The Epistemic Costs and Benefits of Collaboration
| dc.contributor.author | Fallis, Don | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Tollefsen, Deborah | en_US |
| dc.contributor.editor | Henderson, David | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2007-03-03T00:00:01Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-06-18T23:27:28Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006 | en_US |
| dc.date.submitted | 2007-03-03 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | The Epistemic Costs and Benefits of Collaboration 2006, 44(S) Southern Journal of Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10150/105562 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In "How to Collaborate," Paul Thagard tries to explain why there is so much collaboration in science, and so little collaboration in philosophy, by giving an epistemic cost-benefit analysis. In this paper, I argue that an adequate explanation requires a more fully developed epistemic value theory than Thagard utilizes. In addition, I offer an alternative to Thagard's explanation of the lack of collaboration in philosophy. He appeals to its lack of a tradition of collaboration and to the a priori nature of much philosophical research. I claim that philosophers rarely collaborate simply because they can usually get the benefits without paying the costs of actually collaborating. | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | University of Memphis | en_US |
| dc.subject | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.subject | Epistemology | en_US |
| dc.subject | Social Epistemology | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | collaboration | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | epistemic value theory | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | social epistemology | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | procedural knowledge | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | scientific research | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | philosophical research | en_US |
| dc.subject.other | mathematical research | en_US |
| dc.title | The Epistemic Costs and Benefits of Collaboration | en_US |
| dc.type | Journal Article (On-line/Unpaginated) | en_US |
| dc.identifier.journal | Southern Journal of Philosophy | en_US |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2018-08-21T12:49:34Z | |
| html.description.abstract | In "How to Collaborate," Paul Thagard tries to explain why there is so much collaboration in science, and so little collaboration in philosophy, by giving an epistemic cost-benefit analysis. In this paper, I argue that an adequate explanation requires a more fully developed epistemic value theory than Thagard utilizes. In addition, I offer an alternative to Thagard's explanation of the lack of collaboration in philosophy. He appeals to its lack of a tradition of collaboration and to the a priori nature of much philosophical research. I claim that philosophers rarely collaborate simply because they can usually get the benefits without paying the costs of actually collaborating. |
