CEO After-tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance
dc.contributor.advisor | Dhaliwal, Dan S. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Gaertner, Fabio B. | |
dc.creator | Gaertner, Fabio B. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-10-13T20:35:39Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-10-13T20:35:39Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10150/145277 | |
dc.description.abstract | I examine the association between CEOs' after-tax incentives and their firms' levels of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using publicly available data, I estimate CEOs' after-tax incentives and find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. While the results suggest that greater use of after-tax measures in CEO compensation leads to higher tax savings, it is possible that these savings will lead to lower pre-tax returns, or implicit taxes. Therefore, I also examine the association between the use of after-tax incentives and implicit taxes and find a positive association between the two. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between after-tax incentives and total CEO compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated after-tax demand a premium for the additional risk they bear. | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | The University of Arizona. | en_US |
dc.rights | Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. | en_US |
dc.title | CEO After-tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance | en_US |
dc.type | Electronic Dissertation | en_US |
dc.type | text | en_US |
dc.contributor.chair | Dhaliwal, Dan S. | en_US |
dc.identifier.oclc | 752261359 | |
thesis.degree.grantor | University of Arizona | en_US |
thesis.degree.level | doctoral | en_US |
dc.contributor.committeemember | Eldenburg, Leslie G. | en_US |
dc.contributor.committeemember | Bens, Daniel A. | en_US |
dc.contributor.committeemember | Cook, Kirsten A. | en_US |
dc.identifier.proquest | 11489 | |
thesis.degree.discipline | Graduate College | en_US |
thesis.degree.discipline | Accounting | en_US |
thesis.degree.name | Ph.D. | en_US |
refterms.dateFOA | 2018-05-27T22:49:20Z | |
html.description.abstract | I examine the association between CEOs' after-tax incentives and their firms' levels of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using publicly available data, I estimate CEOs' after-tax incentives and find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. While the results suggest that greater use of after-tax measures in CEO compensation leads to higher tax savings, it is possible that these savings will lead to lower pre-tax returns, or implicit taxes. Therefore, I also examine the association between the use of after-tax incentives and implicit taxes and find a positive association between the two. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between after-tax incentives and total CEO compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated after-tax demand a premium for the additional risk they bear. |