Call versus continuous auctions: An experimental study of market organization.
AuthorVan Boening, Mark Virgil.
KeywordsProgram trading (Securities) -- Congresses
Securities industry -- Data processing -- Congresses
Stock exchanges -- Data processing -- Congresses
Commodity exchanges -- Data processing -- Congresses.
AdvisorSmith, Vernon L.
MetadataShow full item record
PublisherThe University of Arizona.
RightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
AbstractThe results from 17 new experiments and 19 previously reported experiments are compared in an investigation of call and continuous auctions. The call auction used is the computerized PLATO sealed bid/offer (SBO), uniform price auction. The continuous auction used is the PLATO double auction (DA), a computerized version of the "open outcry" double auction. The SBO call auction has temporal consolidation of market orders and has limited information about trading activity. The continuous DA auction is characterized by sequential bilateral trades, and trading information (bids, offers, and prices) is publicly displayed. The paper first explores the effect of multiple crossings per trading period in the SBO call auction. Next, a comparison of SBO and DA is made, based on market experiments using flow supply and demand schedules. The institutional comparison is then extended to experimental asset markets. The results imply the following. First, multiple calls per period increase the efficiency of the SBO call auction, relative to one call per period, but they also induce greater misrepresentation of costs and values in the first crossing each period. Buyers and sellers also withhold units from the first crossing in a further attempt to gain strategic advantage. However, neither the withholding nor the misrepresentation appears to have any substantial influence on price. Second, the SBO auction with two calls per period is as efficient as the DA auction. In markets with a random competitive equilibrium (CE) each period, the SBO auction does a better job than DA at tracking the random CE price. Thus the SBO auction is equally as efficient as the DA, and has the further attributes of lower price volatility and greater privacy. Third, in laboratory asset markets, the SBO auction exhibits price bubbles similar to those observed in DA markets. Price dynamics in the two institutions are comparable, despite the stark differences in order flow and information dissemination.