stability. Additionally, researchers have shown political shocks to have a role across multiple substantive areas (e.g., conflict, cooperation, economy, environment, and so on), so it is likely to encompass far more than just one singular factor. Just as with political shocks, a clear conceptualization is necessary for incorporating stability into this project. While previous studies have shown the vast ways in which to understand the concept, as is summarized

interpretation of GDP per capita as a measure of state capacity, as well as a (limited) state capacity indicator developed by Kaufman et al., (2003, 1999).

⁶⁴ Ultimately Hurwitz's (1973) comparison of approaches essentially conveys the process of measuring separate and distinct dimensions of a larger concept. So it is logical that in order to capture a concept like political stability, distinguishing different dimensions might be found to be more effective as well.

in Table 2.3, it is important that the definition specified be adequate and appropriate for the intended purpose of a project. As the goal for this project is to evaluate significant breaks in the existing equilibrium of states, this requires an understanding of stability which reflects a range of core internal characteristics of the state.

For the purposes of this project *stability is defined as the continuation of the existing socioeconomic and political conditions*. As stability literally means the state or degree of being stable, I opt to emphasize a non-changing nature rather than requiring the total absence of any particular indicator or process, such as the total absence of violence for example. While stability is a continuation, instability on the other hand, can be thought of as the opposite; translated instability reflects a deviation from the existing socioeconomic and political conditions as it reflects a *lack of stability*. Given this understanding of stability, it is necessary to distinguish how to capture it. The review of approaches has generally overlapped according to the two broader categories I discussed early on, some sort of change or attribute in the government as well as some type of change or attribute to the dynamic of society, including the degree of conflict.

That said, I suggest stability is more accurately thought of in terms of not only the existing socioeconomic and political conditions, but also in terms of maintaining those conditions as stability again reflects the *continuation* of phenomena. Table 2.4 overviews stability according to two broader dimensions as I am distinguishing them.

Table 2.4: Overview of the Factors of Stability.⁶⁵

	<i>Factors</i>	<i>General Logic</i>
Economic	Gross domestic product (GDP) growth	Consistent = stable Significant change = unstable
Political/ Social	Government Effectiveness & Lack of Major Violence	Consistent = stable Significant change = unstable

Any concept and measure of a project should reflect the most relevant factors identified. Stability can be thought of as multifaceted and made up of arguably three different overarching areas. As such, the research has overwhelmingly shown the combination of 1) the economy, 2) the government or extent of governance, and 3) the dynamics of society as collectively reflecting the extent of stability for a country.

From the literature, we know that the relationship between the economy and political (in)stability has arguably been the most well-researched. Studies have shown the various links between the economy and critical periods or crises (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Alesina et al., 1996; Jong-A-Pin, 2009; Siermann, 1998; Blanco & Grier, 2008). Ultimately, various economic factors have also been argued to be some of the best predictors when it comes to the notion of instability (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Londregan & Poole, 1990; Miguel et al., 2004).

⁶⁵ Table 2.4 simply outlines the primary factors and general logic behind them. It is not intended to explain the construction of any variables, simply to provide an overview of the individual factors of stability. Further elaboration of the measure used and the associated source information is in Chapter 4.

We also know from the literature that the state, or government leadership is an integral element. While there are numerous ways in which government has been approached in terms of stability, what is overwhelmingly pertinent when it comes to stability (and similar concepts) is the degree of ability it carries. This notion is often framed along the lines of competence or effectiveness; it speaks to the ability to maintain, to ensure the continuation of existing conditions. The closely related concept of capacity is inherently relevant for this particular discussion.

Capacity is often viewed in terms of the state's ability to manage and withstand conflict, implement policies, and continue to provide essential services (Marshall & Cole, 2011: 36).⁶⁶ Referring back to Englehart (2009), capacity reflects the willingness and capability of the state apparatus to carry out government policy; however, it is not necessarily a reflection of stability. One could make the argument for a circular logic though, in that capacity can lead to stability while stability can also lead to capacity. But ultimately capacity is another concept that is defined and measured many different ways (Buhaug, 2006). And what is particularly important to remember is there is a distinction between the different types of capacities that should be made, institutional and economic capacity for example.

One could argue that already focusing on economic dynamics reflects a degree of economic capacity, which is not a new argument among the literature. GDP per capita in particular has been argued throughout the literature as serving as a general proxy of state

⁶⁶ The authors speak in the context of state fragility and failure. Fragility is often related to capacity arguments and is defined in terms of the functionality of states. Essentially lacking capacity and/or the political will can lead to outcomes of fragility (Cammack et al., 2006).

capacity or state strength (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Thomas & Wood, 2017; Stewart & Liou, 2017; Salehyan, Gleditsch, & Cunningham, 2011).

However, capacity is unlikely to be properly captured according to a single generalized proxy of economic factors. Ultimately, capacity reflects the range of capabilities that are needed for a state to function and do so effectively (Besley & Persson, 2014). And as such, incorporating notions of capacity in this manner may be one way in which to address the multifaceted nature of stability.⁶⁷ And finally, it is clear that societal dynamics should also be taken into account. In a similar vein to the governmental/state factor, approaches to society have varied but ultimately what stands apart in the literature are the interactions that take place between society and the government. This has often been approached in terms of conflict-related dynamics; but ultimately the broader notion of government-society relationship is likely the third component integral to properly capturing the extent of state stability.⁶⁸

As this project is aimed to capture shocks according to a primary effect rather than via events, I acknowledge that there are a variety of different shocks and effects, however, for the purposes of this iteration of work, I focus on one way in which to capture such a primary effect, via the economic factor listed in Table 2.4 to start.

⁶⁷ Stability perhaps should be thought of as the result of multiple types of capacities, though the opposite also can apply; capacity may be the result of multiple types of stabilities, and if so, then it is logical to consider the concepts in a collective manner.

⁶⁸ Licht & Allen (2018) focus on the relationship between citizens and the regime, especially when uncertainty is introduced into the environment. Identifying instances which introduce greatest uncertainty can lead to understanding why the relationship between citizen and state can become fundamentally altered and carry with it various consequences.

2.3.3 Illustrating with Stability and the Option of Events

With the concepts of political shocks and stability now addressed, they can be discussed within an initial part of the broader political stability framework discussed in Chapter 3, intended to illustrate a number of conditions and dynamics taking place. Through this part we can determine several key aspects necessary for latter theory and assessment. To start, we must identify who is potentially experiencing change as well as clarify how and when we observe such change occurring. This approach requires the following steps: 1) determine what the environment is like for states, 2) identify which states are experiencing change and for which states is there an actual break in stability occurring, and 3) establish how we capture such breaks taking place in a systematic manner. To address these aspects, I establish the first part of the overall framework that combines central elements from international relations theory and the evolutionary model of Punctuated Equilibrium by Eldredge & Gould (1972).⁶⁹ I adapt elements of the P.E. model to broadly illustrate the environment actors are existing within and how the impact of dramatically occurring processes to states can be observed.⁷⁰

The original P.E. model argues that major evolutionary changes are not the outcome of gradual, slow processes, rather they are the result of localized rapid events of branching speciation.⁷¹ Species are thought to exist through long periods of stasis,

⁶⁹ See also Gould and Eldredge (1977); Eldredge (1971). Other scholars outside of the natural sciences have also utilized elements of the P.E. model, most notably Diehl and Goertz (2000) to illustrate life cycles of enduring rivalries, as well as Baumgartner and Jones (1993) in evaluating policy change.

⁷⁰ This exercise is also intended to set the stage for parsing out the environmental dynamics in terms of the influence it may have on state actions or behavior, as well as the secondary dynamics that may follow, which is developed in Chapter 3.


⁷¹ Speciation is the evolutionary process where populations evolve to become distinct species.

meaning there is essentially little change over time for populations. These periods of stasis reflect stability. However, these stable periods eventually become punctuated, or interrupted by short bursts of activity; activity in this case being short bursts of evolution. Such interruptions occur due to speciation events. According to the biological model of P.E., such environmental events such as massive climate change, occur which can come to affect certain populations. When this takes place, portions of a species often become isolated from its broader population and come to exist within an altered environment.

Figure 2.1 illustrates these dynamics.

To be clear, punctuated equilibrium does not claim that evolution *only* happens this way, rather, that a lot of the change that does take place does so in short periods of time.

Figure 2.1: Phases of the Punctuated Equilibrium Model.



In Figure 2.1, species X exists in stasis. The present environment serves as a stasis for the entire population within a given area. Typically, some type of large, significant event then takes place. In this example a drop in the sea level is the speciation event that occurs. As the drop in sea level takes place, portions of the population end up unable to avoid this change. When this happens, a smaller portion of species X becomes separated from the rest of the overall population. As a result, the smaller now isolated population

comes to exist within its own separate environment from the environment of the broader population. Here they experience a range of different conditions and pressures due to the changed environment.⁷² To be clear, it is not merely the occurrence of sea levels dropping that distinguish a shock. Rather it is the impact of the sea level dropping that characterizes it as such. A drop in sea level can occur without the changed environment, so simply the occurrence of sea levels changing is not sufficient to distinguish a shock has occurred. Now these dynamics described are in the context of a species evolving to survive. But what about in terms of states?


In applying the dynamics of the direct P.E. Model to a social science context, we can observe similar processes within the political system. The international political system serves as the broader environment in which actors exist and events take place. States exist within this environment and do so for periods of time following their inception which can be referred to as stasis.⁷³ Such stasis reflects a continuity of the states daily, monthly, annually, and so on within the broader international political environment. However, while actors can be thought of as generally connected within this overarching environment, conditions can become altered for certain states while remaining unchanged for others.⁷⁴ We can return to the figure of punctuated equilibria phases to illustrate this differentiation in Figure 2.2.

⁷² Pressures in this context refer to evolutionary pressures, or any causes that reduces the reproductive success of a population. The environment that is currently in place is significantly altered, exerting these strong selection pressures.

⁷³ Note that stasis does not equal zero change, rather change is slow and gradual at best with processes more accurately observed and conceptualized as long-term instead of short-term.

⁷⁴ This is not to suggest that the domestic environment of states is not relevant when it comes to political shocks, nor is it meant to imply the domestic environment is more or less important than the broader international environment, or vice versa. Rather, the key point here is that we should not assume all states are operating within the same conditions just because they exist within the same broader international

Figure 2.2: Translating the Phases of the Punctuated Equilibrium Model.



The phases on the right side of Figure 2.2 depict the dynamics in the context of a state within the international political community. As illustrated, states exist within the global environment in a general stasis. The existing environment essentially serves as a stasis for all of the population in a given area, while the population in this case are the

community. As such, certain states may experience varying conditions while others do not, suggesting we should not assume a uniformity of change occurring within the international political system.

states themselves. Typically, some type of potentially significant event takes place, which is indicated by the red explosive shape on the map around the United States in this example. As this takes place, it can be viewed as primarily occurring in the United States, which we can think of in terms of being localized. According to the original P.E. model, portions of a species effectively become isolated due to rapidly occurring changes in the environment. Within the political system, true isolation such as this is not possible. However, we can interpret the *localization* of dynamics taking place as one way in which to consider states and populations as being “isolated.” Changes that take place are often not worldwide; rather they happen with geographic specificity.⁷⁵

As a result of this localized and sudden change, the primarily impacted state can be thought of as existing within an altered environment from the broader international population of states. As such, they are thought to be experiencing a range of different conditions and pressures due to the changed environment. Such an environment is one marked with destabilization, that is, the potential for instability, as existing dynamics are interrupted. In the original P.E. model, the isolated population would be feeling evolutionary pressures, translated into the context of a state, such pressures can be thought of in terms of those that challenge the capabilities, resources, status, as well as overall security of the state. To again be clear, it is not merely the occurrence of some rapid or suddenly occurring event that distinguishes a shock. Rather it is the impact to the

⁷⁵ Accounting for this notion of localization and geography is important as the original P.E. theory argues that location plays a significant role in determining which populations will become affected by the sudden and significant changes that occur. Other adaptations of punctuated equilibrium often do not emphasize these aspects as geography and location may not be relevant in those particular studies, however, localization remains a primary component to the original theory, distinguishing why some actors come to be affected and others do not; why certain events have an impact, while others may not, and so on.

state which characterizes whether a shock has taken place. Potentially critical events can occur without the changed environment, so simply the occurrence of such is not sufficient to distinguish a shock has occurred. The significant disruption in state stability is the primary indicator which reveals a political shock has taken place and for who.

However, there is no doubt that critical events among international politics are relevant to the dynamics outlined. Breaks or challenges to the status quo of states are associated with a range of different processes. In evaluating these changes to the status quo, we can opt to consider the degree of possible connection. In terms of evolution in the first example, we observed a drop in the sea level which is generally referred to as a *potential* extinction event. However, as I pointed out, there are instances where sea levels drop but we do not observe the same dynamics as previously illustrated. And this same logic can be applied when considering events within international politics.

Events typically thought of as highly disruptive are often framed within the research as signifying shocks to some process or outcome of interest. Yet disruption should not automatically qualify such events to represent political shocks. However, the events listed in Table 2.2, among others, should not be disregarded entirely. Instead, such events can be referred to as *potential political shock events* or PPSEs.⁷⁶ Potential political shock events are indeed those potentially status-quo altering events identified across the literature; events with the ability to be highly disruptive. However, in order to be

⁷⁶ To be clear, PPSEs can occur through both the external and domestic environments of states. In general, they are not restricted to one domain over the other. In effect, it is plausible to have them occurring from domestic as well as external sources.

distinguished as *actual political shock events* or APSEs, significant disruption in state stability must be observed accordingly. Figure 2.3 illustrates these dynamics.

Figure 2.3: Working Dynamics Between Actual/Potential Political Shock Events.

<u>Actor</u>		<u>Status Quo</u>	<u>Result</u>
State A	Event X takes place (<i>potential political shock event</i>) [PPSE]	Following Event X, observe State A has significant change in stability	State A's status quo is disrupted = Event X is an <i>actual political shock event</i> [APSE]
State B		Following Event X, observe State B does NOT have significant change in stability	State B's status quo is not disrupted = Event X is <i>not a political shock</i>

Breaking down Figure 2.3, as the status quo represents a state's existing conditions, stability then reflects a state's current maintenance of those conditions. A political shock, as defined, is a sudden and significant disruption in the status quo. Such disruption can be captured by observing changes in a state's stability levels. If such changes occur following a *potential political shock event*, then it can be determined that the state experienced an *actual political shock event*. Simply put, change in a state's stability reflects the change to a state's status quo, which means an actual shock has taken place and we have identified a likely associated event to the destabilization. Otherwise, the state would have maintained its status quo, regardless of any previous processes occurring, so any previous potential political shocks remain labeled as such.

In terms of connecting events to the actual breaks in stability, there is no widely accepted timeframe for which to follow. If we consider the conclusions made in terms of the effects of shocks for instance, we have some information to draw from. Time periods of evaluation vary widely when it comes to observing the impact of political shocks as well as other effects suggested among the literature. Rasler (2000) suggests that shock events can theoretically have short, medium, and long-term effects. She defines short, medium, and long to reflect changes occurring within 1 year of a shock's occurrence, 3 years, and then 5 years, respectively. Thies (2008) follows Goertz & Diehl's (1995) specification of 10-year impact windows with regard to rivalry dynamics. Maoz & Joyce (2016) employ three-year moving averages of their shock characteristics to estimate how and when we can observe shocks affect real-world alliances. Numerous studies observe the year of and following year as a default (in reference to shocks as a control variable utilizing one-year lags), as annual data and research designs remain quite prevalent.

Logically a shorter, more intrusive, or unexpected event breaking stability should be observable sooner rather than later, a point argued by Morey (2009) who differentiates between events that will have much greater impact, as opposed to events that are spread out over a longer timeframe. Thyne (2017) finds that the effect of coups on shortening civil wars tends to occur quickly; similarly, Mastanduno (1999) argues that the impact of financial crises tends to be felt immediately. As such, sudden significant change in stability should then logically be observed sooner in order to be associated with a potential political shock event. If a significant change has taken place within the specified timeframe, then we can assume that state has experienced a political shock and that potential political shock event can be considered an actual political shock event. If little

to no change has occurred, then the PPSE in question does not qualify as an actual one in this instance.

To be clear, the incorporation of potential and actual shock events and consideration of time is one alternative approach that can be pursued when it comes to political shocks and the overall framework of this project. There is a prevalence among international relations studies in particular to focus on events and associate political shocks as such. This framework provides one way in which to consider approaching the topic with the use of potentially critical events. As no existing criteria or process to evaluate events on a larger scale exists, the processes as discussed in this chapter and the following is one possibility to consider. However, event identification is *not* required to pursue assessment of political shocks, as events do not define shocks according to the logic I have put forth. As such, I proceed with my initial approach as I have discussed and evaluate the potential secondary effects as discussed in Chapter 3 without event restriction nor specific timing considerations.

2.4 Conclusion

The definitions and dynamics presented in this chapter aim to return the research focus back to basics in terms of the broader concept of political shocks. By redefining the concept and dynamics surrounding political shocks, one can establish a process to distinguish political shocks consistently, across a wide range of different event types, and in a way that can be utilized for larger sized analysis. By first centering on the actor (or state in this instance) to determine whether breaks in equilibria have occurred, we ensure

subsequent assessments are not restricted to specific types of events nor to specific contextual environments. This focus on disturbances to relative internal equilibria serves as a first step in establishing a more comprehensive approach to the topic of political shocks.

While the processes outlined in the chapter do not enable the evaluation of effects beyond capturing instances where stability is significantly altered (i.e., when political shocks have occurred), as it is not intended to do so, it does position one to be able to develop a broader theoretical framework to accomplish such assessments. From the work of Chapter 2, we can identify which actors are impacted and have the option to distinguish among all events which ones are potential political shock events versus actual political shock events. We also have a general idea as to the environment in which these actors are operating within, one which is likely marked with changed stability and uncertainty and is likely to have other pressures presents which states must deal with; an element which is expanded on further in Chapter 3.

Overall, we now have an understanding of the potential dynamics ahead of evaluating political shock environments for the possible secondary consequences or effects. There are likely to be a variety of different conditions, events, and processes that too may be altered in serious and substantial ways within shock-related environments. Evaluating these possibilities is a next step toward contributing to a broader study of political shocks.

CHAPTER 3

Political Shock Framework and Hypotheses

3.1 Introduction

Given the background of information and illustration of the initial part of the overall framework put forth in the previous chapter, a number of important factors regarding political shocks and their dynamics have been determined. In particular, there is a working definition of political shocks established which defines them as significant breaks in the existing equilibrium of states. These breaks are thought to occur in the existing stability levels of states. Stability has also been established for the purposes of this project, which is defined as the continuation of socioeconomic and political conditions. With these concepts recognized, they can be incorporated into a broader framework of political shocks to understand and identify the different dynamics surrounding the occurrence of shocks as well as the associated environmental destabilization.

The dynamics outlined in Chapter 2 allows us to begin to observe when some states experience significant changes, as well as why this can subsequently lead to an altered environment for those specific states. Ultimately, at the center of the overall framework, is the short but significant break in stability, which is the key process necessary to occur in order for political shocks to even be observed. This specific break can also be thought of as the primary impact that must take place. This aspect is stressed

as there are also secondary effects that can come to be evaluated as the framework is expanded, as is the case with the assessment of potentially critical events.

One research approach can differentiate among events and consider the role and subsequent effects critical ones may have. The other, as is the focus here, is to center on the breaks, regardless of event evaluation. However, lack of clarity already exists as to whether researchers are capturing political shocks themselves, some sort of secondary effects of shocks, or perhaps something else entirely, including the use of non-shock events, as I have previously discussed. To avoid this issue, following the conceptualization of political shocks as I have established for this, one is forced to differentiate and account for two different impacts taking place. The first of the two is the break in stability; this will always be the initial one. Anything else that is considered should be viewed as secondary effects or outcomes of interest and labeled as such. Given this specification however, we have yet to consider such secondary effects of political shocks. This is the focus of Chapter 3.

Broadly, shocks are recognized as breaks or disruptions to the existing status quo, leading to destabilization of the environments for certain states in which they exist and interact within. This new environment can be characterized as marked with instability due to the significant break to its existing conditions. While stability reflects a continuation of the existing socioeconomic and political conditions, the converse of instability reflects a deviation from this continuation. And as the situation deviates, uncertainty arises due to the degree of instability that marks the environment. Given this situation, I ask what are the potential domestic and international consequences of shocks for states and its inhabitants? In order to address this question, I consider how both

domestic and international dynamics can be altered given the destabilization of political shocks and resulting degrees of uncertainty, using the context of security dimensions. As such, this chapter proceeds in the following manner.

First, I begin with the topic of security. I briefly overview the different types of security, distinguishing human security from the traditional state-centered form of security. While attention has largely been paid toward more state-centric understandings of the concept, increased consideration has also been given to human security in recent decades. Given this expansion in collective understanding, a more comprehensive view of the concept of security has come to be incorporated within a wide range of research studies accordingly. When it comes to the topic of political shocks, neither type of security is likely to be immune. Significant changes in state stability can be critical for security regardless of the specific domain type. As such, I suggest evaluating the potential dynamics of political shocks across different security dimensions as a more comprehensive and appropriate approach to take.

Next, I build upon the work of Chapter 2 to understand how political shocks can come to affect states according to the environment they are operating in and what this can mean for different dimensions of security. As they experience political shocks, their own environments become altered, which in turn can come to alter their security and threat perceptions. As such, this process can then come to potentially influence future state actions and interactions with their own populations and other states alike. In effect, the occurrence of political shocks can possibly hold consequences for both domestic and international security dynamics accordingly.

Following this broader logic, I consider the dynamics across different types of security dimensions to understand the potential security consequences of political shocks. To consider secondary effects of political shocks, I frame them according to two different security dimensions. For the first application, I start with traditional state security by considering political shocks in the broader context of conflict dynamics. I focus on the state, its security, and the likelihood of conflict. At the heart of traditional notions of security, priorities still reflect the importance of border and territorial dynamics, so I opt to focus on state behavior and interactions in terms of international conflict. For the second application, I turn to the additional dimension of human security. I discuss the conditions for states in terms of the domestic environment, specifically within the context of human rights and repression. The extent of human rights serves as one way in which to capture the treatment of society.⁷⁷ Finally, for both of these applications, I include expectations and outline a set of formal hypotheses for further empirical assessment in Chapter 4.

3.2 Incorporating a Security Context

When it comes to the notion of security, many debates remain regarding which elements are encompassed as security has remained a contested concept (Gallie, 1956; Buzan, 1983). Security generally reflects some sort of absence of threat as well as an absence of fear; when both are present, security is thought to be achieved (Wolfers, 1962:

⁷⁷ Though the dimension is broadly human security, I opt to focus on human rights which is encompassed within human security and which serves as a proxy measure of human security for this and other research projects. I discuss this later in the chapter.

149). While arguably simple enough, determining who is achieving security and in what sense are also necessary tasks. Broadly, when it comes to the concept of security, there have typically been multiple approaches which have focused on international, national, and individual levels of security.

The first two can be thought of in terms of having a more state-centered focus, which can often be understood according to militarized concerns. The third, however, differs as it has typically been framed as having more of a human-centered view, prioritizing humankind over the state or international system; the focus of this approach having been termed as *human security*. Political shocks are inherently relevant to both types of security as shocks reflect a break in the existing socioeconomic and political conditions. A sudden change in those conditions is likely to carry consequences for both the state and its society. As such, I begin by briefly reviewing both types of security encompassed in this project, starting with state security.

The concept of traditional or state security tends to fall within the realist constructs among international relations theory. Essentially, the primary concern is the security of the state. The state is defined as a sovereign nation with centralized power that can be executed within the bounds of a territory (Waltz, 1979). States exist within an international political system that is characterized as anarchic, void of a centralized authority. As such, states are deemed the highest authority, as there is no higher authority above them (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985). As states are the central actors with the highest authority, the system becomes one of self-help for them, where states are responsible for ensuring their own security, which includes their ultimate survival (Waltz, 1979).

The system then is one of competition among states for relative resources, or power which means states view others as potential threats, leading to conflictual rather than cooperative dynamics (Legro & Moravesik, 1999).⁷⁸ As states assess their own capabilities, they do so relative to other states in the system (Waltz, 1979). The accumulation of resources, building up of arms, even in defense of a state's own sovereignty, can thus create tensions among states in an already competitive system. As a result, a security dilemma can arise – as a state arms to defend itself, other states in turn will feel threatened, and, following suit, arm themselves to protect their own national security interests (Herz, 1950; Jervis, 1978). Though states are acting in defense by balancing capabilities against those who pose the biggest threats, the likelihood for conflict to break out still increases (Walt, 1987; Jervis, 1976).

Foreign policy goals according to realist thought are typically equated to the external behavior of states, yet Waltz (1996) suggests considering foreign policy as linked to an analysis of goals instead. Ultimately, Beach (2012: 34), points out, that “the core argument of structural realist theories is that the anarchical and conflictual international system pushes states to adopt survival as their most basic foreign policy goal.” However, linking foreign policy goals with foreign policy behavior can differ in very distinct ways, especially if we consider the stances of the defensive and offensive variants.

⁷⁸ States are viewed as having fixed preferences, their goal being to maximize resources or power to ensure their security in the system. Power in this case is viewed as zero-sum, that is, when one state gains it is at the expense of others (Wohlforth, 2008).

Defensive realists argue that the behavior of states within the international political system is inherently positionalist, meaning that they are wanting to ensure that their position is kept but do not pursue expansion to make this certain (Greico, 1990:10-12). Offensive realists on the other hand, suggest that this anarchic system all states are part of actually incentivizes one to expand. Mearsheimer (2001: 33-34) argues that states while “apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states, and aware that they operate in a self-help system, [will] quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system.”

Ultimately, defensive realists view the balance of power as the safest behavior to take, in essence achieving security via creating an *actual balance* of power (Waltz, 1979; 120). However, offensive realists fail to agree with this and argue that states actually achieve security by creating an *imbalance* of power, as long as it is in their favor (Layne 1998). Regardless of theoretical orientation however, the most basic notion of security is understood in terms of protection from threats within the international political system and is often measured by the extent of capabilities and/or power that actors possess. In approaching the notion of security for states requires one to identify the goals of the state, identify the threats to those goals, and (later) address how to manage those threats accordingly. Table 3.1 summarizes the key aspects of the traditional, state-centric approach to security.

Table 3.1: Summary of State Security.

	Security of:			
	Whom (central actor)	What (values)	From what (broader threats)	Examples (of threats)
Traditional Security	State	National sovereignty; territorial integrity	Threats from other actors in system (states); direct Internal/External	Civil conflicts, international conflicts (wars), nuclear weapons, revolutions

Table 3.1 reflects the priority of security according to traditional approaches is the security of the state, as it is identified as the central actor. We already know that the integrity of the state, its survival is priority and that according to realist constructs of international relations, that threats to such security are largely in the form of other states within the international political system. However, threats can also be thought of in a broader manner to include external and internal dimensions, with state threat being external. Threat can also come from within as it still serves as a challenge to the integrity of the state and its status quo.

While the long-running focus of security has been in the context of the state, a “secure” state does not necessarily translate to security for people. Contemporary approaches to security have often challenged the more state-centric understandings of the concept. Such approaches promote the notion of extending security and focusing on the protection of people. A report by the Commission on Global Governance detailed a series

of different security principles for the new era which spoke to security expansion among other important factors in addressing security. The Commission's report stated:

Security extends beyond the protection of borders, ruling elites, and exclusive state interests to include the protection of people. To confine the concept of security exclusively to the protection of states is to ignore the interests of people who form the citizens of a state and in whose name sovereignty is exercised. It can produce situations in which those in power feel they have the unfettered freedom to abuse the right to security of their people... All people, no less than states, have a right to a secure existence, and all states have an obligation to protect those rights. (Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 84)

First introduced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report in 1994, *human security* was framed as a new concept that redirected the attention of policymakers and researchers to the individual and society of people.^{79,80} Emphasizing a focus on the threats to human life as well as steps toward addressing them were stressed as well overdue when it came to the topic of security within the global agenda accordingly. The report argues that:

⁷⁹ The term human security has been deemed a concept, a framework or paradigm, and is often also used as a catch-all phrase among humanitarian crises. I refer to human security interchangeably.

⁸⁰ There have been previous instances where the notion of security was expanded from just a national standpoint prior to 1994. Instances of such led to the inclusion of other factors besides simply military considerations such as economic, environmental, and societal elements being encompassed, defining security in a broader sense (Buzan, 1983). However, the frame of human security can essentially be thought of as established in the early 1990s.

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of natural interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust...Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. (UNDP, 1994: 22)

The report was clear in its critique of the inadequacies of security approaches thus far and the necessity of expanding our conceptualization to incorporate several fundamental elements. What it was far less clear however, on was how exactly the concept of human security was defined. The report states that:

Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. (UNDP, 1994: 23).

Such a definition is problematic as it is hard to definitively know what is not included versus what is. There is a vast range of what could be considered “sudden and hurtful disruptions” to life, for example. Clearly the goal was to try and account for all those threats often overlooked in previous conceptualizations of security, and to convey the varied threats to everyday that existed. However, more specificity is required to know what exactly what is being talked about.

The variety of threats can be better understood in the context of two broader groupings which human security is thought to be comprised of. These two groupings

represent different securities for communities including those related to violence or the extent society has the *freedom from fear*, and those related to socioeconomic concerns, or the extent society has *freedom from want* (UNDP, 1994).⁸¹ While attention over the years has tended to focus on the former more so than the latter, both have been addressed among literature and policy discussions alike (UNDP, 1994: 24). Table 3.2 outlines these seven different securities as have been established by the United Nations Development Programme, along with a basic elaboration of each security as it exists and substantive examples of insecurity.

⁸¹ The use of freedom from want and freedom from fear are not unique to the concept and development of human security as a concept or framework in the 1994 report. Both were part of the Four Freedoms as part of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt's State of the Union speech in 1941. They were later encompassed as part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948 (UDHR, 2021).

Table 3.2: Dimensions of Human Security.⁸²

	Freedom from Fear		
	<i>Security</i>	<i>Insecurity</i>	<i>Insecurity manifested via:</i>
Personal Security	Protection from physical violence	Lack of protection from physical violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the state (physical torture) • other states/armed groups (conflict/war) • specific groups of people (ethnic driven tensions) • selective targeting of women (domestic violence, rape) • selective targeting of children (child labor)
Community Security	Protection of cultural identity; support and group membership; ethnic and indigenous peoples	Lack of protection of cultural identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • inter-ethnic tensions • religious/other identity-based tensions • targeting of indigenous peoples
Political Security	Respect and support for basic human rights; protection against state repression	Lack of respect and support for human rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • human rights violations • governmental control of information, the media, and press
	Freedom from Want		
	<i>Security</i>	<i>Insecurity</i>	<i>Insecurity manifested via:</i>
Economic Security	An assured basic income either via employment; the provision of a state safety net	Lack of basic income; provision of safety programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • lack of productive, remunerative work • inconsistent employment (incl. underemployment) • unemployment • persistent poverty
Food Security	Available access to basic food	Lacking access to food	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • lack of economic and/or physical access to food • starvation (famines) • improper food distribution • lower purchasing power
Health Security	Available access to health services	Lacking access to health services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • lack of access to health services • lack of medical facilities • presence of deadly infectious diseases • malnutrition
Environmental Security⁸³	Healthy physical environment	Lack of a healthy physical environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • degradation of local systems • lack of access to water • lack of sanitation • proper land quality • resource depletion

⁸² United Nations Development Programme Report (1994). Additional information regarding the different dimensions of human security can be found via the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security website, at www.un.org/humansecurity/.

⁸³ Environmental security as detailed in the table is in reference to the subnational or national level. Environmental threats can also be focused on in terms of global threats which includes all of the listed examples as well as natural disasters, air pollution, and so on.

The groupings as detailed in Table 3.2 reflect the range of different securities thought to capture what contributes/comprises everyday life. The first group, *freedom from fear*, reflects those securities that speak to the violation of a person's integrity. Personal, community, and political threats are captured via violence, targeting based on specific identity attributes, and the extent of government control or interference when it comes to the use of repressive tactics. As for the second group, *freedom from want*, includes those securities that speak to the right to an adequate standard of living. It reflects those different socioeconomic factors that are essential for human life. Economic, food, and health securities refer to whether there is adequate access to such resources, as well as the quality of them. The last of the four securities in this group, environmental security, is often integrated in discussion with others, as it speaks to the overall environment. It can be understood according to both global as well as subnational/national conditions that can come to impact a particular society.

While still referred to as a 'people-centered' approach, human security should ultimately not be interpreted to imply that focus on national security is no longer a priority. Nor should we assume traditional issues of state-security, like border integrity for example, are completely separate from human security; in fact, quite the opposite is true. Perhaps a more accurate way to think of the concept is that human security is concerned with threats to *both* the state and its inhabitants.

Framing human security this way considers the collective range of threats that a state face, internally and externally. It attempts to capture and address the wide range of

threats that can occur across and within countries over time. It also allows for the differentiation between 1) state-directed threats, and 2) threats directed by the state. Additionally, it also allows for the evaluation of responses to threat, including those by the international community to threats by the state, rather than only considering state response to threats.⁸⁴ Human security can be summarized in a similar manner as the traditional state-centric approach was earlier by its key aspects as Table 3.3 shows.

Table 3.3: Comparison of Traditional and Human Security.

	Security of:			
	Whom (central actor)	What (values)	From what (broader threats)	Examples (of threats)
Traditional Security	State	National sovereignty; territorial integrity	Threats from other actors in system (states); direct Internal/External	Civil conflicts, international conflicts (wars), nuclear weapons, revolutions
	Individual/ Society	Individual freedoms; personal safety	Threats from other actors in system (states and non-state actors); Direct/Indirect Internal	Disease, human rights abuse, natural disasters, poverty, violence (in general)

⁸⁴ This is an important distinction to make as certain threats may come from the state and warrant a different approach in considering response to them.

3.3 Political Shock Framework

As was illustrated in Table 3.3, the comparison of securities reflects distinct differences in terms of the central values and substantive types of threats that can be faced. But despite such differences, there is also some overlap. It is also clear that focus can no longer be solely on the state when we consider the wide range of different threats that exist and that are relevant to the different types of security in some way or another. Going forward, the security environment can be conceptualized as one being comprised of multiple dimensions of security, including both the state-centric and individual ones as they have been discussed. This specifies a multidimensional security environment for the purposes of this project.⁸⁵

Within this environment of multiple security dimensions, recall that political shocks are observed whenever states experience a sudden and significant break in their existing status quo, or equilibria. When a break occurs, we can understand that as a change occurring in a state's overall stability. I previously established that stability is defined as the continuation of the existing socioeconomic and political conditions. So as a state's stability is suddenly and significantly altered, this logically reflects an interruption to the existing socioeconomic and political conditions that were previously in place. Given this significant change in a state's situation, what does it mean for the extent of security and how can we observe different security outcomes of interest accordingly?

⁸⁵ A multidimensional security environment is preferable as it serves as an appropriate test given the multidimensional emphasis from Chapter 2 when it comes to both the notion of stability as well as the range of potentially relevant events when it comes to political shocks. It also serves as one way in which to evaluate if shocks do indeed have an effect across different domains, or perhaps if they are far more relevant in one versus the other.

In order to understand the environment that is currently present and in which states and other actors exist in we first need to establish a broader framework of political shock dynamics. From this framework, we can then assess different secondary security outcomes of interest. To accomplish such, I pick up where the discussion left off regarding the differentiation between shock and non-shock changes to states from Chapter 2. To help illustrate the dynamics taking place, Figure 3.1 breaks down each part of the political shock framework to be discussed.

Figure 3.1: Political Shock Framework.




Figure 3.1 is comprised of three main sections. The first section was developed in Chapter 2 which addressed how we can conceptualize political shocks, identify who can be impacted by them, and how such impact can be observed. It emphasizes the significant break in stability as the primary determinant of political shocks and which is acknowledged as the required change that must take place for observing the phenomena.⁸⁶ The second section focuses on the environment. It is here we can understand the environment actors are in and how that may come to be influential in subsequent dynamics. The environment can be thought of in terms of security, as previously discussed and alterations can reflect instability, uncertainty, and which can potentially manifest into insecurity. The third section extends the dynamics of the second to consider potential secondary outcomes of political shocks. In this case, two different outcomes of interest are identified for further evaluation. The first focuses within the context of international conflict while the second concentrates on domestic conditions, considering state repression and the extent of human rights.

The framework put forth focuses on how short and significant changes in state stability act as political shocks to states and their domestic and international security behavior. I argue that shocks are likely to influence conflict (international behavior) and the extent of repression (domestic behavior) levels as they are short, sudden, and unexpected in their occurrence [H1]. Shocks have their own impact but can also come to

⁸⁶ Though the first part of the framework is illustrated as beginning with a potential political shock event, it is important to reiterate that this is not required. It is only listed for completeness of the overall framework. Whether one begins with potential political shock events is dependent on the intentions of the researcher.

highlight existing dynamics for states. Shocks do not occur in a bubble; aspects of both the actor and the environment are part of the overall picture. Such factors can come to potentially shape the impact of shocks as well. In particular, whether existing unrest is present serves as an additional factor to consider. As such, I put forth that existing domestic unrest can also influence the relationship between shocks and international conflict, as well as the relationship between shocks and domestic repression [H2]. Unrest can also exist outside of the state and potentially be influential. So in a similar vein, I also consider whether existing neighboring unrest can influence the relationships of shocks and conflict, as well as shocks and repression [H3]. To evaluate these dynamics however, different factors must be taken into consideration, most directly including the state, its environment, and the relationship between them. To do so, I incorporate an opportunity and willingness framework to address these different elements.

The opportunity and willingness framework developed by Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr serves as an agent-structure approach to evaluating a range of different dynamics within international relations (Starr, 1978; Most & Starr, 1989). The framework's roots stem from the earlier work of Sprout and Sprout (1956; 1968; 1969) and their concept of the Ecological Triad. The ecological triad includes three parts: the entity, its environment, and the relationship between the two. The authors argued that it was necessary to consider ongoing choice processes within an entity, as well as its context or environment, and evaluate the interaction between them, not simply default to

the determinism of the era.⁸⁷ The components were developed further to address and be applied within various political situations and topics.⁸⁸

The opportunity and willingness framework expands on the agent-structure issues as identified by Sprout and Sprout, and others. It is built upon the idea that two concepts, opportunity and willingness, are jointly necessary conditions for any action to take place. That is, the presence of both conditions is necessary for any specified action to occur. Opportunity, to start, reflects the possibility of interaction. It is understood in that:

Conditions exist that permit sufficient interaction between states, that adequate capabilities and resources exist to allow [a] certain kind of action to take place, and that decision makers perceive both the range of possible interactions and the extent of capabilities. (Russett & Starr, 1981: 23)

In other words, what humans do is ultimately constrained by the actual possibilities within their environment. Possibility in this context is most often represented via discussions of borders and proximity (Starr & Most, 1976; Most & Starr, 1980; Starr, 2013). However, possibility can also be thought of in terms of capabilities as they are

⁸⁷ The ecological triad and subsequent alternative views which expanded the original concept were developed in response to determinism, specifically environmental determinism. Sprout & Sprout (1969: 44) details “as alternatives to environmental determinism, where, by definition, decision makers are incapable of choice given the characteristics of the environment, or ‘milieu’.”

⁸⁸ The three ways in which the ecological triad was expanded follows environmental possibilism, cognitive behaviorism, and environmental probabilism. Environmental possibilism, in reference to evaluating the structure can be understood as “a number of factors which limit human opportunities, which constrain the type of action that can be taken as well as the consequences of that action” (Most & Starr, 1989: 27).

Cognitive behaviorism reflects “the simple and familiar principle that a person reacts to his milieu as he apperceives it – that is, as he perceives and interprets it in light of past experience” (Most & Starr, 1989: 28), while environmental probabilism encompasses the first two as an “explanation or prediction by means of a generalized model of the average or typical person’s reaction to a given milieu” (Sprout & Sprout, 1956: 50). That is, a person reacts to their given environment and attributes of their environment “provide cues as to the probability of certain outcomes” (Most & Starr, 1989: 27-29).

viewed as “the means by which the environment can be manipulated” (Most & Starr, 1989; Starr, 2013).

Willingness on the other hand, reflects:

The choice (and process of choice) that is related to the selection of some behavioral option from a range of alternatives. Willingness thus refers to the *willingness to choose* (even if the choice is no action), and to employ available capabilities to further some policy option over others. (Most & Starr, 1989: 23)

In other words, willingness represents the motivations of people to take advantage of the opportunities as outlined above. Willingness ultimately deals with the emotions and perceptions that are related to the choices available to an actor. The decisions made are based on the world image held by a state. Their perception of dynamics affects the calculations they make, their view of advantage/disadvantage in certain situations, and the cost and benefit of different approaches. Ultimately, states come to anticipate and estimate behaviors of those most relevant given the environment and associated possibilities (Starr, 1978: 369).

While both opportunity and willingness are necessary for any action to take place, that does not mean to suggest that both conditions should be viewed as necessarily the same. Starr (1978) simply puts that both opportunity and willingness must cross *some* threshold, so the extent to which each is present and relevant relative to the other is ultimately determined by the researcher and study at hand, though both must be present

to some degree. The concepts can also come to influence one another. Opportunity is largely thought to create or influence incentive structures for willingness (Most & Starr, 1989; Cioffi-Revilla & Starr, 1995). That is, the opportunity – or environment – can come to create or influence higher levels of willingness or perceptions of actors.

In the context of shocks, the environment can be broadly characterized as one of instability and uncertainty. The temporary but significant changes in stability that take place according to political shocks, also reflect instability being introduced into the environment. This is due to the simple fact that change reflects a “challenge” to the present environment or status quo. Change alone should not be equated as significantly troublesome though as it occurs regularly among domestic and international politics. However, it is the variability associated with shock-related change that is relevant and impactful for understanding the environmental dynamics. Significant change reflects higher variability, that is, larger difference from the average or norm.

Meierding (2013) speaks to the concept of variability within the context of climate change. As variability reflects a lack of consistency, conditions surrounding climatic shocks, for example, are much more likely to change or vary from the norm. Higher variability is argued to be associated with short, often sudden, and significant shifts, like in the case of climatic shocks, as opposed to gradual shifts which reflect less variability by comparison. Increased amounts of climate variability have been argued as a critical source of insecurity for populations (Hendrix & Glaser, 2007; Zhang et al., 2007; Raleigh, 2010; Buhaug et al., 2008).

Unpredictability and subsequent uncertainty accompany the notion of variability. As variability is higher, it reflects further distance from what we can refer to as the baseline norm.⁸⁹ Actors and the system have a built-in level of instability and uncertainty. As such, we cannot and should not equate the presence of any and all instability as directly equivalent to insecurity. The baseline level of uncertainty exists and is not an automatic source of insecurity (Meierding, 2013: 199). However, as variability reflects the deviation from the norm, this can be equated with greater change from the existing status quo, resulting in changing degrees of certainty for actors and their environments. Political shocks reflect such a deviation from the baseline. Punctuated shocks ultimately change the environment and when they do, they introduce *new* uncertainty into the mix (Mattes & Savun, 2010). As a result, such shocks that interrupt the material and social equilibria for actors can be understood as producing acute periods of uncertainty (Imerman, 2018; Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007; Widmaier et al., 2007).

Such disruptions and the associated periods of uncertainty can influence the degree of opportunity for conflict and repressive behavior. The occurrence of sudden and unexpected changes is considered to be much more extreme than gradual ones and are thought to carry a much greater impact accordingly (Morey, 2009: 342). As Gurr (1985) argues, when faced with a slower, more gradual scarcity of resources, elites will have more time to protect themselves. Intermittent and sudden changes, on the other hand, do

⁸⁹ Climate change is an often-used example to illustrate dynamics of uncertainty as it is typically considered unpredictable when we consider climatic shocks in particular. Climate change is typically split into two categories: climatic conditions and environmental degradation. While environmental degradation, such as deforestation or water scarcity is a more linear and slower-moving process, climatic shocks are viewed as non-linear and highly variable, with their unexpected and rapid nature leading to higher levels of uncertainty (Meierding, 2013).

not allow for this preparation, and the risk of violence becomes much more likely.

Increasing scarcity of resources carries seriously negative consequences for conflict and the potential for regime backsliding (in Gurr's focus). Building from Gurr's arguments (1970; 1985), Brancati (2007) and Nel & Righarts (2008) also find that quick changes in socioeconomic conditions are far more significant drivers when it comes to conflict than either gradual changes or relative deprivation.⁹⁰

Similarly, the more unpredictable events are, the more likely they are deemed to be dangerous. Periodic events are harder to manage effectively relative to slower shifts in existing conditions (Buhaug et al., 2008).⁹¹ As a result, the inadequacies of states may become obvious. In the case of sharp economic disruptions, Bennett & Nordstrom (2000) argue diversionary behavior is a go-to in terms of interstate conflict and rivalry over addressing internal instability directly. In cases of shocks to the political status quo, instability generated tends to lead to the continuing deterioration of physical integrity rights (Curtice & Arnon, 2019; Poe, Rost, & Carey, 2006). This ultimately reflects a greater degree of environmental influence created by shocks and can be viewed as an instance where opportunity comes to influence the willingness of actors accordingly (Most & Starr, 1989; Cioffi-Revilla & Starr, 1995).

⁹⁰ Generally, relative deprivation is the actual or perceived lack of resources relative to others that are essential for maintaining a quality of life. Relative deprivation theory suggests that when people believe they are being deprived of resources they will be more inclined to act on that belief. This can include organizing, joining social movements, or even participating in armed opposition (*See* Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 1970; Walker & Smith, 2001)

⁹¹ States can often respond to chronic issues or perhaps gradual degradation with the formulation of long-term strategies (Raleigh, Jordan, & Salehyan, 2008),

With this in mind, we can consider political shocks to arguably be the most challenging of phenomena for actors, with stability being far more likely affected and uncertainty introduced given this type of change over others. The first set of hypotheses suggest that given the impactful nature of shocks as sudden and unexpected disruptions, these challenges should influence the extent of conflict or repression that a state experiences. As such, the first set of hypotheses are the following:

Conflict Hypothesis 1: Shocks will lead to increased levels of militarized interstate disputes given their sudden and unexpected occurrence.

Human Rights Hypothesis 1: Shocks will lead to a decreased level of human rights for a country (or, increased levels of repression) given their sudden and unexpected occurrence.

Domestic Unrest & International Conflict

The first argument focuses on the impact of shocks on conflict and repression given its sudden unexpected occurrence. However, the impact on both of these dynamics could be conditional on other factors. While shocks are argued to impact international conflict and domestic human rights, the potential role of the domestic environment is still relevant to also consider.

When it comes to interstate conflict, there are various forms including militarized interstate disputes, or MIDs. Militarized interstate disputes are conflicts in which states

threaten, display, or use force against one or more other states, per the Correlates of War (COW) project.⁹² MIDs can occur between state-dyads (dyadic conflict), as well as multi-actor disputes with involvement reaching across regions/globally, in addition to hostilities spanning years. However, the extent to which states are involved in militarized disputes varies greatly.

We know from extant research that domestic and international politics are inherently linked (Maoz, 1996). The behavior of states internationally can be influenced by what is happening at home. In terms of international conflict, domestic conditions have been shown to influence external armed interactions. In particular, internal violence such as civil wars, revolutions, and other extreme events have influenced the use of force internationally (Enterline & Gleditsch, 2000; Gleditsch et al., 2008; Colgan, 2013; Davies, 2016; Maoz, 1996).⁹³ The connections between intra and interstate are not limited to armed violence as well. Protests, riots, and the like have also come to influence the likelihood for conflict, in particular MID initiation just the same (Davies, 2002). Gleditsch et al., (2008) evaluates a range of possible dynamics behind the influence of domestic conflict on interstate violence. In particular, they include five different arguments which focus on diversionary tactics in addition to externalization, intervention,

⁹² Militarized interstate disputes are broken down according to hostility level by participant, ranging from 1 (no militarized action taken) to 5 (war) (Palmer et al., 2020).

⁹³ When internal violence is also ethno-political in nature, increases in the likelihood of MID initiation have been found to occur (Trumbore, 2003).

opportunism, and spillovers.⁹⁴ They find that in the case of civil wars, such armed conflict substantially increases the probability of disputes between states.⁹⁵

However, is this the case when it comes to the occurrence of political shocks? Rasler et al., (2013:13) suggests that shocks themselves can come to either escalate or de-escalate violence dependent on various factors such as leader perceptions, timing, and the context at hand. Additional authors have taken to incorporating the various domestic-international links along with political shocks directly. In terms of diversionary uses of force, Ackinaroglu et al., (2011) consider domestic unrest in the form of environmental shocks and assess whether such uses of force are more or less likely following natural disasters. Environmental shocks in particular are also argued as generating insecurity as well as a scarcity of resources among other poor and unsafe conditions. These have led to increased threat levels domestically via the outbreaks of domestic conflict (Slettebak, 2012; Burke et al., 2009; Nel & Righarts, 2008; Brancati, 2007; Miguel et al., 2004; Homer-Dixon, 1999).

As shocks are understood as significant and often unexpected changes to the environment, ones that introduce new degrees of uncertainty, the combination of such with existing domestic unrest may come to be reinforcing. With increased uncertainty from the occurrence of shocks, it may be unrealistic to assume leaders would act

⁹⁴ In terms of diversionary theory, leaders facing domestic issues may intentionally pursue interstate conflict as a way in which to *divert* attention from the domestic polity. As Levy (1989) illustrates, “the greater the internal crisis and the greater the need for an external diversion, the greater the tendency towards motivated biases that convince elites that diversionary action would be successful both externally and internally and that it would involve minimum costs and risks” (1989: 274-276).

⁹⁵ Gleditsch et al., (2008) identify intervention and externalization as the primary drivers behind this finding. Extant literature reflects varied support for these, and the other different mechanisms highlighted.

passively in the face of dramatic shocks, nor that they have the ability to devise long-term strategic plans when responding to them or other possibly critical conditions or events (Feldmann, 2019; Mattes & Savun, 2010; Leblang, 2012).⁹⁶

However, the combination of both may also be too much for a state to handle. As earlier illustrated by Gurr (1985) and Buhaug et al., (2008), sudden and unexpected events are harder to manage effectively relative to slower degradations of conditions. If capabilities are impacted (or in the very least perceived as affected), then this can potentially override any reinforcing effect of shocks and domestic unrest. Cammack et al., (2006) focus on the functionality of states, arguing that fragility reflects a lack of functionality. When capacity is effectively altered, this can lead to dire outcomes (poverty, conflict, various security issues, and so on) without the ability to address them. Given these two views, I present two hypotheses for evaluation:

Conflict Hypothesis 2a: States have a higher likelihood to experience militarized interstate disputes when experiencing shocks and additional domestic unrest which reinforce one another.

Conflict Hypothesis 2b: The combination of shocks and additional domestic unrest do not increase the likelihood for states to experience militarized interstate disputes given the extensive internal impact.

⁹⁶ Mattes & Savun (2010) discuss the uncertainty that is introduced by shocks within the context of post-civil war environments and questions surrounding the ratio of capabilities among groups.

Domestic Unrest & Human Rights

We can also consider the role of domestic unrest in terms of human rights and the likelihood for repression. The literature on repression has largely split into two groups when it comes to the type of human rights being targeted and the associated tactics of repression used. The first group focuses on empowerment rights, also referred to as civil liberties restrictions. Research on these types of rights often highlights the use of repressive actions such as arrests and imposed curfews in limiting several freedoms including those associated with assembly, domestic and foreign movement, religion, and speech (Davenport, 1995a; 1995b; 1996; 2004; Hibbs, 1973). The second group has focused on a more specific type of human rights abuse, personal or physical integrity violations. Physical integrity violations involve state or state-affiliated activities which target the *integrity* of the person (i.e., directly threatens human life), such as extrajudicial killings and torture (Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Davenport, 2007a; Harff, 2003; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, & Keith, 1999). It is these types of violations that are the focus of this discussion and latter assessment.

Distinguishing between the two types of violations is necessary in order to address both the likelihood for repression to occur, as well as what form it will take. As Davenport (2007b: 487) points out, “distinction between these two [types] is important, for it has allowed us to explore some differences that exist between repressive strategies.” This is true when considering why the state uses certain tactics and when. In terms of physical integrity rights, the use of repressive tactics not only attempts to limit potential opposition, but also establishes a clear threat to the life of dissidents. The decision to

systematically target people to kill or torture attempts to modify behavior through the elimination of those targeted (Davenport, 2007b).

Domestic conditions have been argued to be better predictors of repression than international ones (Davenport 2007a; Hill & Jones, 2014; Poe & Tate, 1994). Previous research has generalized that the use of political repression toward the civilian population can be considered a response to *real or perceived threats to the state*. While there is no clear and objective way to measure security threats according to some universal criteria, threats are ultimately defined according to the actors and environment involved (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 1995). Threat in this case then is to the stability and maintenance of the current status quo. Incumbents make decisions on how to act to manage uncertainty and potential threats to stability resulting from unexpected shocks (Wood & Wright, 2016). Often the decision to change the extent of repression utilized stems from how the state perceives its capabilities or general ability relative to potential challenges (Wood & Wright, 2016; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe, 2004).

Tilly (1978) suggests that states will want to inhibit challenges against it, becoming more likely to respond with repression to perceived dissent, especially when it comes to calls for leadership change (Gartner & Regan, 1996; Moore, 2000; Regan & Henderson, 2002), as well as staving off what it perceives as hostile or threatening when it comes to support and mobilization among civilians, rebels, and organizations (Mason et al., 2011: 174). Such dynamics are exacerbated by conflict as well as other major changes that take place. Societies at war find themselves more likely to experience additional repression by the state as conflict is one of the most significant predictors of repression (Hafner-Burton, 2013; Poe & Tate, 1994; Goldhagen, 1996).

The instability generated from shocks to the political status quo ultimately comes to deteriorate physical integrity rights, with factors like coups and wars often serving as both sources of domestic unrest as well as conceptualized as shocks (Curtice & Arnon, 2019; Poe, Rost, & Carey, 2006). Serving as changes to the environment, the new uncertainty introduced serves to exacerbate the existing conditions and cause actors to reevaluate their ability as well as others' accordingly (Mattes & Savun, 2010).⁹⁷ The combination of an already potentially threatening environment via domestic unrest now becomes fundamentally altered as uncertainty increases with the occurrence of shocks. The dynamics effectively follow similar patterns as those presented in the discussion of conflict and domestic unrest, so I again present two hypotheses for evaluation given these differing views; considering the possibility of continuing repression versus an inability to counter domestic threats effectively.

Human Rights Hypothesis 2a: States have a higher likelihood to repress when experiencing shocks and additional domestic unrest which reinforce one another.

Human Rights Hypothesis 2b: The combination of shocks and additional domestic unrest do not increase the likelihood for states to repress given the extensive internal impact.

⁹⁷ Mattes & Savun (2010) discuss the uncertainty that is introduced by shocks within the context of post-civil war environments and the self-evaluation of capabilities versus others' capabilities, including potential increases due to the shocks themselves.

The Role of Neighborhood Unrest

Overall, the second argument focused on the possibility of domestic influence when it comes to the impact of political shocks. As a third and final part, we can also consider the occurrence of shocks in the context of neighborhood unrest as well. We have already addressed what happens when unrest from within is emphasized, but what about neighboring dynamics? Political shocks as defined in this project reflect significant disruptions in the status quo states and as has been previously illustrated, can be thought of as localized to the state itself.

However, unrest and other broader dynamics are not limited to borders. As an alternative to domestic disturbances, we can also consider the dynamics in the context of the neighborhood. Extant literature has found that state dynamics extend beyond state borders. In the context of civil conflict for example, there is strong evidence to suggest there is a spatial contagion or diffusion of violence, which increases the risk for neighboring states to also experience war (Gleditsch, 2002a; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Sambanis, 2001; Ward & Gleditsch, 2002). This finding also remains robust under a variety of different specifications (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006).

Economic consequences, in particular ones resulting from war, are also felt well beyond the borders of the host state (Murdoch & Sandler, 2002). Further, the degree of regime similarity when assessing democracy within the neighborhood (or region), is found to significantly decrease the risk of war for the area overall (Gleditsch 2002b). This is a positive influence for neighborhood dynamics; however, shared borders have also

been argued to encourage autocratization as they, along with aridity, are conceptualized as largely creating '*hostile environments*' (Midlarsky 1995).

Diehl (1991) overviews the relationship between geographic proximity and conflict, finding a resounding positive dynamic, as do Bennett & Stam (2004) when assessing the probability of war. Other authors emphasize that geographical contiguity is a necessary condition for war among dyads (Buono de Mesquita, 1981; Maoz & Russett, 1992).⁹⁸ States that are nearby one another are also thought to likely have unresolved conflicts of interest, namely disputes over territory (Vasquez, 1995; 1996).⁹⁹

Ultimately, actors can also be thought of as not only acting according to their own domestic concerns, but also within the context of neighboring, as well as international factors. Zakhirova (2013) points out that state interactions not only establish neighborhood areas but can also indicate the domestic concerns of these actors, in addition to the foreign policy decisions these actors make to address those concerns. And geographic considerations do indeed matter when it comes to the broader notion of insecurity. This is especially so in cases of spillover caused by armed conflicts. According to McGinnis (2000: 66), within the context of humanitarian aid, those central to the decisions made and issues faced are those most directly affected by the emergency. Beyond the host state, those within the most immediate neighborhood would also be most

⁹⁸ Additionally, Bremer (1992) specifically asserts geographic proximity as the number one indicator regarding the likelihood for war in his dyadic study.

⁹⁹ Vasquez (1993) also identifies territory as arguably the most salient type of issue when it comes to conflict.

affected by the consequences of armed conflict as an example.¹⁰⁰ Civil wars in neighboring states tend to lower regional GDP, also thought to lower opportunity costs of rebellion in neighboring areas (Murdoch & Sandler, 2004). Even cross-border population movements reflect a possible mechanism by which conflict is no longer contained to just a neighboring state (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006).

In the context of political shocks, which have already been recognized as significant and unexpected changes for the state, introducing new degrees of uncertainty, the fact that neighboring issues are often not contained to their borders may come to again reinforce the effects brought on by political shocks. This follows the possibility logic of reinforcement by domestic unrest as previously discussed. Ultimately the dynamics of those closest may be just as important to states experiencing shocks as their own domestic conditions.¹⁰¹ Given the strong extant research on proximity dynamics, I also include a set of neighbor-related hypotheses to test accordingly.¹⁰²

Conflict Hypothesis 3: States that experience shocks are more likely to experience militarized interstate disputes when ongoing neighborhood disturbance exists.

¹⁰⁰ Diehl (1991) overviews the relationship between geographic proximity and conflict; Bremer (1992) specifically asserts geographic proximity as the number one indicator regarding the likelihood for war in his dyadic study.

¹⁰¹ While the international community as a whole may ultimately be affected by various destabilizing events, it is unlikely they are impacted at the same magnitude of those physically closest to the phenomena in question.

¹⁰² Key for security is the notion of geographic proximity. In essence, distance influences the degree to which states must consider interests and capabilities of others besides themselves. The notion of geographic proximity has been steadily researched, typically in the context of conflict, which should come as no surprise (Gleditsch, 2005; Gleditsch & Ward, 2001; Enterline, 1998; Lemke, 1995; Vasquez, 1995).

Human Rights Hypothesis 3: States that experience shocks are more likely to repress society when ongoing neighborhood disturbance exists.

CHAPTER 4

Empirical Assessment of Political Shock Dynamics

4.1 Introduction

Given the work of the previous chapters, I now can assess international conflict and human rights dynamics within the context of political shocks. This chapter serves as an assessment of domestic and international dynamics and whether they come to be affected. This chapter proceeds in the following manner. First, I briefly review the key concepts, namely political shocks and stability to reiterate how they are understood within the context of this project and subsequent the assessment. I then discuss the data and measurement utilized, elaborating on the approach I have opted for and break down the choice of indicator for capturing breaks in stability. While this project has discussed the range of ways in which stability has been conceptualized and captured across the literature, I utilize one measure of actual political shocks in the current assessments across multiple dimensions of security outcomes as an initial step toward a more comprehensive assessment. I also include a quick discussion and exercise regarding the validity of approaching political shocks in this manner.

In the next section of the chapter, I begin with the first of two sets of analyses for this project. The first analysis focuses on the international dynamics as discussed in Chapter 3 with regard to international conflict. I list each of the variables used in this

analysis, detailing the data sources, construction of measures, and general logic behind their inclusion. Next, I briefly overview the model used as well as any exceptions or specifics for the type of analysis pursued. I then restate the associated conflict hypotheses and my general expectations. Finally, I present the results of the quantitative assessment and follow with a brief discussion of the outcomes.

The third section of the chapter includes the second of the two sets of analyses within this project. The second analysis focuses on the domestic dynamics as discussed in Chapter 3 with regard to levels of human rights and tactics of repression. I again list each of the variables used in this analysis, detailing the data sources, construction of measures, and general logic behind their inclusion. I then briefly overview the model used as well as any exceptions or specifics for the type of analysis pursued. Next, I reiterate the human rights hypotheses from the previous chapter, as well as my general expectations. Finally, I present the results of the second set of quantitative tests and follow these with a brief discussion of the outcomes to wrap up the chapter.

4.2 Capturing Actual Political Shocks

I begin with reviewing the key concepts and how they have been defined for the purposes of this project. First, I have suggested that political shocks actually reflect significant breaks in states, which are understood as significant disruptions to existing state stability. Given this distinction, I set out that stability is understood as the **continuation of the existing socioeconomic and political conditions of states**. From this understanding, we can state that political shocks are distinguished according to

dramatic breaks in the extent of stability, or socioeconomic and political conditions. As stability is a multidimensional concept, I suggest that multiple factors should be considered to capture it accordingly. Table 4.1 specifies the factors of stability as discussed in Chapter 2.

Table 4.1: Factors of Stability.¹⁰³

<i>Factors</i>		<i>General Logic</i>
Economic	Gross domestic product (GDP) growth	Consistent = stable Significant change = unstable
Political/ Social	Government Effectiveness & Lack of Major Violence	Consistent = stable Significant change = unstable

While this project has overviewed various areas of importance for the concept of stability, this evaluation opts for one measure of actual political shocks for the dual testing pursued. The inclusion of one measure serves as an initial step toward a more comprehensive assessment in future work. Of the different factors, I focus on the economic indicator given the extant research which has conclusively shown its connections to (in)stability.

¹⁰³ The other indicator reflects a combination of elements meant to capture the ability of the government as well as the relationship with society, as discussed in Chapter 2. While I acknowledge there are a variety of different types of shocks and effects, I am focusing on the political consequences of economic shocks in this iteration of work.

Actual Political Shocks (APS): *GDP Growth (annual %) Deviation*

To capture actual political shocks (APS), I utilize economic data via a measure of GDP growth % deviation. The data for this variable comes from the World Bank, GDP growth (annual %) and is available between 1961-2019. Via the World Bank, GDP growth reflects:

The annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices... Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. (World Bank – GDP Growth, 2020)

To construct my measure, I first calculate the standard deviation for each country based on the annual values of growth over time. The standard deviation is calculated for each country over time, essentially competing against itself rather than calculated cross-sectionally with other states. Separately, I then calculate the absolute difference between growth values from one year to the next, starting in 1961 (i.e., I calculate the absolute difference between 1961 and 1962, then the same for 1962 to 1963, and so on). Next, I compare the difference between annual growth rates against the standard deviation of the country's data. If the change in growth rate is equal to or greater than one standard

deviation in a given year, then a political shock is considered to have taken place that year.¹⁰⁴

In order to validate this conceptualization and measurement of political shocks and ensure what is in fact being captured are actual political shocks rather than simply cases of domestic instability, I take a 10% sample from my broader population of political shock cases to identify whether the sampled cases of economic instability are preceded by or accompanied by a potential political shock event. Potential political shocks are large unanticipated events that have the potential to destabilize domestic politics. If these cases are indeed actual political shocks, understood in an event-context to reflect a large event leading to a significant disruption in existing state stability, then these cases should be accompanied by or preceded by a potential political shock event. If they are not, then these are simply cases of domestic economic instability.

There are 1273 cases of political shocks in the overall data when calculating the changes in GDP growth as discussed above for roughly 202 countries between 1961 and

¹⁰⁴ Across the literature that has incorporated similar phenomena, the use of standard deviations to distinguish shocks and shock effects is quite common. A review results in more than can be presented here, but researchers have utilized standard deviation size and language across multiple substantive topics. Ramirez (2009) reflects a standard deviation change in trust levels of congress; Krehbiel (1995); Binder et al. (1999) calculates the effects of a one-standard deviation shock to ratings; DeRouen Jr., & Peake (2002); Sprecher & DeRouen Jr. (2002) frame initial shocks in terms of one-standard deviation in magnitude; Dreher et al. (2012) incorporates shocks as one-standard deviations on physical integrity rights directly, as well as to the logged population size.

Other researchers have leaned on similar elements as I have listed here in terms of GDP growth, which Gleditsch & Ward (2006: 10) utilize as both a measure of economic performance when it is positive and an indicator of crises when it is negative. Miguel et al., (2004) utilized year-to-year percentage changes in rainfall when assessing conflict. This approach however was criticized by Hendrix & Salehyan (2012) as it led to mean reversion issues. Meierding (2013) highlights both sets of authors, as well as others' approaches to this dynamic.

2017.¹⁰⁵ From these cases, I take a 10% sample, or 125 cases. This sample takes into consideration multiple factors including temporal specification (Cold War/post-Cold War eras), geographic diversity (all locations, regional areas), and state characteristics (age of countries, development/wealth levels, regime types, etc.).

Within this sample of cases, the goal is to identify whether potential political shock events occurred, however there are a multitude of different types of events that could have taken place. To start, I draw from the extant literature and create a general grouping according to a number of those event types more commonly indicated to be political shocks. This grouping includes global PPS (1), neighborhood/regional PPS (2), interstate/intrastate conflicts as PPS (3), and a variety of domestic events (4) including adverse regime change and coup d'états (4.1), economic crises that are unanticipated (4.2), and natural disasters (4.3).

I then evaluate the year of and year prior to the actual political shock in these cases to determine whether a potential political shock event has taken place. What I find is that in every instance, one or more potential political shock events precede or accompany each case of economic instability. Every single case is accompanied by an event that we would likely think of (and the literature refers to) as a political shock. These are all large, unanticipated events that have the potential to destabilize domestic politics, and in this sample of cases there is at least one or two and sometimes more associated with each and every case. As a result, my sample is one of actual political shocks as I have understood them and is ultimately reflective of the broader population of

¹⁰⁵ I say roughly 202 countries as a collective number, not an annual count as I account for various changes to the total state membership throughout the timeframe (e.g., independence, splits, unifications, etc.).

cases given the range of different factors I took into consideration when picking cases. I can safely conclude that my assessments are those of political shock dynamics, rather than simply cases of domestic instability. A detailed breakdown of the sample of cases can be found in the Appendix.

4.3 Analysis of External Dynamics – Interstate Conflict

Focusing on the extent of conflict a state experiences following political shocks, the unit of analysis is the country-year, from 1961-2014. I include in my sample every state within the international system that meets the Correlates of War’s state system membership requirements (Correlates of War Project, 2017) between 1961 and 2014.

4.3.1 Data, Measurement, and Methodology

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of interest is the extent of international conflict for states. This is captured by militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). These data come from the Correlates of War Project’s Militarized Interstate Disputes (v5.0) dataset, which records all instances of threats and uses of force between states from 1816-2014 (Palmer et al., 2020).¹⁰⁶ Total, there are four versions of the dependent variable constructed for

¹⁰⁶ Explicitly, militarized interstate disputes are defined as, “united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. Disputes are composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war” (Jones, Bremer, & Singer, 1996: 163).

assessment. I make two distinctions among the variables according to whether a dispute is new or ongoing, as well as the overall severity of the militarized conflict. The variables included in the analysis are as follows:

1. **New MIDS (all):** reflects the number of militarized interstate disputes that a state experiences, intended to capture the extent of *new* participation in interstate conflict, regardless of dispute severity. This variable counts the start of a new militarized dispute each year, from 1960 through 2014.
2. **Ongoing MIDS (all):** reflects the number of militarized interstate disputes that a state experiences, intended to capture the extent of *ongoing* participation in interstate conflict, regardless of dispute severity. This variable counts not only the start of new militarized disputes each year, but also the continuation of them until they are terminated, from 1960 through 2014.
3. **New MIDS (severe):** reflects the number of severe militarized interstate disputes that a state experiences, intended to capture the extent of *new* participation in severe interstate conflict, with severity reflecting those disputes at level four or higher (4/5). This variable counts the start of a new and severe militarized dispute each year, from 1960 through 2014.
4. **Ongoing MIDS (severe):** reflects the number of severe militarized interstate disputes that a state experiences, intended to capture the extent of *ongoing* participation in severe interstate conflict, with severity reflecting those disputes at level four or higher (4/5). This variable counts not only the start of new and severe militarized disputes each year, but also the continuation of them until they are terminated, from 1960 through 2014.

Results are presented using the severe forms of both the new and ongoing MID dependent variables in the findings and discussion portion of the chapter. Additional results using the other forms of the dependent variable are listed in the Appendix.

Independent Variable & Conditioning Factors

Political Shocks

As this analysis focuses on the potential impact of political shocks, the primary independent variable is the measure of actual political shocks annually, as discussed in section 4.1. I capture political shocks via a measure of GDP growth % deviation.¹⁰⁷ In addition to the measure of shocks, I also construct two conditioning measures for use in testing the second and third sets of hypotheses outlined.

Internal unrest

The first conditioning factor is internal unrest, which reflects the extent of mass mobilization a state experiences in a given year. The data for this measure comes from the V-Dem – Varieties of Democracy Dataset (Pemstein et al., 2021: 21; Coppedge et al., 2021-2). The data is available for countries from 1900 to 2020 and captures how frequent and large events of mass mobilization are within a given year for each country.¹⁰⁸ This

¹⁰⁷ Additionally, from this variable I also construct a measure that reflects “*time since*” the occurrence of that significant break in state stability. Time starts in the beginning year of data for each country of the dataset and runs until a political shock occurs. When one does, time resets and runs again until another political shock occurs (if one does), and so on.

¹⁰⁸ In creating the original data, researchers clarified the question posed for the data collection process, which concerned “the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g., to show support of an autocratic government)” (Coppedge et al., 2021-1: 227).

conditioning variable is intended to reflect the degree of internal unrest that may be present in a country, without also capturing the external conflict reflected in the outcomes of interest.

Neighborhood unrest

The second conditioning factor focuses on the neighborhood. This measure reflects the degree of neighboring unrest present around each state within the international political system in a given year. The data for this measure comes from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) Dataset via the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP1, 2019). Data is available for all countries from 1946 until 2012. As such, the neighborhood model specification is short two years compared to the base and internal models, which have data through 2014.

The MEPV scores for armed conflict in neighboring states reflects the aggregate number of varied types of unrest neighboring countries are experiencing in a given year. The logic behind the data and variable per the Center for Systemic Peace,

The security of any state is affected not only by its own conflict dynamics and outbreaks of MEPV but, also, by MEPV in immediate proximity (i.e., in neighboring states) and in general proximity (i.e., in the Apolitically-relevant@ regional system). The following set of variables records the number of neighboring states (i.e., states sharing a contiguous land border or water border of two miles width or less) and the general magnitude of

MEPV in neighboring countries in a given year. (Center for Systemic Peace – CSP2, 2019: 4)

Control Variables

I include a series of control variables which are thought to influence the extent of militarized interstate disputes that states experience. These well-researched variables form a base model of conflict likelihood as they have been found to either generate conflict between states or have a potentially pacifying effect on the existing dynamics, resulting in a decreased likelihood for conflict.

Starting with characteristics of the state itself, I include a measure that captures the regime type of the state. Data for this variable comes from the Polity V project with their Polity5 Annual Time-Series dataset (Marshall & Gurr, 2020). The regime variable reflects the annual Polity2 score, which is a score derived from their constructed democratic and autocratic indices.¹⁰⁹ Next, I include a measure to capture the overall economic conditions of the state. This is a reflection of the extent of resources or capabilities that a state possesses, which we can posit the more resources one has, the more likely they are able to handle instability.¹¹⁰ To capture this, I use gross domestic

¹⁰⁹ The democratic and autocratic indices are established via additive scales across different areas intended to capture the extent of institutionalized democracy or institutionalized autocracy. The democratic index includes competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraint on the chief executive, and competitiveness of political participation (Marshall & Gurr, 2020: 15). The autocracy index on the other hand includes extent of competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, regulation of participation, and competitiveness of participation (Marshall & Gurr, 2020: 16).

¹¹⁰ This logic follows that of capacity measures as capacity is often viewed in terms of the state's ability to manage and withstand conflict, implement policies, and continue to provide essential services (Marshall & Cole, 2011: 36). GDP per capita has also been argued throughout the literature as serving as a general

product (GDP) per capita (constant 2010 US\$) data from the World Bank (World Bank – GDP per Capita, 2020). Because the nature of the data is skewed, I transform the data by taking the natural logarithm.

I also include a series of variables that reflect the current status of international dynamics with the state according to key areas among international relations literature on conflict.

Whether a country is in an active defense alliance is an important dynamic to first consider. A range of different views exists regarding the role of alliances in international politics. Alliances have been thought of and analyzed as mechanisms for war diffusion, as well as an indication as to the likelihood for future conflict (Siverson & King, 1980; Siverson & Tennefoss, 1984; Walt, 1985). While they have also served as an indication of satisfaction (Lemke & Reed, 1996), as well as a reflection of common interests (Buono de Mesquita, 1981). Ultimately, in the context of stability, alliances can serve as a source or indicator of relative security. That is, when you have active defense alliances, you can think of this as adding to your security, if you do not, then you are relatively less secure. Accordingly, I include a measure of defense alliances held by a state. The data for this variable comes from the Correlates of War (COW) Formal Alliances v4.1 dataset (Gibler, 2009; Singer & Small, 1966; Small & Singer, 1969). The variable is constructed to reflect a count of active defense alliances in a given year.

Whether a country is in an active interstate rivalry is also an important dynamic to consider as much of the conflict occurring internationally takes place between rival states

proxy of state capacity or state strength (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Thomas & Wood, 2017; Stewart & Liou, 2017; Salehyan, Gleditsch, & Cunningham, 2011).

(Bremer, 2000). Conflicts have often been fought within the context of rivalries, varying between 50 and 75% of wars fall among international rivals (Diehl & Goertz, 2000; Colaresi et al., 2007). Accordingly, I include a variable which reflects whether a state has any active interstate rivalries ongoing each year. The rivalry data comes from Thompson & Dreyer's (2011) *Handbook of International Rivalries, 1494-2010*, with extended rivalry data provided to supplement the 2012-2014 years. I create two versions of the rivalry variable, the first being a dichotomous measure of whether a state is in an active rivalry in the year of observation, with 1 reflecting a rivalry, and 0 otherwise.

Next, I also capture the dynamics a state may have with others within the international system by considering the existence of mutual claims to territory. Territory has been one of the most prominent reasons for conflict, as territory has been argued the most salient type of issue when it comes to fighting (Vasquez, 1993). As such, I also include a variable reflecting whether a state has any existing territorial claims each year. The data on territorial disputes primarily comes from the territorial claim data captured by Gibler & Miller (2014). The variable is dichotomous, with a 1 indicating a state does have existing territorial claims in a given year, and 0 if they do not.

Additional factors take into consideration the location of the state. The presence of a major or regional power within the region a state is located in is also relevant. Regions which housed either a major power or regional power state experienced less aggregate conflict when compared to those without a regional hierarchy (Volgy et al., 2017b).¹¹¹ Major power and regional power data and information come from multiple

¹¹¹ While the exact mechanism is unclear, the authors suggest there is either a degree of deterrence taking place, which is supported in terms of the deterrence factor associated with stronger states in terms of the

resources which distinguish states as either major or regional powers (Cline et al, 2011; Volgy et al., 2011; Volgy et al., 2017a). From previous data construction and categorization efforts, the following states have also been designated as either major power or regional power states for the listed time periods for this project in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: List of Major Powers/Regional Powers and Associated Decades.

<i>Major Powers</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Time period</i>	<i>Regional Powers</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Time period</i>
China	East Asia	1990-on	Australia	East Asia	1970-on
France	Europe	All years	Brazil	South America	All years
Japan	East Asia	1990-on	Germany	Europe	1990-on
Russia	Europe	All years	India	South Asia	1990-on
United Kingdom	Europe	All years	Nigeria	West Africa	All years
United States	North America	All years	South Africa	Southern Africa	1993-on

The major/regional power presence variable used in the conflict models is a dichotomous measure which reflects a 1 when a state is located in a region that also has either a major power or regional power as determined in the table above, and 0 otherwise.

Also included is an indicator which classifies countries according to different regions. I follow the general logic and classification of the ROW regions and regional delineation developed (Rhamey, 2012; Volgy et al., 2017a; Volgy et al., 2017b).

capacity of certain countries (Salehyan et al., 2011). Or there is perhaps a cooperative hierarchy dynamic at play.

However, slight adjustments were made to those states deemed “border states”, by grouping them with the region of closest proximity. The regional indicator encompasses nine regions total including the distinction of: North America, South America, Middle East, Europe, West Africa, Southern Africa, Central Africa, East Asia, and South Asia.¹¹²

I also include a dichotomous indicator for the Cold War, with 1 reflecting the years prior to 1991, and 0 for years following as the data included in my analysis reflects both timeframes. All independent variables included in the analysis are lagged for one year. Summary statistics are included in Table 4.3 for all of the variables constructed for the international conflict model.

Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for the Conflict Analysis.

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max
New Severe MIDs	11716	0.209	0.623	0	24
Ongoing Severe MIDs	11716	0.316	0.839	0	25
Actual Political Shocks	8401	4.057	6.315	0	185.216
Internal Unrest	9502	-0.261	1.315	-3.3	3.971
Neighborhood Unrest	7868	3.291	5.136	0	20
Polity	8522	0.903	7.379	-10	10
GDP Per Capita	8663	8.243	1.497	4.891	12.178
International Rivalry	11716	0.314	0.464	0	1
Alliances	8677	1.026	1.497	0	11
Territorial Claims	8807	0.348	0.476	0	1
Major Power/Regional Power	11716	0.703	0.457	0	1
Region	11716	5.520	2.954	1	11
Cold War	11716	0.534	0.499	0	1

¹¹² Countries typically thought to occupy areas such as the Horn of Africa and the Maghreb were combined with other regions as the number of states for the region was 3 and sometimes less in certain years giving the degree of limited data.

Method

In evaluating conflict dynamics, the dependent variables of interest, extent of militarized interstate disputes, are in count form. Specific models are required to properly analyze the structure of count data. As such, I opt for a series of Negative Binomial regressions. The Negative Binomial model handles count data and is more well-suited when there is over-dispersion present in the count outcomes. As an alternative, the Poisson regression model can also be used for count data in cases where there is not an over-dispersion in the outcomes of interest, when the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean. I checked for overdispersion in the data and found there was slight overdispersion in my outcomes, as running Likelihood-Ratio tests and Wald tests reflect alpha differs significantly ($\text{prob} > \text{chibar2} = 0.0000$).

A comparison of model fit tests and statistics for both models also reflect that the Negative Binomial is a better fit overall. In comparing the Negative Binomial to the Poisson models, both models did a decent job at most levels, however, the Poisson model tended to overpredict while the Negative Binomial had smaller, positive deviations, showing the possibility for slight underprediction (in considering mean observed and predicted counts).^{113,114} Finally, I also include clustered robust standard errors that control

¹¹³ AIC/BIC for Poisson versus Negative Binomial reflects a difference of 115.555 and 109.220 accordingly, with very strong preference for the Negative Binomial regression.

¹¹⁴ For thoroughness however, I include a set of negative binomial models for all outcomes of interest in the Appendix.

for the nature of the data since observations are independent across countries, but not within them (Long, 1997; Cameron & Trivedi, 2009).¹¹⁵

4.3.2 Results and Discussion

I examine the relationship between political shocks and militarized interstate disputes via a series of Negative Binomial regression models. The results of these models are reported in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. Table 4.4 focuses on conflict experienced via the start of new MIDs. The first model notes the effects on the dependent variable, which is the number of new severe MIDs (levels 4/5) without consideration of political shocks or any subsequent conditioning factors. This serves as the base model, showing the impact of baseline state conditions and international factors.

The second model of Table 4.4 adds the variable *Actual Political Shocks (APS)* via the measure of annual GDP growth % deviation to show the impact of political shocks on the number of new severe MIDs. The third and fourth models of Table 4.4 then assess whether political shocks have any or similar effects given other conditional factors, including existing internal unrest and neighboring unrest accordingly. Table 4.5 follows the same format as Table 4.4 but focuses on conflict experienced via the continuation of severe MIDs as the dependent variable of interest.

¹¹⁵ Robust standard errors help to control for mild violations of the underlying assumptions when running the regression models.

Table 4.4: Militarized Interstate Disputes – New Severe Negative Binomial Regressions.

	Base Model	Shock Model	Internal Model	Neighborhood Model
Actual Political Shock (APS)		0.016**	0.017**	0.009**
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Internal Unrest			0.109**	
			(0.055)	
APS##Internal Unrest			0.006	
			(0.008)	
Neighborhood Unrest				0.084***
				(0.028)
APS##Neighborhood Unrest				0.006***
				(0.002)
Polity	0.019*	0.020*	0.014	0.023**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
lnGDP Per Capita	-0.136**	-0.146**	-0.122**	-0.121**
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.059)
International Rivalry	0.888***	0.883***	0.805***	0.821***
	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.137)	(0.123)
Alliances	0.180***	0.184***	0.182***	0.196***
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Territorial Claims	0.529***	0.523***	0.489***	0.494***
	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.115)
Major/Regional Power	-0.577**	-0.563**	-0.552**	-0.665***
	(0.237)	(0.248)	(0.233)	(0.254)
Region2 (South America)	-1.034***	-1.004***	-0.946***	-0.847**
	(0.371)	(0.376)	(0.340)	(0.373)
Region5 (West Africa)	-1.171***	-1.233***	-1.216***	-1.042**
	(0.435)	(0.446)	(0.421)	(0.446)
Region 6 (Southern Africa)	-1.111**	-1.093**	-1.066**	-0.978**
	(0.446)	(0.453)	(0.420)	(0.449)
Region 7 (Central Africa)	-1.048***	-1.042***	-0.985***	-0.960**
	(0.391)	(0.400)	(0.367)	(0.405)
Cold War	0.096	0.120	0.142	0.019
	(0.099)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.096)
Constant	-0.371	-0.347	-0.545	-0.510
	(0.655)	(0.672)	(0.658)	(0.665)
ln/alpha	-0.508	-0.554	-0.630*	-0.780**
	(0.351)	(0.347)	(0.351)	(0.304)
N	4355	4170	4170	4170
AIC	5183.1	4987.3	4970.5	4928.1
BIC	5291.6	5101.4	5097.3	5054.8

North America is the reference category for regions; only significant regions are listed.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

In considering the extent of conflict dynamics, Table 4.4 first starts with the Base model which reflects the baseline variables without the inclusion of the primary independent variable of political shocks. A review of the baseline variables included reflect results mostly to be expected. International rivalries and territorial claims both have a highly significant and positive effect on the number of militarized interstate disputes. That is, positive coefficients reflect increases in the count of militarized interstate disputes experienced. The opposite is found when looking at the economic measure of GDP per capita, as well as the presence of a major or regional power state in the region of the observed country. Both reflect a significant decrease in the likelihood for new, severe militarized disputes to take place. Alliances also have a highly significant effect that is positive, indicating that the presence of alliances is also associated with increased militarized disputes while the regime measure also comes in as significant and positive for the likelihood of conflict, though its significance and size is relatively smaller. Finally, the Cold War indicator is positive but not significant at conventional levels.

Adding the shock variable, *Actual Political Shocks*, to the second model, we can see that it is positive and significant indicating that shocks do affect the extent of militarized interstate disputes that states experience. Checking the predictive power, both AIC and BIC indicate a preference for the Shock model versus the Base model, with decreases in both measures once political shocks are incorporated into the model. The positive and significant coefficient on the shock variable indicates that shocks impact conflict likelihood when it comes to the start of severe militarized interstate disputes.

With count models, the option of reporting effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable is available via Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR) rather than regression coefficients. IRRs are often more straight-forward in understanding the actual impact of a variable on the dependent variable of interest. Incidence rate ratios represent the change in the dependent variable in terms of a percentage increase or decrease, with the exact percentage amount determined by how much further the IRR is above or below 1. I convert the results to incidence ratios and find that we observe approximately a 33.7% increase in the number of new, severe MIDs experienced when political shocks occur (IRR = 1.336684). This provides support for the first conflict hypothesis which suggests that shocks will lead to increased levels of militarized interstate disputes given their sudden and unexpected occurrence.

For the third and fourth models of Table 4.4, I next consider the potential impact of political shocks with added conditional factors of domestic and neighboring unrest. The Internal model adds in the conditional effect of internal unrest and both the individual and interactive effects are listed. In comparing the Shock and Internal models, the previous logic suggested that states with ongoing domestic unrest would potentially have a lower (or higher) “risk” for international conflict when they have experienced a political shock. We can observe that both the main effects of the *Actual Political Shock* and *Internal Unrest* variables are positive and significant for the number of new severe disputes experienced, however the interaction between the two is not. There is no conditional effect of domestic unrest on the relationship between political shocks and MID involvement, indicating support for the counter hypothesis regarding domestic

unrest: there is no reinforced impact of the two main variables and their possible relationship with interstate disputes.

As for the final model, the Neighborhood model considers the possibility of neighborhood influence taking place. This model includes the conditional effect of additional neighboring unrest and both the individual and interactive effects are listed. In comparing the Shock and Neighborhood models, the previous logic suggested that states with ongoing neighboring unrest are potentially at a lower or higher “risk” for international conflict when they have experienced a political shock. We can see that not only are both the main effects of political shocks and neighboring unrest significant, but the interaction of them is as well. When the interaction and main effects are significant, it reflects that states experiencing shocks and have ongoing neighboring unrest exhibit a more significant and increased risk for experiencing new and severe militarized interstate disputes. Translating the interactive effect to a percentage, we observe that all else being equal, there is a 12.6% increase in the incidence of new, severe MIDs when political shocks occur with existing neighboring unrest (at the $p < 0.001$ level). These results provide support for the final conflict hypothesis.

Turning to the second conflict table, Table 4.5, we can consider conflict dynamics according to the second version of the dependent variable, the number of severe ongoing militarized disputes. The Base and Shock models of Table 4.5 have similar patterns from the first table in terms of both the signage and significance of variables.

Table 4.5: Militarized Interstate Disputes – Ongoing Severe Negative Binomial Regressions.

	Base Model	Shock Model	Internal Model	Neighborhood Model
Actual Political Shock (APS)		0.014* (0.008)	0.015* (0.008)	0.007 (0.005)
Internal Unrest			0.132** (0.061)	
APS##Internal Unrest			0.008 (0.008)	
Neighborhood Unrest				0.088*** (0.028)
APS##Neighborhood Unrest				0.006** (0.002)
Polity	0.023* (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)	0.017 (0.012)	0.027** (0.013)
lnGDP Per Capita	-0.152** (0.066)	-0.160** (0.068)	-0.132* (0.068)	-0.135** (0.065)
International Rivalry	1.002*** (0.139)	1.000*** (0.141)	0.911*** (0.145)	0.932*** (0.134)
Alliances	0.173*** (0.042)	0.176*** (0.044)	0.175*** (0.039)	0.188*** (0.044)
Territorial Claims	0.503*** (0.130)	0.499*** (0.132)	0.457*** (0.129)	0.471*** (0.128)
Major Power/Regional Power	-0.787*** (0.237)	-0.759*** (0.255)	-0.750*** (0.239)	-0.860*** (0.271)
Region2 (South America)	-1.397*** (0.444)	-1.376*** (0.463)	-1.278*** (0.380)	-1.220** (0.478)
Region5 (West Africa)	-1.429*** (0.515)	-1.492*** (0.542)	-1.445*** (0.470)	-1.304** (0.559)
Region 6 (Southern Africa)	-1.209** (0.529)	-1.212** (0.548)	-1.158** (0.469)	-1.100* (0.564)
Region 7 (Central Africa)	-1.508*** (0.474)	-1.492*** (0.500)	-1.398*** (0.424)	-1.410*** (0.525)
Cold War	0.019 (0.109)	0.040 (0.111)	0.070 (0.116)	-0.058 (0.108)
Constant	0.495 (0.759)	0.503 (0.802)	0.243 (0.756)	0.345 (0.808)
ln/alpha	-0.479* (0.272)	-0.514* (0.272)	-0.608** (0.290)	-0.731*** (0.266)
N	4355	4170	4170	4170
AIC	6446.7	6180.7	6143.9	6108.7
BIC	6555.1	6294.8	6270.6	6235.4

North America is the reference category for regions; only significant regions are listed.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

In considering the impact of *Actual Political Shocks*, we can again see that there is a positive and significant impact indicating that political shocks again do come to affect the extent of militarized interstate disputes that states experience, in this case the number of severe *ongoing* disputes. Checking the predictive power, both AIC and BIC indicate a preference for the Shock model versus the Base model again, with decreases observed in both measures once shocks are incorporated into the picture. In comparing the Base and Shock models, the positive and significant coefficient on the shock variable indicates shocks impact conflict likelihood when it comes to the continuation of severe militarized interstate disputes. I convert the results to incidence ratios and find that we observe approximately a 28.5% increase in the number of ongoing, severe MIDs experienced when political shocks occur (IRR = 1.285416). Again, this provides support for the first conflict hypothesis regarding the impact of shocks increasing levels of militarized interstate disputes.

Moving to the third model, the Internal model adds in the potential conditional effect of internal unrest and both the individual and interactive effects are listed. Just as the first domestic unrest model of Table 4.4 shows, we can observe that both the main effects of *Actual Political Shocks* and *Internal Unrest* are positive and significant, however, the interaction between the two is not. This reflects there is no conditional or reinforced effect of domestic unrest on the relationship between political shocks and ongoing MID involvement. Finally, the fourth model considers the possibility of neighborhood influence. This model includes the conditional effect of additional neighboring unrest and both the individual and interactive effects are listed. We can observe that while the individual *Actual Political Shock* measure is positive, it also fails

to reach significance while both the *Neighborhood Unrest* and interaction between the two are positive and highly significant.¹¹⁶ Translating the interactive effect to a percentage, we observe that all else being equal there is a 11.1% increase in the incidence of ongoing, severe MID's when political shocks occur with existing neighboring unrest (at the $p < 0.01$ level). These results again provide support for the final international conflict hypothesis.

4.4 Analysis of Internal Dynamics – Human Rights

Focusing on the respect for human rights, the unit of analysis for this portion of analysis is the country-year, from 1981-2011. I again include in my sample every state in the international system that meets the Correlates of War's state system membership requirements (Correlates of War Project, 2017) between 1981 and 2011.

4.4.1 Data, Measurement, and Methodology

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of interest is the level of human rights, which is presented in both an aggregated measure as well as individual components. These data come from

¹¹⁶ The drop in significance of the individual shock measure does not mean to imply that political shocks have no effect now. If the interaction remains significant, which is the case, interpretation of either main effect becomes misleading (and is potentially irrelevant overall). Interactions essentially change the effect variables have on the dependent variable as they are no longer considered main effects and instead are conditional on the values of one another. While Actual Political Shocks fail to reach significance, this simply reflects the effect of shocks when Neighboring Unrest = 0, though it still has a significant effect at other values of Neighboring Unrest, hence why the interaction is significant.

the CIRI Human Rights Data Project, which provides yearly coverage of various cross-national human rights scores from 1981-2011 (Cingranelli et al. 2014). Total, I include five versions of the dependent variable in my assessment.

The first dependent variable reflects an aggregate measure of human rights for a country, specifically the extent of physical integrity rights via CIRI's Physical Integrity Rights Index variable (*physint*). The Physical Integrity Rights Index is ordinal and ranges from 0 (*no government respect for rights*) to 8 (*full government respect for rights*). It is also an additive index, comprised of data regarding four different rights, including disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and torture.¹¹⁷ This variable captures the extent of government respect for all of these rights, collectively.

However, a state may choose to commit one type of violation over another, suggesting we may not observe significant change in the overall levels of respect for human rights. Taking this into consideration, I also include additional versions of the dependent variable which reflect the individual indicators which make up the aggregate measure.

To test the individual components of the Physical Integrity Rights Index, I include four additional dependent variables, these include disappearances (*disap*), extrajudicial killings (*extra*), political imprisonment (*polim*), and torture (*tort*). Each of these variables measure the specific type of human rights violations that could be occurring. They are also ordinal in structure but are calculated on a scale of zero to two, with 0 reflecting that

¹¹⁷ Further information on construction and source data of the Physical Integrity Rights Index can be located at Cingranelli & Richards (1999).

particular abuse has occurred *frequently*, 1 capturing *occasional* occurrences of the specific abuse, or 2, the specific abuse did *not occur*.

Independent Variable & Conditioning Factors

As this analysis focuses on the potential impact of political shocks, the primary independent variable is the measure of actual political shocks annually, as discussed in section 4.1. I again capture political shocks via a measure of *GDP growth % deviation*. In addition to the measure of shocks, I also utilize the same two conditioning measures from the conflict analysis for testing the second and third sets of hypotheses outlined, *internal unrest* and *neighborhood unrest*. All variables are constructed the same way as before.

Control Variables

I include a series of control variables which are likely to exert influence on the level of human rights for a country. These well-researched variables form a base model of human rights repression as they have been found most relevant to capturing the extent of human rights conditions, or alternatively the extent of repression likelihood by the state. Studies have found both domestic conditions and international effects have influence when it comes to the topic of repression (Poe & Tate, 1994; Davenport, 2007a; Hill & Jones, 2014; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005; Neumayer, 2005; Murdie & Bhasin, 2011; Meernik et al., 2012).

I start with a series of variables intended to capture characteristics of the state first. I include a measure that captures the current regime. There are several different ways in which the extent of regime dynamics and democracy can be captured for a given state. A common approach is often to use Polity scores via the Polity Index (Marshall & Gurr, 2020).

However, as Polity measures the components of competition in democracy, its use in also assessing repression, which defined in the simplest terms is the use of coercion against opponents of the state, becomes problematic. Utilizing Polity in this context leads to “measures of repression [being] related by construction to measures of democracy that include information about violence used to suppress political competition” (Hill & Jones, 2014).¹¹⁸

Taking this into consideration, I instead include a variable of executive constraint as a way of capturing the extent of political institutions in a state (Gurr, 1988). This data comes from the Polity V project, which defines their *‘Executive Constraints’* indicator as: “the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any ‘accountability groups’” (Marshall & Gurr, 2020). When executive constraints are in place, this should in turn restrict the government from committing repression against the population.

¹¹⁸ See Hill and Jones (2014) for a more extensive discussion on the use of the Polity Index in repression studies.

I also include a measure reflecting the size of the country as larger populations have been argued as leading to larger pressures on the state. Larger populations have been found to increase the likelihood for repression (Poe & Tate, 1994; Richards et al., 2015). As such, I include a variable of total population. Population data comes from the World Bank which includes Total Population numbers from the United Nations Statistics and Population Division, based on the “*de factor definition of population, regardless of legal status or citizenship*” (World Bank – Population, 2020). The data are highly skewed, so I take the natural log for the version of the variable included in the empirical models.

The next variable capturing the extent of state conditions focuses on economic factors. I include a measure of economic development via the use of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (constant 2010 US\$). The extent of a state’s wealth has been found to have a positive impact on human rights, increasing the respect for physical integrity rights in particular (Poe & Tate, 1994; Richards et al., 2015). This data also comes from the World Bank via GDP per capita numbers from the United Nations Statistics and Population Division (World Bank – GDP per capita, 2020). GDP per capita data are also skewed like the population data, so I also take the natural log for the final version of the variable used in the subsequent assessment.

In terms of capturing international dynamics and influence, I also include variables regarding foreign assistance in various forms. First, I take into consideration possible international influence occurring via the provision of international aid. I include a measure of the amount of aid received, which reflects the net of official development assistance. The data for this measure comes from the World Bank via the net official

development assistance and official aid received (constant 2015 US\$) data (World Bank – Net Aid, 2020).¹¹⁹ Similar to the GDP per capita and population variables, the aid data are also highly skewed, so I take the natural log of aid received each year for my analysis.

A second way in which to capture international dynamics is with the consideration of third parties. In particular, I consider whether a country has a peacekeeping mission present in a given year. The presence of peacekeeping troops in countries can potentially impact human rights, as repressive action may decline with a so-called watchdog present and monitoring the activity within a state. As such, I include a dichotomous variable for the presence of an active peacekeeping mission, with the measure coded as 1 if there is an active mission, and 0 if there is not. The data for this variable comes from Mullenbach’s (2013) Third-party Peacekeeping Missions Dataset, which includes a wide range of information on various peacekeeping missions and their mandates. Mandate specifics are not considered in this project, as even an observer mission (the least extensive of missions, generally speaking) can reflect a “watchdog” mentality.

I also include a dichotomous indicator for the Cold War, with 1 reflecting the years prior to 1991, and 0 for years following. All independent variables included in the analysis are lagged for one year. Summary statistics are included in Table 4.6 for all the variables that have been constructed for the human rights assessments.

¹¹⁹ Per the World Bank: official development assistance (ODA) consists of “disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients’ (World Bank – Net Aid, 2020).

Table 4.6: Summary Statistics for the Human Rights Analysis.

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max
Aggregate Physical Integrity	5029	4.804	2.417	0	8
Disappearances	5017	1.637	0.672	0	2
Killings	5013	1.299	0.777	0	2
Political Imprisonment	5021	1.107	0.850	0	2
Torture	5019	0.772	0.748	0	2
Actual Political Shocks	8401	4.057	6.315	0	185.216
Internal Unrest	9502	-0.261	1.315	-3.3	3.971
Neighborhood Unrest	7868	3.291	5.136	0	20
Executive Constraint	8522	4.142	2.323	1	7
GDP per capita	8663	8.243	1.497	4.891	12.178
Total Population	11213	15.126	2.220	8.384	21.050
Total Aid Received	11065	13.191	8.728	0	23.969
Third Party Presence	11716	0.054	0.225	0	1
Cold War	11716	0.534	0.499	0	1

Method

In evaluating the human security dynamics of this secondary analysis, the dependent variables of interest, respect for physical integrity rights, are ordinal. As such, an ordered logistic regression is appropriate for testing the hypotheses outlined. I employ a series of ordered logistic regressions which also include clustered robust standard errors that control for the nature of my data since observations are independent across countries, but not within them (Long, 1997; Cameron & Trivedi, 2009).

4.4.2 Results and Discussion

I examine the relationship between political shocks and human rights levels via a series of ordered logistic regression models. The results of these models are reported in Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9. Table 4.7 focuses on the extent of human rights present across both aggregate and individual measures. The first model notes the effects on the dependent variable, which is the aggregate measure of physical integrity rights scores without consideration of political shocks or any subsequent conditioning factors. This serves as the base model, showing the impact of baseline state conditions, international conditions, and controls for time periods.

The second model of Table 4.7 adds the variable *Actual Political Shocks (APS)* via the measure of annual GDP growth % deviation to show the impact of political shocks on the aggregate measure of physical integrity rights scores. The next four models reflect the individual components that make up the aggregated measure: disappearances, killings, imprisonment, and torture, while also including political shocks to assess whether individual human rights are also potentially impacted.

Tables 4.8 and 4.9 follow a similar format in terms of the aggregate and individual measures along with the inclusion of the political shock measure of Table 4.7, but also incorporate whether political shocks still have any or similar effects given other existing internal and neighboring unrest. Table 4.8 reflects the inclusion of additional *Internal Unrest* variable while Table 4.9 includes the Neighboring Unrest measure and the potential interactive effects between unrest and political shocks on the aggregate measure of human rights.

Table 4.7: Aggregate and Individual Human Rights – Base and Political Shock Ordered-Logit Regressions.

	Base Aggregate Model	Shock Aggregate Model	Disap. Model	Killings Model	Impris. Model	Torture Model
Actual Political Shock (APS)		-0.039** (0.019)	-0.040** (0.016)	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.025 (0.018)	-0.020 (0.019)
Executive Constraints	0.369*** (0.050)	0.351*** (0.050)	0.184*** (0.056)	0.062 (0.045)	0.562*** (0.056)	0.213*** (0.049)
lnGDP Per Capita	0.206** (0.104)	0.192* (0.105)	0.088 (0.103)	0.207** (0.096)	0.063 (0.115)	0.100 (0.103)
lnTotal Population	-0.667*** (0.062)	-0.687*** (0.063)	-0.550*** (0.084)	-0.601*** (0.066)	-0.583*** (0.071)	-0.550*** (0.059)
lnAid Assistance	-0.088*** (0.023)	-0.094*** (0.023)	-0.036 (0.040)	-0.115*** (0.020)	-0.062** (0.024)	-0.088*** (0.019)
Third Party Presence	-1.061*** (0.204)	-1.014*** (0.207)	-1.218*** (0.232)	-0.850*** (0.261)	-0.772*** (0.250)	-0.613*** (0.223)
Cold War	0.764*** (0.184)	0.825*** (0.188)	-0.016 (0.228)	0.486*** (0.186)	0.022 (0.192)	1.391*** (0.177)
N	3017	2963	2961	2955	2958	2960
AIC	10646.2	10399.8	3619.7	4816.5	4689.6	4775.0
BIC	10730.4	10489.7	3673.7	4870.4	4743.6	4828.9

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

As a reminder when interpreting the human rights results, negative values of the coefficients reflect *less* respect for human rights (or higher levels of repression), while positive values reflect *more* respect for human rights (or lower levels of repression). In evaluating domestic conditions, Table 4.7 starts with the Base model using the Aggregate measure of human rights. A review of the baseline variables included reflect results mostly to be expected. Both measures regarding economic and regime dynamics are positive and significant. Executive constraints is positive and highly significant indicating that human rights are higher in countries where there is effective constraint applied on its leadership, while GDP per capita supports the well-known finding that wealthier countries tend to experience better levels of human rights. In contrast, population has a negative and highly significant effect on the aggregate measure of physical integrity scores, which follows much of the literature that argues larger populations lead to increased pressures on the government for the provision of services and ultimately results in decreased conditions.

In terms of international dynamics, the measure of aid assistance is not only negative but highly significant as well. This result supports the view that the provision of aid does not actually lead to helping countries to improve, as the aid is not utilized by the state in a manner that benefits the population. Countries that have experienced conflict will often utilize aid received for defense supplementation rather than on the provision of goods and services to the population (O'Hare & Southall, 2007). Additionally, these findings lend support to fungibility arguments that aid received for any wide range of reasons, is often utilized in areas the government deems more important (Pack & Pack, 1993). This can mean international support via aid is used as a resource to fuel armed

units already in place to commit repressive action for the government, effectively maintaining the capacity of the coercive apparatus.

The second measure capturing international influence, the presence of third-party peacekeeping is also negative and highly significant. This suggests that when peacekeeping missions are present, they have a negative effect when it comes to human rights. Mission mandates may indeed be relevant as the presence may not be enough to keep human rights abuses from occurring or continuing. If we keep in mind the watchdog mentality that peacekeeping forces project, it may be the case that their presence does not diminish human rights abuses altogether, rather, violations may still take place, but in a specific form. Arguably, forced disappearances can be considered the least overt tactic of repression relative to the other forms of human rights abuse; one which may be easier to commit by the state despite the presence of the international community. The indicator for the Cold War is positive and significant, however, this should be considered with caution as the analysis of data reflects an uneven sample when considering the Cold War versus post-Cold War years (1981-1990 versus 1991-2011).

Adding the shock variable, *Actual Political Shocks*, to the second model, we can see that it is negative and significant for the aggregate level of physical integrity rights scores. This indicates that shocks do affect the extent of human rights that societies experience. Checking the predictive power, both AIC and BIC indicate a preference for the Aggregate Shock model versus the Aggregate Base model, with decreases in both measures once political shocks are incorporated into the model. The negative and significant coefficient on the shock variable indicates shocks impact repression likelihood when it comes to human rights conditions.

With ordinal models, the option of reporting effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable is available via proportional odds ratios rather than regression coefficients. Proportional odds ratios are often more straight-forward in understanding the actual impact of a variable on the dependent variable of interest. With ordered logistic regression, the model estimates a single equation over the different levels of the dependent variable (in this case, the levels of aggregate physical integrity rights scores). I convert the results to odds ratios and find that the odds of high aggregate human rights versus the combined lower levels of aggregate human rights are 0.482 (0.4816319) times lower, given that the other variables are held constant. This translates into observing approximately a -51.8% change in odds, providing support for the first human rights hypothesis which argued shocks will lead to a decreased level of human rights for a country given the sudden and unexpected occurrence of them.

This result is in reference to only the aggregate measure of physical integrity rights, as the remaining models reflect the individual types of integrity violations. As we can see, when it comes to disappearances, Actual Political Shocks is again negative and significant, indicating that shocks impact the likelihood of disappearances occurring, increasing that particular tactic of repression. However, the remaining tactics of killings, imprisonment, and torture are also similarly signed but fail to reach significance at conventional levels. Converting the results for disappearances to odds ratios, I find that the odds of high disappearances versus the combined lower levels of disappearances are

0.474 (0.4742612) times lower, given that the other variables are held constant. This translates into observing approximately a -52.6% change in odds.¹²⁰

Turning to Table 4.8, I next consider the potential impact of political shocks with the added conditional factor of domestic unrest. All of the models reflect the inclusion of the *Actual Political Shock* variable, as well as the conditional effect of additional *Internal Unrest* and both the individual and interactive effects are listed. In comparing the Aggregate Shock model from Table 4.7 to the Aggregate Shock Model in Table 4.8, the previous logic suggested that states with ongoing domestic unrest would potentially have a lower (or higher) “risk” for repression and human rights violations when experiencing political shocks. In terms of the aggregate measure of physical integrity rights scores, we can observe that the main effects differ in significance and sign.

¹²⁰ To clarify, given the structure of the human rights data, “high” disappearances reflect a score of 2, meaning the specific abuse did not occur, versus lower levels of disappearances scores which range between frequent and occasional occurrence of the repression tactic.

Table 4.8: Aggregate and Individual Human Rights – Domestic Unrest Conditional Ordered-Logit Regressions.

	Shock Aggregate Model	Disap. Model	Killings Model	Impris. Model	Torture Model
Actual Political Shock (APS)	0.026 (0.022)	0.030 (0.029)	0.052** (0.022)	0.003 (0.020)	0.009 (0.021)
Internal Unrest	-0.201*** (0.077)	-0.225*** (0.086)	-0.246*** (0.080)	-0.100 (0.082)	-0.140* (0.075)
APS##Internal Unrest	-0.063*** (0.015)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.102*** (0.021)	-0.073** (0.030)	-0.057*** (0.020)
Executive Constraints	0.369*** (0.049)	0.195*** (0.054)	0.068 (0.044)	0.568*** (0.055)	0.219*** (0.047)
lnGDP Per Capita	0.144 (0.099)	0.039 (0.098)	0.169* (0.087)	0.044 (0.115)	0.077 (0.098)
lnTotal Population	-0.608*** (0.061)	-0.453*** (0.081)	-0.484*** (0.064)	-0.513*** (0.076)	-0.480*** (0.057)
lnAid Assistance	-0.096*** (0.022)	-0.036 (0.039)	-0.115*** (0.018)	-0.059** (0.023)	-0.086*** (0.019)
Third Party Presence	-0.838*** (0.192)	-1.026*** (0.226)	-0.587** (0.237)	-0.591** (0.272)	-0.481** (0.228)
Cold War	0.920*** (0.183)	0.098 (0.236)	0.638*** (0.181)	0.082 (0.189)	1.477*** (0.177)
N	2963	2961	2955	2958	2960
AIC	10192.9	3513.2	4590.0	4626.9	4710.7
BIC	10294.8	3579.1	4655.9	4692.8	4776.7
Robust standard errors in parentheses					

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

While *APS* fails to reach significance, *Internal Unrest* is negative and significant. However, what is more important is the interaction between these two independent variables is negative and highly significant, indicating that states that experience shocks and have ongoing internal unrest exhibit a significant and increased risk for diminished human rights levels. Converting the interactive effect to odds ratios, I observe that the odds of high aggregate human rights versus the combined lower levels of aggregate human rights are 0.314 (0.3141014) times lower, given that the other variables are held constant. This translates into observing approximately a -68.6% change in odds. Given the significance of the interaction, this confirms the second human rights hypothesis which states that the combination of shocks and additional domestic unrest would result in the higher likelihood of repression due to the reinforcement of the two individual effects. Additionally, interactions for all of the individual components tested are also negative and highly significant. As such, they follow the same logic and we can observe the following percentages: *Disappearances* have approximately -58.5%, *Extrajudicial Killings* have approximately -85%, *Political Imprisonment* has approximately -74.3%, and *Torture* has approximately a -65.2% change in odds.

**Table 4.9: Aggregate and Individual Human Rights – Neighborhood Unrest
Conditional Ordered-Logit Regressions.**

	Shock Aggregate Model	Disap. Model	Killings Model	Impris. Model	Torture Model
Actual Political Shock (APS)	-0.049** (0.023)	-0.043** (0.018)	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.029 (0.020)	-0.027 (0.024)
Neighborhood Unrest	-0.039* (0.023)	-0.023 (0.027)	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.060*** (0.022)	-0.040* (0.021)
APS##Neighborhood Unrest	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.034*** (0.013)	-0.050*** (0.015)	-0.022 (0.014)	-0.022 (0.018)
Executive Constraints	0.348*** (0.047)	0.186*** (0.053)	0.066 (0.043)	0.558*** (0.055)	0.208*** (0.047)
lnGDP Per Capita	0.147 (0.101)	0.049 (0.099)	0.174* (0.0923)	0.014 (0.112)	0.070 (0.099)
lnTotal Population	-0.644*** (0.064)	-0.512*** (0.083)	-0.564*** (0.065)	-0.534*** (0.075)	-0.515*** (0.061)
lnAid Assistance	-0.093*** (0.022)	-0.035 (0.039)	-0.114*** (0.019)	-0.057** (0.024)	-0.086*** (0.019)
Third Party Presence	-0.991*** (0.199)	-1.205*** (0.228)	-0.818*** (0.254)	-0.773*** (0.252)	-0.598*** (0.219)
Cold War	0.838*** (0.190)	-0.018 (0.228)	0.487** (0.191)	0.062 (0.192)	1.424*** (0.178)
N	2963	2961	2955	2958	2960
AIC	10357.6	3604.1	4777.7	4655.6	4759.4
BIC	10459.5	3670.1	4843.6	4721.5	4825.3

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

The final table, Table 4.9, follows the format of Table 4.8 with all models reflecting the inclusion of the *Actual Political Shock* variable, as well as the conditional effect of additional *Neighborhood Unrest* and both the individual and interactive effects are listed. I next consider the potential impact of political shocks with the added conditional factor of neighboring unrest. In terms of the aggregate measure of physical integrity rights, we can see that the main effects and interaction are negative and significant, suggesting that states that experience shocks and have neighboring unrest, exhibit a higher risk for experiencing lower human rights levels. This is the case as the negative sign of the coefficient reflects a decrease in the respect of aggregate physical integrity rights, and an increase in overall repression.

Converting the interactive effect to odds ratios, I observe that the odds of high aggregate human rights versus the combined lower levels of aggregate human rights are 0.516 (0.515987) times lower, given that the other variables are held constant. This translates into observing approximately a -48.4% change in odds. Given the significance of the interaction, this confirms the final human rights hypothesis which argued that states that experience shocks are more likely to repress society when ongoing neighboring disturbance also exists. In terms of the individual rights, both *Imprisonment* and *Torture* reflect insignificant interaction terms so there is no conditional effect of *Neighborhood Unrest* on the relationship between shocks and repression of these particular integrity rights. However, there are significant interactions with the other two, *Disappearances* and *Killings*. Converting the interactive effect of these tactics to odds ratios, I observe that the odds of high disappearances versus the combined lower levels of

disappearances are 0.532 (0.5324435) times lower, given that the other variables are held constant. This translates into observing approximately a -46.8% change in odds. In terms of extrajudicial killings, I observe that the odds of high killings versus the combined lower levels of killings are 0.399 (0.3990574) times lower, given that the other variables are held constant. This translates into an even greater effect of approximately -60.1% change in odds.

Ultimately, the literature on domestic international conditions have suggested that domestic conditions are better predictors when it comes to repression relative to international variables (Poe & Tate, 1994; Davenport, 2007a; Hill & Jones, 2014). These results provide support that political shocks, again defined as significant breaks in states stability (via deviations in annual GDP growth), when coupled with neighborhood unrest, reflects a significant and negative impact for physical integrity rights overall. As such, international dynamics should not be discounted in understanding the human rights of countries internally.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

5.1 Broader Contributions

This dissertation has examined the extent to which domestic and international dynamics are altered within the context of political shocks. Overall, the preceding chapters have proposed and begun to test a framework for understanding how political shocks can alter different outcomes of domestic and international security. The political shock framework as has been discussed, suggests that political shocks are relevant across security domains, and across various outcomes of interest, but in order to understand how this is so, we must factor in the actor, its environment, and the dynamics among them. Aside from the arguments and contributions of the core chapters, this project has made two overarching contributions to international relations and political science.

The first broader contribution is in regard to how we approach the phenomena. Much of the literature from international relations and other related areas that have incorporated political shocks has leaned on the identification of events to determine the occurrence of the phenomena. Such events are justified as they exert an ex-post impact on the particular processes being researched. This approach is limiting as shocks are then simplified to such events within those specific contexts. This approach has also resulted

in a blurring as to what is actually being argued and assessed; is it a shock or is it the effects of shocks? There tends to be a confounding of the concept versus its effect that occurs but is admittedly hard to avoid as more often than not the concept is illustrated and understood by its perceived effects.

Approaching political shocks without an events-driven conceptualization allows one to assess a range of dynamics without the context of specific events or their attributes as a necessary condition. This can even include the potential assessment of a wide range of events themselves if that is the research goal. While some may suggest that defining shocks as a temporary yet significant break in stability is then also defining shocks by its effects, or perhaps that by defining it as such suggests we can no longer assess stability as an outcome of interest, I would respond that that is simply not the case.

By defining shocks as a break in stability, I return the focus back to the inherent dynamic behind why political shocks stand apart as a unique phenomenon – their sudden and significant destabilization. And within this approach, I specify there *must* be acknowledgement of two working impacts – the first being the break in stability, the primary and necessary impact. Without it, one is not observing political shocks as I have suggested they be defined. The additional impact, which can also be referred to as the secondary effects, can then assess a range of different outcomes accordingly. By following this logic, we can then avoid the “shock versus the effect” question that so often arises when assessing the incorporation of political shocks across the literature.

The second broader contribution is with respect to the dual assessment pursued within the context of political shocks. I argue that the inherent destabilization and

challenge of political shocks is applicable across different dimensions. While one can capture political shocks by assessing breaks in domestic stability, political shocks can come to impact conditions and interactions not limited to the domestic arena. The analysis pursued within this project aimed to evaluate dynamics relevant at domestic, neighborhood or regional, and international levels. The political shock framework allows for both domestic and international considerations to be tested on a similar playing field without dramatically different exceptions needing to be made in terms of the underlying theoretical arguments and/or possible causal mechanisms.

The outcomes assessed within this project capture dynamics of the state turning inward, centering on the society of people and the extent to which conditions were diminished in regard to human rights, as well as focused on international conflict, the core of international relations research. More often than not we tend to restrict ourselves in terms of assessing strictly internal dynamics or international interactions. However, when considering the framework and models outlined to capture political shock dynamics and potential connections to overall security, it does not limit one or the other.

5.2 Existing Limitations

Focusing on political shocks as a dissertation topic was quite an endeavor. This dissertation project was truly one of an exploratory nature. As the topic of political shocks is relatively less developed than others among international politics, there is far more gray area to wade through. It is simply impossible to fill in all the blanks with just one project, despite my efforts and intentions. However, I believe the work presented

here moves the topic of political shocks forward, which is a primary goal of this dissertation. In taking on this dissertation topic, a number of issues have also arisen. Of these, there are two in particular that are worth detailing further.

In its current form, the analysis put forth only incorporates one measure of actual political shocks. While multiple dimensions of security were evaluated within this project, as well as various outcomes within the context of political shocks, only part of what is thought to reflect the extent of state stability has actually been tested so far. As I have discussed the topic, stability is ultimately a multidimensional concept with no explicit universal measurement. It is unlikely to be sufficiently captured given one individual measure, however, we do have a general idea of what is more or less relevant regarding the concept at hand.

Ultimately, I acknowledge there are indeed a variety of different shocks that create different effects, and my approach has only essentially looked at one type, in terms of economic effects. My first approach to this topic and the concept of stability has produced one measure, GDP growth % deviation, which has a wealth of coverage (spatially and temporally) and is strongly supported by the extant research across various research traditions. And which this project has found significant and compelling results. However, there are others to be addressed given the broader destabilizing effect which characterizes political shocks. It is only logical to recognize that things can happen that are inherently destabilizing but that do not result in the economic effect and measurement central to this project.

Additionally, the project in its present form includes only analyses pursued that focus on freedom from fear outcomes, rather than both freedom from fear *and* freedom from want, as human security is typically understood. So it may be quite possible that significance across the different outcomes of interest evaluated thus far is because political shocks as I have discussed and conceptualized them, are inherently relevant to freedom from fear types of security outcomes. It is unclear at this time whether shocks have the same degree of significance for freedom from want issues, or in other words whether dynamics are similar for other non-violent related outcomes. Further consideration of different freedom from want topics is necessary to truly assess the impact to human security as I have stressed is an important dimension of security to incorporate in studies. While human rights serve as a proxy for human security, it is just that: a proxy. Human security, just like the other concepts highlighted in this project is multidimensional and as such, further work is needed to properly capture it completely.

5.3 Future Directions

Moving forward, the work of this dissertation can and will be extended in at least two related but different ways. The first extension draws from the limitations highlighted by switching the focus from *freedom from fear* outcomes to evaluating outcomes of interest categorized within the *freedom from want* group of human security. Both the assessment of militarized (international) conflict, as well as violation of human rights fall under this grouping. Personal security and political security are both part of the freedom from fear group, however there are a range of additional securities that are present and at

risk. Violations of rights are not limited to only physical integrity rights as other studies have examined other non-physical rights including cultural, economic, and social rights (Davenport, 2007b; Lupu, 2013). Pursuing evaluations of food security, environmental security, as well as health security, is an interesting and exciting path to take.

Additionally, addressing the multidimensional nature of stability is a necessary next step. As I have argued in this project, there are ideally three elements that comprise a measure of stability. Stability can be thought of as multifaceted and made up of arguably three different overarching areas. As such, the research has overwhelmingly shown the combination of 1) the economy, 2) the government or extent of governance, and 3) the dynamics of society as collectively reflecting the extent of stability for a country. While it is clear from the literature that economic factors and (in)stability have arguably the strongest relationship identified, making the identification of economic factors and use of them in analyses much more straightforward, the same cannot be said regarding the other factors. While I have suggested turning the focus on notions of capacity, which I view as highly related and likely interconnected to stability, there are numerous ways in which to approach the concept, just as is the case with stability. As such, future steps will identify different ways in which to create, measure, and test the other two elements of stability, focusing on governmental ability and continuance of existing political and socio-economic conditions.

The second extension incorporates alternative methodologies to further assess the dynamics at hand. This evaluation has been strictly a quantitative approach to the potential consequences of political shocks, as it was intended to be. The ultimate goal of this study was to produce a more comprehensive overview of the topic of political

shocks, addressing how we conceptualize them, how we can evaluate them on a larger scale in terms of temporal and spatial considerations, and how we can incorporate both domestic and international dimensions into the overall picture. As such, I have produced a quantitative study that has included all of these elements, but while aiming for breadth, it is admittedly at the expense of depth.

Much can be gained from the inclusion of alternative approaches, especially in regard to in-depth assessments of these complex environments. Building from this study, which allows and encourages the incorporation of events not always considered when we think about those typically included among international politics, I can consider a qualitative assessment of environmental and health-related phenomena accordingly. In particular, developing a case study comparison of the COVID-19 health pandemic with regard to specific countries is a project and path worth pursuing, not only for accomplishing a study focusing on a freedom from want security (as mentioned above), but clearly for its obvious relevance to the present dynamics taking place. While it is currently too soon to evaluate the consequences of COVID-19, as it is still ongoing, there is no doubt that for certain states, the pandemic will absolutely be deemed a political shock, and assessing the longer-term consequences of such a shock, as well as identifying responses to such shocks are important extensions to pursue.

The consequences of the pandemic are likely to be far reaching in terms of spatial and temporal considerations but also the impacts will vary across various countries and populations. The experience in the United States for instance is likely to stand apart from many other countries, especially those Western developed countries when considering the complete downfall and number of failures that took place over the course of 2020. Future

case study comparisons of events like COVID-19 across different countries is beneficial in understanding not only the actions taken and the results, but perhaps also the counterfactual of steps not taken, and distinguishing the extent of destabilization such an event had for countries and how.

Events such as these reflect an alternative pathway of evaluation for scholars of political science and international relations in particular. While incorporation of health-related variables and climate change effects on conflict has taken place among the extant literature, many conflict studies end up focused on various areas already argued as prone to conflict, or where health issues related to conflict remain most prevalent for example. As an alternative, political shocks show that we can still observe acute periods of devastating destabilization in countries where conflict is far less prevalent. Such instances reflect that even developed countries are still not immune from such events such as health and climatic shocks for instance.

Ultimately, the key question really falls on: does any of this matter? And if it does, how and why? I respond to such a question with a resounding yes, the dynamics presented here absolutely matter. There are various reasons why all of this is important but perhaps one of the most significant of reasons is the consideration of the present. Critical events that have the capacity to destabilize domestic conditions and politics, as well as potentially have regional and global reach are continuing to take place and we can assume with a significant enough degree of certainty, that they will continue to occur in the future as well.

It is not only pertinent but also necessary to establish a way in which to study these events and their dynamics in a systematic manner. By doing so, we not only can better understand the potential effects of such critical events but also work toward better addressing them in the future. Critical events may ultimately be unavoidable; however, this does not mean we cannot lessen the impact of such events in the future if and when they do arise. Identifying strategies and forming policies that have national, regional, and global impact becomes a key priority when we recognize that there is a degree of agency present in the face of often overwhelmingly destabilized environments.

In terms of real-world application and context, as I mentioned in the previous section regarding future directions, this study allows and actually encourages the incorporation of events that we do not always typically think about when it comes to international politics. This can, *and should*, include regional and global pandemics for instance, such as COVID-19 or perhaps the return of the Ebola crisis in West Africa, two examples which highlight the continuing occurrence of critical events and the complex issues that surround them.

The return of the Ebola virus in February 2021 was a frightening and surprising event to take place, especially considering its deadly history. The Ebola virus (also known as the Ebola hemorrhagic fever) was first discovered in 1976, with cases of the disease primarily centered in sub-Saharan Africa. The 2014-2016 West African crisis was the largest Ebola outbreak in history primarily affecting the countries of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.¹²¹ This was the first time the disease had reached levels termed to be at

¹²¹ Collectively the West African outbreak had a total of 28,652 cases and 11,325 deaths (CDC1, 2019).

epidemic proportions per the CDC. What started as a serious health issue came to create a highly complex and consequential environment for states and societies to attempt to operate within.

Key socio-economic areas experienced major disruptions and loss due to the outbreak. Generally speaking, there were four areas primarily impacted. First, there was a major loss of life overall, with healthcare workers and children being impacted at the highest levels. Second, there was an estimated economic loss of \$2.2 billion in GDP for the three countries collectively. Third, education was impacted as schools were shut down across all countries for extended periods of time. And finally, other health-related issues arose as vaccination schedules became disrupted with immunizations for other serious diseases declining along with health resources being diverted to fight the Ebola crisis.¹²²

The 2021 return of the virus in Guinea, one of the original states affected during the 2014-2016 West African outbreak is not only cause for concern, but in some ways also serves as a test as to whether the impact of a disease so clearly destabilizing, as we have previously observed, can be lessened given what we know it is capable of (WHO Africa, 2021). However, these are not dynamics restricted to only conflict-ridden zones or to specific regions as we can also observe global devastation taking place when considering the COVID-19 pandemic.

¹²² Costs of Ebola per the CDC. For additional details see <https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/cost-of-ebola.html>

As of April 2021, there are a total of 223 countries, areas, or territories with cases of the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, or COVID-19 according to the World Health Organization (WHO).¹²³ Simply put, there is no corner of the world this health pandemic has not reached. While it is unlikely that developed and developing countries alike could have avoided being affected, whether certain countries could have avoided such a significant impact is indeed questionable. In the case of the United States for example, effective leadership during the height of COVID-19 in 2020 has been viewed as largely nonexistent. The failure of actual leadership in the United States is thought to have led to 40% of the 500,000 COVID-19-related deaths in the country being avoidable (Woolhandler et al., 2021).

Such shocking conclusions tend to lead to calls for avoiding such devastation in the future at all costs, but how this is accomplished is far less clear. What is evident however is that not only do strategies and policies need to be established to address the impact of events such as these, but effective leadership, or governance broadly understood, is also key. Ultimately, COVID-19 serves as an excellent example as to how shocks are not restricted to any particular type of country or region. Rather, we can observe periods of devastating destabilization as a real possibility for all countries as they are not immune from such events, and as such, shocks are relevant and cause for concern for all communities and states alike.

¹²³ Breaking down the collective total of COVID-19 deaths according to WHO classified regions shows: Americas: 47.7%, Europe: 34.2%, South-East Asia: 8.5%, Eastern Mediterranean: 5.8%, Africa: 2.6%, and Western Pacific: 1.2% (WHO1, 2021).

Although I have highlighted health pandemics to help illustrate, these broader dynamics are not limited to only health-related events. It is becoming more and more clear that climate change for instance, especially in the form of climatic shocks is not only a present threat to state and global conditions but will continue to have a massive impact in the future as well. The evaluation and understanding of critical events like these as well as others are more relevant than ever considering our current climate of global pandemics, assault of climatic change, and a whole host of other event types consistently of interest among international relations and political science as a whole. Considering the ongoing events taking place across 2019, 2020, and now 2021 (when this dissertation project is being completed), the topic of destabilizing events and their effects is quite clearly more relevant than ever.

APPENDIX A

Appendix A1: Summary of the Fund For Peace's Fragile States Index.¹²⁴

	<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Examples</i>
Cohesion Indicators	<p>C1: Security Apparatus</p> <p>C2: Factionalized Elites</p> <p>C3: Group Grievance</p>	<p>C1: Monopoly on the use of force; Relationship between security and citizenry; Force; Arms</p> <p>C2: Representative Leadership; Identity; Resource Distribution; Equality and Equity</p> <p>C3: Post-Conflict Response; Equality; Divisions; Communal Violence</p>
Economic Indicators	<p>E1: Economic Decline</p> <p>E2: Uneven Economic Development</p> <p>E3: Human Flight and Brain Drain</p>	<p>E1: Public Finances; Economic Conditions; Economic Climate; Economic Diversification</p> <p>E2: Economic Equality; Economic Opportunity; Socio-Economic Dynamics</p> <p>E3: Retention of Technical and Intellectual Capital; Economics</p>
Political Indicators	<p>P1: State Legitimacy</p> <p>P2: Public Services</p> <p>P3: Human Rights and Rule of Law</p>	<p>P1: Confidence in the political process; political opposition; transparency; openness and fairness of the political process; political violence</p> <p>P2: General provision of public services; Health; Education; Shelter; Infrastructure</p> <p>P3: Civil and Political Rights; Civil and Political Freedoms; Violation of Rights; Openness; Justice; Equality</p>
Social and Cross-cutting Indicators	<p>S1: Demographic Pressures</p> <p>S2: Refugees and IDPs</p> <p>S3: External Intervention</p>	<p>S1: Population; Public Health; Food and Nutrition; Environment; Resources</p> <p>S2: Refugees; Internally Displaced Persons; Response to Displacement</p> <p>S3: Political Intervention; Force Intervention; Economic Intervention</p>

¹²⁴ Information drawn from Fund For Peace – Fragile States Index website, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/>

Appendix A2: Summary of the Economist's Political Instability Index.¹²⁵

	<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Explanations</i>
Underlying Vulnerability (12)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Inequality 2. State History 3. Corruption 4. Ethnic Fragmentation 5. Trust in Institutions 6. Status of Minorities 7. History of Political Instability 8. Proclivity to Labour Unrest 9. Level of Social provision 10. A Country's Neighbourhood 11. Regime Type 12. Regime Type and Factionalism 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Gini coefficient 2. Measured according to date of independence 3. Economist Intelligence Unit ratings 4. Ethnic fractionalization index (0-100 scale) 5. Percentage of population that trusts/has trust in government 6. High rates of economic or political discrimination against minorities 7. Significant episodes or events of political instability (regime change) 8. Risk of labour unrest 9. Measured on the basis of the "expected" infant mortality rate 10. Based on the average vulnerability index for all of the country's geographic neighbours 11. Based on classification of political regimes 12. The interaction of regime type with the existence of political factionalism
Economic Distress (3)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Growth in Incomes 2. Unemployment 3. Level of Income per Head 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Growth in real GDP per head 2. Unemployment rate, % 3. Measured by GDP per head at PPP, US\$

¹²⁵ Information drawn from The Economist Intelligence Unit, <https://www.eiu.com/default.aspx>

APPENDIX B

Appendix B1: Political Shock Validation – Sample of 125 Cases.¹²⁶

Case Code	Country	Shock Year	Event Type	Event Notes
1-2	United States of America	1970	3	Start of the Communist Coalition (COW War 176); Cambodian Campaign
2-2	United States of America	1974	4.1; 4.2	Resignation of President Richard Nixon; financial recession; unemployment rate increase
3-2	United States of America	1976	3; 4.2	End of Vietnam War in 1975; end of financial crisis from 1975
4-2	United States of America	2001	3	Terrorist attacks; 9/11
5-2	United States of America	2009	1	Global financial crisis; housing crisis; "Great Recession" (2007-2008; 2009)
6-20	Canada	1997	4.3	Red River flood (Manitoba; 1 of 2 worst natural disasters (floods) in Canada's history)
7-40	Cuba	1991	4.2	Cuban GDP and conditions declined during "Special Period"; loss of 80% of trading partners; Soviet subsidies gone following collapse of Soviet Union; collapse in sugar prices also occurred during this time (1990-1991)
8-41	Haiti	1992	4.1	1991 military coup of Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras overthrowing Jean-Bertrand Aristide government (Occurred latter part of 1991); Organization of American States (OAS) with George H.W. Bush imposed trade embargo
9-41	Haiti	2010	4.3	Natural disaster - earthquake (January 2010); collapse of central governance; limited general elections in November 2010 with new elections repeatedly delayed following
10-42	Dominican Republic	1965	3	Dominican Civil War (started April 1965)
11-70	Mexico	1995	2; 4.2	1994 - Mexican Peso Crisis; Tequila Shock/Crisis; sudden devaluation of the Mexican peso causing currency crisis there and elsewhere; central bank converted short-term debt from pesos to dollars resulting in decrease in foreign reserves/increase in debt
12-90	Guatemala	1963	4.1	CIA instigated and supported coup overthrowing President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes; MLN as main party of military
13-90	Guatemala	1981	2; 3	Guatemalan Civil War; largest insurgency mounted/largest offensive for the conflict in 1981; 1981 genocide; in conjunction with regional destabilization via other conflicts

¹²⁶ Case Code is the case number (1-125) and country's COW Code for identification. Event Type reflects the general grouping discussed in Chapter 4: global PPS (1), neighborhood/regional PPS (2), interstate/intrastate conflict as a PPS (3), domestic events (4) including adverse regime change (4.1), economic crises (4.2), and natural disasters (4.3).

Appendix B1: Political Shock Validation – Sample of 125 Cases, Continued.

14-91	Honduras	1969	3	Football War - El Salvador severed diplomatic ties with Honduras, border skirmishes took place; El Salvador forces invade Honduras, warplanes bombed country
15-92	El Salvador	1979	3; 4.1	Salvadoran coup overthrowing President Carlos Humberto Romero; beginning of Salvadoran Civil War
16-92	El Salvador	1982	2; 3; 4.1	Salvadoran Civil War; started following the coup of 1979; 1982 saw the installation of an interim government; heightened killing by government forces; destabilization in region with other conflicts
17-93	Nicaragua	1982	2; 3	Contra War; early 1980s anti-Sandinista movement (Contras) formed; loss of foreign economic aid in 1981 by US Ronald Reagan, continuation of military arms; armed conflict destabilizing region along with conflicts in El Salvador/Guatemala; FSLN military budget prioritized; Contra forces assassinating Nicaraguan government
18-100	Colombia	1975	3	1974 - challenge to state authority via April Movement (M-19) starting new phase of conflict; end of National Front governments
19-101	Venezuela	1993	4.1; 4.2	1992 - attempted coup by Colonel Hugo Chavez; government instituted reforms that hurt rather than helped ensure two-party system; economic downturn
20-130	Ecuador	1973	4.1	President Velasco suspends constitution, dissolves legislature, assumes dictatorial powers to cope with financial emergency. Military deposes Velasco's authoritarian-democratic regime (total polity change of -10)
21-135	Peru	1963	4.1	July 1962 – presidential elections held, no one gains required 1/3 vote. Military's Joint Chiefs of Staff oust President Manuel Carlos Prado and install a junta led by Chairman General Perez Godoy. Moves by General Perez Godoy to gain personal power led to ouster by members of the junta by March 1963; interim leadership while presidential elections are rescheduled (total polity change of -11)
22-140	Brazil	1962	4.1; 4.2	Beginning 1961; inflation and radical reforms proposed by new President Joao Goulart trigger overthrow of a weakly institutionalized democratic government by the armed forces. Bureaucratic-authoritarian regime violently represses left-wing opposition.
23-155	Chile	1974	4.1	September 1973 - Chilean coup deposing President Salvador Allende by General Augusto Pinochet; ongoing social unrest, end of civilian rule; economic war by President Richard Nixon
24-160	Argentina	1995	2; 4.2	1994 - Mexican Peso Crisis; Tequila Shock/Crisis; sudden devaluation of the Mexican peso causing currency crisis elsewhere; central bank converted short-term debt from pesos to dollars resulting in decrease in foreign reserves and increase in debt; devaluation and financial crisis affected "Southern Cone"
25-160	Argentina	1966	4.1	Civilian government ousted by a military coup in an attempt to stem the increasing influence of Peronists in the electoral arena. State repression increases as urban violence escalates and falters.

Appendix B1: Political Shock Validation – Sample of 125 Cases, Continued.

26-160	Argentina	1976	4.1	Domestic instability forces the military regime to hold elections. Military intervenes after Peronist victory ushers in a period of political and social anarchy.
27-200	United Kingdom	2008	1	Global financial crisis (2008-2009)
28-200	United Kingdom	1982	3; 4.2	1981 - UK recession (falling output, inflation rate fall; rising unemployment); manufacturing hit; ideological split leading to Conservative party pursuing free-market supply-side reforms (privatization, deregulation, lower income tax rates); Falklands War in 1982 with territories British dependent with Argentina
29-205	Ireland	1991	3	The Troubles - escalation; IRA armed campaign escalated; armed fighting, snipers, shot down helicopters of British Army; Downing Street mortar attack, attempted assassination of Prime Minister John Major
30-210	Netherlands	2009	1	Global financial crisis (2008-2009)
31-220	France	2008	1	Global financial crisis (2008-2009)
32-230	Spain	2009	1	Global financial crisis (2008-2009)
33-235	Portugal	1974	4.1	Carnation Revolution; April 1974 military coup overthrowing authoritarian Estado Novo; coupled with civil resistance campaign (revolutionary)
34-255	Germany	2008	1	Global financial crisis (2008-2009)
35-255	Germany	2012	2	European Economic Crisis; Eurozone economy crisis - recession spreading across Europe
36-290	Poland	1992	4.2	1991 - Polish post-communist government implemented radical economic reform; "shock therapy"
37-310	Hungary	2009	1; 4.2	Hungarian Financial Crisis; large external debt prior to Global economic crisis, then global economic crisis hit
38-325	Italy	2009	1	Global financial crisis (2008-2009)
39-339	Albania	1997	3	1996 parliamentary election contested; Albanian Civil War 1997 (rebellion escalated into civil war)
40-343	Macedonia	2001	3	2001 insurgency in Macedonia; ethnic militant groups attacked Macedonian security forces early 2001 - lasted entire year
41-345	Yugoslavia	1999	3	Yugoslav wars: Kosovo War (1998-1999); Insurgency in Presevo Valley (1999); NATO bombing 1999; via Kosovo and other previous wars, Yugoslavia home to highest number of refugees and IDPs in Europe at that time
42-346	Bosnia & Herzegovina	1996	3	1995 - end of the Bosnian War (December 1995); case of prior State Failure (1992-1995)

Appendix B1: Political Shock Validation – Sample of 125 Cases, Continued.

43-350	Greece	1974	3; 4.1	1973 Athens Polytechnic uprising rejecting the Greek military junta; subsequent coup via Junta against George Papadopoulos/Spyros Markezinis; reinstating military law; further 1974 coup attempt against Archbishop Makarios III led to invasion of Cyprus and fall of the Greek military regime during 1974
44-355	Bulgaria	1989	4.1	1989 - political reform demonstrations taking place; leader Todor Zhivkov ousted by his Politburo following fall of Berlin Wall; political reforms pursued but changes took place later in 1990; unrest during 1989
45-365	Russia	1992	4.2	Yeltsin transition to market economy (announced in October 1991; market-oriented reform along lines of shock therapy; resulting in hyperinflation)
46-365	Russia	2009	3; 4.2	Great Recession in Russia (2008-2009); 2008 Russo-Georgian War; 2008 energy crisis (crude oil prices)
47-369	Ukraine	2005	4.1	Corrupt 2004 Ukrainian presidential election; electoral fraud; Orange Revolution; Viktor F. Yanukovich resignation as PM
48-369	Ukraine	2009	1; 4.2	Global financial crisis (2008-2009); deficit of Ukraine's foreign trade; decrease in steel prices; local financial issues; Russian gas disputes
49-370	Belarus	1996	4.1	1995-1996; feud between President Alexander Lukashenka and the legislature; referendum allows President to rule by decree, disband Supreme Council (legislature), and so on (total polity change of -14)
50-371	Armenia	1992	3	First Nagorno-Karabakh War; full-scale fighting occurred in 1992; prior was ethnic cleansing pogroms directed against Armenians (1990 on); massive displacement of Azerbaijanis and Armenians
51-372	Georgia	1992	3; 4.1	Georgian Civil War (South Ossetia ongoing 1991, ended 1992; Abkhazia 1992-1993); coup in December 1991 of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia; de facto secession of regions of Georgia
52-373	Azerbaijan	1992	3; 4.2	First Nagorno-Karabakh War; full-scale fighting occurred in 1992; prior was ethnic cleansing pogroms directed against Azerbaijanis (1988 on; Gugark and Khojaly massacres); massive displacement of Azerbaijanis and Armenians; post-Independence 1991 saw collapse of economy with Soviet Union break up and subsequent regression of GDP until mid-1990s
53-375	Finland	1994	4.2	Finnish depression of the early 1990s; Finnish banking crisis; unemployment rate rose to 18.9% from 3.5%; Collapse of Soviet Union impacted as made up 15-20% of Finland's foreign trade
54-380	Sweden	2008	1	Global financial crisis (2008-2009)
55-385	Norway	2008	1	Global financial crisis (2008-2009)
56-402	Cape Verde	1982	4.3	Natural disaster - Tropical Storm Beryl; moderate to heavy damage; deaths and millions in damage; US provided humanitarian aid and economic assistance

Appendix B1: Political Shock Validation – Sample of 125 Cases, Continued.

57-404	Guinea-Bissau	1998	3; 4.1	Guinea-Bissau Civil War - 1998; coup of President Joao Bernardo Vieira by Brigadier-General Ansumane Mane; lost control of government forces; neighborhood influence and support; internal displacement of population
58-420	Gambia	1981	3; 4.1; 4.2	Leftist coup attempted 1981 of President Dawda Jawara by GSRP and Field Force; corruption, economic mismanagement of regime weakened economy; violence/conflict related to coup mid-year with widespread destruction and killings
59-432	Mali	1970	4.2	1969 marked with overwhelming financial and economic problems; stemming in part from poor harvests (1968-1969); previous 1968 coup ousted President Modibo Keita and installed Lieutenant (Major General) Moussa Traore in 1969 where he failed to improve conditions as well
60-433	Senegal	1988	4.1	Senegal state of emergency declared as protests and unrest around Senegal election; fighting, destruction; military style response; labor market was not modified in significant way despite Senegal's effort toward reforms - due to strong opposition by labor unions, fear of social unrest surrounding general election
61-435	Mauritania	1990	3; 4.3	Mauritania-Senegal Border War (1989-1991); deterioration due to drought; deterioration in relations; state of emergency in Dakar (and others) region; mass expulsions and deaths of civilians from both countries; both sides had cross-border raids and mass fleeing of populations; departure of mass numbers caused decline in agricultural production and there was an overwhelming number of refugees in areas
62-437	Ivory Coast	2011	4.1	Ivorian Crisis; started November 2010 through 2011; President Laurent Gbagbo captured and extradited to ICC; opposition candidate Alassane Ouattara took power after conflict throughout months of crisis
63-439	Burkina Faso	1987	3; 4.1	Burkinabe coup by Captain Blaise Compaore of President Captain Thomas Sankara; armed resistance; continuation of previous upheaval including ongoing violence and tension from Upper Volta coup attempt and violence, Agacher Strip War with Mali
64-450	Liberia	2003	3; 4.2	Culmination of Liberian civil war devastated country's economy; infrastructure was damaged, people fled; iron ore production stopped completely; UN banned exports of timber and diamonds (due to rebel market economy); underdeveloped economy continued from first civil war
65-451	Sierra Leone	1992	3; 4.1	1991 - Sierra Leone Civil War by Foday Sankoh; 1992 coup by Captain Valentine Strasser overthrowing President Joseph Saidu Momoh
66-452	Ghana	1984	4.1; 4.3	1983 saw a series of coup attempts; 1982-1983 was its most severe drought leading to famine come 1983/1984; "Crisis for the Ghanaian National Economy"; mass movements of refugees to neighboring countries due to food shortages, and widespread poverty

Appendix B1: Political Shock Validation – Sample of 125 Cases, Continued.

67-461	Togo	1964	4.1	1963 Togolese coup; assassinated first President Sylvanus Olympio; coup leaders formed new government with Nicolas Grunitzky and Antoine Meatchi; possible external involvement by Ghana and France
68-461	Togo	2006	3; 4.1	2005 Togo protests and riots; protesting results of presidential election (President Gnassingbe Eyadema died in office); military installed his son Faure Gnassingbe; ongoing unrest with killed and wounded into following year
69-471	Cameroon	1987	4.2; 4.3	Mid-1980s economic crisis of Cameroon; oil dependent economy; 1986 (and on) saw decrease in production in combination with dropping oil prices; Cameroon acknowledged crisis in 1987; 1986 also saw natural disasters (like Lake Nyos Disaster) which impacted entire areas, including agriculture, infrastructure, and population welfare
70-475	Nigeria	1966	3; 4.1	1966 Nigerian coup by Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu/Emmanuel Ifeajuna overthrowing Abubakar Balewa; Assassination of senior leaders; General Officer of Nigerian Army then takes control Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi; countercoups and subsequent Nigerian Civil War
71-475	Nigeria	1984	4.1	1983 Nigerian coup by officers of Major General Muhammadu Buhari ousting President Shehu Shagari; previous tensions/violence between civilians/military; austerity budgets trigger coups in face of economic corruption
72-481	Gabon	1999	2; 4; 4.2	Large influx of refugees; largely Congolese refugees escaping war; mid-1999 saw at least an estimated 30,000 reflecting destabilization of war for the entire region (per High Commissioner for Refugees)
73-482	Central African Republic	2013	3	Central African Republic Civil War; started at the end of 2012 (December 2012); coalition of rebel groups (Seleka) accused govt of not following peace agreements from prior war, took over territory and capital in 2013.
74-482	Central African Republic	2003	4.1	Coup of General Francois Bozize captured government of President Ange-Felix Patasse; suspension of constitution; creation of new armed forces that commit crimes against civilians
75-483	Chad	1979	3	Chadian-Libyan conflict; began 1979, continued until 1987; four separate Libyan interventions into Chad with 1 occurring 1978, and another in 1979; in conjunction with civil war and failed attempt at national unification also occurring (starting in 1979)
76-484	Congo	1995	3	First Republic of the Congo civil war; began in 1993 but did not end until December 1994; thousands killed and tens of thousands displaced during and following
77-490	DR Congo	1962	3; 4.1	Congo Crisis; one of a number of peaks; Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba executed in 1961; Soviet and UN involvement by 1962
78-500	Uganda	1986	3	Ugandan Bush War - 1985 saw the rapid conquering of Western/Southern Uganda by NRA (National Resistance Army); NRA captured Kampala in January 1986; establishing new government with President Yoweri Museveni

Appendix B1: Political Shock Validation – Sample of 125 Cases, Continued.

79-520	Somalia	1964	3	1964 Ethiopian-Somali Border War
80-520	Somalia	1973	4.3	Severe drought in 1973-on affected 20% of the population; led to deaths; necessitated international help for drought relief efforts
81-520	Somalia	1983	3	1982 Ethiopian-Somali Border War
82-530	Ethiopia	1991	3; 4.1	End of Ethiopian Civil War; EPRDF overthrow of Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist PDRE rule; transitional government
83-530	Ethiopia	1983	3	1982 Ethiopian-Somali Border War
84-540	Angola	1993	3	1992 rekindled civil war after Jonas Savimbi multiparty election; withdrew from run-off election and pursued UNITA returns to war; 1993 saw massive change in the ongoing fighting as UNITA gained control over 70% of Angola by this time
85-541	Mozambique	1992	3	Culmination of fighting, infrastructure destroyed; Mozambican Civil War ends October 1992
86-541	Mozambique	2000	4.3	Natural disaster - Mozambique 2000 flood; catastrophic flooding; displaced people; destroyed arable land; worst flood in Mozambique's last 50 years
87-552	Zimbabwe	1980	3; 4.1	1979/1980 - Rhodesia interim transition to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia; becoming Zimbabwe in April 1980; conclusion of Rhodesian Bush War
88-560	South Africa	2009	1; 4.2	Global financial crisis (2008-2009); in conjunction with negative domestic developments: surge in inflation, increased interest rates; failure to keep infrastructure up for electricity; massive unemployment
89-581	Comoros	1989	4.1	Assassination of President Ahmed Abdallah
90-616	Tunisia	2011	2	Part of Arab Spring regional protests; uprisings; removal of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali
91-620	Libya	2011	2	January 2011 - armed insurrection against Muammar Gaddafi's regime; Regime collapse; Gaddafi killed; loss of central authority over territories/militias
92-625	Sudan	2011	2	Part of Arab Spring regional protests; uprisings, austerity measures; also experienced secession of South Sudan in summer 2011
93-626	South Sudan	2012	3	Heglig Crisis; shut down of oil fields; ongoing bombing, aerial bombardment, shelling, tanks by Sudanese Army/Air Force
94-640	Turkey	1981	4.1	September 1980 Turkish coup of Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren overthrowing 43rd government led by Suleyman Demirel; adverse regime change; economy visibly impacted by coup (country experiencing massive inflation, widescale unemployment, severe foreign trade deficit)

Appendix B1: Political Shock Validation – Sample of 125 Cases, Continued.

95-645	Iraq	2003	3; 4.1	Foreign ouster of leadership by foreign forces; invasion of a country by foreign armed forces; 2003 Iraq War - United States-led coalition overthrowing Saddam Hussein
96-651	Egypt	2011	2	Egyptian Revolution; January Revolution; President Hosni Mubarak resignation; suspension of constitution and dissolution of parliament
97-651	Syria	1962	4.1	1961 Syrian coup by Syrian Army; resulting in the breakup of the United Arab Republic; restoring an independent Syrian Republic
98-651	Syria	1966	4.1	1966 Syrian coup - removal of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party; replaced with Military Committee/Regional Command via Salah Jadid neo-Ba'athist government; instituted radical changes; resolution for socialist revolution in Syria (including economic and foreign trade be nationalized)
99-651	Egypt	1991	4.2	1990 end of the external debt crisis; experiencing financial/banking crisis in 1991; pursuing economic reform starting 1991
100-660	Lebanon	1990	3; 4.1	1989 - Phase: War of Liberation (Lebanese Civil War); rejection of new government by Lebanese Army; President Rene Moawad assassinated
101-666	Israel	1996	4.1	November 1995 - Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin assassinated
102-670	Saudi Arabia	1975	4.1	March 1975 - King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud assassinated
103-679	Yemen	2015	3; 4.1	Yemen Civil War (2014-ongoing); ouster of leadership by rebel forces; 2015 overthrow of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi
104-679	Yemen	2011	2	Part of Arab Spring regional protests; uprisings; unrest leading to latter removal of President Ali Abdullah Saleh (in 2012)
105-700	Afghanistan	2007	3	Ongoing Afghanistan War; 2006 Taliban resurgence, series of suicide attacks; increased anti-American riots in Kabul; sluggish reconstruction
106-702	Tajikistan	1992	3; 4.1	Tajikistani Civil War begins 1992; President Rahmon Nabiyev ousted; Safarali Kendzhayev Communist speaker of parliament ousted; coups and countercoups during 1992 so constant shift of weakened power
107-710	China	1989	3; 4.2	Post-Tiananmen retrenchment; Tiananmen Square 1989 protests; retrenchment of economic reforms and liberalization
108-732	South Korea	1980	4.1	1979 Assassination of President Park Chung Hee; Coup December 1979 following elections by Chun Doo-Hwan
109-732	South Korea	1998	2	Asian Financial Crisis
110-770	Pakistan	1978	4.1	Democratic government overthrown in military coup as political violence escalates due to elections. General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq dissolves the legislature, declares martial law (total polity change of -15)

Appendix B1: Political Shock Validation – Sample of 125 Cases, Continued.

111-775	Myanmar	1963	4.1	1962 Burmese coup marking beginning of 1 party rule; Military replaced AFPFL government Prime Minister U Nu, with Union Revolutionary Council General Ne Win; martial law
112-775	Myanmar	1988	3	8888 Uprising; People Power Uprising; nationwide protests and civil unrest
113-781	Maldives	2004	4.3	Natural disaster - Indian Ocean earthquake; additional tsunami caused by earthquake; government declared national disaster; damages estimated \$460 million, nearly 62% of GDP
114-790	Nepal	2002	4.1	Nepalese Royal family killed mid-2001; peace talks with insurgents break down; state of emergency declared; by 2002 King Gyanendra dismisses entire government; elections postponed
115-800	Thailand	1997	2	Asian Financial Crisis
116-820	Malaysia	1998	2	Asian Financial Crisis
117-830	Singapore	1998	2	Asian Financial Crisis
118-830	Singapore	1964	4.1	September 1963, Singapore (with Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak) formed the Malaysia Federation. Singapore, seceded due to ethnic-Chinese majority not agreeing with Malay-domination federation Lee Kwan Yew became the personalistic ruler of a one-party dominant republic; 1964 race riots and civil disturbances
119-840	Philippines	1973	4.1	Ferdinand Marcos consolidates political power; class and ethnic conflict; institutes martial law; turns to dictatorship (total polity change of -14)
120-840	Philippines	1984	4.1	Assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr. 1983
121-840	Philippines	1986	4.1	People Power Revolution; Yellow Revolution; sustained campaign of civil resistance against regime violence and electoral fraud; leading to the end of President Ferdinand Marcos
122-840	Philippines	1998	2	Asian Financial Crisis
123-850	Indonesia	1998	2	Asian Financial Crisis
124-860	East Timor	2006	3; 4.1	East Timorese Crisis - conflict and coup attempt; forced external military intervention; resignation of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri
125-910	Papua New Guinea	1991	3	1990 dubbed "Year of Crisis" - ongoing Bougainville crisis/conflict/civil war, attempted secessionists proclaimed independence

APPENDIX C

Appendix C1: Militarized Interstate Disputes – All New Negative Binomial Regressions.

	Base Model	Shock Model	Internal Model	Neighborhood Model
Actual Political Shock (APS)		0.015* (0.009)	0.018* (0.009)	0.008 (0.006)
Internal Unrest			0.040 (0.061)	
APS##Internal Unrest			0.015* (0.009)	
Neighborhood Unrest				0.078*** (0.026)
APS##Neighborhood Unrest				0.008*** (0.002)
Polity	0.013 (0.011)	0.015 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	0.017 (0.011)
lnGDP Per Capita	-0.064 (0.072)	-0.070 (0.073)	-0.048 (0.072)	-0.045 (0.071)
International Rivalry	0.871*** (0.128)	0.860*** (0.132)	0.809*** (0.136)	0.802*** (0.121)
Alliances	0.185*** (0.034)	0.192*** (0.036)	0.189*** (0.034)	0.203*** (0.033)
Territorial Claims	0.513*** (0.124)	0.520*** (0.125)	0.507*** (0.123)	0.494*** (0.116)
Major/Regional Power	-0.543** (0.222)	-0.548** (0.232)	-0.544** (0.226)	-0.639*** (0.232)
Region2 (South America)	-0.963*** (0.352)	-0.918** (0.366)	-0.878*** (0.338)	-0.773** (0.365)
Region5 (West Africa)	-1.191*** (0.429)	-1.213*** (0.446)	-1.186*** (0.430)	-1.037** (0.449)
Region 6 (Southern Africa)	-0.961** (0.412)	-0.915** (0.428)	-0.891** (0.408)	-0.806* (0.427)
Region 7 (Central Africa)	-0.991** (0.409)	-0.955** (0.430)	-0.913** (0.410)	-0.882** (0.435)
Cold War	-0.155* (0.094)	-0.124 (0.096)	-0.109 (0.099)	-0.215** (0.093)
Constant	-0.497 (0.734)	-0.534 (0.765)	-0.712 (0.758)	-0.693 (0.761)
ln/alpha	-0.390 (0.254)	-0.434* (0.252)	-0.468* (0.257)	-0.616*** (0.219)
	0.013	0.015	0.011	0.017
N	4355	4170	4170	4170
AIC	6653.0	6405.5	6392.9	6336.5
BIC	6761.4	6519.5	6519.6	6463.2

North America is the reference category for regions; only significant regions are listed.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

Appendix C2: Militarized Interstate Disputes – All Ongoing Negative Binomial Regressions.

	Base Model	Shock Model	Internal Model	Neighborhood Model
Actual Political Shocks (APS)		0.013 (0.009)	0.016 (0.010)	0.006 (0.006)
Internal Unrest			0.066 (0.064)	
APS##Internal Unrest			0.015* (0.009)	
Neighborhood Unrest				0.086*** (0.027)
APS##Neighborhood Unrest				0.007*** (0.003)
Polity	0.018 (0.012)	0.020* (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.022* (0.012)
lnGDP Per Capita	-0.097 (0.074)	-0.101 (0.076)	-0.077 (0.077)	-0.077 (0.073)
International Rivalry	0.977*** (0.132)	0.966*** (0.135)	0.904*** (0.139)	0.900*** (0.128)
Alliances	0.180*** (0.039)	0.186*** (0.041)	0.184*** (0.038)	0.198*** (0.041)
Territorial Claims	0.516*** (0.128)	0.522*** (0.130)	0.499*** (0.127)	0.496*** (0.124)
Major Power/Regional Power	-0.715*** (0.211)	-0.696*** (0.228)	-0.693*** (0.219)	-0.790*** (0.237)
Region2 (South America)	-1.233*** (0.408)	-1.199*** (0.432)	-1.128*** (0.371)	-1.046** (0.446)
Region5 (West Africa)	-1.406*** (0.488)	-1.436*** (0.516)	-1.392*** (0.467)	-1.253** (0.532)
Region 6 (Southern Africa)	-1.071** (0.486)	-1.043** (0.511)	-1.000** (0.459)	-0.929* (0.526)
Region 7 (Central Africa)	-1.387*** (0.461)	-1.339*** (0.487)	-1.270*** (0.428)	-1.259** (0.513)
Cold War	-0.153 (0.102)	-0.124 (0.103)	-0.104 (0.108)	-0.214** (0.103)
Constant	0.296 (0.792)	0.253 (0.841)	0.029 (0.816)	0.090 (0.845)
ln/alpha	-0.369* (0.219)	-0.409* (0.221)	-0.457* (0.235)	-0.595*** (0.216)
N	4355	4170	4170	4170
AIC	7769.4	7455.9	7430.8	7374.2
BIC	7877.8	7569.9	7557.5	7500.9

North America is the reference category for regions; only significant regions are listed.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

Appendix C3: Militarized Interstate Disputes – All New Poisson Regressions.

	Base Model	Shock Model	Internal Model	Neighborhood Model
Actual Political Shocks (APS)		0.013*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.009** (0.005)
Internal Unrest			0.062 (0.064)	
APS##Internal Unrest			0.012 (0.008)	
Neighborhood Unrest				0.085*** (0.030)
APS##Neighborhood Unrest				0.005*** (0.001)
Polity	0.014 (0.011)	0.016 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)
lnGDP Per Capita	-0.077 (0.065)	-0.083 (0.065)	-0.058 (0.066)	-0.064 (0.066)
International Rivalry	0.838*** (0.134)	0.826*** (0.137)	0.761*** (0.140)	0.773*** (0.125)
Alliances	0.186*** (0.034)	0.197*** (0.038)	0.193*** (0.037)	0.206*** (0.033)
Territorial Claims	0.534*** (0.123)	0.540*** (0.125)	0.528*** (0.122)	0.513*** (0.112)
Major Power/Regional Power	-0.503** (0.201)	-0.493** (0.211)	-0.481** (0.204)	-0.580*** (0.211)
Region2 (South America)	-0.957*** (0.346)	-0.872** (0.374)	-0.854** (0.353)	-0.748** (0.352)
Region5 (West Africa)	-1.199*** (0.413)	-1.180*** (0.443)	-1.182*** (0.441)	-1.025** (0.429)
Region 6 (Southern Africa)	-0.926** (0.396)	-0.830* (0.427)	-0.827** (0.418)	-0.740* (0.412)
Region 7 (Central Africa)	-0.942** (0.372)	-0.860** (0.399)	-0.838** (0.390)	-0.797** (0.398)
Cold War	-0.119 (0.101)	-0.081 (0.103)	-0.063 (0.107)	-0.177* (0.096)
Constant	-0.457 (0.671)	-0.543 (0.706)	-0.720 (0.714)	-0.654 (0.713)
N	4355	4170	4170	4170
AIC	6868.5	6604.9	6583.0	6496.9
BIC	6970.5	6712.6	6703.4	6617.3

North America is the reference category for regions; only significant regions are listed.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

Appendix C4: Militarized Interstate Disputes – All Ongoing Poisson Regressions.

	Base Model	Shock Model	Internal Model	Neighborhood Model
Actual Political Shocks (APS)		0.012** (0.005)	0.012** (0.006)	0.008* (0.005)
Internal Unrest			0.095 (0.065)	
APS##Internal Unrest			0.010 (0.008)	
Neighborhood Unrest				0.089*** (0.028)
APS##Neighborhood Unrest				0.004*** (0.001)
Polity	0.020 (0.012)	0.021* (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.025** (0.013)
lnGDP Per Capita	-0.112* (0.065)	-0.117* (0.066)	-0.090 (0.067)	-0.099 (0.066)
International Rivalry	0.939*** (0.140)	0.929*** (0.142)	0.844*** (0.145)	0.871*** (0.132)
Alliances	0.184*** (0.038)	0.196*** (0.043)	0.191*** (0.040)	0.205*** (0.039)
Territorial Claims	0.524*** (0.128)	0.530*** (0.131)	0.508*** (0.126)	0.504*** (0.120)
Major Power/Regional Power	-0.684*** (0.199)	-0.663*** (0.219)	-0.649*** (0.204)	-0.756*** (0.236)
Region2 (South America)	-1.199*** (0.377)	-1.108*** (0.417)	-1.089*** (0.376)	-0.976** (0.404)
Region5 (West Africa)	-1.396*** (0.449)	-1.369*** (0.492)	-1.387*** (0.470)	-1.205** (0.487)
Region 6 (Southern Africa)	-1.018** (0.439)	-0.929* (0.481)	-0.936** (0.450)	-0.831* (0.478)
Region 7 (Central Africa)	-1.310*** (0.405)	-1.216*** (0.447)	-1.196*** (0.417)	-1.147** (0.461)
Cold War	-0.110 (0.108)	-0.077 (0.109)	-0.055 (0.113)	-0.177* (0.104)
Constant	0.339 (0.694)	0.238 (0.748)	0.055 (0.743)	0.133 (0.761)
N	4355	4170	4170	4170
AIC	8114.1	7773.8	7725.4	7621.2
BIC	8216.1	7881.5	7845.8	7741.6

North America is the reference category for regions; only significant regions are listed.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

Appendix C5: Militarized Interstate Disputes – New Severe Poisson Regressions.

	Base Model	Shock Model	Internal Model	Neighborhood Model
Actual Political Shocks (APS)		0.015*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.005)	-0.025** (0.010)
Internal Unrest			0.128** (0.058)	
APS##Internal Unrest			0.005 (0.007)	
Neighborhood Unrest				0.085*** (0.028)
APS##Neighborhood Unrest				0.005*** (0.001)
Polity	0.019* (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.013 (0.011)	0.022** (0.010)
lnGDP Per Capita	-0.138** (0.059)	-0.149** (0.060)	-0.123** (0.059)	-0.111* (0.058)
International Rivalry	0.873*** (0.131)	0.867*** (0.133)	0.774*** (0.137)	0.803*** (0.122)
Alliances	0.173*** (0.039)	0.180*** (0.043)	0.176*** (0.039)	0.193*** (0.036)
Territorial Claims	0.541*** (0.122)	0.533*** (0.123)	0.505*** (0.121)	0.469*** (0.112)
Major Power/Regional Power	-0.532** (0.226)	-0.503** (0.240)	-0.491** (0.220)	-0.589** (0.246)
Region2 (South America)	-1.082*** (0.379)	-1.032*** (0.398)	-0.996*** (0.361)	-0.843** (0.372)
Region5 (West Africa)	-1.222*** (0.435)	-1.265*** (0.459)	-1.277*** (0.438)	-1.002** (0.442)
Region 6 (Southern Africa)	-1.122** (0.443)	-1.074** (0.463)	-1.068** (0.432)	-0.908** (0.443)
Region 7 (Central Africa)	-1.040*** (0.365)	-1.007*** (0.380)	-0.973*** (0.352)	-0.918** (0.385)
Cold War	0.126 (0.106)	0.156 (0.112)	0.182 (0.116)	0.040 (0.092)
Constant	-0.366 (0.620)	-0.366 (0.644)	-0.555 (0.629)	-0.589 (0.650)
N	4355	4170	4170	4170
AIC	5307.1	5102.9	5074.5	5016.8
BIC	5409.1	5210.6	5194.8	5137.2

North America is the reference category for regions; only significant regions are listed.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

Appendix C6: Militarized Interstate Disputes – Ongoing Severe Poisson Regressions.

	Base Model	Shock Model	Internal Model	Neighborhood Model
Actual Political Shocks (APS)		0.012** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.008* (0.004)
Internal Unrest			0.157** (0.063)	
APS##Internal Unrest			0.005 (0.008)	
Neighborhood Unrest				0.091*** (0.030)
APS##Neighborhood Unrest				0.004*** (0.001)
Polity	0.024* (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)	0.016 (0.012)	0.029** (0.013)
lnGDP Per Capita	-0.157** (0.062)	-0.166*** (0.063)	-0.136** (0.063)	-0.150** (0.062)
International Rivalry	0.983*** (0.143)	0.982*** (0.144)	0.872*** (0.146)	0.918*** (0.137)
Alliances	0.167*** (0.042)	0.174*** (0.047)	0.170*** (0.040)	0.186*** (0.044)
Territorial Claims	0.502*** (0.134)	0.497*** (0.136)	0.462*** (0.130)	0.470*** (0.130)
Major Power/Regional Power	-0.731*** (0.247)	-0.700*** (0.271)	-0.686*** (0.243)	-0.798*** (0.293)
Region2 (South America)	-1.425*** (0.416)	-1.374*** (0.452)	-1.329*** (0.379)	-1.227*** (0.444)
Region5 (West Africa)	-1.469*** (0.483)	-1.503*** (0.525)	-1.521*** (0.468)	-1.326** (0.524)
Region 6 (Southern Africa)	-1.200** (0.484)	-1.171** (0.520)	-1.166*** (0.451)	-1.063** (0.523)
Region 7 (Central Africa)	-1.460*** (0.425)	-1.423*** (0.461)	-1.384*** (0.397)	-1.344*** (0.483)
Cold War	0.059 (0.117)	0.082 (0.120)	0.112 (0.124)	-0.024 (0.109)
Constant	0.496 (0.691)	0.478 (0.742)	0.268 (0.699)	0.393 (0.757)
N	4355	4170	4170	4170
AIC	6669.7	6389.3	6324.6	6266.3
BIC	6771.7	6497.0	6445.0	6386.7

North America is the reference category for regions; only significant regions are listed.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

APPENDIX D

Appendix D1: Aggregate and Individual Human Rights Ordered-Logit Regressions, with Civil War.

	Base Aggregate Model	Shock Aggregate Model	Disap. Model	Killings Model	Impris. Model	Torture Model
Actual Political Shock (APS)		-0.029* (0.017)	-0.028** (0.014)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.017)
Executive Constraints	0.359*** (0.047)	0.346*** (0.047)	0.175*** (0.052)	0.040 (0.042)	0.563*** (0.053)	0.205*** (0.048)
lnGDP Per Capita	0.174* (0.097)	0.159 (0.098)	0.036 (0.099)	0.198** (0.092)	0.069 (0.110)	0.100 (0.100)
lnTotal Population	-0.582*** (0.053)	-0.599*** (0.054)	-0.416*** (0.063)	-0.490*** (0.063)	-0.484*** (0.071)	-0.478*** (0.059)
lnAid Assistance	-0.089*** (0.022)	-0.0941*** (0.022)	-0.033 (0.041)	-0.115*** (0.020)	-0.055** (0.023)	-0.084*** (0.019)
Third Party Presence	-0.655*** (0.180)	-0.646*** (0.182)	-0.771*** (0.235)	-0.506** (0.248)	-0.504* (0.274)	-0.427* (0.236)
Civil War	-2.642*** (0.290)	-2.631*** (0.297)	-2.138*** (0.267)	-2.166*** (0.279)	-1.637*** (0.353)	-1.447*** (0.292)
Cold War	0.872*** (0.166)	0.930*** (0.169)	0.109 (0.213)	0.619*** (0.164)	0.091 (0.177)	1.498*** (0.171)
N	3017	2963	2961	2955	2958	2960
AIC	10130.1	9901.1	3305.1	4512.3	4544.9	4678.3
BIC	10220.3	9997.0	3365.0	4572.2	4604.8	4738.2

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

**Appendix D2: Aggregate and Individual Human Rights – Domestic Unrest
Conditional Ordered-Logit Regressions, with Civil War.**

	Shock Aggregate Model	Disap. Model	Killings Model	Impris. Model	Torture Model
Actual Political Shock (APS)	0.004 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.033 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.021)
Internal Unrest	-0.198*** (0.076)	-0.217** (0.088)	-0.235*** (0.078)	-0.088 (0.079)	-0.126* (0.073)
APS##Internal Unrest	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.012* (0.007)	-0.045*** (0.011)	-0.022 (0.013)	-0.022** (0.010)
Executive Constraints	0.367*** (0.046)	0.195*** (0.051)	0.059 (0.043)	0.570*** (0.053)	0.214*** (0.047)
lnGDP Per Capita	0.130 (0.094)	0.013 (0.098)	0.173** (0.086)	0.055 (0.110)	0.083 (0.096)
lnTotal Population	-0.554*** (0.053)	-0.371*** (0.061)	-0.429*** (0.061)	-0.460*** (0.075)	-0.445*** (0.057)
lnAid Assistance	-0.095*** (0.021)	-0.031 (0.041)	-0.114*** (0.019)	-0.055** (0.023)	-0.083*** (0.019)
Third Party Presence	-0.611*** (0.174)	-0.719*** (0.235)	-0.433* (0.230)	-0.465 (0.283)	-0.403* (0.232)
Civil War	-2.420*** (0.305)	-2.010*** (0.283)	-1.799*** (0.282)	-1.469*** (0.352)	-1.205*** (0.302)
Cold War	0.954*** (0.171)	0.138 (0.218)	0.676*** (0.170)	0.100 (0.179)	1.516*** (0.172)
N	2963	2961	2955	2958	2960
AIC	9824.2	3272.9	4423.2	4535.0	4658.4
BIC	9932.1	3344.9	4495.1	4606.9	4730.3

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

**Appendix D3: Aggregate and Individual Human Rights – Neighborhood Unrest
Conditional Ordered-Logit Regressions, with Civil War.**

	Shock Aggregate Model	Disap. Model	Killings Model	Impris. Model	Torture Model
Actual Political Shock (APS)	-0.035* (0.018)	-0.027* (0.015)	-0.015 (0.018)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.022)
Neighborhood Unrest	-0.037** (0.016)	-0.017 (0.020)	-0.016 (0.016)	-0.057*** (0.020)	-0.034 (0.021)
APS##Neighborhood Unrest	-0.033** (0.014)	-0.033** (0.014)	-0.046*** (0.013)	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.017)
Executive Constraints	0.345*** (0.045)	0.181*** (0.051)	0.048 (0.042)	0.559*** (0.052)	0.201*** (0.047)
lnGDP Per Capita	0.124 (0.092)	0.006 (0.094)	0.173** (0.087)	0.025 (0.107)	0.075 (0.096)
lnTotal Population	-0.558*** (0.056)	-0.385*** (0.069)	-0.459*** (0.065)	-0.438*** (0.076)	-0.450*** (0.061)
lnAid Assistance	-0.092*** (0.022)	-0.032 (0.041)	-0.113*** (0.020)	-0.051** (0.022)	-0.082*** (0.019)
Third Party Presence	-0.646*** (0.170)	-0.765*** (0.235)	-0.479** (0.237)	-0.512* (0.270)	-0.418* (0.229)
Civil War	-2.624*** (0.295)	-2.125*** (0.273)	-2.143*** (0.275)	-1.626*** (0.353)	-1.410*** (0.285)
Cold War	0.946*** (0.170)	0.104 (0.210)	0.616*** (0.170)	0.137 (0.177)	1.527*** (0.173)
N	2963	2961	2955	2958	2960
AIC	9864.7	3294.4	4482.1	4516.5	4668.9
BIC	9972.6	3366.3	4554.0	4588.4	4740.8

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1 ^ p<0.1

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