Structuralism: In Defense of a Kantian Account of Perceptual Experience

Abstract

My dissertation develops and defends a broadly Kantian account of perceptual experience. I call this account structuralism. Put briefly, the account holds that perceptual experience has a structure that is the manifestation of its priori content. I defend this account by showing that it provides a unified framework for understanding perceptual intentionality.I develop and defend structuralism by defending three theses. The first thesis is phenomenological. According to this thesis, perceptual experience has proprietary perceptual phenomenal intentionality only if it has a unity structure. I explicate the idea of the unity structure of experience in the process of defending this thesis. The second thesis is epistemic. Put roughly, this thesis holds that perceptual experience provides reasons for perceptual beliefs only if it has a priori content. I develop an account of the a priori content of perceptual experience in the process of defending this thesis. The third thesis unifies the phenomenological and the epistemic theses. According to this thesis, the dynamical unity structure of perceptual experience is the phenomenological manifestation of its a priori content. These three these, in conjunction with some plausible ideas provide a systematic account of perceptual intentionality.