http://hdl.handle.net/10150/595561 Mon, 15 Jun 2026 04:33:24 GMT 2026-06-15T04:33:24Z http://hdl.handle.net/10150/680275 A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Cooper, James M.; Kompella, Kashyap The Article analyzes the divergent regulatory architectures governing artificial intelligence across the European Union, the United States, Japan, and the People’s Republic of China, tracing their evolution from early data-protection frameworks to contemporary system-level governance. The Article demonstrates how the EU’s AI Act operationalizes a comprehensive risk-based regulatory model that imposes ex-ante obligations, categorical prohibitions, and conformity assessments to structure market behavior. The U.S. trajectory is defined by sectoral statutes, oscillating executive priorities, and a persistent absence of federal coherence, producing a permissive environment punctuated by episodic soft-law interventions and subsequent deregulatory shifts under the 2025 administration. Japan advances an innovation-centric, business-led governance model grounded in sector-specific regulation, flexible intellectual property rules, and non-binding ethical guidance. China’s regulatory regime integrates algorithmic licensing, content governance, and mandatory ethical review within a broader security-driven framework characterized by opacity, expansive state discretion, and ideological grounding. Comparative analysis reveals five structural fault lines: transparency and accountability mandates, divergent risk-mitigation rationales, sectoral calibration, data-governance philosophies, and the entanglement of AI policy with national industrial and geopolitical strategy. Efforts at international harmonization, through the Group of 7ca, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Economic Forum, and others, remain non-binding and fragmented. The Article concludes that global convergence is unlikely; regulatory pluralism will define AI governance. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10150/680275 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10150/680274 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AFTER TRUMP Howse, Robert The Trump Administration’s imposition of steep and discriminatory tariffs on much of the world with which the United States trades is often seen as a fundamental attack on the World Trade Organization (WTO), which may not survive unless extreme measures are taken, such as the removal (or voluntary withdrawal) of the United States from the WTO. This article questions this narrative, arguing that there are strong reasons to believe that the WTO has the resilience to survive and evolve despite the tension between the transactional power politics of trade and the values of legalism and non-discrimination that are emblematic of the multilateral trading system embedded in the WTO. A historical perspective reveals that the multilateral trading system has always been confronted with gaps between the ideology and ideals surrounding trade multilateralism and, on the other hand, the reality of the system, where rules and their enforcement are shaped by power and where non-discrimination is often honored in the breach. The system has adapted and accommodated to power politics. Proposals to remove the United States from the WTO would themselves constitute violations of international law, as the WTO constitution or charter does not contain any provision for expulsion of a WTO Member, much less any objective criteria for so doing. In recent years, the WTO has pivoted to new roles and agendas—generally under the rubric of inclusive trade—that deviate from the rule creation and enforcement through dispute settlement focus that many observers still see as the entire basis for the WTO’s existence. It is more equipped to withstand the current trade winds and to ride the waves than is appreciated by those with nostalgia for days when the WTO was widely seen as the poster child for neoliberal globalism in a neoliberal era, as well as for the post-Cold War liberal narrative of the global rule of law. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10150/680274 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10150/680273 NAVIGATING UNCERTAINTY: RUSSIA, UNCLOS, AND ARCTIC GOVERNANCE Nieminen, Alexandra Russia’s threats to withdraw from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) mark a pivotal moment in Arctic geopolitics. For the better part of thirty years, UNCLOS has provided a largely successful legal governance framework for international maritime law. Now, Russia is poised to become the first nation ever to denounce the “Constitution of the Sea.” This Note explores the historical development of customary international maritime law, which ultimately led to the adoption of UNCLOS in 1996. Specifically, this Note examines Russia’s role as both a challenger to and beneficiary of UNCLOS, with particular attention to its relevance to Russia’s Arctic strategy. As a signatory to UNCLOS, Russia has benefited from the treaty’s mechanisms to legitimize territorial claims and, when needed, participate in dispute resolution. Even so, Russia may choose to withdraw pursuant to its claim that UNCLOS is detrimental to its interests in the Arctic. This Note also considers the implications of Russia’s withdrawal from UNCLOS, comparing its position to that of the United States as a non-signatory that has adhered to select UNCLOS provisions. Ultimately, this Note concludes that Russia’s threats to withdraw from UNCLOS are purely political posturing because such a move would undermine its long-term strategic interests, erode its legal standing in Arctic disputes, and further isolate it from the international community. As of the writing of this Note, Russia’s next move remains uncertain. However, if it were to withdraw, there is a risk of the Arctic becoming an unregulated battleground with no legal order to influence the governance of the region. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10150/680273 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10150/680272 TAXATION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION STANDARD IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW Li, Jiangfeng In recent decades, there has been an increasing trend of foreign investors challenging host states’ taxation measures in international investment arbitrations, arguing that host states have violated investment protection standards, including the widely recognized standard of non-discrimination. In international investment treaties, the non-discrimination standard is scattered between five different types of protection standards, including the national treatment standard, the most-favored nation treatment standard, the non-impairment clause, the fair and equitable treatment standard, and the expropriation clauses. Due to the overlapping status of non-discrimination elements among treaty protection standards, the meaning and scope of the non-discrimination standard were never clearly defined. Additionally, because taxation measures closely relate to states’ inherent sovereign power to tax, there are extensive debates regarding the criteria for determining the finding of an investment treaty obligation violation and the need to balance states’ sovereign power to tax with protection of foreign investors’ investment interests. This article analyzes the quandary between sovereign taxation power preservation and foreign investment protection, examines non-discrimination standards in different treaty protection standards, assesses the jurisdiction hurdles for application of non discrimination standards, and then presents an extensive case study of the arbitral precedents of Investor–State Dispute Settlement cases involving non-discrimination claims targeting the host states’ taxation measures. To address the challenge of inconsistent and diverging approaches to applying and interpreting non discrimination standards against taxation measures, this article proposes a redefined “Three-Prong” test to harmonize the chaos in existing jurisprudence. The Three-Prong test aims to establish a consistent methodology for determining the discrimination treatment standard applicable to all types of discriminatory treatment in international investment law and to balance the competing interests of sovereign taxation power and foreign investment protection. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10150/680272 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z