The Association Between CEO Compensation and Earnings for Bailout Bank Recipients
PublisherThe University of Arizona.
RightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
AbstractI examine the association between CEO compensation and earnings for bailout bank recipients. During the financial downturn of 2008 over 100 national commercial banks accepted government funds to maintain solvency. My research seeks to find an incremental pay-for-performance relationship between earnings and CEO compensation for bailout banks over non-bailout banks. Furthermore, I expect to find an incremental relationship for bailout banks to meet or beat annual benchmarks over non-bailout banks. The incremental relationships for bailout banks over non-bailout banks may suggest that bailout banks took on excess risk in an attempt to boost CEO compensation through pay-for-performance or meeting or beating an annual benchmark. Regression analysis is used to test these hypotheses, and I find insignificant results for all incremental relationships for bailout banks over non-bailout banks. From my results, it appears that bailout banks had no incentive to take on excess risk in an attempt to boost CEO compensation through pay-for-performance or meeting or beating an annual benchmark. Finally, this research extends the accounting literature in that it is the first to explore the pay-for-performance relationship in the banking industry.
Degree ProgramHonors College