Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorTurner, Maureen Cassidy
dc.creatorTurner, Maureen Cassidyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-24T19:38:52Z
dc.date.available2011-10-24T19:38:52Z
dc.date.issued2010-05
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/146694
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I will attempt to account for the contents of visual phenomenology. I will suggest that the most useful and sufficient way to account for the information experienced during visual consciousness is to appeal to fundamental, sensory points of data that are organized spatiotemporally. That is, we should understand henomenal experience as composed solely of tiny flecks of sensory information spread over the entire three-dimensional space of which we are aware. This species of information is both intuitively fundamental to our experience and appears to be actually fundamental neurally, so, it is an excellent candidate for a sufficient account of the contents of visual phenomenology. For the present purpose, I will stray little from dealing solely with visual consciousness. However, it is my aim that the account should extend smoothly to each other sensory domain of phenomenology. I will argue that this kind of extension is enough to fully describe the contents of all experience. Visual consciousness is in no way separate from other aspects of conscious experience, except in that it has been most extensively studied scientifically. For that reason, I will focus on how my account functions with respect to visual phenomenology. In sections II and III, I will begin by looking at what a theory of content is and then why we need a theory of content for visual phenomenology. In section IV I will examine the relationship between content and representation and also attempt to provide a set of criteria for selecting a theory of content. In section V I will examine the relationship of the audience to the theory. Section VI will provide an overview of the theory of content that I think follows most naturally from the preceding considerations and standards. I will close with a survey of several objections in section VII.
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.titleThe Relationship Between Neural Content and Visual Phenomenologyen_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Thesisen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
thesis.degree.levelbachelorsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineHonors Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.nameB.A.en_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-06-14T14:05:54Z
html.description.abstractIn this paper, I will attempt to account for the contents of visual phenomenology. I will suggest that the most useful and sufficient way to account for the information experienced during visual consciousness is to appeal to fundamental, sensory points of data that are organized spatiotemporally. That is, we should understand henomenal experience as composed solely of tiny flecks of sensory information spread over the entire three-dimensional space of which we are aware. This species of information is both intuitively fundamental to our experience and appears to be actually fundamental neurally, so, it is an excellent candidate for a sufficient account of the contents of visual phenomenology. For the present purpose, I will stray little from dealing solely with visual consciousness. However, it is my aim that the account should extend smoothly to each other sensory domain of phenomenology. I will argue that this kind of extension is enough to fully describe the contents of all experience. Visual consciousness is in no way separate from other aspects of conscious experience, except in that it has been most extensively studied scientifically. For that reason, I will focus on how my account functions with respect to visual phenomenology. In sections II and III, I will begin by looking at what a theory of content is and then why we need a theory of content for visual phenomenology. In section IV I will examine the relationship between content and representation and also attempt to provide a set of criteria for selecting a theory of content. In section V I will examine the relationship of the audience to the theory. Section VI will provide an overview of the theory of content that I think follows most naturally from the preceding considerations and standards. I will close with a survey of several objections in section VII.


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
azu_etd_mr20100151_sip1_m.pdf
Size:
68.33Kb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record