• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • UA Graduate and Undergraduate Research
    • UA Theses and Dissertations
    • Dissertations
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • UA Graduate and Undergraduate Research
    • UA Theses and Dissertations
    • Dissertations
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of UA Campus RepositoryCommunitiesTitleAuthorsIssue DateSubmit DateSubjectsPublisherJournalThis CollectionTitleAuthorsIssue DateSubmit DateSubjectsPublisherJournal

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    About

    AboutUA Faculty PublicationsUA DissertationsUA Master's ThesesUA Honors ThesesUA PressUA YearbooksUA CatalogsUA Libraries

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

    Allocating effort within a social dilemma: The effects of goal-setting, ability differences, and reward risks on contributions to the group.

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Thumbnail
    Name:
    azu_td_9507008_sip1_m.pdf
    Size:
    4.048Mb
    Format:
    PDF
    Description:
    azu_td_9507008_sip1_m.pdf
    Download
    Author
    Johnson, Pauline Rowe.
    Issue Date
    1994
    Committee Chair
    Shalley, Christina E.
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    The University of Arizona.
    Rights
    Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
    Abstract
    This research examines the effects of two conflicting goals (e.g. a group and an individual goal) and two types of rewards (e.g. an incremental and a target reward) on group contribution when group members vary in their ability to accomplish the group task. The experimental task was set up as a social dilemma in which participants were asked to work on both a group and an individual production task. Contribution to group work could lead to higher rewards for all, but it could also result in lower rewards if others failed to contribute. Setting conflicting group and individual goals, as opposed to not assigning goals, was hypothesized to encourage greater effort for the group. Being compensated after reaching a target of production, or being above or below average in task competence was hypothesized to discourage group effort. Since the assignment of a group goal should help to coordinate group effort, it was also expected to alleviate the perceived risk of contributing to the group. Therefore setting simultaneous group and individual goals when the reward was a target or when participants were above or below average in competence was expected to encourage greater group effort than when no goals were set in these conditions. Results suggest that when rewards are obtained after reaching a target of production, setting conflicting goals encourages individuals to work harder for the group than they do when no goals are assigned. However, when rewards are incrementally obtained, individuals tend to split their efforts between group and individual objectives, regardless of whether conflicting goals are assigned. Results also suggest that goal setting encourages higher group contribution for members who believe their task competence is average compared to the rest of their group, but it has no direct effect on group contribution for members who believe their ability is either above or below the group average. Implications of these results are discussed for the selection of individuals for work teams, the assignment of goals for team effectiveness, and the importance of training to equalize competencies in a team environment.
    Type
    text
    Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
    Degree Name
    Ph.D.
    Degree Level
    doctoral
    Degree Program
    Management and Policy
    Graduate College
    Degree Grantor
    University of Arizona
    Collections
    Dissertations

    entitlement

     
    The University of Arizona Libraries | 1510 E. University Blvd. | Tucson, AZ 85721-0055
    Tel 520-621-6442 | repository@u.library.arizona.edu
    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2017  DuraSpace
    Quick Guide | Contact Us | Send Feedback
    Open Repository is a service operated by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.