

Online Appendix for “Causes of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change: The Signal of Economic Expropriation”

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In this online appendix, Table A1 replicates the main results in Table 1 using a different definition of US hierarchy: rather than including only US allies in the sample, we include only states in the Western hemisphere. Table A2 replicates results from Table 1 with additional controls. Tables A3-A4 present results when the independent variable is the expropriation of all foreign assets, not just the expropriation of US-owned assets. Tables A5-A6 replicate Tables 1 and 2 using the Affinity of Nations score (Gartzke 2006) rather than the Agreement Scores from the United Nations General Assembly Voting data (Voeten et al 2009). Tables A7-A8 replicate Tables 1 and 2, using only the first year of FIRC, rather than counting each additional FIRC year that follows, since the article links FIRC initiation and expropriation. Table A9 replicates Table 1 using the Kobrin data, rather than the expropriation data collected by the authors. Table A10 lists all FIRC attempts. Table A11 provides summary statistics. Tables A12-A14 demonstrate the expropriation cases in both the Kobrin data and the data used in this article, the expropriation cases unique to the data in this article, and the expropriation cases unique to the Kobrin data, respectively. Table A15 shows the breakdown of FIRC attempts within each of the sub-samples used in the main analyses. Table A16 splits the sample of Table 3 in the article to US hierarchy members only and shows that expropriations of both US-owned and domestic assets are associated with FIRC. Table A17 uses a sub-sample of neutrals only, and finds mostly null results.

Table A1: Replication of Table 1 using US Hemisphere as US Hierarchy Member Sub-Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Any FIRC			
	<i>logistic</i>	<i>FELM</i>	<i>IV</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expropriations (count)	0.99*** (0.17)	0.05** (0.02)		
Expropriations (fitted)			0.39*** (0.07)	0.40*** (0.08)
UN Agree US (change)	-0.65 (0.47)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
UN Agree USSR (change)	-0.82* (0.45)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.21 (0.15)	-0.21 (0.15)
Population (logged)	-0.47*** (0.13)	0.07 (0.21)	-0.13 (0.21)	-0.14 (0.22)
Polity	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.01* (0.003)	-0.01* (0.003)
Constant	-4.06** (1.59)			
Observations	1,005	1,005	1,005	1,005
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.27	-1.46	-1.56
Log Likelihood	-245.77			

*Note:*

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Table A2: Replication of Table 1 With Expanded Controls (US Hierarchy Members Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Any FIRC			
	<i>logistic</i>	<i>FELM</i>	<i>IV</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expropriations (count)	0.73*** (0.15)	0.04* (0.02)		
Expropriations (fitted)			0.48*** (0.13)	0.49*** (0.13)
UN Agree US (change)	-0.39 (0.33)	0.01 (0.02)	0.004 (0.03)	0.004 (0.03)
UN Agree USSR (change)	-0.27 (0.30)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.09)
Annual Oil Production	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Military Personnel	-0.0004 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
CINC	35.11*** (11.53)	-11.97 (13.33)	-17.41 (13.03)	-17.44 (13.04)
Any Conflict	0.17 (0.23)	0.03 (0.03)	0.09* (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)
Population (logged)	0.11 (0.13)	0.39* (0.21)	0.36* (0.19)	0.36* (0.19)
Polity	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.0005 (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)
USSR Ally	-13.94 (501.49)	-0.21*** (0.05)	-0.25*** (0.05)	-0.25*** (0.05)
Constant	-5.67*** (1.22)			
Observations	1,658	1,658	1,658	1,658
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.26	-1.74	-1.76
Log Likelihood	-389.61			

*Note:*

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Table A3: Expropriation of Foreign Assets (US Hierarchy Members Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Any FIRC			
	<i>logistic</i>		<i>Felm</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expropriations of Foreign (count)	1.24*** (0.21)	0.07* (0.04)		
Expropriations of Foreign (fitted)			0.87*** (0.19)	0.89*** (0.19)
UN Agree US (change)	-0.49 (0.34)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
UN Agree USSR (change)	-0.38 (0.30)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.11)
Population (logged)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.35** (0.17)	0.33** (0.15)	0.33** (0.15)
Polity	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.01** (0.003)	-0.01** (0.003)
USSR Ally	-13.36 (507.47)	-0.25*** (0.04)	-0.35*** (0.06)	-0.35*** (0.06)
Constant	-4.17*** (0.91)			
Observations	1,658	1,658	1,658	1,658
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.26	-1.93	-2.03
Log Likelihood	-430.32			
F-Statistic (First Stage)			22.15***	23.2***

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A4: Expropriation of Foreign Assets (Neutrals Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Any FIRC			
	<i>logistic</i>		<i>felm</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expropriations of Foreign (count)	0.29 (0.66)	-0.002 (0.04)		
Expropriations of Foreign (fitted)			0.19 (1.83)	0.71 (1.67)
UN Agree US (change)	-0.65 (0.41)	-0.04*** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)
UN Agree USSR (change)	0.25 (0.32)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Population (logged)	0.45*** (0.07)	0.19* (0.11)	0.20 (0.12)	0.21* (0.12)
Polity	-0.03 (0.02)	0.01** (0.003)	0.01** (0.004)	0.01* (0.004)
Constant	-6.38*** (0.72)			
Observations	2,482	2,482	2,482	2,482
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.35	0.34	0.20
Log Likelihood	-414.89			
F-Statistic (First Stage)			0.01	0.18

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A5: Replication of Table 1 with Gartzke Affinity Scores (US Allies Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Any FIRC			
	<i>logistic</i>		<i>felm</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expropriations (count)	0.62*** (0.14)	0.04* (0.02)		
Expropriations (fitted)			0.35*** (0.08)	0.35*** (0.08)
UN Agree US (change - Gartzke)	-0.11 (0.22)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
UN Agree USSR (change - Gartzke)	0.02 (0.19)	-0.001 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Population (logged)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.34** (0.17)	0.37** (0.15)	0.37** (0.15)
Polity	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)
USSR Ally	-13.38 (510.49)	-0.24*** (0.04)	-0.30*** (0.04)	-0.30*** (0.04)
Constant	-4.53*** (0.97)			
Observations	1,653	1,653	1,652	1,652
R <sup>2</sup>		0.30	-0.66	-0.67
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.25	-0.76	-0.77
Log Likelihood	-433.14			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	886.29			
Residual Std. Error		0.24	0.36	0.36

Note:

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Table A6: Replication of Table 2 with Gartzke Affinity Scores (Neutrals Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Any FIRC			
	<i>logistic</i>		<i>felm</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expropriations (count)	0.45 (0.49)	0.03 (0.04)		
Expropriations (fitted)			0.49 (1.08)	0.84 (1.11)
UN Agree US (change - Gartzke)	0.05 (0.24)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
UN Agree USSR (change - Gartzke)	-0.66** (0.26)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Population (logged)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.01)
Polity	-0.001* (0.001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)
USSR Ally	51.81** (23.02)	5.49 (6.45)	4.74 (6.28)	4.42 (6.48)
Constant	-2.30** (1.00)			
Observations	2,308	2,308	2,289	2,289
R <sup>2</sup>		0.41	0.31	0.10
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.37	0.26	0.03
Log Likelihood	-345.22			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	716.44			
Residual Std. Error		0.15	0.16	0.19

Note:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

Table A7: Replication of Table 1 With Only First Year of FIRC, NAs for Following Year (US Hierarchy Members Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Firc1.1			
	<i>logistic</i>		<i>felm</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expropriations (count)	0.41*** (0.14)	0.03*** (0.01)		
Expropriations (fitted)			0.07* (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
UN Agree US (change)	-0.15 (0.78)	0.004 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
UN Agree USSR (change)	0.44 (0.56)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.02)	-0.002 (0.02)
Population (logged)	-0.56*** (0.22)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Polity	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
USSR Ally	-11.46 (819.82)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)
Constant	-2.15 (2.49)			
Observations	1,547	1,547	1,547	1,547
R <sup>2</sup>		0.12	0.05	0.05
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.06	-0.01	-0.01
Log Likelihood	-103.67			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	227.35			
Residual Std. Error		0.12	0.12	0.12

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



Table A8: Replication of Table 2 with only First Year of FIRC, NAs for Following Year (Neutrals Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Firc1.1			
	<i>logistic</i>		<i>felm</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expropriations (count)	1.10* (0.63)	0.03 (0.04)		
Expropriations (fitted)			0.07 (0.17)	0.13 (0.16)
UN Agree US (change)	-15.59 (1,020.30)	-0.01** (0.004)	-0.01* (0.004)	-0.01* (0.005)
UN Agree USSR (change)	-0.72 (1.07)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)
Population (logged)	0.36* (0.21)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Polity	0.01 (0.05)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Constant	-6.79*** (2.06)			
Observations	2,386	2,386	2,386	2,386
R <sup>2</sup>		0.11	0.10	0.07
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.04	0.03	0.004
Log Likelihood	-61.98			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	141.97			
Residual Std. Error		0.07	0.07	0.07

Note:

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Table A9: Replication of Table 1 with Kobrin Expropriation Data (US Hierarchy Members Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Any FIRC			
	<i>logistic</i>	<i>felm</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Kobrin Expropriations	0.09*	0.01		
	(0.05)	(0.01)		
Kobrin Expropriation (Fitted)			0.01	-0.04
			(0.12)	(0.10)
UN Agree US (change)	-0.68*	0.003	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.38)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
UN Agree USSR (change)	0.04	-0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.29)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Population (log)	-0.21***	0.003	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.21)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Polity	0.02	0.01	0.0005	0.0004
	(0.01)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.75			
	(0.62)			
Observations	1,959	1,959	1,959	1,959
R <sup>2</sup>		0.33	0.04	-0.01
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.29	0.02	-0.03
Log Likelihood	-			
	470.71			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	953.42			
Residual Std. Error		0.21	0.25	0.25

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A10: All FIRC Attempts, 1947-1989

Country	Year/s of Any US FIRC Attempt
Afghanistan	1979-1989
Albania	1949-1956
Angola	1964-1972, 1975-1976, 1985-1988
Belarusian SSR	1949-1956
Bolivia	1963-1966, 1971
Brazil	1964
British Guiana/Guyana	1961-1971
Bulgaria	1949-1956
Cambodia	1982-1989
Chad	1981-1982
Chile	1962-1973, 1984-1989
China	1949-1968
Congo	1960
Cuba	1960-1968
Czechoslovakia	1949-1956
Dominican Republic	1960-1962, 1965-1968
East Germany	1949-1956
Estonian SSR	1949-1956
Ethiopia	1981-1983
France	1947-1952
Grenada	1979, 1983
Guatemala	1952-1954
Haiti	1963, 1965-1969, 1986-1988
Hungary	1949-1956
Indonesia	1954-1958
Iran	1952-1953
Iraq	1972-1975
Italy	1947-1968, 1972-1973
Japan	1952-1968
Laos	1959-1973

Latvian SSR	1949-1956
Lebanon	1957-1958
Liberia	1983-1988
Libya	1982-1989
Lithuanian SSR	1949-1956
Mozambique	1964-1968
Nicaragua	1979-1989
North Korea	1950-1953
North Vietnam	1961-1964
Panama	1987-1989
Philippines	1984-1986
Poland	1949-1956, 1981-1989
Portugal	1974-1975
Romania	1949-1956
Somalia	1964-1967
South Vietnam	1963, 1967-1971
South Yemen	1979-1980
Soviet Union/Russian SSR	1949-1959
Suriname	1982-1985
Syria	1955-1957
Thailand	1965-1969
Tibet	1958-1968
Ukrainian SSR	1949-1956

Table A11: Summary Statistics

<i>Statistic</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>St. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
FIRC Attempt	5,690	0.07	0.25	0	1
Count Domestic Asset FIRC	5,690	0.02	0.26	0	12
Count Foreign Asset FIRC	5,690	0.03	0.31	0	17
Pct Agree US	4,930	0.11	0.32	0.00	1.00
Pct Agree USSR	4,930	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00
Population (Logged)	5,125	9.15	1.39	5.74	13.96
Polity	5,094	-1.35	7.40	-10.00	10.00

Table A12: Expropriation Country-Years in the Article Data **and** in the Kobrin Data

Algeria 1963
Argentina 1963
Argentina 1974
Bolivia 1971
Brazil 1965
Chile 1970
Chile 1971
Chile 1972
El Salvador 1980
Indonesia 1965
Iran 1979
Iraq 1972
Jamaica 1977
Liberia 1977
Libya 1973
Nicaragua 1979
Nicaragua 1980
Nicaragua 1983
Panama 1972
Peru 1968
Peru 1969
Peru 1970
Peru 1973
Peru 1974
Peru 1975
Sri Lanka 1962

Table A13: Expropriation Country-Years **not** in the Article Data **But Included** in the Kobrin Data\*

\*The reader should note that the authors attempted to cross-reference each case in the Kobrin data; of the 285 country-years with at least one expropriation case, the authors could not verify 143 country-year cases. This is roughly 55% of the country-year cases in the Kobrin data.

Afghanistan 1975; Afghanistan 1979; Algeria 1962; Algeria 1965; Algeria 1966; Algeria 1967; Algeria 1968; Algeria 1970; Algeria 1971; Algeria 1972; Algeria 1974; Algeria 1976; Algeria 1978; Angola 1975; Angola 1976; Angola 1978; Antigua & Barbuda 1975; Argentina 1971; Argentina 1972; Argentina 1973; Argentina 1979; Bahrain 1974; Bahrain 1979; Bangladesh 1972; Bangladesh 1975; Benin 1969; Benin 1974; Bolivia 1961; Bolivia 1969; Bolivia 1979; Brazil 1962; Cambodia 1968; Cameroon 1977; Central African Republic 1969; Central African Republic 1974; Chad 1971; Chad 1975; Chile 1965; Chile 1973; Colombia 1961; Colombia 1972; Colombia 1974; Colombia 1975; Congo 1964; Congo 1970; Congo 1972; Congo 1974; Congo 1975; Congo 1976; Costa Rica 1968; Costa Rica 1970; Costa Rica 1972; Costa Rica 1975; Costa Rica 1979; Democratic Republic of the Congo 1966; Democratic Republic of the Congo 1968; Democratic Republic of the Congo 1969; Democratic Republic of the Congo 1970; Democratic Republic of the Congo 1974; Democratic Republic of the Congo 1975; Dominican Republic 1976; Ecuador 1969; Ecuador 1972; Ecuador 1973; Ecuador 1974; Ecuador 1977; Ecuador 1979; Egypt 1960; Egypt 1961; Egypt 1964; Egypt 1967; Egypt 1989; El Salvador 1964; El Salvador 1971; Ethiopia 1975; Ethiopia 1978; Gabon 1973; Gabon 1974; Gambia 1973; Gambia 1979; Ghana 1961; Ghana 1963; Ghana 1965; Ghana 1972; Ghana 1973; Ghana 1974; Ghana 1975; Ghana 1976; Guatemala 1970; Guatemala 1971; Guinea 1961; Guinea 1972; Guinea 1977; Guinea 1979; Guyana 1970; Guyana 1975; Guyana 1976; Guyana 1977; Haiti 1965; Haiti 1972; Haiti 1973; Honduras 1974; Honduras 1976; Honduras 1983; India 1967; India 1969; India 1971; India 1973; India 1975; Indonesia 1960; Indonesia 1962; Indonesia 1964; Indonesia 1966; Indonesia 1976; Indonesia 1980; Iran 1970; Iran 1973; Iraq 1960; Iraq 1963; Iraq 1964; Iraq 1968; Iraq 1969; Iraq 1973; Iraq 1974; Iraq 1977; Jamaica 1967; Jamaica 1972; Jamaica 1974; Jamaica 1975; Kenya 1970; Kenya 1971; Kenya 1975; Kuwait 1972; Kuwait 1974; Kuwait 1977; Laos 1977; Lebanon 1972; Lebanon 1973; Liberia 1972; Libya 1969; Libya 1970; Libya 1971; Libya 1972; Libya 1974; Madagascar 1974; Madagascar 1975; Madagascar 1976; Madagascar 1977; Madagascar 1978; Malawi 1968; Malawi 1969; Malawi 1971; Malaysia 1973; Mauritania 1974; Mauritania 1975; Mexico 1960; Mexico 1965; Mexico 1967; Mexico 1970; Mexico 1971; Mexico 1972; Mexico 1974; Mexico 1980; Morocco 1965; Morocco 1967; Morocco 1970; Morocco 1971; Morocco 1974; Morocco 1975; Mozambique 1975; Mozambique 1976; Mozambique 1977; Mozambique 1978; Mozambique 1979; Myanmar 1962; Myanmar 1963; Myanmar 1964; Myanmar 1965; Myanmar 1983; Nepal 1973; Nicaragua 1982; Niger 1967; Niger 1971; Niger 1973; Niger 1974; Niger 1976; Niger 1979; Oman 1972; Pakistan 1972; Pakistan 1976; Pakistan 1983; Panama 1975; Panama 1981; Peru 1971; Peru 1972; Peru 1985; Peru 1986; Philippines 1973;

Philippines 1979; Qatar 1972; Saudi Arabia 1972; Senegal 1974; Sierra Leone 1970; Somalia 1970; Sri Lanka 1964; Sri Lanka 1971; Sri Lanka 1974; Sri Lanka 1975; Sri Lanka 1976; Sri Lanka 1981; Sudan 1970; Sudan 1976; Sudan 1978; Suriname 1974; Swaziland 1974; Syria 1960; Syria 1964; Syria 1965; Syria 1972; Tanzania 1963; Tanzania 1964; Tanzania 1967; Tanzania 1971; Tanzania 1973; Tanzania 1974; Tanzania 1978; Thailand 1975; Togo 1965; Togo 1972; Trinidad and Tobago 1969; Trinidad and Tobago 1971; Trinidad and Tobago 1972; Trinidad and Tobago 1974; Trinidad and Tobago 1975; Trinidad and Tobago 1977; Trinidad and Tobago 1981; Uganda 1970; Uganda 1972; Uganda 1975; Uganda 1977; United Arab Emirates 1972; United Arab Emirates 1973; United Arab Emirates 1975; Venezuela 1963; Venezuela 1969; Venezuela 1974; Venezuela 1975; Yemen Arab Republic 1969; Yemen Arab Republic 1978; Zambia 1964; Zambia 1968; Zambia 1969; Zambia 1970; Zambia 1971; Zambia 1972; Zambia 1973; Zambia 1975; Zambia 1980



Table A14: Expropriation Country-Years **included** in the Article Data **But Not** in the Kobrin Data\*

Argentina 1946; Argentina 1947; Argentina 1948; Argentina 1949; Argentina 1950; Argentina 1951; Argentina 1956; Argentina 1957; Bolivia 1952; Bolivia 1954; Bolivia 1970; Brazil 1951; Brazil 1952; Brazil 1953; Brazil 1957; Brazil 1959; Brazil 1964; Brazil 1966; Brazil 1985; Burma 1962; Canada 1956; Canada 1966; Ceylon 1964; Chile 1966; Chile 1967; Chile 1969; China 1947; China 1951; China 1952; China 1953; China 1954; Colombia 1948; Colombia 1966; Colombia 1967; Congo 1966; Costa Rica 1953; Costa Rica 1957; Cuba 1959; Cuba 1960; Cuba 1963; Cuba 1964; Cuba 1965; Czechoslovakia 1949; Dominica 1972; DRC 1966; Egypt 1952; Egypt 1956; El Salvador 1981; France 1951; France 1956; France 1967; German Democratic Republic 1949; German Democratic Republic 1950; German Democratic Republic 1952; Germany 1947; Germany 1948; Great Britain 1948; Great Britain 1951; Great Britain 1965; Guatemala 1948; Guatemala 1950; Guatemala 1952; Guatemala 1953; Guatemala 1954; Guatemala 1959; Haiti 1986; Hungary 1948; Hungary 1949; India 1951; Indonesia 1957; Indonesia 1959; Indonesia 1963; Iran 1951; Iran 1980; Israel 1948; Israel 1954; Italy 1949; Italy 1950; Italy 1951; Italy 1963; Italy 1971; Japan 1978; Malaysia 1977; Mexico 1952; Mexico 1953; Mexico 1957; Mexico 1958; Mexico 1959; Mexico 1976; Mexico 1978; Mexico 1982; Mexico 1985; Myanmar 1948; Myanmar 1951; Nicaragua 1986; Nicaragua 1989; Paraguay 1980; Peru 1958; Peru 1960; Peru 1963; Peru 1964; Peru 1987; Philippines 1948; Philippines 1955; Philippines 1960; Portugal 1975; Portugal 1976; Portugal 1977; Romania 1948; Romania 1949; Romania 1959; South Africa 1959; South Vietnam 1970; Spain 1947; Spain 1948; Spain 1983; Sri Lanka 1958; Sri Lanka 1984; Syria 1953; Tunisia 1960; Tunisia 1964; Turkey 1953; Venezuela 1960; Venezuela 1973; Venezuela 1974; Venezuela 1975; Venezuela 1951; Venezuela 1959; Venezuela 1976; Venezuela 1980; Vietnam 1966; Yugoslavia 1948; Yugoslavia 1952; Yugoslavia 1953

Table A15: Percentage of FIRC Attempts Within Each Sub-Sample

FIRCs occurring in the US hierarchy (US Allies with a formal defense pact)	FIRCs occurring in the USSR Hierarchy (USSR Allies with a formal defense pact)	FIRCs occurring in Neutral Countries (No Formal defense pact with US or USSR)
44%	10%	46%

Table A16: Expropriation of Domestic and US-Owned Assets and FIRC (US Hierarchy Members Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Any FIRC					
	<i>logistic</i>	<i>felm</i>	<i>IV</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Expropriations - US-owned	0.67** (0.30)	0.03 (0.03)				
Expropriations - Domestic-owned	0.31* (0.17)	0.03 (0.02)				
Expropriations - US-owned (fitted)			0.76** (0.38)	0.74* (0.37)		
Expropriations - domestic-owned (fitted)					0.83*** (0.27)	0.84*** (0.28)
UN Agree US (change)	-0.41 (0.33)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
UN Agree USSR (change)	-0.34 (0.29)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.09)
Population (logged)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.35** (0.17)	0.39** (0.17)	0.39** (0.17)	0.39** (0.17)	0.39** (0.17)
Polity	- 0.04*** (0.01)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.01** (0.003)	-0.01* (0.003)
Constant	- 3.88*** (0.90)					
Observations	1,658	1,658	1,658	1,658	1,658	1,658
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.25	-1.25	-1.14	-1.51	-1.53
Log Likelihood	- 443.74					

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A17: Expropriation of Domestic and US-owned Assets and FIRC (Neutrals Only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Any FIRC					
	<i>logistic</i>	<i>felm</i>	<i>IV</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Expropriations - US-owned	0.80 (1.11)	0.07 (0.13)				
Expropriations - Domestic-owned	0.53 (0.73)	0.12 (0.09)				
Expropriations - US-owned (fitted)			8.63 (5.46)	8.65 (5.47)		
Expropriations - domestic-owned (fitted)					2.05 (2.61)	4.51 (3.50)
UN Agree US (change)	-0.64 (0.41)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.05 (0.04)
UN Agree USSR (change)	0.27 (0.32)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
Population (logged)	0.45*** (0.07)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.07 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.18)
Polity	-0.03 (0.02)	0.01* (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.01* (0.003)	0.01 (0.004)
Constant	- 6.41*** (0.73)					
Observations	2,482	2,482	2,482	2,482	2,482	2,482
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.27	-5.53	-5.56	-0.18	-2.27
Log Likelihood	- 414.53					

Note:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

## References

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