

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE EARLY CHINESE AND JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENTS:
A FOCUS ON HISTORICAL CONDITIONS

by

Jie Xiang

Copyright © Jie Xiang 2022

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2022

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

As members of the Master’s Committee, we certify that we have read the thesis prepared by:

titled: Comparison between the Early Chinese and Japanese Labor Movements:
A Focus on Historical Conditions

and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the thesis requirement for the Master’s Degree.

Fabio Lanza

Fabio Lanza

Date: Apr 21, 2022

Hai Ren

Hai Ren

Date: Apr 21, 2022

Joshua Schlachet

Joshua Schlachet

Date: May 2, 2022

Final approval and acceptance of this thesis is contingent upon the candidate’s submission of the final copies of the thesis to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this thesis prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the Master’s requirement.

Fabio Lanza

Fabio Lanza

Thesis Committee Chair
History and East Asian Studies

Date: Apr 21, 2022



CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	IV
INTRODUCTION.....	1
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST: APPEARANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS	7
THE ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE WORKING CLASS	7
THE ORIGIN OF THE JAPANESE WORKING CLASS	10
MOMENTUM (天时).....	13
EXPLOITATION BY CAPITALISTS.....	13
GEOPOLITICS/NATIONALISM.....	15
INTERNAL ADVANTAGES (地利).....	25
ORGANIZED MOVEMENTS WITH BOTTOM-UP ORIGINS.....	25
SPONTANEOUS MOVEMENT, ORGANIZED PARTY	29
HUMAN FACTOR (人和)	36
THE MAY THIRTIETH MOVEMENT.....	36
FACTIONALISM AND RADICAL POLICY.....	39
CONCLUSION.....	51
BIBLIOGRAPHY	53

Abstract

Labor movements represent social protection systems designed to serve as survival means for workers, usually executed in the form of picketing, peaceful demonstrations, and boycotts. This paper explores past studies on the labor movements in China and Japan, compares and contrasts their characteristics, and explains the various factors that made the Chinese socialist labor movement extend beyond Japan's. The Japanese labor movement was disproportionately instigated by non-government and non-political reasons. A significant proportion of the factors that spurred the Japanese labor movement was associated with the need to increase workers' wages and status. On the other hand, nationalism, spurred by oppression, was the most important factor that contributed to the success of the Chinese Socialist labor movement. Imperialist antagonism greatly abused Chinese labor influence through private enterprises, indirectly disassembling the country's feudal economy. The early industrialization experienced in Japan was dissimilar to that experienced in China because the latter was subjected to increased colonial presence, while Japan was in the process of initiating the Meiji Restoration and westernization. Between 1900 and 1920, China was in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal state while Japan was a colonialist country. Unlike China's labor movement, the emergence of the Japanese labor movement was sudden and without any formal organization. Japanese labor movements also had minimal rivalry from various inter-city workers' movements compared to the Chinese labor movements. Since China and Japan were experiencing different national situations between 1900 and 1920, they experienced different impacts of nationalism on their labor movements

Introduction

Labor movements are a social defense mechanism. As Marx wrote, “capital presupposes wage-labor, and wage-labor presupposes capital. They condition each other; one brings the other into existence.”¹ In a sense, there is never a balance between capital and wage-labor. It is always unbalanced as capital tries to extract as much surplus labor as possible. When wage-labor's endurance is exhausted, the defense mechanism is triggered, and a labor movement will form. Labor movements usually start spontaneously in the form of an unorganized strike, a riot, or demonstration. Then, some thoughtful workers bond with intellectuals and others and establish a labor union to resist the exploitation from the capital and to organize the workers. The early goal for any labor movement is for the means of subsistence. Andrew Gordon has been reconstructing the process of movement-building in Japan and argues that some workers learned to carry out disputes and organize unions, pressing for better treatment in the workplace and improved status in broader society.² This led so workers to seek a socialist transformation as well.³ In addition, Gordon argues that the expansion of heavy industry, imperial democracy, and era of popular violence between 1905 and 1919 informed the subsequent building of a labor movement, and through the unions, the “dispute culture” of the Japanese working class was developed.⁴ Speaking about China, Elizabeth J. Perry argued that the course of the labor movement cannot be explained simply by reference to the partisan strategies and union organization. She asserts that labor movement's politics began with the laborers themselves in relation to aspects such as

¹ Karl Marx, *Wage-Labour and Capital* (New York: International Publishers, 1933), 33.

² Andrew Gordon is a historian of modern Japanese history. He is the experts on Japanese labor history in his early profession.

³ Andrew Gordon, *Labor, and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 3

⁴ Andrew Gordon, *Labor, and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 4-7

geographical origins, gender, educational attainment, and work experience.⁵ She argues that previous studies of the Chinese labor movement have been written as a party history (党史 *dangshi*) and the scholars focused only on the policies of the communists, which made them miss the point about laborers themselves.⁶ The Chinese Scholar Liu Gongcheng's argument incorporates both Gordon's thoughts about the Japanese labor movement and Perry's thoughts about the Chinese labor movement. He argues that the Chinese labor movement had two incarnations: Chinese Communist Party (CCP) story and Chinese labor history.⁷ Liu divides the early Chinese labor movement into three steps: 1) the labor movement before May Fourth (1900–1919) (May Fourth movement happened on 1919), 2) a golden era after May Fourth (1921–1927), and 3) the labor movement led by the CCP in The Kuomintang (KMT)-ruled areas and the areas occupied by Japan (1928–1949).⁸

In this paper, I examine previous studies of the Chinese and Japanese labor movements, compare their features and discuss why China's socialist labor movement went farther than Japan. First, in the section titled "The Development of Capitalism: Appearance of the Working Class," I follow the evolution of the Japanese labor movement based on the Japanese labor and employment relationship stage between 1850 and 1939, as explained by Gordon, the development crisis of Sodomei (Greater Japan General Federation of Labor), and the rise and the downfall of the Japanese radical union.⁹ I divide this history into three stages: 1) the embryonic

⁵ Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 4.

⁶ Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 5.

⁷ Gongcheng Liu, *Zhongguo Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi Yan Jiu 30 Nian Wen Xuan* (中国工人运动史研究30周年文选) (Shenyang: Liaoning ren min chu ban she, 2011), 115.

⁸ Gongcheng Liu, *Zhongguo Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi Yan Jiu 30 Nian Wen Xuan* (中国工人运动史研究30周年文选) (Shenyang: Liaoning ren min chu ban she, 2011), 115.

⁹ Andrew Gordon, *The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan Heavy Industry: 1853-1955* (Cambridge Mass.: Publ. by Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, and distributed by Harvard University Press, 1985), 410.

period of socialism and Marxism after the Meiji reform (1900–1911), 2) the development of workers' unions (1912–1922), and 3) the fissions and conflicts between moderate parties and radical parties (1923–1938). This chronology helps me to compare the Japanese and Chinese cases. In both Japan and China, I set the first stage of the workers' movement chronology in 1900 not only because it was the origin of the organized labor movement, but also because 1900 was a very important year for both China and Japan. China was at the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1900 and the system transformed from 1900 to 1919 was a process from a feudal dynasty to a republic. During this process, China not only accepted many unequal treaties because it was oppressed by force, but also capitalist enterprises came to China. The year 1900 was also a turning point for Japan. Japan tasted the sweetness of the Meiji Restoration in the Sino-Japanese War, and then accelerated the development of the military industry, leading to frequent workers' movements. The reason why 1928 is used as the third stage of the workers' movement in both Japan and China, because of, both China and Japan in 1928, the workers' movement suffered a devastating blow. The organizations and leaders of the Chinese workers' movement were forced to move underground. And almost all the leaders of the Japanese workers' movement were assassinated, leading to a period of stagnation in the development of the workers' movement.

I articulate this comparison based on three concepts, which I derive from Mencius's explanation on how to win a battle. Mencius argued that the success of one's achievement is based on momentum (天时), internal advantages (地利), and human factor (人和). Momentum includes tendency, background situation, and external impact. Although the concept about momentum, internal advantages, and human factor based on early Chinese philosophy, it can reflect on the Japanese labor movement and Chinese labor movement well. According to Mencius, timing is a very important thing for the successful in movements. So, the element of

momentum can mirror the historical and the background situation during or before the labor movement. It is a good way to compare with China and Japan in different historical discourse combined with internal and external impact. The internal advantage shows the existing attributes and foundation of the labor movement under the history context. In addition, because of the country, the society and the historical discourse are composed of humanity. So, the element of human factor exam policies and ideologies between different individuals and reflect how it influence the outcome of the labor movement in both China and Japan. Later, Sun Bin also recorded the concept of momentum, internal advantages, and human factor in *The Art of War* (孙子兵法). He mentioned “During the war, you cannot lack any of the element of momentum, internal advantages, and human factor. If so, even you win the war, there have many hidden problems remained”¹⁰ (天时、地利、人和, 三者不得, 虽胜有殃) Thus, all three elements influence each other and determine the direction of the workers' movement in China or Japan.

In the section “Momentum,” I use the case of Hangzhou’s industrial companies, such as the Hua feng (华丰) paper mill and others and compare it with that of the Ashio copper mine in Japan. I argue that Chinese and Japanese workers had different goals for the labor movement because of their different historical backgrounds. Between 1900 and 1920, China was a semi-colonial, semi-feudal state, in which Chinese workers faced threefold oppression (imperialist, bourgeois, and feudal). This combined oppression unified Chinese workers and imperialism in particular had the effect to transform regional devotion into nationalism. As Sun Zhongshan wrote,

The difference between the Chinese workers and foreign workers lies in the fact that the latter are oppressed only by their own capitalists and not by those of other countries....

¹⁰ Sunbin and Li,Chensen, *Sun Bin Bing FA* (Hei long jiang mei shu chu ban she, 2016).

The Chinese workers are as yet not oppressed by Chinese capitalists.... They are oppressed by foreign capitalists.¹¹

I argue that nationalism under this triple oppression is the most important element for the success of the Chinese Socialist labor movement. Between 1900 and 1920, Japan was instead a colonial country, therefore, Japanese nationalism functioned differently, which enhanced the development of capitalism under a colonial structure. Without any external oppression, the Japanese labor movement occurred predominantly for non-political and non-state interests. Most of the motivations behind the Japanese labor movement were to raise the status and wages of workers.

The section on “Internal Advantages” considers two versions of labor movements: an organized movement originating bottom-up and a spontaneous movement, with an organized party component. In addition to Hangzhou and the Ashio copper mines as my case studies, on the Chinese side, I refer to the development of Shanghai’s native-place guilds and gangs and, on the Japanese side, I also use the Shibura’s case to show the importance of migrant labor. In this section, I compare the origins of unions in China and Japan. Unions appeared earlier in Japan; however, because of some of the features of Japanese labor (e.g., migrant labor, atomized labor, and the size of the union), the labor movement organized by early Japanese unions were usually ineffective. Although China did not almost have any union before 1919, gangs and native-place guilds did the union’s job and organized an efficient labor movement in Shanghai. In addition to Shanghai, similar organizations emerged in Hangzhou, such as the National Salvation 10-men teams, (救国十人团) which had functions similar to unions. I argue that nationalism promoted the development of native-place guilds and gangs, which played the role of a prototype or an

¹¹ Shu-Chin Tsui, *The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente upon Sun Yat-Sen's Political Philosophy and Revolutionary Tactics*, 1934, 120.

antecedent for work unions. They laid the foundation for the development of the red unions in 1920.

The human factor relates to factionalism within the party or the union and their specific policies. The CCP, the Japanese Socialist Party (1906), the Japanese Communist Party (1922) as well as the unions in China and Japan had internal conflicts and the balance between right and left wings was always unstable. In China, the Shanghai-led group and the Mao Zedong-led group did not break up even though they had different policies. They worked together and when mistakes were made, they would report them and avoid the same mistakes. For example, after the Failure of the Hangzhou's red movement, the CCP established an organization called Hangzhou Gonghui Zuzhi Tongyi Weiyuanhui (杭州工会组织统一委员会 Committee for the unification and reorganization of the Hangzhou workers' unions), to reorganize the red unions, correct past mistakes, and arbitrate and mediate labor disputes under the KMT regime.¹² Furthermore, the Chinese advocated Sinicization of Marxism and created new socialist policies that were adapted to the Chinese situation. Some CCP's comrades, such as Peng Pai and Mao, considered the peasants to be the core of the national revolution thought it necessary to arm the peasants and make a violent revolution. However, in Japan, The Japanese communism party (JCP) and some left parties did not buy the lesson about the split-up between Katayama Sen and Kōtoku Shūsui, inner Japan Socialist Party (1906) and conflicting and opposing tactical approaches split the union and the party many times. Sodomei, a socialist union in Japan, split into three unions with different strategies because of different policies. The Japanese socialists did not reflect on the defeat of 1911. So, they did not change how they balanced tactical differences.

¹² *Repertory of the work of the Unification Committee of Hangzhou Trade Union Organizations*, 1928.

The Development of Capitalist: Appearance of the Working Class

The Origins of the Chinese Working Class

The emergence of the Chinese working class is different from the same phenomenon in Western Europe. Some Chinese scholars argue that the transformation from feudal society to a semi-colonial society in China played a role in the development of the modern Chinese industry.¹³ After the Second Opium War, the Treaty of Tianjin forced China to open the southern port cities to western countries.¹⁴ Thirty years later, China lost the first Sino-Japanese War and signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki,¹⁵ which allowed foreign nations to establish factories on Chinese soil. Through this opportunity, foreign capitalists set up silk, sugar, and many different types of factories in the port cities. At the same time, some Chinese bureaucrats were influenced by the powerful western industries and started to establish military industries with western machines and western management policy. According to Mao:

imperialist aggression stimulated China's social economy, brought about changes in it, and created the opposites of imperialism the national industry and national bourgeoisie of China, and especially the Chinese proletariat working in enterprises run directly by the imperialists, those run by bureaucrat-capital and those run by the national bourgeoisie.¹⁶

¹³ Mingda Liu, Yuliang Tang, and Xingxing Liu, *Zhongguo Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi. Di 1 Juan: Zhongguo Gong Ren Jie Ji De Chan Sheng He Zao Qi Zi Fa Dou Zheng, 1840 Nian- 1919 Nian 4 Yue* (中国工人运动史第一卷中国工人阶级的产生和早期自发斗争)(Guangzhou: Guangdong ren min chu ban she, 1998), 3.

¹⁴ Treaty of Tianjin 1858, an unequal treaty forced on the Qing government by Great Britain, France, Russia and the United States during the Second Opium War in Tianjin. Opening of the port city to Britain, Russia, the United States and France and granting one-sided MFN status.

¹⁵ The Treaty of Shimonoseki was an unequal treaty between the Qing Dynasty government of China and the Meiji government of Japan on April 17, 1895, in Shimonoseki, Japan. According to the treaty, China ceded the island of Taiwan and its subsidiary islands, the Penghu Islands to Japan and compensated Japan with 200 million taels of silver. China also opened additional commercial ports of Sha, Chongqing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou, and allowed Japan to invest in factories at China's commercial ports.

¹⁶ Mao Zedong, *Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle*, accessed March 29, 2022, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_66.htm.

The imperialist aggression not only exploited Chinese labor power through capitalism, but also indirectly dismantled the Chinese feudal economy. The anti-imperialist and anti-feudal movements held by patriotic forces improved the national industry.¹⁷ The Chinese national cotton mill spinning machine's numbers increased from 174,000 in 1895 to 484,000 in 1913 and the number of knitting machines from 1,800 machines to 2,016 machines.¹⁸

During the period of the imperialist economic assault and the rise of Chinese national industry, China's labor movement took its first steps, highlighting the contradiction between the working class and the capitalists. In addition, it also aroused the dissatisfaction of the Chinese people with the imperialist invasion. In 1917, an October revolution proved the feasibility of Marxism and socialism. Many Chinese scholars started to understand and refer to Marxism, such as Chen Duxiu(陈独秀), who had opted for a version of guild socialism under the influence of John Dewey and Bertrand Russell in his early career.¹⁹ In 1919, China, while a part of the victorious nations in World War 1, was nonetheless forced to give the German occupation rights to Japan in Shandong province. The unequal treaty and oppression served as catalysts for the 1919 protests called the May Fourth movement and, eventually, the CCP was established in 1921 with the help of the Comintern.

The founding of the Communist Party played a very important turning point for the labor movement. Jean Chesneaux argues that “the Chinese labor movement from beginning to end was developed under the direction of the Chinese Communist party.”²⁰ I argue that the relationship

¹⁷ Liang yu kui, *Zao Qi Zhong Guo Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi*(早期中国工人运动史) (Chang chun: Ji lin ke xue ji zhu chu ban she, 2000), 15.

¹⁸ zhong ping Yan, *Zhong Guo Mian Fang Zhi Shi Gao: Cong Mian Fang Zhi Gong Ye Shi Kan Zhong Guo Zi Ben Zhu Yi De Fa Sheng Yu Fa Zhan Guo Cheng* (中国棉纺织史稿)(Bei jing: Ke xue chu ban she, 1955), 140.

¹⁹ Chen Duxiu was one of the main founders of the Chinese Communist Party. He was also a major leader of the Communist Party of China (1921-1928)

²⁰ Jean Chesneaux and H. M. Wright, *The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919-1927* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), 405.

between ideology and organization are bilateral, which means the CCP provided the labor movement with coherent ideological framework but also an organizational support structure. In 1922, the First United Front was a good opportunity for the CCP to associate with more unions and diffuse Marxism within the union movement.²¹ However, in 1927, to suppress the development of the CCP, KMT arrested and executed many CCP members. The CCP shifted the battlefield quickly and went underground. The labor movement was also suppressed by the Kuomintang at this stage, and the remaining red unions went underground.

The years 1922–1927 were a golden period for the development of the socialist labor movement, but it was ultimately stopped by the Kuomintang's military repression. Between 1927 and 1937, the CCP went underground, but the labor movement remained active. Corruption within the Kuomintang stimulated the exploitation of labor by capitalists. The resentment of the workers against the capitalists was growing. In 1937, Japan took the Marco Polo Bridge incident as an excuse to invade China, which reinvigorated nationalism of Chinese workers. In addition, the Second United Front reached in 1937 after Japan declared the war with China. Chalmers Johnson contends that the Japanese invasion contributed to the rise of communism in China.²² I argue that the Japanese army not only influenced Chinese peasants to join against the Japanese, but also stimulated the development of a Red Worker Union, according to the Hangzhou case.

²¹ The Chinese Communist Party held its Third National Congress in Guangzhou from June 12 to 20, 1923. The congress correctly estimated Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary position and the possibility of the Kuomintang undergoing reorganization and decided that communists should join the Kuomintang in their individual capacity in order to realize the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. It was clearly stipulated that when a Communist Party member joined the Kuomintang, the Party must maintain its independence politically, ideologically and organizationally.

²²Chalmers Ashby Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence O Revolutionary China, 1937-1945* (Oxford U.P: Stanford U.P, 1963).

The Origin of the Japanese Working Class

Overall, the early industrialization of Japan was not like that experienced by China. While China was subject of intense colonial occupation, Japan was beginning the Meiji restoration and westernization. Japan was subject to unequal treaties, but not to systematic territorial and economic exploitation. Gordon wrote,

The rise of industrial capitalism in late nineteenth-century Japan brought on a related set of politically important changes. Expansion of heavy industry beginning in the interwar decade around the turn of the century was financed in part by fruits of empire such as the demand for arms production and the Sino-Japanese War indemnity, which subsidized steelmaking and shipbuilding.²³

The aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War was characterized by further development of capitalism in Japan. The outcome led to an increase in social inequality. As a result, the country's intellectuals were consulted to design approaches for bringing about social justice. The intellectuals became more interested in socialism, for example Takano Fusataro is passionate about socialist ideas.²⁴ In 1897, the Society for the Study of Socialism was established with the objective of studying the core principles of socialism as well as advise on the application of these principles in Japan. In the same year, some members of the Society for the Study of Socialism joined together to form the Association for the Establishment of Labor Unions, marking the first wave of the labor movement in Japan. The government, in order to police all mass activities, enacted the Public Safety and Police Law, leading to the destruction of infant labor unions. Enactment of the Public Safety and Police Law influenced the members of the Socialist Society

²³ Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 123.

²⁴ Takano Fusataro was a Japanese labor activist and the co-founder of the Japan Socialist Party (1906)

to assume the posture of fully alleged socialists. The enactment of these laws eliminated any prospect for seeking the abolishment of those social inequalities that the workers were facing in Japan. The first wave of the labor movement ended in 1910 after the High treason incident happened.²⁵ Japanese government hunted down socialists and anarchists and warned the working class who intended to join the labor movement.

In the process of developing a socialist ideology and leading labor movements by Kōtoku Shūsui and Katayama Sen, the phenomenon of the “migrant labor” undermined the value and efficiency of the worker union. The high mobility of the labor force made the union's membership (and its funding) unstable, damaging the union’s ability to organize the movement. Both Kōtoku Shūsui and Katayama Sen were Japanese socialists who played leading roles in introducing socialism to Japan in the early twentieth century. Katayama Sen was the co-founder of the Japanese Communist Party in 1922 and spent most of his life leading the Japanese socialist and communist movement. In 1920s, through the joint efforts of the union and capitalists, labor become more stable, and the union found it easier organize workers. By 1919, the Yūaikai (the friendly society) changed its name to Sodomei (the Greater Japan Federation of Labor). Sodomei declared itself a labor union, using strike actions to win worker's demands. That year, 497 organized strikes and 1,891 organized disputes took place, the largest number in the history of the Japanese labor movement. During the 1920s, more workers created new unions, and all the unions were divided into three camps. The first type of union was led by the Japanese Communist Party, which aimed to break the exploitation of capital through revolution. The

²⁵ From the end of 1910 to January 1911, hundreds of socialists were arrested and tried in secret. Japanese socialist pioneer Kotoku and 26 others were falsely accused of treason, attempting to assassinate the emperor, creating a riot, and committing the crime of attempted assassination of the emperor. On January 18, 1911, after a special verdict of the first and final trial by the Grand Auditors' Court, 24 people, including Kotoku, were sentenced to death and two others were sentenced to prison terms.

second type of union was led by moderates, who sought to raise the status of working people within the capitalist system. The third type of union was to cater to the capitalists and to eliminate the resistance of the working class by cooperating with the capitalists. The Sodomei was the biggest union, which combined all the three types of members. Starting in 1922, the conflicts within the union become fierce, and different factions left the Sodomei, which weakened the labor movement.

The 1923 Kanto earthquake gave the Japanese government a good chance to suppress the radicals and the red union.²⁶ After this suppression, the moderate members in Sodomei and the moderate worker union were afraid of a revenge by the Japanese government, so they estranged the JCP and the more radical union. The capitalists seized this opportunity to raise the worker's salary and treatment. In addition, the government founded a think tank called the Harmonization society to study social problems and promote harmony between laborers and the capital. This society would educate workers in the spirit of cooperation and self-restraint and urge employers to take better care of their workers.²⁷ Under the influence of these actions, the employment relationship in Japan gradually changed, and the Japanese socialist labor movement was severely suppressed.

²⁶ An 8.2 magnitude earthquake struck the Kanto region of Japan on September 1, 1923. The earthquake destroyed the Kanto region, including the two major cities of Tokyo and Yokohama. The earthquake killed 143,000 people, 9/10 of whom were burned to death.

²⁷ Sheldon M. Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 52

Momentum (天时)

Exploitation by Capitalists

In this section, I compare the labor movement in Hangzhou, China and Ashio, a one-company mine town in Japan. Hangzhou was not a one-company town and there are therefore advantages and disadvantages to this comparison. Both cases involve a relatively limited area and private enterprises and allow for an exploration of the labor movement as a bottom-up phenomenon. The downside is that Hangzhou is not a one-company town, so the socio-economic model of Ashio and Hangzhou is not the same.

With the industrial development introduced by western countries in China in 1856 and Japan in 1895, capitalism took roots in Chinese port cities. The working class that emerged with the development of industrialization was exploited by capitalists. The quality of life and the working environment of laborers were arduous. In one paper mill in Hangzhou called Hua feng (华丰), the Chinese owner always extended the working time and strengthened the labor efficiency to extract more surplus labor value.²⁸ The Hua feng paper mill regulated that every laborer had to work 12 hours per day and 18 hours during the weekend.²⁹ There were many songs popular among the Hangzhou's textile workers that commiserated the harsh conditions. A famous one was titled “Going to the work when rooster crowing, going back to home when ghost howl, the lighting is both dark at home and at factory.”³⁰ Even if the laborers worked every day with little rest, their salaries were pitiful. The average for Hang Zhou textile laborers was 3 cents

²⁸ *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (杭州工人运动史)(Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 7.

²⁹ *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (杭州工人运动史)(Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 7.

³⁰ *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (杭州工人运动史)(Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 7.

per day in 1905 and 2.5 cents per day in 1909.³¹ In 1909, the price of rice in Hangzhou was 6 yuan per load, which means a normal laborer could only buy three or four *shen* (升) of rice.³² In addition to the long hours and miserable pay, work conditions were also disgusting. In 1910, the equipment of Hangzhou silk factory was rudimentary. Laborers had to work in a narrow, dim, dirty, humid, and unsafe spaces. In addition, the owner kept the doors and windows closed to save energy for the machines, so the female workers often fainted in the workshop.³³ In 1903, when the workers in Hangzhou could not endure the exploitation, the first documented labor movement in Hangzhou began, led by workers at the mint Hangzhou Copper Yuan (铜元局).³⁴ Copper Yuan's laborers allied themselves with textile laborers and struck to gain an increase in salary. From 1903 forward, there were frequent labor demonstrations and strikes.

Labor conditions in Japan were similar to those in Hangzhou. Japanese laborers suffered not only from low wages, but also from an incredibly harsh working environment. In the words of Katayama Sen:

Government arsenal has been treating its employees in the cruelest manner. They cannot go to the W.C. without a permission ticket during recess. The number of the tickets is only 4 for a hundred workers, consequently some must wait five hours.... Every and all little mistakes are fined at least 5 hours' earnings. They are fined 10 to 20 hours' earnings if they forget anything their personal belongings. They are now limited to drink hot water in the mealtime.... Being unbearable at the treatment, they 15,000 in number in a body petitioned the authorities for the immediate remedy with a tactic threat of a strike.³⁵

³¹ *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (杭州工人运动史)(Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 7.

³² *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (杭州工人运动史)(Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 8. Literis(升,shen) the old Chinese unit of measurement of grain, before 1949 ten liters for a bucket, a bucket for thirty pounds, four buckets for a stone, a liter is three pounds.

³³ *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (杭州工人运动史)(Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 8.

³⁴ Yutang Sun, *Zhongguo Jin Dai Gong Ye Shi Zi Liao* (中国近代工史资料) (Beijing: Ke xue chu ban she, 1957), 1290.

³⁵ *Shakai shinbun*, March 8, 1908, p. 4. Katayama wrote this for the paper's column of English-language news briefs.

In Ashio, a town formed by miners, the working conditions were harsh. Mining was a dangerous job. There were no safe walkways for laborers inside the Ashio mine.³⁶ Furthermore, the long working hours chemically poisoned the miners. The economic structure of Ashio operated around workers and their families. Therefore, the capitalists were able to replace salaries with ration coupons.³⁷ Those coupons could be exchanged for products in shops, which were managed by the mine's owners. The mine paid the workers every year after deducting the money spent in coupons, but the workers hardly got a penny. Although this system meant that workers could buy goods at relatively stable prices and lower than other shops in town, the quality was usually poor. The owners offered different commodities for different classes. For example, the shop sold high quality domestic rice to managers but offered the laborers only poor imported rice at the same price, despite the large difference in quality.³⁸ During the labor movement, Ashio workers demanded rice of the same quality as their managers. The laborers could not endure the exploitation by the mine owner, and they rioted violently in 1907.

Geopolitics/Nationalism

By observing and analyzing the labor movement in both China and Japan between 1900 and 1920, I argue that the Chinese nationalism is one of the elements that gave momentum to the Chinese socialist labor movement to succeed. The Japanese labor movement also involved an element of nationalism but, I argue, because the national situations in China and Japan were different, the impact of nationalism on the social workers' movement was also different. China was in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal period between 1900 and 1920. The anti-colonial

³⁶ Kazuo Nimura and Andrew Gordon, *The Ashio Riot of 1907: A Social History of Mining in Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 95.

³⁷ Kazuo Nimura and Andrew Gordon, *The Ashio Riot of 1907: A Social History of Mining in Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 62.

³⁸ Kazuo Nimura and Andrew Gordon, *The Ashio Riot of 1907: A Social History of Mining in Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 79.

movement promoted the desire of Chinese workers to revive China. On the other hand, between the last decade of the 19th century and 1920, Japan emerged as a colonialist country. There, unlike in China, nationalism was used to support the Japanese military-industrial complex and indirectly promote the development of capitalism.

According to Hangzhou's historical records, in 1905 the Qian (钱江) river porters refused to transport American goods because of American abuse of Chinese workers and the persecution of Chinese overseas. Similarly, women who worked at textile mills started refusing to make cloth for the United States.³⁹ One year later, the Qing government authorized British control over the Suzhou-Hangzhou-Ningbo Railway, which tested the limit of Hangzhou workers' patience. Thus, the workers of Hangzhou, Suzhou, and Ningbo united with members of other classes and refused to accept the orders of the late Qing government. They bought a stake in the Suzhou-Hangzhou-Ningbo Railway with their subsistence money and refused the British takeover.⁴⁰ A Hangzhou railway porter stated:

Although I do not have a chance to read and write and I do not understand the principles of state and how the country operates. I know as a Chinese that we should reject all the invaders' unequal treaties. To rehabilitate Chinese ancient glory, all the Chinese should work hard in their position.⁴¹

The unequal treaties signed in the Second Opium War and the First Sino-Japanese War buried the seeds of hatred for the aggressors in the Chinese people's heart. While China was too chaotic, and people with ambition and patriotic fervor could not focus on resisting the invader, if the fuse of resistance was lit, the entire Chinese proletariat would resist the aggressor. As Mao said, "the Chinese proletariat is more resolute and thoroughgoing in revolutionary struggle than any other

³⁹ *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 10.

⁴⁰ *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 10.

⁴¹ *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 10.

class because it is subjected to a threefold oppression (imperialist, bourgeois, and feudal), which is marked by a severity and cruelty seldom found in other countries."⁴² The power of the Chinese proletariat was dispersed by the threefold oppression, and it needs external stimulation to unleash.

From Regionalism to Nationalism

Elizabeth Perry argued that before the unions existed, workers in Shanghai would often form alliances with others from the same native place and were usually indifferent to workers from different native-places.⁴³ She asserts that the division among Shanghai laborers generated systematic and long-standing solidarities: immigrants of the same geographical place and gender engaged in common lines of work, thereby creating a potent basis for collective action. As she demonstrates, "The intimate relationship between native-place identity and job opportunities meant that immigrant workers fell into occupational niches depending on their geographical origin."⁴⁴ For example, Cantonese carpenters, Ningbo coppersmiths, and Yangzhou rickshaw pullers become symbols of Shanghai's labor structure. When, in 1874, the French decided to extend their territorial control by building a road right through the Ningbo guild burial grounds, more than 1,500 Ningbo natives gathered at the office to resist foreign intrusion. Perry argues that such movements transcended class,⁴⁵ as both wealthy and poor Ningbo natives were united in defense of shared cultural properties.

⁴² Mao, Zedong. *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1968.

⁴³ Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995),29

⁴⁴ Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995),29

⁴⁵ Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995),24

Following Perry's argument, I maintain that native-place cultural identity is the foundation of Chinese nationalism. If the angle is switched from micro to macro and the native-place identity is set aside, it is easy to see a group of human beings sharing the same cultural identity. For example, the Shaoxing (绍兴) carpenters and Shanghai (上海) masons formed a guild that focused on resisting western style buildings and retaining traditional Chinese architectural elements. During this boycott, the Shaoxing carpenters and Shanghai masons, as well as carpenters from all over China, joined the resistance process. A guild leader had an uplifting speech:

The foreigners take advantages of our shortcomings to export their own products There have foreign personal in our government, our factories have foreign capitalist, our school have foreign teacher. The European influence is everywhere..... Our 400 million Chinese lack vigor. Only we can stand up, we can be free. Only we are free, we can be strong. Only when everybody is strong will the nation and race (民族) become strong. Only when our nation and race become strong, we can expel the foreign. However, a single person can't not be strong. Only after combining with millions of others, we can become strong. Brother and sister, with these we can win out against foreigner, with these we can renaissance Chinese glory again.⁴⁶

The example of Shaoxing carpenters and Shanghai masons is evidence for the possible transition of regionalism to nationalism. I argue that it was the exploitation of Chinese workers and the invasion of Western culture after the colonization of China that led to the transformation of regionalism into nationalism. Regionalism emerged because of cultural differences between workers, such as the cultures of northern China and southern China that created a divide between southerners and northerners. In a sense, there was also a cultural divide between China and the West. This cultural divide is part of what promoted nationalism. As Benedict Anderson argued, nationalism is imagined political community.

⁴⁶ Translate by Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shang Hai Bei Ke Zi Liao Xuan Ji*, (上海碑刻资料), 321-322.

According to Anderson, “It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”⁴⁷ Anderson also explains that a nation is imagined as a community because, despite inequalities, exploitation, and cultural differences within each nation, it is united and has its own unique culture compared to other civilizations.⁴⁸ Similar to contemporary scholarly views of the nation, early Chinese philosophers divided the family into two categories. The first is “small family” (小家), which referred to an individual's family. The second is “big family” (大家), which refers to the whole of China. As Anderson said, there is divergence between the different small families but all small families contributed to the big family. The workers in Shanghai, Shaoxing, Ningbo, and other regions of China joined together to resist Western architectural culture, which was trying to protect the big family and was a manifestation of nationalism. So, I think the imagined political community issued by Anderson and the idea about the big family and small family are both good examples to explain how regionalism transformed to nationalism when Shanghai's worker was suppressed by imperialists.

There are many such guilds in Shanghai and Hangzhou, and they can be viewed as prototypes of or an antecedent to a workers' union. For example, the Qing gang and some native-place guilds organized labor strike movements for workers' interests and in the name of nationalism (see the Internal Advantages section).

⁴⁷ Anderson Benedict R O'G, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2016), 7.

⁴⁸ Anderson Benedict R O'G, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2016), 7.

Japanese Nationalism under Colonialism

The Meiji revolution had three goals for: Syokusan Kougyou (殖産興業 Encouraging new industries), Fukoku koyuhei (富国強兵 Increasing wealth and military power), and Bunmei Kaika (文明開化 Japanese national systems, country structure and customs learned from west). To rapidly develop these three goals, the Japanese government exploited the Japanese hatred for the invaders. Bunmei Kaika and Syokusan Kougyou strengthened the development of industrialization and the status of capitalism in Japanese society. After Japan won the first Sino-Japanese war, the outcome not only stimulated Japanese nationalism but also served as an answer to the Meiji reform's goals. As Gordon has argued, the Sino-Japanese war inspired a huge outpouring of nationalist pride and strengthened the Japanese government's confidence in capitalist development policies.⁴⁹ In 1894, a Japanese report declared:

Today we no longer have to feel inferior as Japanese, we can stand tall and face the world. Before the Sino-Japanese War, the world did not know Japan, but after 30 years of westernization, we used our own strength to let the world know Japan.⁵⁰

Along with nationalist pride, the Japanese government found that foreign expansion and plundering of resources were good ways to consolidate domestic support for capitalist development. Thus, as part of Shimonoseki Treaty, Japan gained an extraordinary indemnity of 360 million yen from China, and 300 million yen went to military costs.

⁴⁹ Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 193.

⁵⁰ Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 135-136.

After the Meiji Restoration, Japanese economic development was not held back by unequal treaties, and it gained cultural and technological knowledge from the exchanging with Western countries. However, the size and the location of the Japanese territory made Japanese had limit resource. Therefore, Japan still feel very much insecure in terms of access to resources. As Marius Jarisen argued Japan's drive for colonial control was a reasonable approach to make sure they have enough resources.⁵¹ In addition, Japan's access to basic resources and markets is uncertain, and the Japanese government wants to be guaranteed access to food supplies and raw materials to be able to compete in the world market under any conditions.⁵² For example, during the world crisis of 1929, the North Korea's rich mineral resources, abundant hydroelectric power, and cheap labor helped Japan getting through the crisis.⁵³ In 1905, after Japan won the Russo-Japanese war, a diverse assortment of Japanese activist groups called for a rally at Hibiya Park. They thought the conditions agreed upon in the Treaty of Portsmouth were not in Japan's favor, and even if Japan had won the war, the Russian government would not pay any war reparations. As a result, large numbers of Japanese marched and rioted in Hibiya Park, demanding that the Japanese government continue the war. As Gordon has highlighted, as the terms became clear, a coalition of journalists, university professors, and politicians in the Japanese Diet who strongly supported the war came together to protest for peace in August 1905.⁵⁴ They used nationalism to turn the Japanese laborers

⁵¹ Ramon Hawley Myers and Mark R. Peattie, *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 78.

⁵² Ramon Hawley Myers and Mark R. Peattie, *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 77.

⁵³ Ramon Hawley Myers and Mark R. Peattie, *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 33.

⁵⁴“Andrew Gordon, “the Hibiya Riot,” MIT TechTV – Andrew Gordon, The Hibiya Riot, accessed February 25, 2022,

and urban population to support and continue the war. Modern nationalism in Japan is related to war. The Japanese believe that the victory of the war is a symbol of the greatness of the Japanese nation, except for the fact that Japan itself was a colonial country and Japanese workers were not bothered by colonization (and in some cases, benefited from it). In addition to the war expansion strengthened the recognition of capitalist development by Japanese workers. The better benefits of foreign companies in Japan also prevented Japanese workers from experiencing the hellish life of Chinese workers during the colonization.

The exploitation of Japanese workers by the owners of foreign companies was relatively mild compared to that of local Japanese companies. Japanese workers preferred to work in a foreign factory in Japan because they believed that foreign capitalists offered better welfare and working conditions than the local companies. In contrast, in China, the exploitation of Chinese workers by foreign capitalists was inhumane. According to a Japanese laborer, after he visited an American factory in Japan, he discovered that the laborers there followed rules, came to work on time, and would seek to double their prior output every day.⁵⁵ He also mentioned that the wages for the American factory in Japan's laborers were high. After they spent money for necessities, they could save some money for other use.⁵⁶

In China, the foreign companies' handling of Chinese workers was very unfriendly.

Mitoshi Nakamura wrote:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20131005090454/http://techtv.mit.edu/collections/vclectures/videos/17509-andrew-gordon-the-hibiya-riot>.

⁵⁵ *Taiheiyo shoko sekai*, 8/1/1909. PP. 26-27

⁵⁶ *Taiheiyo shoko sekai*, 8/1/1909. PP. 26-27

Foreign capitalists take inhuman measures to treat Chinese workers. In Japanese companies, Japanese supervisors will wear guns, and if a worker disturbs the factory order, they will be shot directly. Foremen beat Chinese workers with leather and wire whips. Female workers are often raped by Japanese foremen.⁵⁷

In addition to Nakamura's observation, an observer from Britain reported:

As in England or Japan or any other industrial country, the worker is mere unit, a hand feeding a machine. But in addition, in China, the workers belong to a race alien to the foreign owner, which he has always regarded as inferior. Their names seem to the foreign owner of foremen all exactly alike, their faces indistinguishable one from the other, and the dehumanizing process is complete.⁵⁸

Comparing foreign factories in China and Japan, the conclusion is obvious. Foreign capitalists treated Chinese workers as colonized inferiors, not human beings, which naturally increased the hatred by Chinese laborers and paved the way for Chinese nationalism. However, In Japan, workers preferred to work in U.S. companies in Japan rather than in local Japanese factories, as welfare and wages in the American factories were better.

More fundamentally, nationalism shaped the goal for the labor movement in these two countries. As I illustrated in the case of Hangzhou and Shanghai, one of the characteristics of the Chinese labor movement is that it quickly emerged from pure economic demands and regionalism to embody a truly national concern. In Japan, however, the labor movement's actions were almost always aimed at improving the treatment of workers and had no overarching national significance. For example, in the Ashio mine case, before the spontaneous riot in 1907, the group of miners had listed twenty-three demands. The following is an excerpt:

Article

1. A base wage increase of 60 percent for fixed-rate workers.
2. A raise in the piecework rate of 1yen 20 sen for the lowest grade worker.

⁵⁷ Mitoshi Nakamura, Yuping Wang, and De'an Li, *Zhongguo Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi* (Beijing: Gong ren chu ban she, 1989), 17.

⁵⁸ Cecil L'Estrange Malone, *New China. Report of an Investigation* (London: I.L.P., 1926), 11-13.

3. Workers absent without notice for five days a month will be subjected to no penalties.
4. Drinking water installations will be sited in every pit tunnel
5. Safe walkways will be provided underground in all three mines.
6. Miners working at depths of more than 300 shaku (100meter) will work a six-hour shift.
7. Henceforth, work will be notified in advance of the announcement of new company regulation affecting them and execution of such regulation will be contingent upon our agreement or disagreement.⁵⁹

This excerpt of miners' demands can be divided into five categories. Articles 1 and 2 are demands for higher wage. Article 3 asks for aid for the sick and the injured. Article 4 demands the supply of daily provisions. Articles 5 and 6 ask for safety and sanitation. Article 7 asks for the rights of workers. The remaining 16 requirements repeat the content of these 5 categories. These requests do not rise to the level of a concern for national salvation, as there was no real outside pressure on Japan. The goals of the strikes and riots were better wages, healthcare, living environment, and status in the factory. Therefore, from the Japanese workers' point of view, nationalism was not the reason for their labor movement. After the Sino-Japanese War, Japan was a colonial expansionist country, and its laborers did not have to worry about Japan's territorial rights. Moreover, the imperialist expansionist policy provoked the development of Japanese military industry and solved the employment problem of more laborers.

⁵⁹ Kazuo Nimura and Andrew Gordon, *The Ashio Riot of 1907: A Social History of Mining in Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 96-97.

Internal Advantages (地利)

Organized Movements with Bottom-up Origins

For both the Chinese and the Japanese labor movements, I analyze the patterns of the labor, distinguishing between spontaneous and organized movements. The organized movement can be further divided into those organized by labor unions and by political parties. The establishment of a union is an important turning point in any labor movement. While the Chinese unions were established later than their Japanese counterparts, some characteristics of Chinese labor made the development of Chinese unions more mature and more united than in Japan. First, nationalism helped unite workers from multiple industries and people of different classes. Ningbo guild is a labor movement organization we mentioned early when we talk about the dispute between Ningbo guild and French Officer in Shanghai, which combined different classes from the same native-place and the workers from multiple industries. In addition to skilled factory workers, there was a large group of unskilled workers in Shanghai. The most common organization for unskilled workers was the gang, which would mobilize unskilled workers for some collective actions. A characteristic of these gangs is that they led unskilled workers in the same industry, such as for the nightman (excrement worker) or for the docker. To resist the capitalists' bullying behavior, the gang for the nightman organized all workers to strike in 1912. A week later, the government compromised and participated in mediating the strike. In 1914, under the leadership of the dockers gang, the dockers of the 17 piers in Shanghai simultaneously went on strike for better labor conditions.⁶⁰ This kind of Shanghai gang has a very strong appeal

⁶⁰ Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 68.

and influence on the workers. And by uniting many workers, these gangs are more likely to benefit workers in general, rather than individual sectors or workers in a single factory.

In addition to gangs, there was also a large-scale spontaneous labor union movement in Hangzhou in 1917. The Hangzhou Federation of Unions called this cooperation the prototype of the Hangzhou Union.⁶¹ This movement was organized by Hangzhou Dinxin yarn factory to drive out Wang Leili, who was the spokesman for the capitalists and had exploited and bullied workers in different workhouses. The Dinxin yarn factory joined workers from twelve factories to punish Wang. The Hangzhou unions describe this labor movement as an expression of the struggle of industrial workers in Hangzhou and beyond the limits of economic struggle. The movement also formed a powerful force to unite against the enemy, which was a milestone in the development of Hangzhou's unions.⁶²

The Shanghai and Hangzhou cases allow us to see that between 1911 and 1917, embryos of labor unions were formed spontaneously by workers, without the guiding ideology of political parties. Both the guild-organized labor movement in Shanghai or the Hangzhou's labor alliance represented a beginning of the organized union movement. It was only after the May Fourth Movement in 1919 that intellectuals realized the importance of a guiding ideology for workers and unions. Before the founding of the Communist Party in 1921, Marxist intellectuals began to guide and develop unions.

In China, after 1917, labor movements were usually led by communist intellectuals and after 1921, almost all the labor unions were developed by Chinese communist party.⁶³ Before the

⁶¹ *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 11.

⁶² *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 11.

⁶³ Mingda Liu, Yuliang Tang, and Mingda Liu, *Zhongguo Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi. Di 2 Juan: Xin Min Zhu Zhu Yi Ge Ming Chu Qi De Gong Ren Yun Dong, 1919 Nian 5 Yue- 1923 Nian 12 Yue* (Guangzhou: Guangdong ren min chu ban she, 1998), 191-200.

May Fourth Movement, in many cities in China, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Changsha, intellectuals, students and workers made some ideological and organizational efforts to further develop anti-imperialist mass movements. On May Fourth, the student demonstrations in Beijing and the slogan “preserve peace at home and resist foreign invasion” reflected the common goals of the people of the country and China's nationalism. Therefore, when the May Fourth Movement broke out in Beijing, it immediately received support by students, workers, and other people from all walks of life. Strikes by workers, students, and merchants as well as demonstrations and boycotts of Japanese goods took place in hundreds of cities in China. According to the Hangzhou union's records, after the Treaty of Versailles, Hangzhou's students, intellectuals, and workers had a meeting in Zhijiang University(之江大学).⁶⁴ The Intellectuals' speeches linked the students, worker, and people from other classes. Then, Hangzhou printing workers, University of Hangzhou's professors, and people from other fields formed groups called National Salvation Ten-people Teams (救国十人团).⁶⁵ They took the materials provided by the students to publicize the ideas of the May Fourth Movement in various places in Hangzhou and mobilized the staff and students to use strikes to resist imperialism.

The strike activity during the May Fourth period in Shanghai was even more intense. A new term was coined during Shanghai's anti-imperialist movement, “three strikes” (三罢),⁶⁶ which meant that students, workers, and merchants all joined a strike.⁶⁷ As Liu Kuiming pointed out, on June 5, the 5,000 workers in the third, fourth and fifth Japanese cotton mill in Shanghai struck shouting “we will never work for the enemy.”⁶⁸ In addition to workers in the textile

⁶⁴*Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 13.

⁶⁵*Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 14.

⁶⁶Mingkui Liu, *Zhong Guo Gong Ren Yun Dong Tu Shi* (guang zhou shi: yan dong ren min chu ban she, 2006), 63.

⁶⁷Mingkui Liu, *Zhong Guo Gong Ren Yun Dong Tu Shi* (guang zhou shi: yan dong ren min chu ban she, 2006), 64.

⁶⁸Mingkui Liu, *Zhong Guo Gong Ren Yun Dong Tu Shi* (guang zhou shi: yan dong ren min chu ban she, 2006), 65.

industry who went on strike, workers in the printing industry, cigarette factories, and others joined the strike. According to statistics from the Shanghai Union, under the influence of the three strikes, about 120,000 Shanghai workers and students joined.⁶⁹ The workers' strike in 1919, in addition to the class characteristics of the three strikes, were similar to joint strikes in different cities. On June 5, to support the strike movement in Shanghai, the Hangzhou-Ningbo railway workers and the Hangzhou academic community went on strike. The business community in Hangzhou announced a strike at the same time and no longer provided goods. A Hangzhou businessman said to the customers of the day, "The country will be gone, making money has no meaning! Our generation should join the road of anti-imperialist and anti-feudalism!"⁷⁰

While the May Fourth Movement was not originally a labor movement, it developed into a national labor movement in the following months. The May Fourth Movement is not a case of either a labor movement organized by unions, or of one organized by political parties. It was organized by advanced intellectuals. It is also the connection linking the labor movement organized by unions and the labor movement organized by political parties. The labor movement that took place in the two years after the May Fourth Movement was almost inseparable from the organization of political parties. Even though there had been movements organized by guilds and some by spontaneous groups who chose their representatives, before the May Fourth Movement, there were only about forty unions organized by workers. However, after the May Fourth Movement, unions emerged, more than half of which were modern unions under Marxist guidance (and a few anarchists ones).⁷¹ With the spread of Marxism in China and its initial

⁶⁹ Mingkui Liu, *Zhong Guo Gong Ren Yun Dong Tu Shi* (guang zhou shi: yan dong ren min chu ban she, 2006), 65.

⁷⁰ Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992 (Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 14.

⁷¹ Mingkui Liu, *Zhong Guo Gong Ren Yun Dong Tu Shi* (guang zhou shi: yan dong ren min chu ban she, 2006), 142.

integration with the Chinese workers' movement, and with the emergence of a group of communist intellectuals within Chinese society, the task of building a new type of working-class party was put on the agenda. Then, the Communist Party of China was founded in 1921 and most of the workers' movements became organized by unions under the leadership of the Communist Party. The May Thirtieth Movement of 1925 was a large workers' movement organized by unions, which was directed by the political party. I will introduce and analyze the May Thirtieth Movement in the human factor section.

Spontaneous Movement, Organized Party

Compared to the Chinese labor movement, the Japanese labor movement usually occurred spontaneously and without any organized system, and there were few inter-city cooperative movements like the ones in Hangzhou and Shanghai. Before the 1930s, minimal labor movements emerged among multiple unions and cities. Except for a few strikes led by Japanese communist intellectuals, such as the Tokyo strike against train fare increases, most workers' movements were unorganized and spontaneous. For example, Okochi Kazuo argued that the labor movement in Ashio was a spontaneous rebellion by unorganized, economically deprived workers, thus generating an image of the Ashio workforce as one that lacked any sense of independence or solidarity.⁷² There were three main reasons for a spontaneous labor movement: the predominance of migrant labor, small union size, and conflicts within the working class. These three elements were not only the reasons for the emergence of the spontaneous workers' movement, but also the reasons that hindered the development of Japanese unions before 1920.

⁷² Hirotake Koyama, *Nihon rōdō undō Shi: Teikō to kaihō No Tatakai* (A History of the Japanese Labor Movement) (Tōkyō: Shakai Shinpō, 1968), 18.

The explanation based on migrant labor was put forth by Okochi Kazuo; he summarized Japanese employment relations and argued that they had a great influence on the development of the Japanese workers' movement. Frequent job-switching was reported nationwide. The factory inspection report for 1919 found the nationwide machine industry separation rate to be exactly 75 percent.⁷³ A survey in Kyoto showed that the annual personnel turnover rate for the city's 1,700 mechanical workers ranged from 82 to 87 percent.⁷⁴ At the Shibaura company, the personnel turnover rate was even more greater. Between 1900 and 1910, the rate of change in personnel at Shibaura reached a maximum of 99% (Table 1). The worker at that time mentioned, "Especially in times of prosperity when workers are in short supply, there are many who, based on a trifling difference in wages, will readily switch to another factory or who constantly move from one large factory to another."⁷⁵ This pattern of migrants' s wage labor above, Okochi Kazuo argued, "underlay the problem of low wages, poor working conditions, the lack of a horizontal industrywide labor market, status-based personal relations at work, the company-based configuration of union organization, the premodern attitudes of workers, and labor movement's lack of stability."⁷⁶

Year	Total Workers	Total Hired	Total left or fired	Yearly turnovers
1904	779	450	289	47
1905	778	787	747	99
1906	860	567	485	61
1907	929	611	271	47
1908	853	357	433	46

⁷³ For factory inspection reports, see *Noshomusho, Kojo Kantoku nempo.*(1919).51

⁷⁴ For factory inspection reports, see *Noshomusho, Kojo Kantoku nempo.*(1919). 52

⁷⁵ *Shokko jijo*,11.12

⁷⁶ Kazuo Nimura and Andrew Gordon, *The Ashio Riot of 1907: A Social History of Mining in Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 154.

1916	2264	1890	867	61
1917	3188	2499	1575	64

Table1. Source: Shibaura seiakujo eigyo hokokusho. 1904-1927. Category labeled shokko, roekisha, or konin

Workers left a company for the simple reason that they were seeking a better work environment and benefits. This was also a silent workers' movement, but this way of getting a better deal by changing jobs failed to improve the working environment for all workers and hindered the continued growth of unions in Japan during the 1900s. According to Gordon, the migrant labor exasperated the first union organizers in Japan as well as managers.⁷⁷ The ironworkers' union was created in 1898. While there were 3,000 members in 1898, by late 1900, the union had all but dissolved because of the migrant labor issue. Compared to Japan, Chinese workers were not as free because Chinese workers were under the double oppression of imperialism and feudalism. Few people could change their jobs at will. The Shanghai gangs mentioned earlier would not let workers leave. As Perry discovered, servitude to one's gang master was a lifetime sentence from which the only escape might be a return to the countryside.⁷⁸

The main reason for the high mobility of Japanese workers was that if they were dissatisfied with the wages and benefits in their factories, they were more likely to leave and find a better factory than to join the labor movement. For example, women workers in the Japanese textile industry rarely confronted capitalists directly if they could not tolerate the exploitation of capital in the textile factories. The most common approach was to simply run away or leave the factory. They behaved, in Okochi Kazuo's description, as "atomized" individuals, and this kind of atomized labor is centripetal and dissociative. These types of people were bitterly suffering

⁷⁷ Andrew Gordon, *The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan Heavy Industry: 1853-1955* (Cambridge Mass.: Publ. by Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, and distributed by Harvard University Press, 1985), 35.

⁷⁸ Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 52.

from the actual or imagined state of uprootedness and the loss of norms of conduct. Thus, the atomized individual was usually apathetic to public affairs.⁷⁹ However, in China, under the combined oppression of various powers, fewer Chinese laborers would be apathetic to public affairs. In a situation of atomized labor, not all workers in a factory would be involved in a worker' movement against exploitation in that factory.

According to the records of the Ashio riot, the workers who joined 1907 movement were mostly pit workers, particularly mine diggers.⁸⁰ In Japan, workers with high skills often have very high wages. If they were not satisfied with a company, they often left their current company for one with better benefits. So, the interests of the larger worker community were not relevant to them, all these workers cared about was their own individual interests. An anonymous machinist provided his thoughts as a skilled worker:

A worker is someone who enters society with his skill and who travels far a wide with them. Who could possibly credit with a spirit of advancement those worker cling to a single place and put up with sorts of abuse. Past and present, whatever the occupation, a worker is someone who travels broadly, enters factories here and there, accumulate greater skill and overcoming adversity, finally become a worker deserving of the name.⁸¹

These highly skilled Japanese workers rarely joined unions or participated in strikes for their own benefit. Even some highly skilled workers would actively alienate themselves from union bodies or supervise them to gain the favor of capitalists.⁸² However, in China, the highly skilled workers did not leave the unions, but led workers in the movement.

⁷⁹ Kazuo Nimura and Andrew Gordon, *The Ashio Riot of 1907: A Social History of Mining in Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 42.

⁸⁰ Kazuo Nimura and Andrew Gordon, *The Ashio Riot of 1907: A Social History of Mining in Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 34.

⁸¹ *Toyo Keizai Shimpō*, May 25, 1903.

⁸² Andrew Gordon, *The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan Heavy Industry: 1853-1955* (Cambridge Mass.: Publ. by Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, and distributed by Harvard University Press, 1985), 73.

Because of the prevalence of atomized labor and the phenomenon of stratification within the working class, Japanese workers were more focused on the individual than the collective. Whether it was the indifference to social phenomena in atomized labor or the preference of skilled workers to change their working environment frequently instead of participating in the workers' movement, this produced a focus on self-interest above everything else. Chinese workers behaved very differently from their Japanese counterparts. It is true that many Chinese workers' movements were also originally motivated by the desire to improve the working environment and to get better economic treatment, and in this initial stage, the workers' movement in China was consistent with individualism. But under the oppression of foreign invaders, capitalists, and the feudal order, the nationalism of Chinese workers moved them from individualism to collectivism.

In addition to the divide between skilled and general workers and the problems of migrant workers, the influence of early Japanese unions was very limited. Before 1920, Japanese unions were based on the smaller unit of the factory called workshop, and those unions were established spontaneously in China often had a leading role in factory.⁸³ As Sheldon Garon has argued, the unions based on the workshop were often unable to organize the larger workers' movement.⁸⁴ At the same time, Gordon also shows that worker unions before 1920 made few advanced plans and their disputes usually involved only a small part of company's workshops.⁸⁵ Starting in 1920s, the unions organized

⁸³ Units in factory enterprises that complete certain processes or produce certain products individually in the production process

⁸⁴ Sheldon M. Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 209.

⁸⁵ Andrew Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 73.

themselves almost exclusively into local units composed of workers at a single factory, but not beyond that.⁸⁶

The Ashio riot of 1907 is a good example of the status of Japanese unions before 1920. The Ashio mine did have four unions: Doshikai, Kyowakai, Shiseikai, and one brotherhood organization.⁸⁷ While these organizations shared the common goal of improving the working environment for workers, there was essentially no collaborative activity. To work more efficiently, the capitalists divided Ashio into four pits: Tsudo, Honzan, Kodaki, and Sunokobashi. Since the four pits had their own boss and own lodge system, different unions existed within the pits. As Nimura depicts, each pit had its own agreement and its own organizational management, and each union could only directly influence its own pit.⁸⁸ This divided union structure made it difficult to organize the workers' movement; for example, the Ashio riot only happened in two pits, Tsudo and Honza. The workers in Kodako and Sunokobashi had no idea about the movement. They did join the riot, but the workers roamed aimlessly and rogue-like, destroying Ashio's mines. Although the Ashio riots appear to have been organized by a union, the final definition of the Ashio riots by Japanese scholars is a spontaneous workers' movement stimulated by the union.⁸⁹

When comparing workers' movements like Ashio with the workers' movement in Hangzhou, even if it did not have a union, the Hangzhou movement still showed a high

⁸⁶ Andrew Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 153

⁸⁷ Kazuo Nimura and Andrew Gordon, *The Ashio Riot of 1907: A Social History of Mining in Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 51-57.

⁸⁸ Kazuo Nimura and Andrew Gordon, *The Ashio Riot of 1907: A Social History of Mining in Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 51-57.

⁸⁹ Kazuo Nimura and Andrew Gordon, *The Ashio Riot of 1907: A Social History of Mining in Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 116.

level of organization. In 1910, when Japanese labor unions were still organized in workshops, in Hangzhou there was already a precedent for spontaneous workers' activities forming alliances between factories and plants to start a workers' movement.

Human Factor (人和)

In the process of the party-organized labor movements in China and Japan, conflicts always existed outside and within the party. In China, the relationship between the CCP and the KMT began with cooperation (1923) and ended with suppression (1927). Within the CCP, Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, Wang Ming, and Mao Zedong had conflicting policies for the development of the labor movement. In Japan, the disagreement between Katayama and Kōtoku led to a split in the early socialist forces during the period 1900-1915. After 1919, the Japanese Communist Party did not learn from Katayama's and Kōtoku's mistakes and the Sodomei split again. As a result of the government's crackdown on socialists, the unions began to alienate themselves from the Japanese Communist Party, leading to a stalemate in the development of socialism in Japan. Compared to Japan, the first Nationalist and Communist Party cooperation in China was unique. In Japan, during the 1920-1930 period, the Japanese Communist Party had little political cooperation with other Japanese parties, and instead, the Japanese government focused on suppressing the Japanese Communist Party. For the Chinese movement, the first Kuomintang-communist cooperation was a golden period of union development and workers' movement under Marxist leadership.

The May Thirtieth Movement

In June 1923, the Third National Congress of the CCP was held in Guangzhou. The conference formally decided to cooperate with the KMT, and members of the CCP joined the KMT on an individual basis. Deng Zhongxia pointed out that after the collaboration between the Kuomintang and the CCP, the Kuomintang was also prepared to approach the proletariat and establish a link between the KMT and the proletariat.

However, the KMT members were not good at reaching out to the workers, and they had to rely on the communists who joined the KMT. Therefore, during the period of cooperation, the Communist Party was responsible for almost all the work of organizing workers and peasants.⁹⁰

After the First United Front, the Chinese workers' movement began to recover from the downturn caused by the February 7 tragedy.⁹¹ The May Thirtieth Movement in 1925 showed the great influence of the workers' movement under the leadership of the CCP. Previously, the Chinese workers' movement was characterized by inter-city workers' unions, alliances with urban factories, and unions that transcended class via nationalism. The May Thirtieth Movement not only inherited these three characteristics, but a new movement emerged that highlighted the internationalization of Chinese labor.

The trigger for this movement was the shooting of a worker, Gu Zhengong (a member of the Communist Party) and the wounding of dozens of other workers by Japanese capitalists in a Shanghai cotton processing factory on May 15, 1925. This incident aroused the anger of people from all walks of life in Shanghai. On May 28, the Central Committee of the CCP held an emergency meeting to launch a massive march of workers, students, and businessmen-- transforming the economic struggle of workers into a political struggle against imperialism. Thirteen people were killed and a thousand injured. After the incident, the Central Committee held another meeting and plan to organize an anti-imperialist workers' movement.

⁹⁰ Zhongxia Deng, *Zhong Guo Zhi Gong Yun Dong Jian Shi* (中国职工运动简史)(Zheng zhou: He nan ren min chu ban she, 2016).

⁹¹ The February 7 Tragedy refers to the bloody incident of February 7, 1923, when Wu Peifu, a warlord in the direct line of the Beiyang government, suppressed a general strike by workers of the Beijing-Han railroad. The Jinghan Railway Workers' Strike was the culmination of the first workers' movement led by the CCP, which ended in failure. Fifty-two workers were killed and more than 300 were injured. This event led to a period of depression for some of the CCP-led unions.

In response to the workers' movement in Shanghai, workers in Hangzhou again gave assistance through marches. At 8:00 a.m. on June 3, nearly 50,000 workers and students from more than 100 organizations and 90 schools marched along West Lake, chanting “Fight the British and Japanese imperialists,” “Avenge the deaths of our compatriots in Shanghai,” and “Take back the Japanese territory in Hangzhou.”⁹² In the early morning of June 25, more than 100,000 people —city workers, peasants, businessmen, and students—again held three anti-imperialist marches in the city. Throughout the movement, Hangzhou workers united with other people from all walks of life and demonstrated the power of the proletarian movement. In addition to inheriting the characteristics of the previous Chinese workers’ movement, the May Thirtieth Movement also exhibited the characteristics of internationalization of the workers’ movement. A demonstration of 500,000 people was held in Moscow to show solidarity with the Chinese people’s May Thirtieth Movement and to donate money to the Chinese workers. Around the world, Chinese people from nearly 100 countries and regions held rallies and initiated fund-raising in solidarity with the May Thirtieth Movement. On June 7, more than 30 groups in Japan held a meeting and resolved to show solidarity with Chinese groups protesting the Japanese government and capitalists. The British working class took active action to stop ships, vessels, and vehicles from transporting arms to China. The May Thirtieth Movement became a struggle against imperialism with wide international resonance.⁹³

⁹² *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 30.

⁹³Feng Tong, Qiuming Qing, and Quan Xia, “Wu San Yun Dong Shi Qi Hai Wai Qiao Jie ‘Hu An’ Jiao She De Shi Tai Ji Ying Xiang,” *Ji Nan Shi Xue* (暨南史学), no. 1 (2020): pp. 234-251, 251.

The May Thirtieth Movement can be described as a workers' movement that took place with the cooperation of the CCP and the Chinese Nationalist Party. The May Thirtieth Movement not only had all the characteristics of previous Chinese movement, but also had new ones. The scale of the May Thirtieth Movement was much larger than that of the previous movements. It can be said that the May Thirtieth Movement was a combination of a workers' movement and a political movement, and a manifestation of the movement under the leadership of the CCP, which played a dominant role.

Factionalism and Radical Policy

In 1927, the Kuomintang, fearing the influence of Chinese communists among the workers, launched the April 12 purge. The communists were besieged. The CCP suffered heavy losses and gradually shifted from cities to rural areas. However, during this period there were three main ideological factions within the party: the right-leaning group led by Chen Duxiu, the left-leaning group led by Qu Qubai and Zhang Guotao, and a small group led by Mao Zedong. After the defeat of the February 7 Workers' Movement, Chen Duxiu stated his view of the current situation in China. He believed that

The Chinese proletariat is immature both quantitatively and qualitatively. Most of the workers are still imbued with patriarchal notions and their family ties and regional patriotism are extremely strong. These former handicraft workers carry over the habits of their previous existence even when they become industrial workers. They do not feel the need for political action and are still full of ancient superstitions.⁹⁴

Chen Duxiu also believed that the progress of workers' ideas depended on the progress of society and could not be influenced by artificial propaganda. Therefore, Chen Duxiu was

⁹⁴ Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism, and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 116.

convinced that the democratic revolution in China could only be led by the bourgeoisie and after the victory of the revolution, a bourgeois republic would be established. After the development of capitalism, the proletariat would launch a second revolution to seize power from the bourgeoisie and build socialism.

Chen's position was the same as the Comintern and Stalin's. Mikhail Borodin has summarized the Comintern and Stalin's statement and he explains that the Chinese National Revolution could only succeed if it was a revolution led by the Kuomintang with the cooperation of the workers and peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the revolutionary intellectuals, and the revolutionary army, and in close connection with the world revolutionary movement.⁹⁵ Even after the events of April 12, the Comintern and Stalin thought the task of the CCP was to continue to raise the prestige of the KMT left wing and the Wuhan government.⁹⁶ Stalin and the Comintern believed that the revolution in China should rely mainly on the Kuomintang. Stalin's theory that the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese proletariat held the leadership in the national revolution was a potential, strategically developed direction of leadership, not a realistic direct leadership. To preserve the Communist-Kuomintang coalition, Stalin advised Chen Duxiu to shelve the land reform program and postpone the Communist Party's independence program.⁹⁷ The Comintern also warned the Chinese Communist Party, "Do not attempt to replace Nationalists with Communists in the leadership."⁹⁸ Trotsky mentioned Chen Duxiu, who was bound hand and foot by the false leadership of the representatives of Comintern.⁹⁹ Therefore,

⁹⁵ Xiurong Huang, *Gong Chan Guo Ji Yu Zhongguo Ge Ming Guan Xi Shi* (Peking: Zhong gong zhong yang dang xiao chu ban she, 1989), 365.

⁹⁶ Xiurong Huang, *Gong Chan Guo Ji Yu Zhongguo Ge Ming Guan Xi Shi* (Peking: Zhong gong zhong yang dang xiao chu ban she, 1989), 367.

⁹⁷ Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2010), 175.

⁹⁸ *Gong Chan Guo Ji You Guan Zhongguo Ge Ming Di Wen Xian Zi Liao* (Beijing: Zhongguo she hui ke xue chu ban she, 1981), 279.

⁹⁹ Leon Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution* (London: Union Books, 2011), 77-78.

Chen Duxiu repeatedly compromised with the attacks of the right wing of the Kuomintang and rejected the strategy of a land reform for the peasant. Mao Zedong asserted that “Chen Duxiu did not understand the role of peasantry in the revolution and greatly underestimated its possibilities at this time”¹⁰⁰ Finally, on the eve of Chiang Kai-shek's April 12 Purge, he was still persuading the communists to compromise with the Kuomintang, which eventually led to the tragedy. On August 7, 1927, an emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China summed up Chen Duxiu's right leaning and erroneous policies and set the guidelines for land reform and armed resistance against the Kuomintang reactionaries. Yet, while this meeting reflected on Chen Duxiu's rightward leanings, it opened the way for the leftward leanings of Qu Qubai's team.

In 1927, under the leadership of Qu Qubai, the Central Provincial Committee (Central Committee) misjudged the revolutionary situation in Zhejiang and Hangzhou and instructed the Zhejiang Provincial Committee to carry out the Red Terror. On the advice of the Central Committee, the Zhejiang Provincial Committee blindly called on the workers to carry out armed riots and seize power. The Hangzhou General Labor Union, which had already gone underground, started a radical strike. Under the leadership of the Zhejiang Provincial Committee, several assassinations attempts against the Kuomintang and capitalists were carried out.¹⁰¹ In November 1927, the Communist Party in Hangzhou was exposed, more than 70 members of the Communist Party were arrested, 53 branches of the union were destroyed, and the Hangzhou General Union was almost destroyed.¹⁰² Mao Zedong summarized this policy of Qu Qubai and others in 1945:

¹⁰⁰ E. Snow, *Red Star over China*, 1968, 162.

¹⁰¹ *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 60.

¹⁰² *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 62.

Politically, it failed to realize that either appropriate counterattacks or necessary tactical retreats had to be organized at that time, according to the different conditions in the different localities, in order to preserve revolutionary positions and muster the revolutionary forces in a planned way. Instead, it tolerated and fostered tendencies towards adventurism and commandism (especially forcing workers to strike).¹⁰³

In conclusion, there were three main mistakes in the CCP's guidance of the workers' movement after September 1927. The first was the blind implementation of an adventurous offensive line. Not recognizing that the revolutionary situation was at a low ebb, the conference refused to implement the necessary retreat and defense because it could not see the disparity between their forces and those of the enemy in the cities. Secondly, in carrying out the struggle it did not make use of the unions that could legally exist in the KMT-ruled areas. Third, it proposed unrealistically high goals for the struggle, such as urging Hangzhou to use the Red Terror and carry out armed revolution. On the Japanese side, during the Second Convention for the Japan Socialist Party, there was a crisis after the question was raised on whether the party was supposed to follow a direct action or parliamentary policy approach in pursuing its objectives. While direct action advocated pursuing a revolution that would have changed the political stage in the country, the parliamentary policy approach sought activities that were within the limits of legality in Japan.¹⁰⁴ A division on which approach to take led to the disintegration of the party's membership into two factions that supported either of the approaches. The faction that advocated direct action followed Kōtoku Shūsui, whereas the parliamentary policy faction chose Katayama Sen as their leader.

¹⁰³ "Bannedthought.net," accessed April 18, 2022, <https://www.bannedthought.net/China/Individuals/MaoZedong/Pamphlets/OurStudyAndCurrentSituation-Mao-1962-Appendix.pdf>, 26.

¹⁰⁴ Sen Katayama, *Labor Movement in Japan* (On Our Own Authority Pub, 2013), 278-285.

Conflicting ideologies among the party leaders caused more confusion in the party at a time when they needed greater unity and solidarity. At this moment of confusion, the government continued to adopt conciliatory policies that discouraged the formation of political movements. The enactment of the Public Safety and Police Law came as a surprise for most socialists since they were not expecting such changes in the country's political arena. Considering that the intellectuals who identified as socialists were prematurely forced to adopt the motion instead of letting it evolve naturally, they did not have the appropriate strategies for dealing with the situation they were facing in the country. Katayama's parliamentary policy did not contradict the strategy of direct action, but Katayama's emphasis was on communist propaganda, and he believed that socialism needed more substance in Japan. However, Kōtoku was determined to fight the Japanese government and the capitalists through strikes and riots. Later, in 1911, the Japanese government arrested socialists and radical anarchists such as Kōtoku on the pretext of the High Treason Incident. After that, the development of Japanese socialism stagnated and even workers or hooligans were disgusted with socialism. Katayama noted in his later recollections:

A robber at Yamanashi prison committed suicide because he was insulted by his mate. The insult was in being called a socialist. A Tokyo daily, commenting on the case, points out that the robber convict in prison considers himself above a socialist, feels himself insulted because he was called by that title! Socialists are the most hated and despised people in Japan, as well as in this country among Japanese.¹⁰⁵

Although the socialist workers' movement in Japan declined significantly after the High Treason Incident, the Friendly Society survived as the only union and was renamed Sōdōmei in 1921. Because of the effects of World War I, the exploitation of Japanese

¹⁰⁵ Sen Katayama, *Labor Movement in Japan* (On Our Own Authority Pub, 2013), 295.

labor by the military industry increased significantly, leading workers to rejoin Sōdōmei, and in 1921 Sōdōmei again had 100,000 members and more than 300 branch unions.

However, at this time Sōdōmei was not a socialist or Marxist-oriented union. There was divisive tension between supporters of Bolshevism and of anarchism in the Sōdōmei, and in order to make sure the Sōdōmei operated normally, the leader merged the two contending labor groups.¹⁰⁶

Realizing the power of the workers' movement, the Japanese government decided to use a “carrot and whip” policy to control the power of the unions. The Japanese government knew that most of the striking Japanese workers were not looking for a political revolution but for better treatment. According to Gordon, “While workers in all sorts of unions certainly launched unprecedented numbers of disputes through the 1920s, the rank and file did not fully share the transformative vision of union. What the workers want is better treatment.”¹⁰⁷ Therefore, the Japanese government established a mediation agency to balance the interests of capitalists and workers. Feeling that this was a government conspiracy, the Japanese communist members did not compromise, but kept on protesting through strikes. However, the Japanese government took the opportunity of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 to suppress and massacre the Japanese communist members. The “whip” had its immediate effects, to be sure. This side strike shocked all the worker activists, who not only dissolved the existing unions but also alienated the communist worker activists. The few unions that existed expelled communist militants. As Sheldon explained, “In May 1925, Akamatsu Katsu Maro, Matsuoka Komakichi, and Nishio Suehiro led the central committee in expelling twenty-five unions that backed the Communist

¹⁰⁶ Andrew Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 156

¹⁰⁷ Andrew Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 278.

group. The purged unions immediately formed the Japan Council of Labor Unions (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Hyogikai).”¹⁰⁸ Because of internal conflicts within the union, Sōdōmei split into three different unions: Nichiro (Japan Labor Union League), Sōdōmei, and Hyōgikai. The general union of 200,000 people disintegrated overnight, with only a few thousand members in Nichiro and Hyōgikai, in addition to the new Sōdōmei. This split weakened the position of communism in the guidance of workers, and it also weakened the power of the Japanese workers’ movement. However, communists continued to carry out radical activities such as strikes, which were finally suppressed by the Japanese government on March 15, 1928. One thousand, six hundred and fifty-two communists were arrested and the socialist movement basically ended. Japan did not make changes during the development of the two socialist workers’ movements in 1911 and 1928. The organizational split reappeared in 1926. The extreme movements of the left after 1926 also failed to learn from the defeat of 1911 and instead continued their strike campaigns blindly. These unchanging patterns of the movement not only brought the Japanese Communist Party to an impasse, but also deprived the Japanese socialist workers’ movement of its vitality.

In China, learning the lessons of 1927, the CCP adjusted its policy, and in the 1929 political resolution of the Zhejiang Provincial Committee the Communist Party reflected on it. One response to the Red Terror Movement in Zhejiang Province in 1927 was as follows:

The incorrect strategy of the struggle was the main reason for the failure of the revolution. A correct strategy of struggle is a prerequisite for the victory of the revolution. In the past, the Party did not know the correct strategy of struggle, did not correctly estimate the objective environment and the demands of the masses, decided the demands of the struggle subjectively, ordered the masses to struggle, simply ignored the conditions of victory, so that the struggle often fell into failure. In particular, the armed insurrection in 1927 was blind activism, which almost killed the development of the Communist Party of Zhejiang. The idea that only strikes are the struggle of the masses is wrong, and that some party members

¹⁰⁸ Sheldon M. Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 114.

should not organize strikes for no reason but should seize the opportunity to develop socialism and unions.¹⁰⁹

In addition, the Communists of Zhejiang Province considered commandism a dangerous phenomenon. The Party subjectively believed that there was a need for struggle or riots, but the masses were not willing to do so. The Party needed to understand more about the will of the masses and to organize movements according to their demands. In addition to these internal reflection documents, the CCP had a new policy toward workers' movements.

In 1927, Mao realized that the power of the working class was limited, that China had not yet experienced an industrial revolution, and that the number of Chinese workers was not that large compared to the working class in Russia and Western Europe. Therefore, Mao believed that the workers' movement in China needed to be combined with the Chinese peasants. In his report on an investigation of the peasant movement in Hunan, he analyzed the potential of the Chinese peasants as the most revolutionary force. Before Mao Zedong issued the Hunan Report, there were in fact several people within the CCP who believed that the peasants were the natural allies of the working class. However, there had been controversy over whether this should be a worker-peasant alliance led by workers or a peasant-based workers' alliance. For example, Liu Shaoqi said in 1926 that "the peasants are an important force in the National Revolution and are the natural allies of the working class. The Chinese working class should effectively bring the peasants along to carry out the Chinese revolution."¹¹⁰ In 1926, Peng Pai(澎湃)

¹⁰⁹ See Political Resolution of the Zhejiang Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China. (中共浙江省委政治决议案)1929.1

¹¹⁰ Liu Shao Qi Lun Gong Ren Yun Dong, *Gong Ren jie ji zai Ge Ming Zhong de di wei yu zhi gong yun dong fang zhen*(工人阶级在革命中的地位与职工运动方针)(Bei jing: Zhong yang wen xian chu ban she, 1988), 23.

published his *Report on the Haifeng Peasant Movement*, which was an important guide to the national peasant movement. Peng Pai argued the national revolution in semi-colonial China had to be a peasant revolution, so the peasant revolution was the central issue in the National Revolution.¹¹¹ The progress and success of the National Revolution depended on the progress and success of the peasant movement.¹¹² After 1927, Mao Zedong decided that the chances of a proletarian urban revolution were too low, so he and Zhu De moved to the Jinggang Mountain and began to develop the worker-peasant alliance and the worker-peasant movement based in the countryside. It was the attempts of Mao and Zhu that led to the emergence of Mao's famous revolutionary policy and of encircling the cities using peasant from the rural areas.

In addition to uniting the peasants and developing the socialist workers' movement and socialist revolution based in the countryside, the biggest difference between the CCP-led unions and the Japanese unions was that the CCP unions had their own armed forces. Scholars believe that after the Shanghai massacre in 1927, the Communist Party realized the need for its own armed forces, which led to the Nanchang Uprising and the creation of a revolutionary army. However, according to sources from Hangzhou, even before the Shanghai massacre the CCP unions had their own armed forces. The Hangzhou General Labor Union called them "pickets." According to sources, in December 1926 the Hangzhou General Labor Union deployed 40 pickets for military training to resist the Hangzhou warlords. In January 1927, there were about 9,000 pickets belonging to the Hangzhou Federation of Trade Unions, with 10–100 people in

¹¹¹ Pai Peng, *Haifeng Nong Min Yun Dong* (Oakton, VA: Center for Chinese Research Materials, 1990).

¹¹² Pai Peng, *Haifeng Nong Min Yun Dong* (Oakton, VA: Center for Chinese Research Materials, 1990).

each factory, and these pickets were armed.¹¹³ The pickets, under the instruction of Zhou Enlai, helped the Northern Expeditionary Army in 1927 to fight against Sun Chuanfang.¹¹⁴

The contrast between the development of these organizations in China and Japan was that although there were indeed conflicting political opinions within both organizations, the Chinese group did not split. Whether left-leaning or right-leaning, the goal of the CCP members was the same. Although they had different ideas and there were internal conflicts, the presence of three kinds of oppression forced them to move forward in one direction. It is true that many Chinese communists quit the party in the process, but the idea of driving out the invaders and restoring one China was the motivation of those who still held on to the party. The reason why there was no and no split within the party was ultimately due to the social conditions in China from 1900-1920. This was unlike the development of the Japanese organization, whether it was Kōtoku and Katayama in 1911 or Sōdōmei in the 1920s where, following conflicts and divisions within the unit, the Japanese organization would immediately split. In 1927, the leadership of the CCP cracked down by the KMT, because of its blind radical activities, but the Communist Party immediately held an emergency meeting to reflect on the situation and changed its main policy. For example, in 1927 Mao Zedong proposed “encircling the cities from the rural areas...” and that “political power flows out of the barrel of a gun,” which were elements in the process of Sinicization of Marxism. On the other hand, Japanese communists Japanese socialized socialism and Marx’s theory. Tatiana Linkhoeva argues that “despite their admiration for the Russian Revolution, early Japanese communists

¹¹³ *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 36-39.

¹¹⁴ *Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi: 1876-1992* (Beijing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996), 36-39.

concluded that the Russian model of socialist revolution was not applicable to Japan's conditions."¹¹⁵ Instead, they came up with their own vision for the Japanese revolution, one that was quite divergent from the expectations of the Comintern for the role of the Japanese Communist Party in the Asia-wide anti-imperialist struggle. For example, Yamakawa, who was a Japanese revolutionary socialist and the co-founder of the Japanese Communist Party, thought the strategy of two-stage revolution guided by Comintern was incompatible with the situation in Japan.¹¹⁶ The situation was very complicated, comprising feudal remnants, such as imperial rule (*tenno-sei*) and the privy council. Those systems still influenced society, and they had an important role in inhibiting the development of socialism.¹¹⁷ Japanese scholars have considered the possibility of Japanese peasants' force for the socialist movement as much as Chinese scholars did, but the rural situation in Japan is different from that in rural China:

Japanese capitalism now still has the vestiges of the feudal characteristics of a previous era. The greater part of the land is in the hands of semifeudal large landlords, and the largest of them is the emperor. . . . On the other hand, most of the arable land owned by these large landlords is rented to tenant farmers, and tenant farmers cultivate with their own agricultural implements.¹¹⁸

The influence of the surviving feudal system on the peasants made it difficult for Japanese communism to integrate the power of the peasants. Yamakawa argued that except for the peasants who were still influenced by the emperor, the remaining peasants

¹¹⁵ Tatiana Linkhova, *Revolution Goes East: Imperial Japan and Soviet Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020), 159.

¹¹⁶ Germaine A. Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 36.

Two-stage revolution: a bourgeois-democratic revolution led by the proletariat would complete the tasks abandoned by Japan's weak bourgeoisie and then be followed immediately by a socialist revolution.

¹¹⁷ Germaine A. Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 35.

¹¹⁸ Germaine A. Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 223.

worked under the landowner, and those landowners had already become “bourgeoisified” and had applied the industrial capitalist system on the rice economy system.¹¹⁹ Yasakawa thought those peasants were equivalent to workers, so Yamakawa did not view peasant force as sufficiently problematic to occupy a larger position in his strategic theory as a whole.¹²⁰

In addition, through soft power, the Japanese government reduced the influence of socialist ideas among Japanese workers by maintaining harmony between workers and companies, and through the labor arbitration council, the government was able to manage the attitudes of workers effectively. Through violence, the Japanese government continued to suppress the Japanese Communist Party and take advantage of the chaos following the Great Kanto earthquake (1924). It slaughtered a large number of the Japanese Communist Party’s member to deter swing parties. The Japanese Communist Party was dissolved in 1924, which, once again, affected the development of Japanese socialism. So, the situation of the Japanese Communist Party in 1924 was very similar to the situation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. But the Chinese Communist Party was not completely disbanded and was still trying to develop the red forces in various ways. I further argue that because of the size of the country, it was difficult for the CCP to be eradicated by the Kuomintang and the anti-communist forces after it went underground whereas, because of the limitations of the size of Japan’s territory, even if the Japanese Communist Party went underground, the Japanese government still had the means to suppress it.

¹¹⁹ Germaine A. Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014),223.

¹²⁰ Yamakawa Hitoshi, "*Seiji-teki toitsu sensen e!*" 180-183.

Conclusion

The primary distinctions underlying the Japanese and Chinese socialist workers' movements are based on momentum, internal advantages, and human elements. Chinese nationalism might be considered the fuel for growth of the socialist workers' movement and the development of communism. Between 1900 and 1919, the imperialist invasion of China and the exploitation of Chinese workers by foreign capitalists united the Chinese workers. Later, between 1920 and 1927, the imperialist speakers of the Chinese warlords brought the CCP and the Chinese Nationalist Party together for a brief period, allowing the CCP to better build the unions that belonged to the socialist ranks. It may be stated that the nationalism of contemporary China was important to the growth of the socialist workers' movement and also to communism. Chinese workers were angered by the exploitation caused by capitalist society because of the promotion of nationalism and desired to transform the current society through revolution.

In Japan, nationalism instead helped the growth of Japanese capitalism and restrained the Japanese socialist workers' movement. Japanese workers did not wish to transform the existing Japanese society through revolution, and victory in the Sino–Japanese War convinced the Japanese people that the present path of industrial growth was the appropriate one. Therefore, both Japanese workers and the government aspired to strike a “harmonious” balance with the Japanese capitalists. Most of the socialist workers' movements and strikes were just for higher salaries and status of workers, and most of the skilled employees would not even engage in these activities anymore. Nothing like the three strikes in Shanghai, which spanned plant and municipal borders, occurred in Japan. According to Gordon's figures, the proportion of union members among the total number of employees in Japan in 1920 never topped 7.9 percent. It is true that migrant wage labor and atomized work had a tremendous influence on the growth of Japanese unions owing to the social milieu of Japan at the time.

Nationalism also influenced the creation of social organization. In 1923, after the Chinese Communist Party was founded, nationalist impulses shaped the KMT-Communist alliance. I believe Mao was crucial in shaping the differences between the Chinese and Japanese workers' movements. Chinese and Japanese socialisms developed similarly before Mao, but his regime made a difference in the growth of socialism in China. The Third International inspired both socialist workers' movements and socialism's growth, but China had a better foundation and more room to flourish than Japan had in its early history. Mao Zedong's ascendancy transformed Chinese and Japanese socialism. Mao Zedong took advantage of the CCP's passivity in 1927 to resurrect the movement on Marxist and socialist ideas. On the Japanese side, although there are many scholars in Japan who are trying to Japanize Marxism and stay away from the control of the Third International. The historical conditions in Japan made it difficult for Japanese socialism to succeed. However, my study demonstrates that there are many unsolved issues between the Chinese and Japanese social worker movements. For example, the Comintern influenced the socialist labor organizations in China and Japan, which were thereafter repressed by the Japanese government, the Chinese Nationalist Party, and warlords. Understanding the development of socialism requires comparing the Chinese and Japanese Communist Parties. The fundamental disparities in the two nations' plans and tactics explain why China's exponential growth cannot be compared to Japan's.

Bibliography

- “Andrew Gordon, the Hibiya Riot.” MIT TechTV – Andrew Gordon, The Hibiya Riot. Accessed February 25, 2022.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20131005090454/http://techtv.mit.edu/collections/vclectures/videos/17509-andrew-gordon-the-hibiya-riot>.
- Chesneaux, Jean, and H. M. Wright. *The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919-1927*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968.
- Deng, Zhongxia. *Zhong Guo Zhi Gong Yun Dong Jian Shi*. Zheng zhou: He nan ren min chu ban she, 2016.
- Garon, Sheldon M. *The State and Labor in Modern Japan*. New York: ACLS History E-Book Project, 2005.
- Gluck, Carol. *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton Univ. Press, 1987.
- Gordon, Andrew. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.
- Gordon, Andrew. *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
- Gordon, Andrew. *The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan Heavy Industry: 1853-1955*. Cambridge Mass.: Publ. by Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, and distributed by Harvard University Press, 1985.
- Hang Zhou Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi*. Bei jing: Gong shang chu ban she, 1996.
- Hitoshi, Yamakawa. *Seiji-Teki Toitsu Sensen e*, n.d.
- Hoston, Germaine A. *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Huang, Xiurong. *Gong Chan Guo Ji Yu Zhongguo Ge Ming Guan Xi Shi*. Peking: Zhong gong zhong yang dang xiao chu ban she, 1989.
- Isaacs, Harold R. *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2010.
- Johnson, Chalmers Ashby. *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1992.
- Katayama, Sen. *Labor Movement in Japan*. On Our Own Authority Pub, 2013.

- Koyama, Hirotake. *Nihon rōdō undō Shi: Teikō to kaihō No Tatakai (A History of the Japanese Labor Movement)*. Tōkyō: Shakai Shinpō, 1968.
- Kui, Liang yu. *Zao Qi Zhong Guo Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi*. Chang chun: Ji lin ke xue ji zhu chu ban she, 2000.
- Linkhoeva, Tatiana. *Revolution Goes East: Imperial Japan and Soviet Communism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020.
- Liu Shao Qi Lun Gong Ren Yun Dong*. Bei jing: Zhong yang wen xian chu ban she, 1988.
- Liu, Gongcheng. *Zhongguo Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi Yan Jiu 30 Nian Wen Xuan*. Shenyang: Liaoning ren min chu ban she, 2011.
- Liu, Mingda, Yuliang Tang, and Mingda Liu. *Zhongguo Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi. Di 2 Juan: Xin Min Zhu Zhu Yi Ge Ming Chu Qi De Gong Ren Yun Dong, 1919 Nian 5 Yue- 1923 Nian 12 Yue*. Guangzhou: Guangdong ren min chu ban she, 1998.
- Liu, Mingkui. *Zhong Guo Gong Ren Yun Dong Tu Shi*. guang zhou shi: yan dong ren min chu ban she, 2006.
- Liu, Wenfeng, and Wenzhang Wang. *Zhongguo Jin Dai Di Fang Xi Qu Ju Ben Cong Kan.. Di 1 Ji*. Beijing: Xue yuan chu ban she, 2017.
- Malone, Cecil L'Estrange. *New China. Report of an Investigation*. London: I.L.P., 1926.
- Myers, Ramon Hawley, and Mark R. Peattie. *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.
- Mao, Tse-tung. *Our Study and the Current Situation: Appendix: Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966.
- Mao, Zedong. *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1968.
- Marx, Karl. *Wage-Labour and Capital*. New York: International Publishers, 1933.
- Nimura, Kazuo, and Andrew Gordon. *The Ashio Riot of 1907: A Social History of Mining in Japan*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998.
- O'G, Anderson Benedict R. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 2016.
- Peng, Pai. *Haifeng Nong Min Yun Dong*. Oakton, VA: Center for Chinese Research Materials, 1990.

Perry, Elizabeth J. *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Repertory of the Work of the Unification Committee of Hangzhou Trade Union Organizations, 1928.

Schwartz, Benjamin I. *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Shakai Shinbun. Tōkyō: Kashiwashobō, 1908.

Shang Hai Bei Ke Zi Liao Xuan Ji. Shanghai: Shang hai ren min chu ban she, 1980.

Snow, E. *Red Star over China*, 1968.

Sun, Yutang, and Jingyu Wang. *Zhongguo Jin Dai Gong Ye Shi Zi Liao*. Beijing: Ke xue chu ban she, 1957.

Tong, Feng, Qiuming Qing, and Quan Xia. “Wu San Yun Dong Shi Qi Hai Wai Qiao Jie ‘Hu An’ Jiao She De Shi Tai Ji Ying Xiang.” *Ji Nan Shi Xue* (暨南史学), no. 1 (2020): 234–51.

Toyo Keizai Shimpo, May 25, 1903.

Tōkyō Kangyō Hakurankai. Tōkyō: Hakubunkan, 1907.

Trotsky, Leon. *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*. London: Union Books, 2011.

Tsui, Shu-Chin. *The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente upon Sun Yat-Sen's Political Philosophy and Revolutionary Tactics*, 1934.

Wang, Jianchu, and Maosheng Sun. *Zhongguo Gong Ren Yun Dong Shi*. Shenyang: Liaoning ren min chu ban she, 1987.

Yan, Zhongping. *Zhongguo Mian Fang Zhi Shi Gao*. Beijing: Shang wu yin shu guan, 2017.

Zedong, Mao. Cast away illusions, prepare for struggle. Accessed April 11, 2022.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_66.htm.