• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • UA Graduate and Undergraduate Research
    • UA Theses and Dissertations
    • Dissertations
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • UA Graduate and Undergraduate Research
    • UA Theses and Dissertations
    • Dissertations
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of UA Campus RepositoryCommunitiesTitleAuthorsIssue DateSubmit DateSubjectsPublisherJournalThis CollectionTitleAuthorsIssue DateSubmit DateSubjectsPublisherJournal

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    About

    AboutUA Faculty PublicationsUA DissertationsUA Master's ThesesUA Honors ThesesUA PressUA YearbooksUA CatalogsUA Libraries

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

    Toward a theory of firms' training and development behavior under externality: A game theoretic analysis and experimental evidence.

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Thumbnail
    Name:
    azu_td_9303295_sip1_m.pdf
    Size:
    4.300Mb
    Format:
    PDF
    Description:
    azu_td_9303295_sip1_m.pdf
    Download
    Author
    Li, Ya.
    Issue Date
    1992
    Keywords
    Dissertations, Academic.
    Economics.
    Game theory.
    Committee Chair
    Oaxaca, Ronald
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    The University of Arizona.
    Rights
    Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
    Abstract
    This dissertation presents a new approach to one of the classic problems in economics: firms' training and development (T&D hereafter) behavior under externality. Its objective is threefold. The first objective is to identify the conditions under which T&D externalities are present in the labor market; the second is to examine firms' strategic T&D behavior under T&D externality; the third is to provide a possible institutional remedy for the less than socially optimal level of firms' T&D investments that T&D externalities generate. The most important findings of this research are that the labor market in general cannot fully internalize T&D externalities in a world of imperfect information. In the presence of T&D externalities, firms' training investments are socially sub-optimal. In a dynamic game environment, one firm's T&D decision depends on the magnitude of T&D externalities, as well as on the level of training provided by the other firms. Under certain conditions, a firm may invest zero in T&D, pirating skilled workers from the other firm. One firm's T&D investment is inversely related to its own discount rate, but positively related to its competitors' discount rates. In addition, a T&D externality reduces firms' T&D incentive not only at the firm that generates the T&D externality, but also at the firm that receives the T&D externality. More importantly, it is shown that market structure per se affects firms' T&D investment behavior. The level of firms' T&D investments is inversely related to the competitiveness of the output market. In terms of social optimality of T&D, monopoly market organization is superior to perfect competition. The results are hence consistent with Schumpeter's (1943) dynamic efficiency arguments. Finally, it is shown that joint T&D programs can serve as a possible remedy to correct T&D externalities, and joint T&D programs, as impure public goods, can be provided efficiently on a voluntary basis under certain conditions. A game theoretic model of the public goods provision with positive Nash equilibria is presented and experimental evidence which supports the hypothesis is provided.
    Type
    text
    Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
    Degree Name
    Ph.D.
    Degree Level
    doctoral
    Degree Program
    Economics
    Graduate College
    Degree Grantor
    University of Arizona
    Collections
    Dissertations

    entitlement

     
    The University of Arizona Libraries | 1510 E. University Blvd. | Tucson, AZ 85721-0055
    Tel 520-621-6442 | repository@u.library.arizona.edu
    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2017  DuraSpace
    Quick Guide | Contact Us | Send Feedback
    Open Repository is a service operated by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.