Stability of monarchical regimes.

Abstract

In 1968, Samuel Huntington hypothesized in his well- known book, Political Order in Changing Societies, that stability of the state in monarchical regimes of the developing countries depends on the balance between the necessity to centralize power in order to modernize, and the necessity to decentralize it in order to assimilate into the system the new groups that have been produced by the modernization process. After examining all the possible choices available to the state, Huntington concluded that violence and change of the state were inevitable outcomes. Comparative tests of several variables with respect to five stable and five unstable monarchical states showed no support for Huntington's hypothesis, but did show some support for the role of high violence, low government coerciveness, high land and income inequality, and involvement in external conflict in the instability of the state in monarchical regimes. It was found that monarchical states that experienced three or more destabilizing factors all at the same time were very likely to be unstable (Iran, Cambodia, Ethiopia), whereas those that experienced two destabilizing factors or less, were more likely to be stable (Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Nepal) unless there was a family coup (Afghanistan), or the monarch had expressed his desire to abdicate (Libya). However, in the case when a stable monarchical state experiences more than two destabilizing factors (Jordan), leadership characteristics play a big role in stability of the state, such as the skill to expand political participation and still be able to maintain legitimacy, and the skill to balance reform with government coercion.