Selection-socialization control in auditing firms: A test of Ouchi's model of control.
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azu_td_8906382_sip1_m.pdf
Author
Davidson, Ronald Allan.Issue Date
1988Advisor
Felix, William L.
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The University of Arizona.Rights
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.Abstract
This research tests the descriptive validity of Ouchi's model of organizational control when it is applied to auditing firms. An analysis of Ouchi's model and other writings indicates that the selection-socialization type of control (or clan control or control by a strong organizational culture) would be expected to be used in auditing firms and that it would he evidenced by similarities in values perceived to be held by clan members. Empirical evidence is gathered from graduating students who are accounting majors and from professional staff in auditing firms using SYMLOG to measure perceived values. This evidence provided some support for the descriptive validity of Ouchi's model, but the evidence is mixed. The sets of perceived values found in staff of auditing firms do not appear to come from a single set, but the perceived values of each firm are different. Offers do appear to be made to individuals who have different sets of perceived values when compared to people who did not receive offers. No evidence was found to indicate that length of association within firm results in more similar sets of perceived values being held by firm members.Type
textDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Degree Name
Ph.D.Degree Level
doctoralDegree Program
PhilosophyGraduate College
