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    Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments

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    Author
    Fallis, Don
    Editors
    Fitelson, Branden
    Issue Date
    2007
    Submitted date
    2007-08-01
    Keywords
    Philosophy
    Epistemology
    Social Epistemology
    Local subject classification
    Bayesianism
    categorical belief
    degree of belief
    epistemic risk
    epistemic utility
    epistemic value
    logarithmic rule
    proper scoring rule
    scientific experiment
    
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    Citation
    Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments 2007, 86(2) Studia Logica
    Publisher
    Springer
    Journal
    Studia Logica
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10150/105761
    Abstract
    Several different Bayesian models of epistemic utilities (e.g., Levi 1962, Horwich 1982, Maher 1990, Oddie 1997) have been used to explain why it is rational for scientists to perform experiments. In this paper, I argue that a model--suggested independently by Patrick Maher (1990) and Graham Oddie (1997)--that assigns epistemic utility to degrees of belief in hypotheses provides the most comprehensive explanation. This is because this proper scoring rule (PSR) model captures a wider range of scientifically acceptable attitudes toward epistemic risk than the other Bayesian models that have been proposed. I also argue, however, that even the PSR model places unreasonably tight restrictions on a scientist's attitude toward epistemic risk. As a result, such Bayesian models of epistemic utilities fail as normative accounts--not just as descriptive accounts (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1972, Giere 1988)--of scientific inquiry.
    Type
    Journal Article (On-line/Unpaginated)
    Language
    en
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