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dc.contributor.authorLeonard, Meghan Elizabeth*
dc.creatorLeonard, Meghan Elizabethen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-05T22:04:00Z
dc.date.available2011-12-05T22:04:00Z
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/193807
dc.description.abstractAs courts in separation-of-powers systems are said to have the power of neither the purse nor the sword, their institutional legitimacy is essential for ensuring compliance with their decisions. While institutional legitimacy has been examined in-depth for national high courts, the legitimacy of sub-national courts has been overlooked. In this dissertation I develop a new measure of court-level institutional legitimacy for state high courts. I use multilevel regression and poststratification to create state-level measures from individual-level survey results. In this dissertation, I develop a theory of review and delegation by state high courts. I argue that these courts work toward two main goals: implementing their policy preferences and maintaining the legitimacy of their institution. I argue for a two-stage process that considers whether or not the court will decide on the constitutionality of a statute in the first stage and whether they will overturn the statute and delegate policy control back to the other branches of government in the second. Relying on the literatures on both institutional legitimacy and political delegation, I suggest that courts may delegate policy control back to the other branches of government by specifically stating this in their opinion. Finally, I examine the conditions under which a state high court will delegate to either the state legislature or the executive branch. Overall, I find that legitimacy is important when considering state high court decision-making; and it must be considered along with political context and institutional rules as one of the central motivations for state high courts in separation of powers theories.
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.subjectdelegationen_US
dc.subjectinstitutional legitimacyen_US
dc.subjectjudicial decision-makingen_US
dc.subjectstate high courtsen_US
dc.titleDelegation and Policy-Making on State High Courtsen_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.contributor.chairLanger, Lauraen_US
dc.identifier.oclc659754932en_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberLanger, Lauraen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberLeighley, Janen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberWesterland, Chaden_US
dc.identifier.proquest10998en_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePolitical Scienceen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-06-23T23:16:36Z
html.description.abstractAs courts in separation-of-powers systems are said to have the power of neither the purse nor the sword, their institutional legitimacy is essential for ensuring compliance with their decisions. While institutional legitimacy has been examined in-depth for national high courts, the legitimacy of sub-national courts has been overlooked. In this dissertation I develop a new measure of court-level institutional legitimacy for state high courts. I use multilevel regression and poststratification to create state-level measures from individual-level survey results. In this dissertation, I develop a theory of review and delegation by state high courts. I argue that these courts work toward two main goals: implementing their policy preferences and maintaining the legitimacy of their institution. I argue for a two-stage process that considers whether or not the court will decide on the constitutionality of a statute in the first stage and whether they will overturn the statute and delegate policy control back to the other branches of government in the second. Relying on the literatures on both institutional legitimacy and political delegation, I suggest that courts may delegate policy control back to the other branches of government by specifically stating this in their opinion. Finally, I examine the conditions under which a state high court will delegate to either the state legislature or the executive branch. Overall, I find that legitimacy is important when considering state high court decision-making; and it must be considered along with political context and institutional rules as one of the central motivations for state high courts in separation of powers theories.


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