

ENEMIES AND BROTHERS: NATIONALISM IN RUSSIAN OFFICIAL DISCOURSE
REGARDING CRIMEA

by

Maria Donahoe

Copyright © Maria Donahoe 2021

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF RUSSIAN AND SLAVIC STUDIES

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2021

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

As members of the Master's Committee, we certify that we have read the thesis prepared by Maria Donahoe, titled Enemies and Brothers: Nationalism in Russian Official Discourse Regarding Crimea and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Master's Degree.

L. Klimanova

Dr. Liudmila Klimanova

Date: Dec 15, 2021

John Leafgren

Dr. John Leafgren

Date: Dec 16, 2021

Pat Willerton

Dr. Pat Willerton

Date: Dec 15, 2021

Final approval and acceptance of this thesis is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copies of the thesis to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this thesis prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the Master's requirement.

L. Klimanova

Dr. Liudmila Klimanova
Master's Thesis Committee Chair
Department of Russian and Slavic Studies

Date: Dec 15, 2021

ARIZONA

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to the Department of Russian and Slavic Studies for the opportunity to study and complete my research under the faculty. I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr Liudmila Klimanova, for her dedication and guidance during the completion of my thesis. Many thanks to my committee members, Dr John Leafgren and Dr Pat Willerton. I would also like to thank Professor Suzanne Thompson for her tremendous help and support throughout my time at the University of Arizona. Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their dedication to me during my studies, and their availability to support me at any time day or night, despite the time difference. I dedicate this little brother, my motivation, inspiration, and light of my life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES.....	5
ABSTRACT.....	6
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	7
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	15
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY.....	29
CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS.....	36
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION.....	67
REFERENCES.....	77

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLE 1. Anti-Ukrainian sentiment keyword frequency in news articles.....	47
TABLE 2. Pro-Russian sentiment keyword frequency in articles.....	63
FIGURE 1. Categories of anti-Ukrainian sentiment	65
FIGURE 2. Categories of pro-Russian sentiment.....	66

ABSTRACT

This study focuses on nationalist language in Russian official discourse (political and media discourse) regarding Crimea. The discourse reveals two major trends: anti-Ukrainian sentiment and pro-Russian sentiment. While several studies outline the official narrative and document examples of nationalist language, no study analyzes this language through the lens of nationalist theory. This study aims to 1) outline the language and sentiments in Russian official discourse, 2) place this language within its social/historical context, and 3) explain the emotive power of such language through nationalist theory and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The researcher used Eric Hobsbawm's instrumentalist theory of nationalism and Anthony Smith's ethno-symbolist theory of nationalism, as well as Norman Fairclough's and Teun van Dijk's frameworks of CDA. The research suggests that through ideologically contested language, the discourse presents a narrative of the Ukrainian regime as a threat to Russians in Crimea and highlights Russia's duty to defend its historic homeland.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

On November 21, 2013, in the beginning of what would become a nationalist revolution that elicited a sharp retaliation from Russia, about 2,000 people gathered on the Maidan Square in Kiev to protest the Ukrainian president's refusal to sign an agreement that would bring the country a step closer to joining the European Union. What began as a civic protest soon turned into a nationalist revolution in which "a conservative, Russophobic nationalist ideology came to predominate."¹ Different nationalist groups came together to protest, with the Right Sector, an amalgamation of "radical right-wing movements" which "inherited the Bandera philosophy that Russia was the main enemy in all circumstances at all times," at the forefront.²

Violence filled the Maidan square where the first protester was killed on January 22, 2014. The following day, "insurgents took over regional state administration buildings, effectively ending government control...armed protestors occupied several government buildings, including City Hall, which was festooned with Nazi banners, and also seized a military arsenal."³ The insurgents demanded President Yanukovich's removal, and a month later his impeachment on February 22, 2014 "was accompanied by armed insurgents strutting around the debating chamber." The constitutional process for impeaching a president was ignored, and "MPs were simply instructed to 'sack' Yanukovich." The required 75% majority needed to impeach the president was not reached: only 73% of Parliament voted in favour.⁴ Authorities in Russia viewed Yanukovich's impeachment as what Starikov and Bealiaev call a "silovoi gosudarstvennyi perevorot vo vsei krase."⁵

¹ Richard Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2016), 91.

² Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine*, 84.

³ Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine*, 83.

⁴ Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine*, 94.

⁵ Nikolai Starikov and Dmitrii Beliaev, *Rossia. Krym. Istoria*. (St Petersburg: Piter, 2018), 18.

Thus, a “coup-sponsored” government was born, which voted on February 23 “by an overwhelming majority” to repeal a law that protected Russian (among others) as a minority language in Ukraine. According to Savitskii, this only catalyzed the events in Crimea.⁶ The Russian government viewed this not only as an attack on Russia, but as “an assault against all of the country’s minority nations, and above all against the Russian-speakers in Crimea and the Donbas.”⁷ According to Richard Sakwa, “The forcible seizure of power by radical nationalists represented the breakdown of the constitutional order in Kiev; and if the constitution had been repudiated in the centre, then on what basis could it be defended in the regions?”⁸ The Euromaidan protests combined with the political situation in Kiev sparked fear in both the Russian government and many Russians living in Ukraine. That a popular nationalist movement that promoted Russophobia had overthrown a democratically elected president (journalist A. Brega writes: “v 2010-m godu ukraintsy absolutno chestno i samostoiatel'no vybrali Ianukovycha”) worried officials in Moscow.⁹ The coup, in the government’s point of view, warranted intervention.¹⁰ These several months of unrest culminated in a referendum in which the citizens of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea voted to rejoin the Russian Federation in an overwhelming majority.¹¹

Russian media reporting played a crucial role in shaping the country’s official narrative of the events leading up to the referendum and the referendum itself, framing it as a reunification of Crimea with the motherland, rather than an annexation of a foreign territory. When creating and

⁶ I.Savitskii “Krymskoe obshchestvo kakanyne Russkoi vesny: novoe issledovanie o razvitii russkogo dvizhenie v Krymu,” *Uchenye zapiski Krymskogo federal'nogo universitete imeni V. I. Vernadskogo Seria «Istoricheskie nauki»*, 6, no. 1 (2020), 132.

⁷ Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine*, 96.

⁸ Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine*, 106.

⁹ Starikov and Beliaev, *Rossia*, 19.

¹⁰ A. Brega, “Politiko-Pravovye Aspekty Vkhozhdeniia Krymskogo Poluostrova v Sostav Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Mezhdru Legal'nost'iu i Legitimnost'iu,” *Aktual'nye sotsial'no-politicheskie issledovania* 10, no. 1 (2020), 86.

¹¹ “Za Vkhozhdenie Kryma v Rossiiu Vyskazalis' 96,77% Uchastnikov Referenduma,” RIA Novosti, March 17, 2014, ria.ru/20140317/999795240.html.

disseminating this official narrative, Russian media outlets and politicians relied heavily on nationalist language to provoke an emotional response from the Russian public. Disseminated to the audience, altogether, each individual instance of this nationalist language worked to create a dual-faceted narrative for viewer/listener consumption.

First, the narrative presented the Ukrainian regime as a threat to the Russian nation in Crimea and legitimized Russia's use of self defense of ethnic Russians abroad.¹² Second, the narrative appealed to the importance of Russia and Ukraine's shared history on the Crimean peninsula and emphasized the reunification of a sacred piece of Russian history with the mainland.¹³ Although seemingly contradictory, these two facets flow together to create one seamless narrative laden with nationalism. This narrative established the positions of Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea within the conflict as perceived by the Russian government.

Statement of the Problem

This study aims to understand the narrative presented by the Russian media and politicians. Thus far, research notes and outlines nationalist language in official discourse, but does not analyze it within the context of nationalist theory. Prevailing Western scholarship views the events in Crimea as an annexation of a foreign territory in which a power-hungry Russia is looking to overtake Ukraine (and possibly other surrounding territories). A look at the language used in official discourse tells a different story that is deeply rooted in history and whose sentiments may be explained by nationalist theory.

¹² David Marples, "Russia's Perceptions of Ukraine: Euromaidan and Historical Conflicts," *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 4 (2016).

¹³ Yuri Teper, "Official Russian Identity Discourse in Light of the Annexation of Crimea: National or Imperial?," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 32, no. 4 (2015)

Before trying to analyze the discourse, it is necessary to first determine what Russia's official narrative regarding Crimea is. Mapping out the exact words and phrases that constitute nationalist language in the discourse provides the basis for placing that language into its historical context. Next, understanding the historical context allows the reader to access the nationalist references to Russian history. With this background on how Russian nationalism emerges in context, it is possible to analyze the linguistic strategies employed in the previously recorded and mapped language.

To determine what constitutes nationalist language in official discourse, it is necessary to develop a "road map" of the relevant lexemes and phrases. A database of each instance of language that promotes a nationalist ideology will include samples of language which either 1) presents Ukraine as the "other" or 2) emphasizes Russia's historical connection to Ukraine. Such mapping will provide an outline of each type of nationalist sentiment, and how/in what contexts they occur. This data will be the basis for analysis.

Understanding the reasoning behind the nationalist sentiments that crop up in official Russian discourse requires a deep knowledge of the history that shapes the contemporary Russian mentality. The narrative is primarily concerned with Crimea's legacy in both Kievan Rus' and World War II and relies heavily on historical references to these periods. The link between history and nationalism allows one to trace both how nationalism arises from a given context and how nationalist sentiments influence a population. To understand the effectiveness of Russian media narratives surrounding Crimea and their success in drawing citizens' support of the reunification/annexation, the nationalist sentiments in these narratives must be placed in their historical context.

Having established the appropriate nationalist context, it is possible to analyze the linguistic strategies used in Russian official discourse. Nationalist ideology lends itself to certain linguistic strategies such as polarization and negative other presentation that play off nationalist sentiments. Linguistic strategies work by drawing upon a mental reservoir of social and historical information that are activated when listeners interpret discourse. For example, discourse referring to the orchestrators of the coup in Ukraine as Nazis activates the historical memory and posits Ukraine as the other in negative other presentation, while discourse referring to Crimea's role in WWII reminds the audience of Russia's military glory and presents Crimea as an integral part of Russian history.

Background and Need

Thus far, studies published on the topic of nationalist language regarding Crimea offer a summary of the language and map out the overall official narrative. While existing studies do note that Russian media and politicians use nationalist language when discussing the reunification/annexation, there is no analysis within different theories of nationalism. This thesis aims to analyze the language used within two frameworks of nationalism: Eric Hobsbawm's Instrumentalist theory and Anthony Smith's Ethno-symbolist theory.^{14,15} By using these two theories to analyze the official language and place it into context, this thesis explores the reasons for and implications of the nationalist sentiments in the official narrative within a new theoretical framework and aims to shed new light on Russian nationalism.

¹⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, "Ethnic Nationalism in the Late Twentieth Century," in *Ethnicity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

¹⁵ Anthony Smith, "Ethno-Symbolism and the Study of Nationalism," in *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

First, determining the narrative within the context of nationalist theory allows for the mapping of the narrative along the lines of this theory, and allows the selection of relevant material for analysis. Nationalist context also helps studying the correct historical context and determines which historical events are instrumental in the construction of current nationalist sentiment. Finally, analyzing the discourse through the lens of nationalist theory demonstrates how certain linguistic strategies are effective in the intersection of nationalism and language.

Research questions

This thesis aims to answer three major questions. First: What is the overall narrative present in the official discourse? The researcher will trace the relevant lexical items that constitute nationalist language appearing in media reporting and political speech. Second: How do these items (tokens) work as part of different strategies to disseminate an ideology to the audience? Using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the researcher will explore which linguistic strategies appear in the discourse and how they influence the audience. Finally: How do these nationalist lexemes assume the nationalist sentiment that makes them effective in those strategies? An analysis of the language used in the context of nationalist theory relates this context to the appropriate linguistic strategy to explore how they relate to each other. A CDA analysis of the data will reveal the relationship between nationalism and linguistic strategies in narrative creation. Because of the cyclical and contextual nature of CDA and the contextual importance of nationalism, the two frameworks complement each other in the given analysis.

Significance to the field

Studying nationalism and nationalistic views reveals socio-cultural information about a given area: it explains personal biases and shows how political decisions may be made based on how a country perceives itself and outsiders. The other contribution the research aims to make is the representation of an alternative viewpoint to the traditional Western narratives concerning Russia. As Richard Sakwa aptly points out, “What for Moscow was a defensive reaction, above all to prevent in Crimea what it considered a putsch in Kiev, confirmed in the West already deep-seated prejudices about Russia’s potential to challenge the Western-dominated international order.”¹⁶ By exploring the discourse comprising the Russian narrative, the researcher aims to contribute to existing scholarship by providing a Russian-centric evaluation of the conflict.

Definitions

In this thesis, the events in Crimea are referred to as the “annexation/reunification” to remain unbiased when defining it. Russian official discourse refers both to Russian media discourse and political speech reported in the media. The media analyzed is either owned by the government or supports it and is an instrumental tool of disseminating official government stances.¹⁷ Regarding nationalism, the two theories will be discussed in detail in the methodology chapter, however, a short definition is provided here. In his instrumentalist theory, Eric Hobsbawm defines nationalism as imposed by the elite and born out of fear that an outside group poses a threat to one’s nation.¹⁸ Anthony Smith takes an ethno-symbolist approach which views the nation as a historical phenomenon around which identities are created and shared.¹⁹

¹⁶ Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine*, 106.

¹⁷ “A Guide to Media and Journalism in Russia,” Geohistory, last modified May 3, 2020. <https://geohistory.today/media-journalism-russia/>

¹⁸ Hobsbawm, “Ethnic Nationalism” (1996).

¹⁹ Smith, “Ethno-Symbolism” (1999).

These theories offer two different approaches to nationalism that each reflect one of the main facets of the Russian official narrative. Hobsbawm's instrumentalist theory lends itself to analyzing anti-Ukrainian sentiment as it focuses on the idea of an enemy (the media's presentation of the power in Kiev as a threat to Russians and Russian-speakers in both Crimea and throughout Ukraine). Smith's ethno-symbolist theory is useful when analyzing pro-Russian sentiment since it focuses on the idea of historic homeland, creation myths, and nations beyond borders (the media's view of Crimea as a part of Russia despite geopolitical borders). Because each aspect of the official narrative is significantly different, the framework of nationalism in which to analyze them was chosen by its best fit for both anti-Ukrainian language and pro-Russian language.

Limitations and Biases

The study is limited by ease of access to Russian media articles/reports. Many news sites are behind a paywall, which limits the diversity and amount of articles available for analysis. Physical copies of newspapers are also unavailable, however they are not useful when performing a keyword search in order to perform a keyword analysis. Additionally, while this thesis aims to provide and analyze the Russian perspective on the events in Crimea, the researcher comes from a Western context and some Western biases may remain.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Russian official discourse (media reporting and political speech) relies heavily on nationalist language to create and disseminate a particular narrative regarding the annexation/reunification of Crimea in March of 2014. This narrative consists of two main facets. First, the discourse posits Ukraine as an enemy to Russians residing in Crimea and describes the Ukrainian government as having been overtaken by neo-Nazis and Russophobes. Second, the narrative highlights the role of Crimea in different periods of Russian history and justifies its long-awaited return to mainland Russia. These narratives are deeply rooted in Russian history, which informs the linguistic strategies used to construct them.

The literature review will address three aspects of the literature related to Russian official discourse. The first section will document research related to the prevalent trends of the language in order to outline a general narrative. The second section will address research focused on contemporary Russian nationalism in the context of foreign relations with Ukraine. Finally, the third section will focus on research related to the specific linguistic strategies used in Russian official discourse.

Section I: Trends in Discourse

This section explores literature that focuses on the overall trends in Russian discourse regarding Crimea. The articles reviewed here outline some of the major narratives present in the discourse, ranging from language that presents Ukraine as an enemy to language that presents reunification with Russia as the logical choice for Crimea. The discourse outlined in the literature focuses on Euromaidan, Russia and Crimea's roles in the Great Patriotic War, and the

West's intervention in Kiev. The literature also discusses the ethnic component of the language used in the discourse, with a shift from *rossyiskii* to the more ethnic *russkii*.

The official Russian narrative gave considerable focus to Ukraine's role as Russia's enemy in the Crimean crisis. David Marples analyzed the representations of the Euromaidan in Russian media, of which "the prevailing theme is of a neo-Nazi takeover of Ukraine and the removal of a legitimate president."²⁰ The study took place in 2016 and analyzed publications in online Russian newspapers such as *Rossiiskaia gazeta* and *Vesti* in February 2014 and February 2015 (following Yanukovich's overthrow and the second Minsk agreement between Ukraine and Russia). Marples argues that "there is a clearly defined methodology and purpose to the treatment of Euromaidan by the Russian media."²¹ The media focuses on Yanukovich's removal by Ukrainian nationalists, the role of the West in the Euromaidan, and anti-Russian indoctrination in Ukraine.

Beginning with Euromaidan and the removal of pro-Russian president Yanukovich, the Russian media described the protests and new regime as "fascist," "neo-Nazis," "ultra-nationalist," etc.²² The media repeatedly describes the forces in Ukraine using terminology referring to WWII. According to Marples, the "Russian media provide almost daily pseudo-historical accounts of the Soviet and Imperial Russian past and especially World War II," comparing the current Ukrainian regime to Russia's historical enemy.²³ A key component of this narrative is the adoration in Ukraine of Stepan Bandera, "who is regarded as a traitor to his country" in Russia.²⁴ The role of the European Union and the United States is also a point of contention in Russian media. Marples notes that "virtually all reports from media affiliated with

²⁰ David Marples, "Russia's Perceptions of Ukraine: Euromaidan and Historical Conflicts," *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 4 (2016): 434.

²¹ Marples, "Historical Conflicts," 424.

²² Marples, "Historical Conflicts," 431.

²³ Marples, "Historical Conflicts," 432.

²⁴ Marples, "Historical Conflicts," 432-433.

the government maintain that Euromaidan could not have occurred without support from the EU and the United States.”²⁵ The media blamed the United States for meddling in Ukrainian affairs and sponsoring the coup in February 2014. Finally, the article discusses the role of anti-Russian indoctrination in Ukraine. According to Marples, the Russian media’s representation of the instigators of the coup as the “heirs of Bandera” demonstrates the official “view that the current leaders...seek to rewrite the history of the country” and “indoctrinate children in anti-Soviet and Russophobic interpretations of the past.”²⁶ Marples concludes that the narrative presents the Euromaidan and the overthrow of Yanukovych as a “neo-Nazi takeover of Ukraine” that was backed and funded by the West.²⁷

The other main aspect of the Russian narrative is Crimea’s place in Russian history and its historical ties with mainland Russia. Yuri Teper discussed the nationalist terminology prevalent in the Kremlin’s account of the annexation/reunification of Crimea. The study focused on the nationalist and ethnic aspects of political and media discourse and how the discourse framed Russian identity and “Russianness” in the context of Crimea. Teper analyzed broadcasts from four political television programmes from January to June 2014: *Politika*, *Voskresnoe Vremia*, *Voskresnyi vecher s Vladimirom Solov'evym*, and *Vesti Nedeli*. In addition to the four programmes, Teper also analyzed Putin’s declarations about Crimea.

Teper argues that the main strategies used in creating the Russian official narrative are 1) the use of the adjective *ruskii* and 2) the use of familial metaphors. First, the use of *ruskii* over *rossiiskii* demonstrates an “ethnicization” of the discourse: Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s and Vladimir Putin in his early presidency used *rossiyanie* which focused more on citizenship than

²⁵ Marples, “Historical Conflicts,” 427.

²⁶ Marples, “Historical Conflicts,” 430.

²⁷ Marples, “Historical Conflicts,” 434.

ethnicity, but later in his presidency, Putin shifted to using the ethnically-charged *russkie*.²⁸ For example, he referred to Crimea as “native *russskiy* soil,” and Sevastopol as a “native *russskiy* city.”²⁹ *Russskii* is also present in conjunction with allusions to Crimean history and military heritage, particularly during WWII. Teper argues that the use of *russskii* indicates that the discourse constructs Russian identity as primarily linguistic and ethnic, which transcends borders.

Teper also notes the emphasis the official narrative places on *reunification*. The discourse paints Russia as a divided nation and the events in Crimea are merely a return to a natural state. Familial metaphors are prevalent in constructing this narrative: Putin has compared Crimea to a “ship returning to its home port,” and states that Russia welcomed Crimeans “home as its daughters and sons.”³⁰ The article documents the language used to construct the second half of the official narrative: that Crimea is an integral part of Russian heritage that has returned to the motherland. Teper concludes that official discourse “was marked by a profound ethnicization,” and focused on “Russia’s moral obligation to protect fellow Russkiye beyond its state borders and the need to reunite the divided Russkiy nation.”³¹

Seregina and Chudinov also note the prevalence of metaphors in Russian media. The authors explore the language used leading up to the referendum and conclude that media (studied media includes televised news, billboards, flyers, etc.) used “domestic metaphor” to support the joining of Crimea with the Russian Federation.³² According to the authors, this was achieved through lexical items chosen to convey a certain image of Russia.

²⁸ Yuri Teper, “Official Russian Identity Discourse in Light of the Annexation of Crimea: National or Imperial?,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 32, no. 4 (2015): 381.

²⁹ Teper, “Identity Discourse,” 385.

³⁰ Teper, “Identity Discourse,” 383.

³¹ Teper, “Identity Discourse,” 391-392.

³² I A Seregina and A P Chudinov, “Metaforicheskie Slogany v Diskurse Referenduma o Statuse Kryma,” *Politicheskaia Lingvistika* 48, no. 2 (2014), 92.

“Obrashchaet na sebja vnimanie posledovatel'naia vnutritekstovaia podderzhka rassmatrivaemoi metafory, kotoraiia osushchestvlietsia putem ispol'zovaniia leksiki s pozitivnymi smyslami: *vzaimovyruchka, otzyvchivost', chestnost', obshchie interesy, bratstvo, terpimost', ponimanie, otkrytost', gotovnost' prenebrech' lichnymi ambitsiiami radi obshchego blaga, otvetstvennost' za svoi postupki, trezvast' myslei i postupkov, sposobnost' prognozirovat' svoi deistviia, dobrota.*”³³

(Attention is drawn to the consistent internal support of the metaphors under consideration, which is implemented by using vocabulary with positive meanings: *mutual assistance, responsiveness, honesty, common interests, fraternity, tolerance, understanding, openness, willingness to neglect personal ambitions for the common good, responsibility for their actions, sobriety of thoughts and actions, ability to predict their actions, kindness.*)

The authors provide examples of commonly used metaphors, such as “16 Marta -- domoi -- v Rossiuu!”³⁴ These metaphors, according to Seregina and Chudinov, represent the events in Crimea as a return to the homeland “iz chuzhoi, negostepriimnoi strany.”³⁵

Another strategy of Russian media was reporting the words of Crimean citizens themselves as they returned from the polls. The words “vozvrashchaetsia domoi”/“vosvrashchenie domoi” are continuously recycled.³⁶ The article also analyzes Putin’s use of domestic metaphor in his speech following the vote. Putin uses imagery of a ship returning to its home port and sailors supporting their close ones.³⁷ According to the authors, “Eti slova prezidenta otchetlivo razgranichivaiut ‘svoikh’, k kotorym otnosiatsia vse zhiteli

³³ Seregina and Chudinov, “Slogany,” 92.

³⁴ Seregina and Chudinov, “Slogany,” 91.

³⁵ Seregina and Chudinov, “Slogany,” 91.

³⁶ Seregina and Chudinov, “Slogany,” 91.

³⁷ Seregina and Chudinov, “Slogany,” 91.

poluostrova, i ‘chuzhikh’, k chislu kotorykh otnosiatsia storonniki ideologii Stepana Bandery i ego posledovatelei.”³⁸ (These words of the president clearly distinguish between 'their own', which include all residents of the peninsula, and 'strangers', which includes supporters of the ideology of Stepan Bandera and his followers.) Finally, the authors make an important distinction: these domestic metaphors have a long history in Russia-Ukraine discourse and thus the metaphors themselves seem “traditsionnye, estestvennye, privychnye.”³⁹ Overall, the article provides further documentation of the prevalence of domestic metaphor in Russian official discourse regarding Crimea.

The literature demonstrates that the Russian narrative consists of two main facets that are disseminated through media and political speech. As indicated by Marples, Russian media uses references to fascism and Nazis when describing the Euromaidan and the coup that deposed Yanukovich. The other two articles highlight the prevalence of familial metaphors used to describe Crimea’s “reunification” with Russia. The literature notes the role of history in each of these narratives, which underscores Crimea’s role in Russian history. However, while Teper notes the nationalist nature of media and political discourse, the articles generally do not discuss this nature in depth. The research mainly serves to outline the discourse used, but analysis within a nationalist framework is limited.

Section II: Russian Nationalism and National Identity in the Context of Ukraine

Nationalism is a difficult topic to define, with numerous scholars proposing their own theories to explain this phenomenon. This section explores literature dealing with Russian nationalism and its modern manifestations. In the first article, Laruelle discusses different levels

³⁸ Seregina and Chudinov, “Slogany,” 92.

³⁹ Seregina and Chudinov, “Slogany,” 92.

of nationalism in Russia, from the government level to grassroots organizations. Second, Evgen'eva explores the opinions of Russians themselves by investigating the effect of the media on Russians' national perception. Both articles offer a different perspective on nationalism in Russia, from an overall survey to a smaller scale study.

Marlene Laruelle explores the role Ukraine plays in the construction of Russian nationalism and the numerous sources for this nationalism. Russian nationalism is not uniform. From the Kremlin to the Orthodox Church to private organizations, "a variety of interest groups produce varied nationalist narratives."⁴⁰ For example, the Izborsky Club, created in 2012, serves as the main nationalist think tank. However, one of the main actors is "the media, and television above all," which "serve to disseminate consensus-generating views on Russia's mission in the world, its national identity, and the soundness of current public policies."⁴¹

Laruelle notes that Russian nationalism comes from above and below; nationalism is not a purely top-down phenomenon. Grassroots nationalist organizations claim two main narratives, the first of which is "civilizational: Russia is a unique country whose destiny is to be among the great powers, and whose culture both represents the distinctive 'Russian soul' and carries a universalism that legitimizes messianic tendencies."⁴² The second is xenophobic and "claims that Russia's national identity is at risk from an invasion of immigrants."⁴³ However, Laruelle notes that the xenophobic narrative is rarely invoked by authorities and constitutes a mainly bottom-up nationalism.

Regarding Ukraine and the annexation/reunification of Crimea, the Russian government viewed the Maidan "as a neo-Nazi coup organized with the support of the United States."⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Marlene Laruelle, "Russian Nationalism and Ukraine," *Current History* 113, no. 765 (2014), 272.

⁴¹ Laruelle, "Russian Nationalism," 273.

⁴² Laruelle, "Russian Nationalism," 273.

⁴³ Laruelle, "Russian Nationalism," 273.

⁴⁴ Laruelle, "Russian Nationalism," 274.

According to Laruelle, this nationalism is “primarily instrumental.”⁴⁵ Putin “stirred historical memory” and “emphasized above all Russia’s relationship to Russian-speaking people and ethnic Russians abroad.”⁴⁶ This implies that Putin and government-controlled media disseminate a nationalist ideology that presents Ukraine as the enemy of Russians abroad in Crimea, a narrative which relies on historical memory. Laruelle concludes that the primary characteristic of Russian nationalism in the context of Ukraine is “the gap between Russia’s territorial body and its cultural body.”⁴⁷

Russian national identity in the context of Crimea is not only represented in the media, but is perceived by Russian citizens themselves. Evgen'eva explores the effects of Russian media on Russian citizens’ perception of the Russian government. The article conceptualizes the Russian media representations and mass perceptions of Crimea and Russian identity in terms of P.K. Grechko’s concepts of the mental basis of identity. According to Grechko, identity is the mental association of an individual with a human community. This mental association includes values, norms, and ideals.⁴⁸ Evgen'eva argues that one of the most important communities is that of the nation, which she defines as not only having an ethnic and political component, but also a “mental nature.”⁴⁹ According to a research project conducted at Moscow State University, national-state identity is defined as “samoassotsiatsiia lichnosti s geopoliticheskim obrazom opredelenного natsional'no-gosudarstvenного konstrukta, imeiushchaia v svoem osnovanii personal'nye freimy (tsennosti i predstavleniia), zakrepliaiushchiasia i proiavliaiushchiasia cherez sistemu simvolicheskikh reprezentatsii.”⁵⁰ (The self-association of a person with a

⁴⁵ Laruelle, “Russian Nationalism,” 275

⁴⁶ Laruelle, “Russian Nationalism,” 275.

⁴⁷ Laruelle, “Russian Nationalism,” 275.

⁴⁸ T. V. Evgen'eva, “Krym v prostranstve rossiiskoi Identichnosti: obrazno-simvolicheskoe izmerenie,” *Tsennosti i Smysly* 50, no. 4 (2017), 21.

⁴⁹ Evgen'eva, “Rossiiskoi Identichnosti,” 21.

⁵⁰ Evgen'eva, “Rossiiskoi Identichnosti,” 22.

geopolitical image of a certain national-state construct, which has personal frames (values and representations) at its foundation, anchoring the identity and pro-identity through a system of symbolic representations.) Thus, the geopolitical aspect of identity is closely associated with symbols which were disseminated by “vlastnye politicheskie elity.”⁵¹

One strong symbol was the depiction of the Crimean peninsula on a poster: “my mozhem otsenivat' samyi tirazhiruemyi plakat, na kotorom vizual'noe izobrazhenie Krymskogo poluostrova, okrashennogo v tsveta rossiiskogo flaga, protivopostavialos' krasno-chernomu risunku s nakhodiashcheisia v tsentre ego svastikoi.”⁵² (We can evaluate the most replicated poster, on which the visual image of the Crimean Peninsula, painted in the colors of the Russian flag, was contrasted with a red and black drawing with swastikas in the center.) The message is clear--Crimea will either remain Russian, or fall to neo-fascists. Another strong symbol in the news was imagery of military battles. According to Evgen'eva, these images were perceived by the masses, “dlia kotorogo eti sobytiia byli estestvennym elementom istoricheskoi pamiati.”⁵³ These symbols play on a concept Grechko calls the “Other” (Drugoi).⁵⁴ Being likened to a war, leading up to the referendum Crimea was represented as being at a crossroads between two Others, with Ukraine being the negative symbol and Russia assuming a positive identification.⁵⁵

To measure how effective this media narrative was on Russian citizens, respondents were asked to finish statements such as “Rossiia -- eto...” and to draw Russia as a house or an imaginary animal.⁵⁶ According to the data,

“uslovnye patrioty-gosudarstvenniki stroiat svoiu identichnost' na identifikatsii s pozitivnym obrazom rossiiskogo gosudarstva. V simvolicheskom prostranstve otvetov i

⁵¹ Evgen'eva, “Rossiiskoi Identichnosti,” 22.

⁵² Evgen'eva, “Rossiiskoi Identichnosti,” 25.

⁵³ Evgen'eva, “Rossiiskoi Identichnosti,” 25.

⁵⁴ Evgen'eva, “Rossiiskoi Identichnosti,” 26.

⁵⁵ Evgen'eva, “Rossiiskoi Identichnosti,” 26.

⁵⁶ Evgen'eva, “Rossiiskoi Identichnosti,” 23.

proektivnykh risunkov dominiruet gosudarstvennaia simvolika, izobrazhenie Kremliia i prezidenta, razlichnye voennye atributy, prizvannye oboznachit' silu i moshch' Rossii. V proektivnykh risunkakh dom izobrazhaetsia v vide kreposti, a nesushchestvuiushchee zhiivotnoe snabzhenno moshchnymi kogtiami i klykami.”⁵⁷

(Conditional patriots-statesmen build their identity on identification with the positive image of the Russian state. The symbolic space of answers and projective drawings is dominated by state symbols, the image of the Kremlin and the president, and various military attributes designed to denote the strength and power of Russia. In the projective drawings, the house is depicted as a fortress, and the non-existent animal is equipped with powerful claws and fangs.)

Thus, the media’s focus on Russia as a powerhouse heavily influenced national identity in regards to the collective view of the power of the Russian government and Russia’s position in the world. However, the historical events symbolized in the media did not have as strong of an effect and were “weakly represented” among respondents.⁵⁸

The research literature explores Russian nationalism and national identity in the context of Ukraine. While nationalism is not uniform, Laruelle notes that the Russian media plays a significant role in disseminating nationalist narratives to the public. A major aspect of Russian nationalism is the role of Russia as a “great power” in the world.⁵⁹ This idea is shared by many Russians, as evidenced in Evgen'eva’s research, where respondents depicted Russia/the Russian government as a powerful institution. The articles are limited in their discussion of nationalism. Laruelle mentions instrumentalism, but does not expand upon this framework. Evgen'eva talks at

⁵⁷ Evgen'eva, “Rossiiskoi Identichnosti,” 29.

⁵⁸ Evgen'eva, “Rossiiskoi Identichnosti,” 30.

⁵⁹ Laruelle, “Russian Nationalism,” 273.

length about national symbols, but not nationalism itself. These ideas will be developed within specific frameworks of nationalism in the current research.

Section III: Linguistic Strategies in Russian Official Discourse

When using nationalist language in discourse, Russian media encodes it in various linguistic strategies. This section explores literature that deals with the linguistic strategies present in the official discourse. The main strategies discussed are legitimation/delegitimation strategies, or how the discourse legitimizes Russian action and delegitimizes the Ukrainian opposition. Both articles discuss polarization and negative other-presentation and their prevalence in the main media narratives regarding Crimea.

Olga Pasitselska explores how Russian media frames the Crimean conflict. Through the media, “the government possesses the greatest strength in promotion and spreading of frames and thereby sets a dominant interpretation of events throughout the conflict.”⁶⁰ The government presents these frames through linguistic strategies such as legitimation, de-legitimation, positive self-presentation, and negative other-presentation. The article analyzes newscasts from two government-owned television channels (Channel one and Russia-1) from the last week of November 2013 to the last week of March 2014.

Pasitselska uses van Dijk’s theoretical framework of legitimation, which she defines as “a discourse that explains and justifies social activity and typically involves providing ‘good reasons, ground, or acceptable motivations for past or present action.’”⁶¹ This discourse strategy also involves “moral evaluation legitimation,” where the media “pronounces a certain group of

⁶⁰ Olga Pasitselska, “Ukrainian Crisis through the Lens of Russian Media: Construction of Ideological Discourse,” *Discourse & Communication* 11, no. 6 (July 2017), 594.

⁶¹ Pasitselska, “Ideological Discourse,” 595.

people as a ‘threat’ to state security.”⁶² By presenting Ukraine as a threat to Russian security, the media legitimizes Russian action in Crimea. According to Pasitselska, “one of the powerful instruments of de-legitimation...is a portrayal of ‘Maidan’ supporters as radical nationalists and, ultimately, as neo-fascists..”⁶³ In this portrayal, media reporters use “highly moralized lexical resources,” the most frequent of which are “‘radicals’, ‘extremists’, ‘nationalists’, and finally, ‘fascists/Nazi’.”⁶⁴ These historical references work to legitimize Russia’s actions as self-defense and de-legitimize the coup-backed government born out of the Maidan.

Pasitelska also discusses positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, which serves to “promote one group and debase or attack the opposition” through “discursive tactics that play in various ways upon dimensions of sameness and difference.”⁶⁵ This strategy creates an “us vs them” dichotomy between Russia and the West, where “Russia is seen by interviewees as a better partner and ally for Ukraine than the USA or the EU. In some way, Russia is even considered not a foreign country but ‘our homeland’.”⁶⁶ In contrast, the West is the enemy who conspired against Russia in Ukraine by sponsoring the Maidan. Pasitelska concludes that discourse works to legitimize the “us” (Russia) and de-legitimize “them” (Ukraine and the West) through “cultural-historical constructs” such as references to the “Ukrainian Nazi”.⁶⁷ The media also highlights the “otherness” of European values in comparison with traditional Russian values.⁶⁸

Anastasia Kolmogorova and Yulia Gornostaeva also examine the relationship between the Russian state ideology and media coverage and discuss how Russian media manipulates the

⁶² Pasitselska, “Ideological Discourse,” 595.

⁶³ Pasitselska, “Ideological Discourse,” 597.

⁶⁴ Pasitselska, “Ideological Discourse,” 597.

⁶⁵ Pasitselska, “Ideological Discourse,” 595.

⁶⁶ Pasitselska, “Ideological Discourse,” 600.

⁶⁷ Pasitselska, “Ideological Discourse,” 606.

⁶⁸ Pasitselska, “Ideological Discourse,” 606.

audience through linguistic strategies. The article examines Russian and Western (USA) media from May 2014 to May 2016 and compares how each presents the annexation/reunification of Crimea. The authors use van Dijk's ideas on the role of context in discourse and his theory of polarization in their analysis. Context includes "circumstances, time, place, event, participants, sphere, participants' role, social relationships between participants, cognitive characteristics of the participants."⁶⁹ Polarization refers to using negative-other presentation to show a dichotomy between a social group and the "other" or enemy. The authors analyze 50 articles from Western media (including the New York Times, the Daily Telegraph, etc) and 50 articles from Russia Today at the lexical level. Kolmogorova and Gornostaeva note that "both Western and Russian media often chose words with negative connotation to describe each other and use the strategy of negative other-presentation to manipulate the audience."⁷⁰ This is achieved in Russian media through the use of lexical units with negative connotations such as "violent extremist organizations" and "fascists".⁷¹

The literature in this section highlights the Russian media's use of discourse strategies such as polarization and legitimation when framing the Crimean conflict. The articles note the important historical context of lexemes used to describe Ukraine and the Maidan, which are rooted in the memory of WWII. The negative connotation associated with Russia's historical enemy (Nazi Germany) is projected onto Russia's current enemy in Ukraine. However, the articles do not address the impact of historical context from a nationalist perspective.

Summary

⁶⁹ Anastasua Kolmogorova and Yulia Gornostaeva, "Media Coverage of Current Political Situation in Ukraine: Discourse Analysis," *Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences*, 2017, 3.

⁷⁰ Kolmogorova and Gornostaeva, "Media Coverage," 4.

⁷¹ Kolmogorova and Gornostaeva, "Media Coverage," 4.

The existing research demonstrates a clear existence of nationalist language in Russian official discourse, and that this language falls into two distinct categories: anti-Ukrainian sentiment and pro-Russian sentiment. The research hints that this language is nationalist, but does not perform an in-depth analysis of the language within a theory of nationalism. Laruelle's article, for example, provides an introduction to nationalism in Russia, but offers only a starting point for deeper analysis. Several articles do offer a discourse analysis of the language used in official discourse, namely Pasitselska and Kolmogorova & Gornostaeva. These articles mention strategies such as polarization (one of van Dijk's approaches to CDA), positive self-presentation, and negative other-presentation. The context for these strategies is not explored in a nationalist context, which would offer a deeper analysis of the historical and social contexts of the discourse.

Overall, the existing research highlights a general narrative, discusses nationalism to a minimal extent, and utilizes a degree of Critical Discourse Analysis. The current thesis aims to add to the existing research by contextualizing the discourse in history, and explaining the historical significance of this context through theories of nationalism. It also aims to link nationalist language with the linguistic strategies in which it appears, and discuss how different notions of nationalism align with the goals of the associated linguistic strategies.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

The given study examines the language used in Russian official discourse to create a narrative regarding Crimea. The nationalist language used in this discourse is strongly rooted in a historical context, the importance of which can be explored through nationalist theory. Application of nationalist theory connects key moments in Russian history to current discourse and explains the strength of the language employed in official discourse. The study also analyzes this language through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA examines language through its social context and highlights the cyclical nature of discourse as being both shaped by and shaping society. Thus, the contextual aspect of CDA complements nationalist theory. CDA also offers a linguistic approach through analyzing the linguistic strategies present in the discourse that couple with historical references/nationalist sentiments and amplify the narrative. The researcher aims to answer the following questions: what narrative is present in the official Russian discourse, how do the lexical items and metaphors comprising this narrative work within different linguistic strategies to disseminate the government ideology to the public, and how do these nationalist lexemes assume a nationalist sentiment which makes them effective in the linguistic strategies?

To establish a theoretical framework through which to explore these questions, first, nationalism in the context of this study must be defined. To understand such a highly nuanced subject, many scholars have proposed their own theories of nationalism, ranging from primordialism (nations are a natural phenomenon) to constructivism (nations are social constructions). This study is concerned with primarily two theories: ethno-symbolism and instrumentalism. In his ethno-symbolist theory, historian Anthony Smith argues that nations are

historic phenomena that develop over time through historical processes.⁷² According to Smith, “a central theme of historical ethno-symbolism is the relationship of shared memories to collective cultural identities...and the cultivation of shared memories is essential to the survival and destiny of such collective identities.”⁷³ Smith refers to these shared long-term memories as a nation’s “ethno-history.”⁷⁴ Given the importance of history in creating a collective identity, it is necessary to examine the relationship between a given nation’s present and past: “*modern* nations may have *pre-modern* precursors and can form around recurrent ethnic antecedents.”⁷⁵ The culmination of historic memory, territory, and origin myths “handed down over generations” form the basis of a nation, and nationalist elites aim to “reconstruct a modern nation in the image of the past *ethnie*.”⁷⁶ Smith defines an *ethnie* (ethnic community) as “a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among the elites.”⁷⁷ Ethno-symbolism, then, holds that nations are “based on ethnic ties” with emphasis on a historical homeland. Given the prevalent geo-political component of the Crimean conflict, the emphasis Smith’s ethno-symbolism theory places on historical homeland makes the theory useful in understanding the pro-Russian aspect of the official Russian narrative.

Another useful theory in understanding this narrative is Eric Hobsbawm’s instrumentalist theory. Hobsbawm views nationalism as a construction of the elite that is exclusive to “all who do not belong.”⁷⁸ According to Hobsbawm, the ruling elite creates nationalism to “impose it on

⁷² Smith, “Ethno-Symbolism,” (1999): 23.

⁷³ Smith, “Ethno-Symbolism,” (1999), 23.

⁷⁴ Smith, “Ethno-Symbolism,” (1997), 24.

⁷⁵ Smith, “Ethno-Symbolism,” (1999), 24.

⁷⁶ Smith, “Ethno-Symbolism,” (1999), 25.

⁷⁷ Smith, “Ethno-Symbolism,” (1999), 26.

⁷⁸ Eric Hobsbawm, “Ethnic Nationalism in the Late Twentieth Century,” in *Ethnicity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996):357.

their peoples.”⁷⁹ In doing so, the elite’s nationalist ideology maintains “vagueness and a lack of programmatic content [that give] it a potentially universal support within its own community.”⁸⁰ Despite its vagueness, nationalism creates a “sense of collective separateness” and instills a fear of an out-group(s) that poses “real or imaginary threats” to a nation.⁸¹

According to Hobsbawm, one of the main mobilizing factors of nations is a fear that “some force, tendency, or enemy... [is perceived] as potentially or actually eroding, corroding, or endangering one’s movement and what it holds dear.”⁸² The fear of a potential threat is what unites a group of people and creates an imagined nation. The “defensive reactions” towards perceived threats characterizes nationalism as “essentially negative” and “divisive.”⁸³ Rather than uniting a group around commonality, “the call of ethnicity or language...is merely a protest against the status quo or, more precisely, against ‘the others’ who threaten the ethnically defined group.”⁸⁴ Hobsbawm’s instrumentalist theory is useful when analysing the component of the Russian official narrative that focuses on the threat the Ukrainian regime poses to ethnic Russians in Crimea.

The nationalist aspect of the Russian official narrative manifests in the language used in creating it and may be revealed through a discourse analysis based on theories by Norman Fairclough and Teun van Dijk. van Dijk defines Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as “a type of discourse analytical approach that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.”⁸⁵ CDA “focuses primarily on *social problems* and political issues...more specifically,

⁷⁹ Eric Hobsbawm, “Ethnic Nationalism,” 358.

⁸⁰ Eric Hobsbawm, “Ethnic Nationalism,” 357.

⁸¹ Eric Hobsbawm, “Ethnic Nationalism,” 357.

⁸² Eric Hobsbawm, “Ethnic Nationalism,” 356.

⁸³ Eric Hobsbawm, “Ethnic Nationalism,” 356-57.

⁸⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, “Ethnic Nationalism,” 357.

⁸⁵ Teun van Dijk, “Chapter 18: Critical Discourse Analysis,” in *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, London: Academic Press, 1987), 352.

CDA focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of *power* and *dominance* in society.”⁸⁶ Because the study focuses on the role of the media and politicians (dominant social actors) in creating and disseminating an official narrative, the researcher chose CDA as the analytical framework for discussing the discourse.

Ruth Wodak provides an overview of CDA and its interdisciplinary nature. According to Wodak, in CDA “all approaches are problem oriented and thus necessarily interdisciplinary and eclectic.”⁸⁷ Thus, “studies in CDA are multifarious, derived from quite different theoretical backgrounds.”⁸⁸ In this study, the theoretical framework is nationalist theory. One of the most important aspects of CDA is that it views language as “social practice” and takes into account the context in which language is used.⁸⁹ Expanding on the idea that language is both socially constructed and in turn constructs society, Wodak states that “discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned - it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people...it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it.”⁹⁰ The current study is built around this theory: it takes into account the social context of discourse about Crimea and how it is conditioned by existing historical and societal frameworks, and then explores how the discourse itself influences social perceptions of the Crimean crisis.

One of the main challenges in CDA, according to Wodak, is “analyzing, understanding and explaining the relationship between complex historical processes, hegemonic narratives and CDA approaches.”⁹¹ In this way, CDA examines the influence of historical events on present

⁸⁶ van Dijk, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 353.

⁸⁷ Ruth Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory, and Methodology,” in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. Michael Meyer (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2001), 3.

⁸⁸ Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 5.

⁸⁹ Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 5.

⁹⁰ Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 6.

⁹¹ Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 11.

events, and the recontextualization of these events.⁹² This study focuses a great deal on the role of WWII and references to WWII in the discourse in shaping the official narrative on Crimea. CDA also takes into account the idea of in-groups and out-groups, particularly “the analysis of the relationships between the discursive construction of national sameness and the discursive construction of difference leading to the political and social exclusion of specific out-groups.”⁹³ The analysis section of the study spends a considerable amount of time on the presentation of Ukraine as the out-group and Russia/ethnic Russians in Crimea as the in-group, and how these groups are linguistically constructed in the discourse.

The study also draws on the theoretical framework of Norman Fairclough. Fairclough provides a guideline for analyzing the role of interpretation of discourse in CDA--understanding how an audience will interpret a given discursive act directly relates to the production of the discourse. In these productive-interpretive discursive processes there exists an “interplay between properties of texts and a considerable range...of ‘members’ resources’ residing in people’s heads.”⁹⁴ When both producing and interpreting a text, people “draw upon” socially generated members’ resources (MRs), such as “representations of the natural and social worlds they inhabit, values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on.”⁹⁵ In other words, MRs are socially conditioned and influence how an individual interprets discourse. This concept is useful paired with nationalist theory when analyzing Russian official discourse--it helps to trace the social and historical contexts of certain discursive acts to understand how they are effective in evoking nationalist sentiment in the audience.

⁹² Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 11.

⁹³ Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 18.

⁹⁴ Norman Fairclough, “Discourse as Social Practice,” in *Language and Power*, (London: Routledge, Taylor, 2015), 24.

⁹⁵ Fairclough, “Discourses,” 24.

In addition to Fairclough's concept of MRs, van Dijk's concept of polarization further explains how official discourse constructs nationalist narratives. Polarization is a fundamental strategy that the elite "[deploy] in exercising the power of the dominant...group."⁹⁶ In the context of nationalism, polarization is thus by definition instrumental because it a) is disseminated by the elite, and b) focuses on the threat of an out-group. This presentation manifests in discourse as "hyperbole and metaphor," which both semantically and lexically associate the Other with not only difference, but also with deviance and threat. This is useful in analyzing how Russian official discourse uses nationalist language in the form of hyperbole/overwording and metaphor to create a negative-other presentation of Ukraine.

This study analyzes 53 news articles from November 2013-May 2014. The news articles are taken from government run news sources or sources in which the government owns stock in. 27 articles are from online publications of *Ekspert*, a magazine owned by Expert Media Holding. VEB Bank owns 31.2% of Expert Media Holding, and the Russian government owns 100% of VEB Bank.⁹⁷ The magazine's ties to the government establish that their content is acceptable to those in power and thus provides an accurate representation of the official narrative regarding Crimea. 26 articles are from *RIA Novosti*, a state-owned news agency based in Moscow. The RIA Novosti articles were found through the NEXIS database.

Additionally, the thesis analyzes Putin's speech celebrating the "reunification" of Crimea with Russia. Putin gave his speech on March 18, again with the referendum results fresh in everyone's mind. The address contains numerous examples of ideologically-charged language regarding Ukraine and Russia's relations to Crimea.

⁹⁶ van Dijk, "Critical Discourse Analysis," 362.

⁹⁷ A Guide to Media and Journalism in Russia," Geohistory, last modified May 3, 2020. <https://geohistory.today/media-journalism-russia/>

Relevant portions of the articles and speech were coded to trace the main themes in the texts. The first coding category includes language that presents Ukraine as a threat, while the second coding category includes language that focuses on Crimea as the Russian historical homeland. The appropriate lexemes for each category are selected and analysed first within nationalist theory, and then CDA frameworks. The CDA reveals how the chosen words are used in discourse to disseminate the official narrative (for example, polarization strategies)⁹⁸, and the nationalist context reveals what it is about the words that allows them to be effective in disseminating this narrative.

In addition to a qualitative analysis of the articles and speech, a quantitative analysis of the news articles was also performed. Keyword frequency was determined for several sub-categories of lexemes within the two main categories of anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian speech. When determining the number of each lexeme, words were shortened to their root or first few letters to account for case endings, consonant mutation, and verb endings. The roots were also chosen so that verbs and nouns with the same root would be counted in the same category (for example, radikal and radikalizirovat' were found in a keyword search by searching "radika"). The frequency of lexemes from each category were compared with each other to determine which categories were most popular in the discourse and to help reconstruct the contents of the official narrative. While the researcher did not perform automatic sentiment analysis, this keyword analysis is based on sentiment analysis. According to Loukachevitch, sentiment analysis is "the identification of the author's opinion about the subject discussed in the text."⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Van Dijk, "Critical Discourse Analysis," 362.

⁹⁹ Natalia Loukachevitch, "Automatic Sentiment Analysis of Texts: The Case of Russian," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia Studies*, 2021, 501.

CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS

The official Russian narrative regarding Crimea may be divided into two overarching themes: anti-Ukrainian sentiments, and pro-Russian sentiments. Each sentiment will be discussed separately before being analyzed together as a whole. These themes are prevalent in both Putin's speech and the news articles, and sometimes appear alongside each other.

Category I: Anti-Ukrainian Sentiment

a. Description of data

Many themes combine to form this overall narrative of anti-Ukrainian sentiments. The language used in both the articles and Putin's speech present the Ukrainian nation, on both the governmental and civilian level, as a threat to Russia and Russians abroad, especially in Crimea. One of the most common sub-narratives characterizes the Euromaidan protesters as violent radicals and their changes to the government as an illegitimate coup. The entry of Ukraine to the European Union or even NATO presented a major threat to the Kremlin, as did the anti-Russian sentiments present throughout the protests.

"Radicals" was one of the most common words employed to describe the Euromaidan protests in the articles. Throughout 53 articles, the words "radikal, radikalizirovat', radikalizm, radikal'nyj," etc appear a total of 79 times (out of 179 anti-Ukrainian lexemes chosen through a keyword search across all articles). When describing the actions of the protesters, Sergei Tikhonov writes for *Ekspert*, "Etoi noch'iu na kievskom Maidane vosstanovilos' khrupkoe zatish'e, prervannoe vchera neozhidannym poboishchem mezhdou radikalami i militsiei."¹⁰⁰

Tikhonov delegitimizes the protesters' cause not only reducing them to "radicals," but referring

¹⁰⁰ Sergei Tikhonov, "Zatish'e pered burei?," *Novosti dnia*. (21 февраля 2014), February 20, 2021, <https://expert.ru/2014/02/21/zatishe-pered-burej/>.

to their encounter with the police as a “massacre.” The author frames the protests not as a group of people opposing the government or acting in self defense against the police, but agents who are actively inciting violence and attacking government buildings. Tikhonov describes how “okolo vos'mi chasov bolee sotni chelovek vorvalis' v zdanie Darnitskoi raionnoi administratsii Kieva.”¹⁰¹ The verb *vorvalis'* implies use of considerable force and violence, further positioning the protesters as senseless radicals relying on destruction and physical brutality against the government to achieve their goal.

Seizure of government buildings and violence against the police also comprise a large part of the anti-Ukrainian narrative. Variants of the word *zakhvat'* (*zakhvacheny*, *zakhvativshikh*, etc) characterized protesters' actions regarding government buildings. In an interview with Veronika Krasheninnikova, Director of the Institute for Foreign Policy Studies and Initiatives, *Ekspert* reports Krasheninnikova as stating the goal of protesters was to “Zakhvatit' kak možno bol'she vlasti v strane.”¹⁰² Across all news articles, *zakhvat'* appeared 36 times. News reporters thus create imagery of protesters not simply entering government buildings, but forcibly storming and seizing them. This imagery positions protesters as a violent threat to law and order. One reporter quotes Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov: “Glava MID RF podcherknul, chto nesmotria na to, chto oppozitsiia ratuet za skoreishuii evrointegratsiiu, ee deistviia narushaiut vse normy, priniatye v tsivilizovannom obshchestve. ‘Pogromy, napadeniia na politsiiu, podzhogi, kokteili Molotova, kakie-to vzryvnye ustroistva... Eto zhutko. Zakhvat merii, zakhvat pravitel'stvennykh zdani, gde boeviki derzhalis' neskol'ko nedel', — vy predstav'te, esli by eto proizoshlo v liuboi strane Evrosoiuza. Vozmozhno eto? Oni by nikogda etogo ne pozvolili’, —

¹⁰¹ Тikhonov, “Затишье Перед Бурей?”

¹⁰² Valerij Mikhailin, “I vse zhdali, chto prineset Ukraine zavtra...,” *Novosti dnia*. (2 декабря 2013), <https://expert.ru/2013/12/2/i-vse-zhdali-cto-prineset-ukraine-zavtra/>.

zaiavil Lavrov.”¹⁰³ (The Russian Foreign Minister stressed that despite the fact that the opposition stands for early European integration, its actions violate all norms accepted in a civilized society. "Pogroms, attacks on the police, arson, Molotov cocktails, some explosive devices... It's terrible. The seizure of the city hall, the seizure of government buildings where the militants held out for several weeks - imagine if this happened in any EU country. Is it possible? They would never have allowed it," Lavrov said.) The news reports demonstrate that even the top politicians of Russia agree that the actions of the Maidan protesters are unlawful and uncivilized.

Imagery of protester violence against police adds to this narrative of lawlessness. Reporters frequently talk of protesters launching assaults on the police. A report by RIA Novosti describes how “Agressivno nastroennaia tolpa pytalas' podoiti k parlamentu Ukrainy, radikalny vryvalis' v zdaniia v tsentre Kieva, zhgli avtomobil'nye pokryshki, brosalii kamni i kokteili Molotova v militsionerov.”¹⁰⁴ By vividly describing violent attacks on police, news reporters position protesters as a destabilizing force threatening law and order, rather than rational people exercising their right to protest the government.

The articles also link the violence of the Euromaidan protesters to Russia and Russians in Ukraine and Crimea. Reporters frame the government established by protesters as a coup, where an illegitimate government replaced a democratically elected president. Another frequent sub-narrative is that of a coup in Kiev, resulting in a government that threatens the rights of Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine, including Crimea. According to *RIA Novosti*, “Na Ukraine 22 fevralia proizoshla smena vlasti, imeiushchaia priznaki gosudarstvennogo

¹⁰³ Anton Mesniano, “Rossiia gotova pomoch' Ukraine, esli ona poprosit,” *Novosti dnia*, January 21, 2014, <https://expert.ru/2014/01/21/rossiya-gotova-pomoch-ukraine-esli-ona-poprosit/>.

¹⁰⁴ RIA Novosti, RIAN, “Krym postavit vopros ob otdelenii ot Ukrainy v skuchae smeny legitimnoi vlasti v Kieve,” *RIA Novosti Main News* (February 20, 2014 Thursday), <https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy1.library.arizona.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5BJR-92F1-JDRJ-W1N7-00000-00&context=1516831>.

perevorota. Rada odstranila ot vlasti prezidenta Viktora Ianukovicha, izmenila konstitutsiiu, vozlozhila ispolnenie obiazannostei glavy gosudarstva na spikera Aleksandra Turchinova i naznachila vybory na 25 maia."¹⁰⁵ (In Ukraine, on February 22, there was a change of power with signs of a coup d'etat. The Rada removed President Viktor Yanukovich from power, changed the constitution, entrusted the duties of the head of state to Speaker Oleksandr Turchynov, and scheduled elections for May 25.) As described by Sakwa, this interpretation is not far-fetched. Protesters did indeed storm government buildings and remove Yanukovich as president.¹⁰⁶

Yanukovich's removal and the imposition of an anti-Russian government worried officials in Moscow, and was thus represented as a coup from which Russians in Ukraine needed protecting. *RIA Novosti* reports:

Ranee deputaty oblastnogo parlamenta prizvali novoe rukovodstvo Ukrainy v slozhivsheisia situatsii, kogda "razrushaiutsia pamiatniki sovetskim voynam, nachinaiutsia goneniia na Russkuiu pravoslavnuuiu tserkov', usilivaiutsia natsionalisticheskie nastroeniia i fakticheski nachalis' goneniia na russkoiazychnoe naselenie", obespechit' vsem ee grazhdanam, v tom chisle russkoiazychnym, ravnopravie. Takzhe Mosoblduma prizvala Rossiiskuiu Federatsiiu predpriniat' vse neobkhodimye deistviia dlia zashchity russkoiazychnogo naseleniia Ukrainy i politicheskikh sil, ne soglasnykh s politikoi novoi vlasti Ukrainy.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ РИА Novosti, RIAN, "Krym - eshche bolee osobyi sluchai, chem Kosovo - Lavrov," *RIA Novosti Main News* (March 14, 2014 Friday), <https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5BRG-BX61-JDRJ-W1MS-00000-00&context=1516831>.

¹⁰⁶ Sakwa, "Frontline Ukraine," 94.

¹⁰⁷ RIA Novosti, RIAN, "Delegatsii iz Podmoskov'ia poedut v Krym dlia otsenki neobkhodimoi gumanitarnoi pomoshchi," *RIA Novosti News of CIS* (March 4, 2014 Tuesday), <https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy1.library.arizona.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5BN8-YFN1-F16M-K0MT-00000-00&context=1516831>.

(Earlier, the deputies of the regional parliament called on the new leadership of Ukraine in the current situation, when they were destroying the Russian monuments to Soviet soldiers, beginning the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church, strengthening the nationalist sentiments and actually began the persecution of the Russian-speaking population, to ensure for all its citizens, including the Russian-speaking, equal rights. The Moscow Duma also called on the Russian Federation to take all necessary actions to protect the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine and political forces that disagree with the policies of the new Ukrainian authorities.)

Unsurprisingly, a violent crowd of “radicals” fueled by anti-Russian sentiments concerned the Russian government. The article calls on Russia to “defend” Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine. Reporters framed the actions of the protesters and their new regime as a direct threat to Crimea: journalist Bykov writes, “Kiev neodnokratno pytalsia likvidirovat' krymskuuiu avtonomiiu.”¹⁰⁸

Another concern for the Russian government was the new “government’s” repeal of a law protecting the status of the Russian language in Ukraine: “Parlament takzhe priznal utrativshim silu zakon ob osnovakh gosudarstvennoi iazykovoii politiki ot 3 iiulia 2012 goda, kotoryi, v chastnosti, rasshirial sferu ispol'zovaniia russkogo iazyka.”¹⁰⁹ (The Parliament also declared invalid the law on the fundamentals of the state language policy of July 3 2012, which, in particular, expanded the scope of the use of the Russian language.) Considering the high amount of Russians residing in Ukraine and Crimea, a threat to the Russian language represented a threat to Russians themselves. If the new anti-Russian “government” could attack the Russian

¹⁰⁸ Pavel Bykov, “Velikii Istoricheskii Moment,” *Novosti dnia*, March 16, 2014, <https://expert.ru/2014/03/16/velikij-istoricheskij-moment/>.

¹⁰⁹ RIA Novosti, RIAN,, “ANONS - Verkhovnaia rada naznachit pravitel'stvo oppozitsionerov i “revoliutsioerov””, *RIA Novosti Main News* (February 27, 2014 Thursday), <https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy4.library.arizona.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5BM5-S781-JDRJ-W30H-00000-00&context=1516831>.

language, then surely it could attack the rights of Russians themselves. Indeed, in Ukraine there is a large degree of separation between the titular ethnic group and “others:” according to Gorodianenko, the Ukrainian government “posledovatel’no proderzhivaiutsia tol’ko odnoi politiki...deleniia grazhdan na titul’nuu natsiiu i ostal’nyx...imeet mesto diskriminatsiia russkikh.”¹¹⁰

The news articles also highlighted a more figurative threat: that of Nazis, fascists, and Banderites in Ukraine. While less tangible than violence and radical protesters, the idea that fascism and Nazism was alive and well in Ukraine presented a new threat. Across all articles, 82 references to Nazis, fascists, nationalists, and Bandera appear. Vandysheva and Labykin cite Pavel Krasheninnikov, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Civil, Criminal, Arbitration and Procedural Legislation, “Vystuplenie predstavitelia Ukrainy v OON v podderzhku Bandery – odno iz podtverzhenii togo, chto novoe pravitel'stvo strany ne svobodno ot vliianiia natsionalisticheskikh organizatsii, posledovatelei posobnikov fashistskoi Germanii.”¹¹¹ (The speech of the representative of Ukraine at the UN in support of Bandera is one of the confirmations that the new government of the country is not free from the influence of nationalist organizations, followers and accomplices of fascist Germany.) Krasheninnikov calls for the “preodolenie vnutriukrainskogo krizisa; v predotvrashchenie prikhoda k vlasti v Ukraine profashistskogo, natsionalisticheskogo kryla; v preduprezhdenie novykh krovoprolitii.”¹¹² (Overcoming the internal Ukrainian crisis; preventing the pro-fascist, nationalist wing from coming to power in Ukraine; preventing new bloodshed.)

¹¹⁰ V. Gorodianenko, “Polozhenie russkikh v ukraine i problemy pkh pdenticnosti,” *Stosilogicheskie Issledivaniia*, no. 1 (2009), 90

¹¹¹ Ol'ga Vandysheva and Aleksandr Labykin, “Krym i Sevastopol' voshli v sostav Rossii,” *Ekspert*, March 18, 2014, <https://expert.ru/2014/03/18/kryim-i-sevastopol-voshli-v-sostav-rossii/>.

¹¹² Vandysheva and Labykin, “Krym i Sevastopol'.”

Krasheninnikov highlights a common theme throughout the official discourse throughout the news articles: that Ukrainian nationalists, fascists, and neo-Nazis are directly threatening Russians in Ukraine. By likening the new government in Ukraine to a historical enemy representing the antithesis of perceived Russian values, news reporters emphasize the very real threat present in the Ukrainian government. Many reporters supplement this imagery by recalling Stepan Bandera, an anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalist who defected in WWII to fight for Hitler. References to “Banderites” appear across the articles. According to Anton Mesianko for *Ekspert*, citizens of Sevastopol’ “vser'ez opasaiutsia prikhoda v Krym ‘fashistov’ i ‘benderovtsev’, kotorye nachnut ‘rezat’ vsekh russkikh”.¹¹³ These citizens firmly believe that the “novaia ukrainskaia vlast’ — za Banderu, to est’ za fashistov.”¹¹⁴ Mesianko highlights the very real fear in Crimea that a fascist coup and the resulting fascist government who glorifies Bandera, a historical enemy of Russia, is threatening Russians’ existence in Ukraine and Crimea. Diatlikovich echoes this sentiment: “V Rossii i na vostoke Ukrainy zagovorili o prikhode k vlasti “fashistov’ i “benderovtsev’ kak neizbezhnom itoge pobedy oppozitsii.”¹¹⁵

Vladimir Putin’s speech following the reunification/annexation of Crimea expresses similar sentiments regarding Ukraine and its status regarding Russia and Crimea. Putin frames the Euromaidan events similarly to the news reporters--as a coup resulting in the removal of a democratically elected president and the imposition of an illegitimate government run by fascists and Nazis. Putin’s speech echoes the media’s narrative of Ukraine as a threat to Russians in Crimea.

¹¹³ Anton Mesianko, “Sderzhannaia radost’,” *Novosti dnia*, (12 марта 2014), March 12, 2014, <https://expert.ru/2014/03/12/sderzhannaya-radost/>.

¹¹⁴ Mesianko, “Sderzhannaia radost’”.

¹¹⁵ Viktor Dialikovich, “Maidan i Ego Aktsioneri. Vse Tainy Ukrainskogo Politicheskogo Krizisa,” *Novosti Dnia*, January 28, 2014, https://expert.ru/russian_reporter/2014/04/majdan-i-ego-aktsioneryi/.

When portraying the Euromaidan protesters, Putin portrays their actions as that of a violent mob: “oni gotovili gosudarstvennyi perevorot ocherednoi, planirovali zakhvatit' vlast', ne ostanavlivaias' ni pered chem. V khod byli pushcheny i terror, i ubiistva, i pogromy.”¹¹⁶ (They orchestrated a government coup, planned to seize power, not stopping before anything. They launched terror, killings, and pogroms.” Participants in the Maidan are represented not as protesting the government, but completely destroying it in a violent coup that resulted in seizures of buildings, terror, and killings. Putin’s description of chaos in Kiev echoes that of the media’s depiction of lawlessness, thus eliciting a sentiment of fear.

About the protesters and orchestrators of the coup, Putin states: “Glavnymi ispolniteliami perevorota stali natsionalisty, neonatsisty, rusofoby i antisemity.”¹¹⁷ Putin uses imagery of modern day Nazism to extend his narrative of a threat in Ukraine. He also directly links this ideology to Russia itself by highlighting the “Russophobia” rampant within the new Ukrainian ruling power. Not only does the new government exemplify ideas that are fundamentally opposite of Russian values, they are directly threatening Russia by being actively Russophobic.

Putin takes this comparison a step further by recalling Stepan Bandera and Hitler: “No uzhe vsem stalo predel'no iasno, chto imenno namereny v dal'neishem delat' ukrainskie ideinye nasledniki Bandery – prispeshnika Gitlera vo vremia Vtoroi mirovoi voiny.”¹¹⁸ (But it has already become extremely clear to everyone what exactly the Ukrainian ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler's henchman, during the Second World War intend to do in the future.) During the Maidan protests, the Ukrainian nationalists’ glorification of Bandera troubled Russians in

¹¹⁶ Vladimir Putin, “Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” March 18, 2014, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>.

¹¹⁷ Putin, “Obrashchenie.”

¹¹⁸ Putin, “Obrashchenie.”

Ukraine and the Russian government. According to Marples, this glorification works to erase history in the eyes of the Russian government and uphold anti-Russian ideology in Ukraine. From the Russian perspective, through historical revisionism Ukraine “seeks to indoctrinate children in anti-Soviet and Russophobic interpretations of the past,”¹¹⁹ resulting in what Nikolaev calls the “aktivno i napriazhenno ‘istoricheskie srazheniia’ proiskhodiat v mediinom prostranstve.”¹²⁰ In his allusion to Bandera and the current nationalist ideology in Ukraine, Putin amplifies sentiments of fear.

Putin also assures listeners that Russia will not allow these sentiments to spread to Crimea: “on [Crimea] nikogda ne budet banderovskim!”¹²¹ This framing posits Russia’s involvement in Crimea as the protection of Russian citizens abroad. Putin states that the citizens of Crimea themselves asked Russia for this protection. According to Putin, “zhiteli Kryma i Sevastopolia obratilis' k Rossii s prizyvom zashchitit' ikh prava i samu zhizn', ne dopustit' togo, chto proiskhodilo, da i seichas eshche proiskhodit i v Kieve, i v Donetske, v Khar'kove, v nekotorykh drugikh gorodakh Ukrainy.”¹²² (The residents of Crimea and Sevastopol appealed to Russia to protect their rights and life itself, to prevent what was happening, and is still happening in Kiev, in Donetsk, in Kharkov, in some other cities of Ukraine.) Juxtaposed with imagery of dangerous radicals and fascists in Kiev, Putin presents Russia as the saviour of ethnic Russians in Crimea. Thus, action in Crimea was necessary to prevent the spread of the events in Kiev to Crimea and other primarily Russian areas of Ukraine.

Putin repeats the verb “zashchishchat” throughout his speech, solidifying the sub-narrative that the annexation/reunification of Crimea was simply Russia fulfilling its duty to

¹¹⁹ David Marples, “Russia’s Perceptions of Ukraine: Euromaidan and Historical Conflicts,” *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 4 (2016), 430.

¹²⁰ Nikolai Nikolaev, “Rossiisko-Ukrainskaia ‘Voyna za istoriiu’ na ‘Radio Svoboda’,” *Novoe proshloe*, no. 1 (2020), 42.

¹²¹ Putin, “Obrashchenie.”

¹²² Putin, “Obrashchenie.”

defend Russians abroad. He asserts that “Na Ukraine zhivut i budut zhit' milliony russkikh liudei, russkoiazychnykh grazhdan, i Rossiia vsegda budet zashchishchat' ikh interesy politicheskimi, diplomaticheskimi, pravovymi sredstvami.”¹²³ (In Ukraine live and will live millions of Russian people, Russian-speaking citizens, and Russia will always defend their interests by political, diplomatic, and legal means.) Putin emphasizes the millions of Russians and Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine who need Russia’s protection during the current lawlessness and anti-Russian regime in Kiev. In this way, “Krym olitsetvoriat soboi khrabrogo boitsa, kotoryi vyderzhal natisk vraga i zashchitil svoiu territoriiu.”¹²⁴

Additionally, Putin assures Russians that they themselves agree with this narrative by citing a survey regarding Russians’ attitudes towards Crimea. “Vy znaete poslednie sotsiologicheskie oprosy, kotorye byli provedeny v Rossii bukval'no na dniakh: poriadka 95 protsentov grazhdan schitaiut, chto Rossiia dolzhna zashchishchat' interesy russkikh i predstavitelei drugikh natsional'nostei, prozhivaiushchikh v Krymu.”¹²⁵ (You know the latest sociological surveys that were conducted in Russia just the other day, about 95 percent of citizens believe that Russia should protect the interests of Russians and representatives of other nationalities living in the Crimea.) This strengthens the narrative by positioning it as the idea of Russians themselves, and not simply a government sponsored ideology.

b. Analysis of data

As a whole, both the news articles and Putin’s speech employ an abundance of anti-Ukrainian language when making their case for Crimea. This language characterizes the

¹²³ Putin, “Obrashchenie.”

¹²⁴ Ibragim Kurbanov, “Militarye i Sportivnye Metaforы Pri Sozdanii Obraza Kryma v Zarubezhnykh i Rossiiskikh SMI,” *Gumanitarnye nauki*, no. №09/2 (2020), 90.

¹²⁵ Putin, “Obrashchenie.”

Euromaidan protesters as lawless radicals, their actions as a violent coup, and the new power in Kiev as fascist, anti-Russian, neo-Nazis. The media paints a vivid image of absolute chaos and danger in the Ukrainian capital, and emphasizes its capacity to spread to majority Russian populated areas, especially Crimea. This allows the media to make the case for the protection of Crimea from this chaos, which comes in the form of Russian action in the peninsula.

To construct this narrative, the news articles and Putin's speech are saturated with ideologically-contested lexemes that create an image of Ukraine as a threat. According to Fairclough, an ideologically-contested word is one that is "the focus of ideological struggle."¹²⁶ If a word is ideologically-contested, this is called an experiential value, or "a trace and cue to the way in which the text's producer's experience of the natural or social event is represented." In other words, ideologically-contested words demonstrate how the given event is perceived by the creator of a text and thus, how they want their audience to perceive it. In this case, the media and Putin want the audience to view the Euromaidan as a violent pandemonium resulting in a new "government" fueled by a Russophobic, fascist ideology.

To emphasize this narrative, the official discourse couples ideologically-contested lexemes with a linguistic strategy Fairclough calls "overwording." Overwording constitutes an "unusually high degree of wording, often involving words which are near synonyms."¹²⁷ When present in discourse, overwording usually signals a "preoccupation with some aspect of reality--which may indicate that it is a focus of an ideological struggle."¹²⁸ A keyword analysis of the 53 articles shows that overwording is present in the discourse, presented in Table 1.

¹²⁶ Norman Fairclough, "Critical discourse analysis in practice: description," in *Language and Power*; (London: Routledge, Taylor, 2015), 115.

¹²⁷ Fairclough, "Critical discourse analysis," 115.

¹²⁸ Fairclough, "Critical discourse analysis," 115.

Table 1. Anti-Ukrainian sentiment keyword frequency in news articles

Word and its variants	Total number of uses
Радикал (радикализм, радикальный, радикализировать)	79
Националист (национализм)	42
Захват (захватить, захваченный, захвативший)	36
Оружие (оруженный)	31
Беспорядок	25
Экстремист (экстремизм, экстремальный, экстремизировать)	18
Фашист (фашизм)	18
Бандера (бандеровцы)	12
Переворот	12
Нацист (нацизм)	10
Боевик	10
Кровь (кровапролитие, пролилась кровь)	8
Total	301

Throughout all articles, lexemes describing the protesters such as radicals, extremists, nationalists, militants, armed, etc are ideologically-contested and overworded. This demonstrates that the official narrative is preoccupied with creating an image of the protesters as dangerous and threatening. According to Likhanova, nationalists are generally viewed negatively in Russia: *v rossiiskikh SMI poniatie natsionalizma traditsionno ispol'zuetza v negativnom kliuche.*¹²⁹ The use of words like riot/lawlessness, coup, and bloodshed to describe their actions goes a step further than describing the agents of such actions, but ascribes actions to them, thus painting them not as passive but active participants. According to van Dijk, people “describe an act as

¹²⁹ Tamara Likhanova, “K voprosu o sostoianii natsional’nogo samossznaniia v sovremennoi Rossii,” *Bulletin of the Moscow State Regional University*, no. 1 (2021) 96.

being engaged by someone (an Agent), or as being undergone by someone (a Patient).”¹³⁰ For the Russian media, it is important to emphasize that the protesters engaged in violent acts. Finally, words like nationalist, fascist, and Bandera characterize the ideology or motivation behind the actions of the protesters. This further characterizes the protesters as a threat as their actions are not thoughtless, but motivated by an ideology that elicits fear and loathing of and towards them.

Ideological polarization is also present throughout these descriptions. Polarization includes positive self-presentation (the image of Russia “defending” Crimea) and negative-other presentation (where the ideologically-contested lexemes present Ukraine as a threat). According to van Dijk, the main strategies are hyperbole and metaphor¹³¹--overwording of ideologically-charged lexemes could serve as a type of hyperbole to emphasize the “threat” of the out-group (Ukraine/the protesters). Polarization is present in both the news articles and Putin’s speech.

Putin often directly juxtaposes the protesters and Russia to ideologically polarize the two. After describing the events of the Maidan for several paragraphs, Putin highlights Crimea’s request to Russia for help. Putin begins by describing in detail how fascists “heirs of Bandera” orchestrated a government coup. He then provides an account of the seizure of government buildings and the threat this poses to Crimea, before following up with the image of Russia as Crimea’s saviour:

Mnogie gosorgany uzurpirovany samozvantsami, pri etom oni nichego v strane ne kontroliruiut, a sami – khochu eto podcherknut', – chasto sami nakhodiatsia pod kontrolem radikalov. Dazhe popast' na priem k nekotorym ministram nyneshnego

¹³⁰ Teun van Dijk, *Discourse and Context: A Sociocognitive Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 180.

¹³¹ van Dijk, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 362.

pravitel'stva možno tol'ko s razresheniia boevikov maidana. Eto ne shutka, eto realia segodniashnei zhizni.

Tem, kto soprotivlialsia putchu, srazu nachali grozit' repressiiami i karatel'nymi operatsiiami. I pervym na ocheredi byl, konechno, Krym, russkoiazychnyi Krym. V sviazi s etim zhiteli Kryma i Sevastopolia obratilis' k Rossii s pryzvom zashchitit' ikh prava i samu zhizn', ne dopustit' togo, chto proiskhodilo, da i seichas eshche proiskhodit i v Kieve, i v Donetske, v Khar'kove, v nekotorykh drugikh gorodakh Ukrainy.

Razumeetsia, my ne mogli ne otkliknut'sia na etu pros'bu, ne mogli ostavit' Krym i ego zhitelei v bede, inache eto bylo by prosto predatel'stvom...¹³²

(Many government agencies were usurped by impostors, while they do not control anything in the country, and they themselves - I want to emphasize this - are often themselves under the control of radicals. Even to get an appointment with some ministers of the current government is possible only with the permission of the Maidan militants. This is not a joke, these are the realities of today's life.

Those who resisted the coup were immediately threatened with reprisals and punitive operations. And the first in line was, of course, Crimea, the Russian-speaking Crimea. Because of this, the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol appealed to Russia to protect their rights and life itself, to prevent what was happening, and is still happening in Kiev, in Donetsk, in Kharkov, in some other cities of Ukraine.

Of course, we could not but respond to this request, we could not leave Crimea and its inhabitants in trouble, otherwise it would be just a betrayal...)

Here, the Russian and Ukrainian governments are clearly polarized, with Ukraine being represented as the picture of lawlessness and a problem for Russians in Ukraine, and Russia

¹³² Putin, "Obrashchenie.

characterized as the protector of Russians in Crimea and other Ukrainian cities. According to van Dijk, such a conflict “is cognitively represented and enhanced by polarization, and discursively sustained and reproduced by derogating, demonizing, and excluding the Others from the community of Us, the Civilized.”¹³³

Having established that Russian official discourse uses ideologically-charged language with discursive strategies, theories of nationalism may explain why these particular words have such a strong effect. Recall Eric Hobsbawm’s instrumentalist theory of nationalism: according to Hobsbawm, nationalism is created by the elite and serves to mobilize the people around a perceived “threat” posed to one’s nation by an outside group. Hobsbawm calls this group association “essentially separatist and divisive” and characterizes the Us vs Them dichotomy as an “[attempt] to erect barricades.”¹³⁴ These “defensive reactions” by nations may be “against real or imaginary threats.”¹³⁵ For Russia, the threat is Ukraine.

Within this context of nationalism, discursive strategies such as polarization are by definition instrumental because they a) are disseminated by the elite through media and political speech, and b) focus on the threat of an out-group. Russian discourse positioning the protesters and the government they established as fascist, anti-Russian radicals who serve as a threat to Russians and Russophones living in Ukraine reflects Hobsbawm’s focus on the “us-them” binary and the threat of outsiders in creating nationalism. In turn, the nationalist sentiment these lexemes used in the proper discursive strategies evokes a strong feeling of nationalism in readers and enforces the official narrative. This reflects the cyclical nature of CDA: society influences language, while language is then in turn used to influence society.

¹³³ van Dijk, “Critical Discourse,” 362.

¹³⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 170.

¹³⁵ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 171.

This concept directly relates to Fairclough's idea of Members Resources (MRs). Fairclough writes that "[MRs] are socially generated, and their nature is dependent on the social relations and struggles out of which they were generated...people internalize what is socially produced and made available to them, and use this internalized MR to engage in their social practice, including discourse. This gives the forces which shape societies a vitally important foothold in the individual psyche."¹³⁶ In other words, the socially constructed meanings of MRs (in this case, words such as fascism and Nazis that refer to an event strongly ingrained in social collective memory) influence people's interpretations of given words. The media uses these specific ideologically-contended lexemes so the corresponding MRs are activated in the psyche of the audience.

This leads to the question, why is the threat of fascism and neo-Nazis so compelling? Placing the discourse within the appropriate historical context is necessary to understand the impact of MRs because the social origin of these MRs gives them the power to shape society. Along with the general negative connotation of these lexemes, they touch upon the Russian collective memory of the Great Patriotic War, where Russia's greatest enemies were Nazi Germany and fascism. For many Russians, victory in the Second World War remains an extremely important part of Russian history and identity. According to Gaufman, "due to the profoundly traumatic nature of the collective memory of the Great Patriotic War in Russia, its citizens are bound to react in an emotional way to topics that are discursively connected to the war. For most Russians, the memory of fascism is associated first and foremost with the immense suffering of the Soviet population."¹³⁷ Thus, by using such lexemes, the media and

¹³⁶ Fairclough, "Critical Discourse Analysis," 24.

¹³⁷ Elizaveta Gaufman, "The Post-Trauma of the Great Patriotic War in Russia," *Digital Icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media* 18 (2017): pp. 33-44.

politicians (elite) create a type of nationalism based on fear of an out-group and disseminate it down to the public.

Through ideologically-contested lexemes and polarization, likening Ukraine to the enemy Russia is so proud to have defeated enforces the idea that contemporary Ukraine is a threat equal to that present in the Great Patriotic War. In addition to the sentiments involved in nationalism, the instrumentalist theory also emphasizes that nationalism is created by the elites in a top-down process. In line with the instrumentalist claim that elites create nationalism, van Dijk states that among other strategies, polarization is “deployed in exercising the power of the dominant...group” in order to manipulate “readers to form or confirm the social representations that are consistent with a conservative, supremacist ideology.”¹³⁸ Parallel to Hobsbawm’s explanation of nationalism where the elite create nationalism through fear of an outside threat, polarization and ideologically-charged lexemes create nationalist sentiment by drawing upon MRs.

Category II: Pro-Russian sentiment

a) Description of data

Opposite to anti-Ukrainian sentiment, Russian official discourse also contains a large amount of pro-Russian sentiment regarding Crimea. As with anti-Ukrainian sentiment, many themes combine to create this overall narrative. In both the news articles and Putin’s speech, the language used to describe the Russian nation and its historical ties with both Ukraine and Crimea presents Russia as the logical choice to answer the question to which country does Crimea belong. The narrative positions Russia not only as the saviour of Crimea, but also as its historic homeland and thus naturally a part of Russia.

¹³⁸ Van Dijk, “Critical Discourse,” 362.

One of the main themes recurrent in the discourse was the idea of “reunification (*vossoedinenie/prisoedinenie*) of the Crimean peninsula with the mainland. Although the majority of the articles deal with the events in Ukraine rather than the actual reunification/annexation, across the articles, the words relating to *reunification* or *return* appear 25 times. Reporting for *Ekspert* about the referendum, Vandysheva and Labykin write: “96,77% prishedshikh na izbiratel'nye uchastki krymchan progolosovali za prisoedinenie k Rossii.”¹³⁹ Vandysheva and Labykin do not characterize the referendum as a foreign country annexing a territory, but as the citizens of a territory themselves deciding to reunite with a country they once called and still consider home. Linking to two countries, Vandysheva and Labykin cite a survey reporting that 90% of Russians also support *prisoedinenie*. The authors here paint the situation as two sides of a separated family reaching out to one another, a sub-narrative that is echoed by many other reports.

Many sources refer to the reunification/annexation as a “return home” (*domoi*). RIA Novosti refers to the referendum as a “istoricheskii shans ‘vernut'sia domoi – v Rossiiu’.”¹⁴⁰ As with the word “reunification,” the use of “*domoi*” indicates the return of Crimea to a natural state rather than an annexation into a foreign country with no ties to the land. The media portrays Crimea and Russia as an inseparable whole, which the referendum has made possible.

While these are the words of many news reporters themselves, a common strategy was to quote Crimeans themselves. RIA Novosti quotes one Konstantinov: “Uzhe seichas vsem ochevidno - my sdelali eto, my pobedili! Imenno my, krymchane, za eti dve nedeli perevernuli

¹³⁹ Ol'ga Vandysheva and Aleksandr Labykin, “Krym i Sevastopol' voshli v sostav Rossii,” *Novosti dnia*, (18 marta 2014), March 18, 2014, <https://expert.ru/2014/03/18/kryim-i-sevastopol-voshli-v-sostav-rossii/>.

¹⁴⁰ RIA Novosti, RIAN, “Krym ischerpal vozmozhnosti dobit'sia dostoinogo statusa v sostave Ukrainy - spiker VS”, *RIA Novosti Main News* (March 9, 2014), <https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy1.library.arizona.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5BPD-DST1-F16M-K00B-00000-00&context=1516831>.

ves' mir vverkh nogami i skazali, chto imenno my vernemsia domoi, v Rossiuu!”¹⁴¹ (It's already obvious to everyone - we did it, we won! It was we, the Crimeans, who turned the whole world upside down in these two weeks and said that it was we who would return home to Russia!) This quote accomplishes two goals. One, it supports the idea that Crimea is returning home to Russia. Second, it gives the citizens of Crimea agency in the reunification/annexation. “My sdelali, my pobedili” shifts the focus from Russia’s actions to the actions of the citizens of Crimea, who achieved this reunification through participation in the referendum. As noted earlier when ascribing certain actions of violence to the protesters, agency is an important tool in Russian official discourse. The use of “pobedili” also highlights a struggle between right and wrong, between Crimea and the new power in Ukraine. It indicates a triumph over an outside threat. In this win, Russia did not annex Crimea, but Crimea won a fight against a fascist regime.

The official discourse also employs familial references and metaphors in its depiction of the reunification/annexation of Crimea. In a step beyond reunification with Russia, Vandysheva and Labykin claim the referendum as a return to *family*: “A zhiteli Kryma progolosovali za svoiu zhizn', za svoe poniatnoe, stabil'noe budushchee, fakticheski za vossoedinenie so svoei sem'ei. Potomu chto my sviazany krovnymi uzami.”¹⁴² (And the residents of Crimea voted for their lives, for their clear, stable future, in fact, for reunification with their family. Because we are related by blood.) Vandysheva and Labykin position Russia and Crimea as members of a family that, separated for a long time, have finally reunited. This bond between territories is strengthened by blood ties. The idea that Crimean’s right to their life is at stake is a common theme in the discourse, where the media and politicians ispol'zpuvatsia sposob obosnovaniia -

¹⁴¹ RIA Novosti, RIAN, "Lidery Kryma pozdravili zemliakov s priniatiem resheniia o vkhozhdanii avtonomii v sostav RF," *RIA Novosti Main News* (March 17, 2014 Monday), <https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5BS1-7FB1-JDRJ-W3NX-00000-00&context=1516831>.

¹⁴² Vandysheva and Labykin, “Krym i Sevastopol”.

‘zashchita’ - obiasnenie svoikh deistvii cherez apelliatsiio k obespecheniiu ‘prava na zhizn’.
Narrativ postroen na tom, chto Rossiia fizicheski zashchitila Krymchan.”¹⁴³ (The method of justification was used – "protection" - an explanation of their actions through an appeal to ensure the "right to life". The narrative is based on the fact that Russia physically defended Crimeans.)

Like many other reporters, Vandysheva and Labykin extend this familial relationship between Crimea and Russia to Ukraine. Vandysheva calls for the “sokhraneniia traditsionnoi druzhby mezhdum dvumia bratskimi narodami, imeiushchimi obshchie etnicheskie korni, obshchuiu istoriiu i kul'turu.”¹⁴⁴ (Preserving the traditional friendship between two fraternal peoples having common ethnic roots, common history and culture.) This strategy may do one of several things. First, it may absolve Russia of the guilt of annexing a Ukrainian territory, because if Russia and Ukraine are the same people, this must also apply to the land. It may also try to appeal to Ukraine by mentioning the “brotherly” ties between the two nations. Finally, it may assert that Crimea, through this fraternal relationship, is rightfully Russia. Regardless of the goal, the allusion to family positions Russia and Crimea as inseparable through ethnic roots.

Ethnic roots are not the only tie the media notes between Russia and Ukraine. The media also highlights the historical relationship between the two nations, namely through the role of Crimea in the Second World War. Mesianko reminds readers of the history that permeates all of Crimea, especially Sevastopol: “Zdes' vse propitano dukhom geroicheskogo proshlogo, v kotorom Sevastopol' byl neotemlemai chast'iu Rossii.”¹⁴⁵ No explicit reference is made to the Great Patriotic War, because it simply isn't needed. Recalling the city's “geroicheskoe proshloe,” readers automatically know to what Mesianko is referring.

¹⁴³ Stanislav Miasnikov, “Pochemu ‘Krym - nash’: analiz obosnovaniia prisoedineniia Kryma v vystupleniakh V.V. Putina i predstavitelei MID RF S 2014 po 2018 g.”, *Politicheskaiia nauka*, no. 2 (2020), 248.

¹⁴⁴ Vandysheva and Labykin, “Krym i Sevastopol”.

¹⁴⁵ Mesianko, “Sderzhannaia radost”.

Putin also relies heavily on similar familial references and metaphors. Throughout his speech, he emphasizes the nature of the referendum as resulting in a reunification, refers to Russia and Ukraine's shared history, and utilizes extensive metaphors to characterize the relationship between Russia and Crimea. According to Putin, Russians constitute "odnim iz samykh bol'shikh, esli ne skazat', samym bol'shim razdelennym narodom v mire."¹⁴⁶ This separation comes in the form of geopolitical borders, particularly those of the former USSR, where "Milliony russkikh legli spat' v odnoi strane, a prosnulis' za granitsej, v odnochas'e okazalis' natsional'nymi men'shinstvami v byvshikh soiuznykh respublikakh."¹⁴⁷ For Putin, Russians did not stop being Russian following the drawing of new borders, but became a minority abroad. Reuniting Crimea with Russia is simply reuniting a group of Russians who similarly woke up in a new country overnight after Khrushchev's transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954. In fact, Putin considers the reunification/annexation as righting a "historical injustice."

Putin's speech also focuses on the historical ties between Russia and Ukraine in Crimea. From the very beginning of Russian history, Putin highlights the role of Crimea as the common thread between the two nations:

V Krymu bukval'no vse pronizano nashei obshchei istoriei i gordost'iu. Zdes' drevnii Khersones, gde prinial kreshchenie sviatoi kniaz' Vladimir. Ego dukhovnyi podvig – obrashchenie k pravoslaviiu – predopredelil obshchuiu kul'turnuiu, tsennostnuiu, tsivilizatsionnuiu osnovu, kotorai obediniaet narody Rossii, Ukrainy i Belorussii. V Krymu – mogily russkikh soldat, muzhestvom kotorykh Krym v 1783 godu byl vziat pod Rossiiskuiu derzhavu. Krym – eto Sevastopol', gorod-legenda, gorod velikoi sud'by, gorod-krepost' i Rodina russkogo chernomorskogo voennogo flota. Krym – eto Balaklava

¹⁴⁶ Putin, "Obrashchenie."

¹⁴⁷ Putin, "Obrashchenie."

i Kerch', Malakhov kurgan i Sapun-gora. Kazhdoe iz etikh mest sviato dlia nas, eto simvoly russkoi voinskoi slavy i nevidannoi doblesti.¹⁴⁸

(In Crimea, literally everything is permeated with our common history and pride. Here is the ancient Chersonese, where the Holy Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat - conversion to Orthodoxy - predetermined the common cultural, religious, and civilizational basis, which unites the peoples of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers, whose courage took Crimea under the Russian empire in 1783, are in Crimea. Crimea is Sevastopol, a city of legend, a city of great destiny, a fortress city and the birthplace of the Russian Black Sea Navy. Crimea is Balaklava and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Mountain. Each of these places is sacred to us, they are symbols of Russian military glory and unprecedented valor.)

Putin recalls the “creation myth” of Prince Vladimir, who, King states, baptized the citizens of Kievan Rus' in Crimea in 988 AD.¹⁴⁹ Not only is the earliest Russian city traced back to Crimea, but so is the beginning of Russian Orthodoxy, which Putin also emphasizes as one of the uniting factors of the people of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. By recalling Crimea’s role as the location of the earliest Russian city and the birthplace of Russian Orthodoxy, Putin positions Crimea as an inseparable part of Russia, present from its conception.

Putin then briefly discusses the Crimean war and conjures images of the graves of Russian soldiers who courageously fought in 1783. However, the most important war fought in Crimea was the Great Patriotic War, in which Sevastopol was a “city of legend” and Russian glory. Because Russians take pride in the country’s role in the Second World War (as evidenced by Victory Day, celebrated yearly on May 9th), Putin asserts Crimea’s instrumental role in such

¹⁴⁸ Putin, “Obrashchenie.”

¹⁴⁹ Charles King, *The Black Sea: A Political and Social History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 164.

an important part of Russian history and collective memory and thus its place as an instrumental part of Russia itself. The city itself is a “symbol of military glory.” Putin explicitly states: “Krym – eto iskonno russkaia zemlia, a Sevastopol' – russkii gorod.”¹⁵⁰ The fundamental role of Crimea in WWII cannot be separated from the land or erased from history--for Putin, Crimea and Sevastopol are entirely Russian entities.

In addition to historical ties, Putin talks about the relationship between Russia and Ukraine in terms of familial metaphors. Putin states that from the beginning, “my fakticheski, kak ia uzhe mnogo raz govoril, odin narod. Kiev – mat' gorodov russkikh. Drevniaia Rus' – eto nash obshchii istok, my vse ravno ne smozhem drug bez druga.”¹⁵¹ (We are, in fact, as I already said many times, one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus' is our common source, we cannot be without each other.) Here, Kiev is compared to the *mother* of Russian cities, demonstrating that both Ukraine and Russia can trace their roots back to the same place: Kievan Rus. This historical relationship is strengthened by the familial metaphor, where the reference to Kiev as a “mother” city shows that the bond is not merely historical, but deeper: it is familial. This bond leads to Russians and Ukrainians being not separate, but “odin narod.”

Mother is not the only family member represented in Putin’s metaphors. Putin stresses the fraternal nature between Russia and Ukraine: “A otnosheniia s Ukrainoi, s bratskim ukrainskim narodom byli i ostaiutsia i vsegda budut dlia nas vazhneishimi, kliuchevymi, bez vsiakogo preuvelicheniia.”¹⁵² (And relations with Ukraine, with the fraternal Ukrainian people, have been and remain and will always be the most important, key for us, without any exaggeration.) Thus, Putin demonstrates that Russia indeed values its relationship with Ukraine, and that the two nations are fraternal ones. This again demonstrates that Crimea is not a territory that is

¹⁵⁰ Putin, “Obrashchenie.”

¹⁵¹ Putin, “Obrashchenie.”

¹⁵² Putin, “Obrashchenie.”

completely Ukrainian: because the two nations are indeed brothers, Russia has a stake in Crimea and any action in the territory cannot be viewed as an annexation by a foreign nation.

b) Analysis of data

Both Putin and the news articles stress the idea that Russia did not annex Crimea, but that Russia and Crimea reunited, thus correcting a great “istoricheskoi nespravedlivost’iu”.¹⁵³ The prevalence of words like *vossoedinenie/prisoedinenie* and *vozvrashchenie domoi* emphasizes this point. The ties between Russia and Crimea are positioned as deeply historical, from the beginning of Russian history to Crimea’s role in WWII. Ideologically-contested lexemes in this case evoke the image of WWII not as a negative event, but a positive one. Finally, these ties are strengthened by representing them not only as historical, but familial. Russia and Ukraine do not simply share a border or historical homeland, they are indeed brothers.

Similarly to lexemes with negative connotations that touch upon the WWII-era fear of fascism, positive references to the Great Patriotic War (and other events in Russian history, such as Prince Vladimir’s baptism or the role of Kievan Rus as the “mother” of Russian/Ukrainian cities) evoke strong patriotic sentiments. The ideology attached to these lexemes is positive and touches upon pride in Russia’s role in WWII, thus causing the audience to perceive Crimea as an integral part of the Russian nation, bound by history. This ideology is not unfounded: according to Marples, due to this common history “Putin and many others consider Ukrainians and Russians as essentially one people.”¹⁵⁴

These lexemes also appeal to Fairclough’s MRs. Unlike the anti-Ukrainian sentiment, however, the MRs associated with WWII are positive. Fairclough states that MRs are “socially generated, and their nature is dependent on the social relations and struggles out of which they

¹⁵³ Putin, “Obrashchenie.”

¹⁵⁴ Marples, “Historical Conflicts,” 431.

were generated.”¹⁵⁵ Russia’s role in WWII is staunchly engrained in the Russian collective memory, so when these ideologically-contested MRs are touched upon, memories of the defeat of Russia’s greatest historical enemy and patriotism are awakened and associated with Crimea.

Polarization also factors into pro-Russian sentiments in discourse. When the news articles and Putin refer back to Crimea’s role as a city of military glory, they juxtapose this with the riots and chaos currently occurring in Kiev. Russia offers a shining alternative rooted in one of the most important events in Russian history. Crimea can remain in Ukraine in danger of an anti-Russian, fascist government, the antithesis of what Russia fought for in WWII, or join Russia and continue to serve as a symbol of Russian victory in the Great Patriotic War. As one journalist states, “Ukraina i mezhdunarodnoe soobshchestvo prodolzhaet okazyvat’ davlenie na Rossiiu. Odnako Moskva stoit na svoem i prodolzhaet spokojno gotovit’sia k krymskomu referendumu.”¹⁵⁶ (Ukraine and the international community continue to put pressure on Russia. However, Moscow stands its ground and continues to calmly prepare for the Crimean referendum.) Here, instead of focusing on the Other as deviant, polarization serves to focus on “any positive attributes of *Us*.”¹⁵⁷ Familial metaphors make up the final sub-narrative of pro-Russian discourse. These metaphors strengthen the image of Crimea as an integral part of Russia. According to Fairclough, a “metaphor is a means of representing one aspect of experience in terms of another.”¹⁵⁸ Here, the relationships between Russia and Ukraine, and Russia and Crimea are represented in terms of family. Equating Kievan Rus’ to a “mother” softens the Russia-Ukraine relationship and focuses not on current differences, but historical sameness. Similarly, comparing Ukraine to a “brother” emphasizes the two nations’ shared

¹⁵⁵ Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, 24.

¹⁵⁶ Gevorg Mirzaian, “Vy Sami Nas Vtianuli,” *Novosti dnia*, March 13, 2014, <https://expert.ru/2014/03/14/vyi-sami-nas-vtyanuli/>.

¹⁵⁷ van Dijk, *Discourse and Context*, 192.

¹⁵⁸ Fairclough, “*Critical Discourse Analysis*,” 119.

history and shifts focus away from their current rocky relationship. These representations of family not only paint the reunification/annexation of Crimea in a positive light, but also positions it as a return to a natural state--that of its role in the “family” of Russia.

The use of verbs like *pomoch'/pomogat'* may also extend the familial metaphor. Both the media and Putin emphasize Russia’s role in helping Crimea and Russians in Ukraine, or Crimea’s request to Russia for help. Coupled with familial metaphor, by helping its “siblings,” Russia is playing a brotherly role. In this way, the discourse represents Russia not as a foreign entity terrorizing and annexing a foreign territory, but as that territory’s big brother offering a helping hand.

The next logical question, then, is why are historical references and familial metaphors so persuasive? Recall Anthony Smith’s ethno-symbolist theory of nationalism. This theory explains why references to family and common history have a substantial effect on the audience. Smith argues that nations are a historical phenomenon with a strong ethnic component. In this theory, an ethnic group’s shared history, an origin/common ancestry myth, and historical homeland are the uniting forces in creating nations. Thus, nationalism draws upon “pre-existing memories, myths, symbols, and traditions” of the given ethnic community.¹⁵⁹

The media’s reference to Crimea’s role in WWII and Putin’s colourful imagery of the city of Russian military glory and home of the Russian Black Sea fleet represent some of the major moments in Russians’ shared history. Because Crimea is so integrally tied to these moments, within this theory of nationalism it is an integral part of Russia. Thus, ideologically-contested lexemes referring to Kievan Rus’, Prince Vladimir, and the Great Patriotic War allow the discourse to strongly assert that Crimea is an undeniable and inseparable part of the Russian nation. Smith’s theory also emphasizes the idea that nations transcend borders. Because the

¹⁵⁹ Smith, “Ethno-Symbolism,” (1999), 30.

factors that make a nation (common history, creation/origin myth, and historical homeland) are not constrained by geopolitical borders, the media and Putin assert that the Russian nation thus cannot be constrained by modern borders. It is also important to note that for many Russians, Crimea and Sevastopol are *symbols* of WWII. Smith notes that symbols are a key component of nation construction.¹⁶⁰

Additionally, Smith mentions the importance of “election” myths that “set the chosen people apart from their profane surroundings, through a covenant between the deity and the elect.”¹⁶¹ Prince Vladimir serves as the election myth with his solidification of power as the ruler of the Slavs in Crimea. This creation myth also has a religious aspect--Vladimir baptised the Slavs in the river to gain legitimacy as a nation in order to forge a relationship with the Byzantine empire, and thus, the predecessor of the Russian Orthodox Church was born. The importance of this election myth in the official narrative further supports Smith’s ethno-symbolist theory of nationalism.

Finally, familial metaphors that emphasize ethnic ties also tie the nationalist ideologies present in the official discourse to Smith’s ethno-symbolist theory. According to Smith, “Ethno-symbolism claims that most nations, including the earliest, were based on ethnic ties and sentiments and on popular ethnic traditions, which have provided the cultural resources for later nation formation...It is this *ethnic model* of the nation that has proved the most influential, with its emphasis on genealogical descent, vernacular codes, popular mobilization and historical nativism in a *homeland*.”¹⁶² Familial metaphors imply a biological, and thus *ethnic*, tie between Russia and Crimea and Ukraine. This ethnic tie, packaged by the media and Putin in metaphor, is

¹⁶⁰ Anthony Smith, *The Nation in History* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000), 66.

¹⁶¹ Smith, “Ethno-Symbolism,” (1999), 28.

¹⁶² Smith, “Ethno-Symbolism,” (1999), 26.

thus a strong mobilizing aspect of nationalism to convince the audience that Crimea belongs to Russia.

Anti-Ukrainian vs Pro-Russian: Which facet of the official narrative is most prevalent?

So far, the researcher has outlined the official narrative and the language used to create it, examined the linguistic strategies employed, and analyzed the nationalist and historical context of the discourse. Altogether, the two sub-narratives of anti-Ukrainian discourse and pro-Russian discourse create an overall argument that the government in Ukraine is threatening Russians in Crimea, but the Russian government is perfectly positioned to help reunite Crimea with Russia. Looking at the overall narrative, it is clear that one facet is emphasized more than the other.

When comparing the amount of positive and negative lexemes, it is clear that the amount of negative lexemes is triple that of positive. Compare Table 1 and Table 2: there are 301 negative lexemes and only 82 positive lexemes across 53 articles. Statistically, the negative lexemes are more significant than the positive. It can be concluded that this aspect of the narrative is more important, or at least mentioned more than the positive.

Table 2. Pro-Russian sentiment keyword frequency in articles

Word and its variants	Total number of uses
Помогать (помочь, помощь)	15
Брат (братский)	15
Защищать (защитить, защита)	12
Присоединение/воссоединение	10
История (исторический)	10
Вернуться	8
Домой	5

Возвращение	5
Семья	2
Total	82

Within each category, different themes also weigh in at different frequencies. In the negative lexemes category, the most common theme is that of characterizing the protesters as radicals (26.2% of all lexemes). In general, characterizing the protesters themselves is more important than characterizing their actions. Almost three quarters of the lexemes (73.1%) are dedicated to positioning the protesters as radicals, nationalists, Nazis, Banderites, etc. Only 26.9% of the lexemes describe the actions of these radicals. It can be inferred that for the media, the agents rather than the act is the most important. *Who* is committing violence takes precedence over the violence itself.

In the positive lexemes category, the most prevalent ideas are those of helping and brothers. 18.3% accounts for lexemes focused around the act of help or help itself. This indicates that a major aspect of the pro-Russian narrative is the image of Russia as a powerful nation with the capacity to help its people residing abroad, and also to protect them (verbs pertaining to defense account for 14.6% of positive lexemes). The discourse also presents Russia as a brother (18.3%), indicating that familial metaphors are also a major focus of the pro-Russian narrative. Lexemes related to the idea of reunification or return (prisoedinenie/vossoedinenie, vernut'sia, domoi, vozvrashchenie) account for a third of all positive lexemes (34.1%). Thus, this aspect is also a major sub-narrative of the pro-Russian argument. The discourse positions Crimea as simply returning to a natural state. Russia is positioned not as annexing a foreign territory, but helping its brothers reunite with the motherland.

Figure 1. Categories of anti-Ukrainian sentiment





Figure 2. Categories of pro-Russian sentiment



CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

Language is an extremely powerful tool with the capacity to influence and manipulate the emotions and perceptions of listeners. Through ideologically-charged lexemes, polarization, metaphor, and other linguistic devices, the Russian media and politicians know how to effectively employ the best-suited rhetorical strategies in their portrayals of Russia, Ukraine, and the Crimean crisis. The language manipulated by these strategies gains its power of influence through context. Lexemes and metaphors associated with certain historical contexts evoke certain emotions, which allows for their successful use in different rhetorical strategies.

Discussion

This study aimed to answer three questions, quoted from Chapter One as follows: *What is the overall narrative present in the official discourse? How do these items (tokens) work as part of different strategies to disseminate an ideology to the audience? How do these nationalist lexemes assume the nationalist sentiment that makes them effective in those strategies?*

Following is a discussion of the findings for each question.

a. What is the overall narrative present in the official discourse?

From keyword search, it is clear that two main sub-narratives comprise the overall narrative of the discourse. First, the discourse employs numerous examples of anti-Ukrainian language. A keyword analysis shows that the most common lexemes used to describe the Euromaidan protesters and the resultant new regime in Kiev included words and phrases such as “radicals,” “nationalists,” “fascists,” “seizure [of government buildings],” “armed,” “riots,” etc. These lexemes indicate that the overall sentiment expressed towards both the actors of the

Euromaidan and the Euromaidan itself is extremely negative. The media and political discourse portrayed the protesters as lawless rioters who established a fascist, anti-Russian regime.

These descriptors of the actors were accompanied by detailed descriptions of their actions. Pictures of building seizures, destruction of property, and violence against the police coloured the news reports and political speech. This shows that the narrative is preoccupied not only with the people committing such actions, but the actions themselves. Both agent and action are portrayed as dangerous and threatening, creating an image of Ukraine as dangerous for Russians as a whole.

The other major sub-narrative evident in the discourse is comprised of pro-Russian language. In a stark contrast to violent rioters and their fascist regime, the overall narrative is preoccupied with presenting Russia as a calm, powerful alternative to the chaos rampant in Ukraine. A keyword analysis establishes that the main lexemes used to describe Russia include “protect,” “defend,” “help,” and the words used to describe the events in Crimea as a “reunification” or “return home.”

The language used to describe Russia positions the nation neither as an aggressor nor a foreign entity determined to annex a foreign territory, but as a protector of ethnic Russians across an arbitrary border. The relationship between Russia and Ukraine is brotherly, and thus Russia acted as a big brother by helping out its neighbouring country. Familial metaphors also play a large role in the discourse. The narrative portrays Crimea as a missing piece of a puzzle, which has finally found its place by returning home to the Russian mainland.

Overall, these two sub-narratives combine to form the main narrative of the discourse: the events in Ukraine and those orchestrating them pose a threat to Russians in Crimea, and Russia is the saviour by helping Crimea to return home. What is interesting about these two sub-narratives

is that one refers to Ukraine as the enemy, while the other emphasizes the brotherly relationship between the two nations. It seems that the Russian media and politicians choose which side of the coin is most relevant at the time when creating their narrative. Ukraine is either an enemy or a brother, depending on the message being conveyed.

b. How do these items (tokens) work as part of different strategies to disseminate an ideology to the audience?

Different linguistic strategies appear throughout the discourse, with the most prevalent being overwording, polarization, and metaphor. Throughout the anti-Ukrainian discourse analyzed, the lexeme tallies demonstrate a high degree of overwording (according to Fairclough, overwording is the repetition of adjectives and similes).¹⁶³ With 79 mentions out of 301 anti-Ukrainian lexemes analyzed, “radicals” was the most common token in this sub-narrative and is a prime example of overwording. This and similar lexemes (nationalist, extremist, etc) serve to emphasize the official stance of the Russian government and burn this image into the minds of the audience. “Nationalist” is the second most prevalent lexeme, demonstrating that the official narrative highlights the threat of Ukrainian (which could by default be perceived as anti-Russian) nationalism. Tracing which words are most common throughout the discourse allows the researcher not only to trace the narrative, but to see what the most important aspects of this narrative are.

Polarization is also a common tactic. According to van Dijk, polarization involves negative other-presentation and positive self-presentation in order to juxtapose two different groups and highlight their differences.¹⁶⁴ The difference highlighted here, as demonstrated by the

¹⁶³ Fairclough, “Critical discourse analysis,” 115.

¹⁶⁴ van Dijk, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 362.

two sub narratives, is the threat of Ukraine and the solution for Crimea found in reunification with Russia. The media juxtaposes these two narratives to present to viewers a wholly negative image of Ukraine, and provide a positive alternative with Russia. The negative “Other” or out-group here constitutes Ukrainian nationalists, fascists, and Russophobes, all of whom pose a threat to Russians living in Ukraine, especially those residing in Crimea. Meanwhile, Russia, or the positive in-group, is presented as family (through its brotherly relationship with Ukraine) and the protector of ethnic Russians abroad (through repetition of the verb “defend” and allusions to Crimeans’ appeal to Russia for protection.¹⁶⁵ Placing these two entities in direct opposition with each other highlights and emphasizes the differences between the two groups, leading readers to identify with the “correct,” or positively-presented in-group.¹⁶⁶

Finally, metaphor is one of the most frequent linguistic strategies used throughout the discourse. Familial metaphors serve to highlight Crimea’s place in the world, which, according to the official narrative, is with Russia. According to Fairclough, metaphors involve representing one thing in terms of another - here, Crimea and Russia’s political and historical relationship is represented in terms of a family relationship.¹⁶⁷

These metaphors serve many purposes. First, when the media and politicians refer to Kiev as the “mother” of Russian cities or to Russia as the motherland, they soften the relationship between Russia and Ukraine/Crimea. Rather than presenting Russia as an aggressive entity, the discourse positions Russia as a motherly figure protecting its children.

“Brother”/“fraternal” is another common metaphor comparing Russia and Ukraine. The media achieves an image of the two nations’ disputes as a brotherly fight rather than a serious political quagmire. It also positions Russia in a big brother role, where it is helping out its ethnic Russian

¹⁶⁵ Anton Mesniano , “Pravda - Zdes'” ,” *Novosti dnia*, March 1, 2014, <https://expert.ru/2014/03/2/pravda--zdes/>.

¹⁶⁶ van Dijk, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 362.

¹⁶⁷ Fairclough, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 119.

siblings residing in Ukraine. Familial metaphors also imply a return to a natural state. Crimea was not annexed by a foreign entity; it returned to its original family forged through years of shared history.

c. How do these nationalist lexemes assume the nationalist sentiment that makes them effective in those strategies?

Theories of nationalism then explain why these contexts are capable of this type of manipulation. Words associated with the Great Patriotic War touch upon a different aspect of nationalism depending on their context. In a negative context (lexemes such as fascism and Nazi), these words activate a stored memory and associate the object being described with Russia's historical enemy. According to the instrumentalist theory, nationalism is a product of fear where the elites present an "other" as a threat to one's nation. If the context is positive (lexemes such as "military glory"), the words activate the memory of Russia's great victory in WWII and associate the object described with this patriotic sentiment. This falls in line with the ethno-symbolist theory, which holds that nationalism is largely a product of an ethnic group's shared history and emphasizes the importance of symbols/symbolism.

The cyclical nature of Critical Discourse Analysis also helps to provide an understanding of how nationalism works as a persuasive tool in narrative construction. In practice, "discourse has effects upon social structures, as well as being determined by them, and so contributes to social community and social change."¹⁶⁸ In other words, the social constructions and categories stored in one's mind influence how they interpret discourse, and the discourse in turn affects the individual's perception of the world around them. According to Fairclough, the interpretation of

¹⁶⁸ Norman Fairclough, "Discourse as Social Practice," in *Language and Power*, (London: Routledge, Taylor, 2015), 17.

discourse “depends upon which social...conventions [interpreters] are assumed to hold.”¹⁶⁹ A given event in Russian history serves as a social phenomenon that consequently socially conditions language. When the media and Putin reference this event, they evoke emotions associated with the event, be they positive or negative. In doing so, the emotions evoked by this language shape society. The event shapes discourse, and that discourse in turn shapes society.

References to the Great Patriotic War, then, are socially conditioned by historical context, and the language that evokes associated emotions manipulates the listeners in order to have a desired effect on contemporary social structures. To understand why references to WWII are effective, instrumentalism then suggests that appealing to the fear of a fascist threat evokes strong nationalist sentiment--thus, context gives strong nationalist meanings to WWII references, and officials in turn use these references so that their nationalist meaning may influence listeners in favour of an official ideology. Ethno-symbolism, then, explains how positive references to WWII evoke patriotic feelings that influence listeners to positively evaluate the official ideology.

Limitations

The given study is limited in scope. The articles studied only represent two news outlets and one political speech. Ideally, several more government-owned news sources and several more political addresses from a variety of politicians would have been analyzed for a more diverse study. Time limitations and limited access resulted in a narrower scope of articles/rhetoric available for analysis.

Other limitations are related to the implementation of the keyword analysis. The software for performing a full-scale sentiment analysis was not available for the given study. Rather than

¹⁶⁹ Fairclough, “Discourse as Social Practice,” 19.

compiling hundreds of articles into a database for a computer-automated large-scale sentiment analysis, the researcher individually performed a keyword search across all 53 articles to compile a preliminary list of the most frequently used lexemes (adjusted for context - for example, one article used the word “radical” as a pseudonym for one protestor and thus these instances of the word “radical” were omitted so as not to skew the results).

Recommendations for further research

Further studies might address how the use of multiple narratives is effective. How can Russian official discourse refer to Ukraine both as an enemy and a brother? How do two seemingly incompatible/opposing narratives in fact complement each other to create a single official stance on Crimea? Because nationalism is a highly nuanced subject for which many scholars have proposed their own theories, it follows that multiple types of nationalist sentiment can be effective, but how do two contradictory stances maintain their influence in this juxtaposition?

Further research in this direction may delve deeper into the intricacies of Russian politics, identity, and foreign policy. In particular, the use of analogy and metaphor provides an interesting avenue for future research. According to Keith Shimko, metaphors are particularly useful in understanding the foreign policy choices of nations and “students of international relations and foreign policy (or any other area of policy-making) should explore the role metaphors play in decision making.¹⁷⁰ Shimko states that “if one takes almost any major foreign policy crisis, one would be able to find metaphorical allusions.”¹⁷¹ First, like CDA, the study of metaphors and foreign policy is interdisciplinary and draws on linguistics and cognitive

¹⁷⁰ Keith Shimko, “Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making,” *Political Psychology* 15, no. 4 (1994), 657

¹⁷¹ Shimko, “Metaphors and Foreign Policy,” 656.

psychology.¹⁷² This demonstrates a clear path for linguistic analysis and political science/foreign policy studies to intersect. Secondly, Shimko notes that people use metaphor as a basis for understanding what they do not know - in the case of politics, people draw on events/ideas they are familiar with to make conclusions for the new, current situation.¹⁷³ Understanding the metaphors used to describe these situations gives a clue into how the politicians/media using that metaphor understand a given political event. Finally, Shimko states that it is important to “[examine] the empirical record of statements by decision makers for clues which increase one’s confidence that a metaphor is playing a truly cognitive function.”¹⁷⁴ In other words, one must analyze large amounts of political speech to trace if and which metaphors are being used. This lends itself to linguistic analysis, and one may conclude that close linguistic analysis of official discourse provides a strong basis in the navigation of further political interactions with any foreign country, including the Russian Federation.

Conclusion

Overall, this study demonstrates that the relationship between Russia and Ukraine is not as simple as one might think, especially from a Western point of view. Regarding the events in Crimea, Richard Sakwa states: “What for Moscow was a defensive reaction, above all to prevent in Crimea what it considered a putsch in Kiev, confirmed in the West already deep-seated prejudices about Russia’s potential to challenge the Western-dominated international order.”¹⁷⁵ As evidenced by the findings and analysis presented in this study, it is clear that this is not the case, at least from an Eastern perspective.

¹⁷² Shimko, “Metaphors and Foreign Policy,” 659.

¹⁷³ Shimko, “Metaphors and Foreign Policy,” 662.

¹⁷⁴ Shimko, “Metaphors and Foreign Policy,” 663.

¹⁷⁵ Sakwa, “Frontline Ukraine,” 106.

The language used in the official discourse reveals a deeply-rooted historical basis for Russia's perspective on both its relationship with Ukraine and the 2014 events in Crimea. The nationalist frameworks used in the study demonstrate that the official narrative is based partly on fear and partly on ethnic and historical ties to the Crimean peninsula. Hobsbawm's theory of instrumentalism emphasizes the role of fear in constructing nationalism, and this fear is evident in an analysis of anti-Ukrainian language. According to the Russian narrative, a real threat existed in the Ukrainian capital which had the capacity to spread to majority Russian areas like Crimea. This demonstrates that, at least in part, Russian action in Crimea was not based on a power-driven desire to take over the former Soviet territories, but rather it was based on the perceived threat of an enemy in its neighbouring country.

Similarly, Smith's theory of ethno-symbolism emphasizes the role of history and historical homeland in creating nationalism, which is evident in the language used to describe the relationship between Crimea and Russia. According to the Russian narrative, Crimea is the historical homeland of the entire Russian nation, and thus is naturally a part of the Russian territory today, despite arbitrary geopolitical borders. Crimea is seen as part of a family, an inseparable part of the Russian nation. From this point of view, Russian action in Crimea is not a power-hungry land grab, but simply facilitating a return to a natural state where Crimea is returned to its original host country.

The Western narrative tends to simplify the Russian Federation's goals and motivations, both in Crimea and the foreign policy arena in general. This study has attempted to prove that this is not the case, and that Russia's motivations are influenced by a long history and complex social constructs existing in the contemporary Russian mentality. While in the West Russia may

appear as a power-hungry nation attempting world dominance, it is actually a complicated nation, with a complicated past and even more complicated present.

References

- Brega, A B. "Politiko-pravovye aspekty vkhozhdeniia krymskogo poluostrova v sostav Rossiiskoi Federatsii: mezhdu legal'nost'iu i legitimnost'iu." *Aktual'nye sotsial'no-politicheskie issledovania* 10, no. 1 (2020): 84–89.
- Bykov, Pavel. "Velikii istoricheskii moment ." *Novosti dnia*, March 16, 2014.
<https://expert.ru/2014/03/16/velikij-istoricheskij-moment/>.
- Diatlikovich, Viktor. "Maidan i ego aktsioneri. Vse tainy ukrainskogo politicheskogo krizisa." *Novosti Dnia*, January 28, 2014.
https://expert.ru/russian_reporter/2014/04/majdan-i-ego-aktsioneryi/.
- Evgen'eva, T. V. "Krym v prostranstve rossiiskoi identichnosti: obrazno-simvolicheskoe izmerenie." *Tsennosti i smysly* 50, no. 4 (2017): 20–33.
- Fairclough, Norman. "Discourse as Social Practice." In *Language and Power*, 16–42. London: Routledge, Taylor, 2015.
- Gaufman, Elizaveta. "The Post-Trauma of the Great Patriotic War in Russia." *Digital icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media* 18 (2017): 33–44.
- Geohistory. "A Guide to Media and Journalism in Russia." Last modified May 3, 2020.
<https://geohistory.today/media-journalism-russia/>
- Gorodianenko, V. "Polozhenie Russkikh v Ukraine i Problemy Ikh Identichnosti." *Stosiologicalheskie issledivaniia*, no. 1 (2009): 89–96.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. "Ethnic Nationalism in the Late Twentieth Century." In *Ethnicity*, 355—358. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Hobsbawm, Eric. *Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

King, Charles. *The Black Sea: A Political and Social History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Kolmogorova, Anastasia V., Yulia A. Gornostaeva. “Media Coverage of Current Political Situation in Ukraine: Discourse Analysis.” *Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences* (2017): 1–7. <https://doi.org/10.17516/1997-1370-0031>.

Kurbanov, Ibragim Aleivich. “Military and Sportive Metaphors in the Creation of the Image of Crimea in Foreign and Russian Mass Media.” *Gumanitarnye nauki*, no. №09/2 (2020): 59–63.

Laruelle, Marlene. “Russian Nationalism and Ukraine.” *Current History* 113, no. 765 (2014): 272—277.

Likhanova, Tamara Y. “On the Issue of National Identity in Modern Russia.” *Bulletin of the Moscow State Regional University*, no. 1 (2021): 88–99.

Loukachevitch, Natalia. “Automatic Sentiment Analysis of Texts: The Case of Russian.” Essay. In *The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia Studies*, 501–16, 2021.

Marples, David R. “Russia’s Perceptions of Ukraine: Euromaidan and Historical Conflicts.” *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 4 (2016): 424–37.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2016.1154129>.

Mesianko, Anton. ““Pravda - Zdes”.” *Novosti dnia*, March 1, 2014.

<https://expert.ru/2014/03/2/pravda--zdes/>.

Mesianko, Anton. “Russia Ready to Help Ukraine, if One Proposes.” *Novosti dnia*, January 21, 2014.

<https://expert.ru/2014/01/21/rossiya-gotova-pomoch-ukraine-esli-ona-poposit/>.

Mesianko, Anton. "Sderzhannaia radost'." *Hovosti dnia*. (12 марта 2014), March 12, 2014.

<https://expert.ru/2014/03/12/sderzhannaya-radost/>.

Miasnikov, Stanislav. "Pochemu 'Krym - nash': analiz obosnovaniia prisoedineniia Kryma v vystupleniakh V.V. Putina i predstavitelei MID RF S 2014 po 2018 g.," *Politicheskaiia nauka*, no. 2 (2020): 234–55.

Mikhailin, Valerij.. "I vse zhdali, chto prineset Ukraine zavtra..." *Hovosti dnia*. (2 декабря 2013), February 20, 2021.

<https://expert.ru/2013/12/2/i-vse-zhdali-cto-prineset-ukraine-zavtra/>.

Mirzaian, Gevorg. "Vy Sami Nas Vtianuli ." *Novosti dnia*, March 13, 2014.

<https://expert.ru/2014/03/14/vyi-sami-nas-vtyanuli/>.

Nikolaev, Nikolai. "Rossiisko-Ukrainskaia 'Voina za istoriiu' na 'Radio Svoboda'." *Novoe proshloe*, no. 1 (2020): 40–53.

Pasitselska, Olga. "Ukrainian Crisis through the Lens of Russian Media: Construction of Ideological Discourse." *Discourse & Communication* 11, no. 6 (July 2017): 591–609.

Putin, Vladimir. "Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii." March 18, 2014.

<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>.

RIA Novosti, RIAN. "ANONS - Verkhovnaia rada naznachit pravitel'stvo oppositsionerov i "revoliutsionerov"." *RIA Novosti Main News*. February 27, 2014 Thursday.

<https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy4.library.arizona.edu/api/document?collection=news&iid=urn:contentItem:5BM5-S781-JDRJ-W30H-00000-00&context=1516831>.

RIA Novosti, RIAN. "Delegatsii iz Podmoskov'ia poedut v Krym dlia otsenki neobkhodimoi gumanitarnoi pomoshchi". *RIA Novosti News of CIS*. March 4, 2014 Tuesday.

<https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy1.library.arizona.edu/api/document?collection=news&iid=urn:contentItem:5BN8-YFN1-F16M-K0MT-00000-00&context=1516831>.

RIA Novosti, RIAN. "Krym - eshche bolee osobyi sluchai, chem Kosovo - Lavrov". *RIA Novosti Main News*. March 14, 2014 Friday.

<https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/api/document?collection=news&iid=urn:contentItem:5BRG-BX61-JDRJ-W1MS-00000-00&context=1516831>.

RIA Novosti, RIAN. (March 9, 2014 Sunday). "Krym ischerpal vozmozhnosti dobit'sia dostoinogo statusa v sostave Ukrainy - spiker VS." *RIA Novosti Main News*. March 17, 2014.

<https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/api/document?collection=news&iid=urn:contentItem:5BS1-7FB1-JDRJ-W3NX-00000-00&context=1516831>.

RIA Novosti, RIAN. "Krym postavit vopros ob otdelenii ot Ukrainy v sluchae smeny legitimnoi vlasti v Kieve". *RIA Novosti Main News*. February 20, 2014 Thursday.

<https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy1.library.arizona.edu/api/document?collection=news&iid=urn:contentItem:5BJR-92F1-JDRJ-W1N7-00000-00&context=1516831>.

RIA Novosti, RIAN. "Lidery Kryma pozdravili zemliakov s priniatiem resheniia o vkhozhdanii avtonomii v sostav RF". *RIA Novosti Main News* March 17, 2014 Monday.

<https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/api/document?collection=news&iid=urn:contentItem:5BS1-7FB1-JDRJ-W3NX-00000-00&context=1516831>.

Sakwa, Richard. *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2016.

- Savitskii, I V. "Krymskoe obshchestvo kakanyne Russkoi vesny: novoe issledovanie o razvitii russkogo dvizhenie v Krymu." *Uchenye zapiski Krymskogo federal'nogo universitete imeni V. I. Vernadskogo Seria «Istoricheskie nauki»*. 6, no. 1 (2020): 128–36.
- Seregina, I A, and A P Chudinov. "Metaforicheskie slogany v diskurse referendumo o statuse Kryma." *Politicheskaia lingvistika* 48, no. 2 (2014): 89–94.
- "A Guide to Media and Journalism in Russia." *GeoHistory*, July 22, 2021.
<https://geohistory.today/media-journalism-russia/>.
- Shimko, Keith. "Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making." *Political Psychology* 15, no. 4 (1994): 655–71.
- Smith, Anthony Douglas. "Ethno-Symbolism and the Study of Nationalism." In *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, 23–31. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1999.
- Smith, Anthony. *The Nation in History*. Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000.
- Starikov, Nikolai and Dmitrii Beliaev. *Rossia. Krym. Istoria*. St Petersburg: Piter, 2018.
- Teper, Yuri. "Official Russian Identity Discourse in Light of the Annexation of Crimea: National or Imperial?" *Post-Soviet Affairs* 32, no. 4 (2015): 378–96.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2015.1076959>.
- Tikhonov, Sergei. "Zatish'e pered burei?" *Novosti dnia*. (21 февраля 2014), February 20, 2021. <https://expert.ru/2014/02/21/zatishe-pered-burej/>.
<https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy1.library.arizona.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5BPD-DST1-F16M-K00B-00000-00&context=1516831>.
- van Dijk, Teun A. "Chapter 18: Critical Discourse Analysis." In *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, 352-363. Academic Press: London, 1987.

van Dijk, Teun. *Discourse and Context: A Sociocognitive Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Vandysheva, Ol'ga and Labykin, Aleksandr. "Krym i Sevastopol' voshli v sostav Rossii."

Novosti dnia. March 18, 2014.

<https://expert.ru/2014/03/18/kryim-i-sevastopol-voshli-v-sostav-rossii/>.

Wodak, Ruth. "Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory, and Methodology." Essay.

In *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Michael Meyer, 1–33. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2001.

"Za Vkhozhdenie Kryma v Rossiю Vyskazalis' 96,77% Uchastnikov Referenduma." RIA

Novosti, March 17, 2014, ria.ru/20140317/999795240.html.