Goldman on Probabilistic Inference
| dc.contributor.author | Fallis, Don | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2006-10-20T00:00:01Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-06-18T23:23:08Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2002 | en_US |
| dc.date.submitted | 2006-10-20 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Goldman on Probabilistic Inference 2002, 109(3) Philosophical Studies | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10150/105286 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In his latest book, Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman claims to have established that if a reasoner starts with accurate estimates of the reliability of new evidence and conditionalizes on this evidence, then this reasoner is objectively likely to end up closer to the truth. In this paper, I argue that Goldmanâ s result is not nearly as philosophically significant as he would have us believe. First, accurately estimating the reliability of evidenceâ in the sense that Goldman requiresâ is not quite as easy as it might sound. Second, being objectively likely to end up closer to the truthâ in the sense that Goldman establishesâ is not quite as valuable as it might sound. | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Springer | en_US |
| dc.subject | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.subject | Social Epistemology | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | epistemic risk | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | epistemic value theory | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | epistemology | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | probability | en_US |
| dc.title | Goldman on Probabilistic Inference | en_US |
| dc.type | Journal Article (On-line/Unpaginated) | en_US |
| dc.identifier.journal | Philosophical Studies | en_US |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2018-06-27T13:40:58Z | |
| html.description.abstract | In his latest book, Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman claims to have established that if a reasoner starts with accurate estimates of the reliability of new evidence and conditionalizes on this evidence, then this reasoner is objectively likely to end up closer to the truth. In this paper, I argue that Goldmanâ s result is not nearly as philosophically significant as he would have us believe. First, accurately estimating the reliability of evidenceâ in the sense that Goldman requiresâ is not quite as easy as it might sound. Second, being objectively likely to end up closer to the truthâ in the sense that Goldman establishesâ is not quite as valuable as it might sound. |
