The nonprofit firm in a market setting.
| dc.contributor.author | Franciosi, Robert Julius. | |
| dc.creator | Franciosi, Robert Julius. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-10-31T18:16:45Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-10-31T18:16:45Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1994 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186691 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation analyzes the nonprofit sector using a framework developed by economists to analyze for-profit industries. Its central hypotheses are that nonprofit 'firms' are run by self-interested individuals and compete for donations in a 'market'. It develops a model that demonstrates that nonprofit contracts are not necessary to solve the principal-agent problem that stems from a good being financed by unconditional lump-sum donations. The effects of nonprofit contracts in the model are ambiguous and might very well be harmful. The model is tested using both field data from California and laboratory experiments. The tests broadly support the model. | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | The University of Arizona. | en_US |
| dc.rights | Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Nonprofit organizations -- Marketing. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Fund raising -- United States. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Nonprofit organizations -- Finance. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Competition. | en_US |
| dc.title | The nonprofit firm in a market setting. | en_US |
| dc.type | text | en_US |
| dc.type | Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) | en_US |
| dc.contributor.chair | Isaac, R. Mark | en_US |
| dc.identifier.oclc | 703274092 | en_US |
| thesis.degree.grantor | University of Arizona | en_US |
| thesis.degree.level | doctoral | en_US |
| dc.contributor.committeemember | Reynolds, Stanley | en_US |
| dc.contributor.committeemember | Block, Michael | en_US |
| dc.identifier.proquest | 9426322 | en_US |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Economics | en_US |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Graduate College | en_US |
| thesis.degree.name | Ph.D. | en_US |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2018-08-23T15:50:25Z | |
| html.description.abstract | This dissertation analyzes the nonprofit sector using a framework developed by economists to analyze for-profit industries. Its central hypotheses are that nonprofit 'firms' are run by self-interested individuals and compete for donations in a 'market'. It develops a model that demonstrates that nonprofit contracts are not necessary to solve the principal-agent problem that stems from a good being financed by unconditional lump-sum donations. The effects of nonprofit contracts in the model are ambiguous and might very well be harmful. The model is tested using both field data from California and laboratory experiments. The tests broadly support the model. |
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