Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorJain, Sanjay.
dc.creatorJain, Sanjay.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-31T18:38:10Z
dc.date.available2011-10-31T18:38:10Z
dc.date.issued1995en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/187373
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation is motivated by the recent increase in formation of product standards in many high technology markets. These markets are characterized by a high degree of technological uncertainty and high levels of R&D expenditures by incumbent firms. In this dissertation we examine how how rapid technological change in the environment affects firms incentive to standardize. We also examine how product standards affect R&D investment levels and how firms' competence in different types of innovation affects their preferences for compatibility. We developed a game theoretical model in which firms make both compatibility and R&D investment decisions. We first studied how rapid technological change in high technology markets affects firms' incentive to standardize. We find that the inherent technological uncertainty in high technology environments promotes the formation of standards. This result is in contrast to the popular view that in technologically uncertain environments standards are less likely to be formed. Our results suggest that incumbent firms can use standards to protect themselves from the threat of displacement by exogenously developed superior technology. In other words, incumbent firms can use compatibility as a competitive tool to deter entry. We also find that compatibility generally leads to higher investments in minor R&D. In contrast, compatibility decreases investment in breakthrough R&D. This result suggests that standards affect the nature of R&D competition. Before products are standardized, firms are more likely to invest in developing new breakthrough technologies. In contrast, when products become standardized innovation efforts will be focused on developing minor improvements for the present technology. We also examined how firms' R&D competence will affect their preferences for compatibility. Our results show that firms which are more efficient at developing at minor product improvements have a stronger preference for compatibility than firms which are less efficient in minor R&D. In contract, firms which are efficient in developing breakthrough technologies find standardization a less attractive option.
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.titleThe process of standard formation and its strategic implications.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.contributor.chairChakravarti, Dipankaren_US
dc.contributor.chairRao, Ambar G.en_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberKopalle, Praveenen_US
dc.identifier.proquest9620429en_US
thesis.degree.disciplineBusiness Administrationen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-07-15T06:10:27Z
html.description.abstractThis dissertation is motivated by the recent increase in formation of product standards in many high technology markets. These markets are characterized by a high degree of technological uncertainty and high levels of R&D expenditures by incumbent firms. In this dissertation we examine how how rapid technological change in the environment affects firms incentive to standardize. We also examine how product standards affect R&D investment levels and how firms' competence in different types of innovation affects their preferences for compatibility. We developed a game theoretical model in which firms make both compatibility and R&D investment decisions. We first studied how rapid technological change in high technology markets affects firms' incentive to standardize. We find that the inherent technological uncertainty in high technology environments promotes the formation of standards. This result is in contrast to the popular view that in technologically uncertain environments standards are less likely to be formed. Our results suggest that incumbent firms can use standards to protect themselves from the threat of displacement by exogenously developed superior technology. In other words, incumbent firms can use compatibility as a competitive tool to deter entry. We also find that compatibility generally leads to higher investments in minor R&D. In contrast, compatibility decreases investment in breakthrough R&D. This result suggests that standards affect the nature of R&D competition. Before products are standardized, firms are more likely to invest in developing new breakthrough technologies. In contrast, when products become standardized innovation efforts will be focused on developing minor improvements for the present technology. We also examined how firms' R&D competence will affect their preferences for compatibility. Our results show that firms which are more efficient at developing at minor product improvements have a stronger preference for compatibility than firms which are less efficient in minor R&D. In contract, firms which are efficient in developing breakthrough technologies find standardization a less attractive option.


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
azu_td_9620429_sip1_m.pdf
Size:
4.240Mb
Format:
PDF
Description:
azu_td_9620429_sip1_m.pdf

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record