Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorJackson, Susan Teresa
dc.creatorJackson, Susan Teresaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-05T21:51:32Z
dc.date.available2011-12-05T21:51:32Z
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/193513
dc.description.abstractMilitary spending briefly dipped in the early 1990s only to rebound by the end of the 20th century, yet policymakers and academics alike predicted a peace dividend if the cold war should end. What happened to this peace dividend? How do some countries actualize a peace dividend in a world that seems not to encourage one? Typically military spending is analyzed through lenses focusing on international politics, bureaucratic process, or domestic political economy. I argue that these three lenses have failed to account for some of the reasons military spending remains high in the post-cold war era. Utilizing sociological institutionalism and world models, I examine how the rules of the Washington consensus via the neo-liberal economic agenda and the national security exception promote high levels of military spending that the three main theories fail to recognize. This study particularly delves into the roles of states and transnational corporations in terms of competitiveness in the global political economy and privileges allotted to the military industry. My tests rely on fuzzy-set comparative qualitative analysis (fsQCA) as an innovative means for looking at necessary conditions as well as sufficient conjunctural causation through which countries can achieve a peace dividend in the post-cold war era.
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.subjectmilitarizationen_US
dc.subjectglobalizationen_US
dc.subjectmilitary spendingen_US
dc.subjectWashington consensusen_US
dc.subjectnational security exceptionen_US
dc.subjectsociological institutionalismen_US
dc.titleMilitary Spending and the Washington Consensus: The Unrecognized Link between Militarization and the Global Political Economyen_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.contributor.chairVolgy, Thomas J.en_US
dc.identifier.oclc659749929en_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberPeterson, V. Spikeen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberRagin, Charlesen_US
dc.identifier.proquest2867en_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePolitical Scienceen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.namePhDen_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-08-24T18:28:18Z
html.description.abstractMilitary spending briefly dipped in the early 1990s only to rebound by the end of the 20th century, yet policymakers and academics alike predicted a peace dividend if the cold war should end. What happened to this peace dividend? How do some countries actualize a peace dividend in a world that seems not to encourage one? Typically military spending is analyzed through lenses focusing on international politics, bureaucratic process, or domestic political economy. I argue that these three lenses have failed to account for some of the reasons military spending remains high in the post-cold war era. Utilizing sociological institutionalism and world models, I examine how the rules of the Washington consensus via the neo-liberal economic agenda and the national security exception promote high levels of military spending that the three main theories fail to recognize. This study particularly delves into the roles of states and transnational corporations in terms of competitiveness in the global political economy and privileges allotted to the military industry. My tests rely on fuzzy-set comparative qualitative analysis (fsQCA) as an innovative means for looking at necessary conditions as well as sufficient conjunctural causation through which countries can achieve a peace dividend in the post-cold war era.


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
azu_etd_2867_sip1_m.pdf
Size:
2.212Mb
Format:
PDF
Description:
azu_etd_2867_sip1_m.pdf

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record