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    Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology

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    Author
    Fallis, Don
    Issue Date
    2006
    Submitted date
    2006-10-20
    Keywords
    Philosophy
    Social Epistemology
    Local subject classification
    epistemic value theory
    epistemology
    preference change
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Citation
    Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology 2006, 2(3) Episteme
    Publisher
    University of Edinburgh
    Journal
    Episteme
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10150/105269
    Abstract
    In order to guide the decisions of real people who want to bring about good epistemic outcomes for themselves and others, we need to understand our epistemic values. In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman has proposed an epistemic value theory that allows us to say whether one outcome is epistemically better than another. However, it has been suggested that Goldmanâ s theory is not really an epistemic value theory at all because whether one outcome is epistemically better than another partly depends on our non-epistemic interests. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic value theory that serves the purposes of social epistemology must incorporate non-epistemic interests in much the way that Goldmanâ s theory does. In fact, I argue that Goldmanâ s theory does not go far enough in this direction. In particular, the epistemic value of having a particular true belief should actually be weighted by how interested we are in the topic.
    Type
    Journal Article (On-line/Unpaginated)
    Language
    en
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