Collective Epistemic Goals
| dc.contributor.author | Fallis, Don | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2007-11-21T00:00:01Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-06-18T23:43:52Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007 | en_US |
| dc.date.submitted | 2007-11-21 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Collective Epistemic Goals 2007, 21(3) Social Epistemology | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10150/106289 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We all pursue epistemic goals as individuals. But we also pursue collective epistemic goals. In the case of many groups to which we belong, we want each member of the group--and sometimes even the group itself--to have as many true beliefs as possible and as few false beliefs as possible. In this paper, I respond to the main objections to the very idea of such collective epistemic goals. Furthermore, I describe the various ways that our collective epistemic goals can come into conflict with each other. And I argue that we must appeal to pragmatic considerations in order to resolve such conflicts. | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis | en_US |
| dc.subject | collectives | en_US |
| dc.subject | epistemic goals | en_US |
| dc.subject | distribution of knowledge | en_US |
| dc.subject | group belief | en_US |
| dc.subject | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.subject | Epistemology | en_US |
| dc.subject | Social Epistemology | en_US |
| dc.title | Collective Epistemic Goals | en_US |
| dc.type | Journal Article (On-line/Unpaginated) | en_US |
| dc.identifier.journal | Social Epistemology | en_US |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2018-08-18T18:54:01Z | |
| html.description.abstract | We all pursue epistemic goals as individuals. But we also pursue collective epistemic goals. In the case of many groups to which we belong, we want each member of the group--and sometimes even the group itself--to have as many true beliefs as possible and as few false beliefs as possible. In this paper, I respond to the main objections to the very idea of such collective epistemic goals. Furthermore, I describe the various ways that our collective epistemic goals can come into conflict with each other. And I argue that we must appeal to pragmatic considerations in order to resolve such conflicts. |
