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dc.contributor.advisorWaller, William S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMortenson, Kristian G*
dc.creatorMortenson, Kristian Gen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-05T22:19:42Z
dc.date.available2011-12-05T22:19:42Z
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/194133
dc.description.abstractA primary cause of income volatility for employees is job loss due to firm downsizing. Economists have suggested that firms use share contracts rather than wage contracts as one possible solution to downsizing. In my experimental setting employment contracting involves an employer who hires two employees to produce output. In each of 31 rounds, employees choose between a wage contract (status quo) and a share contract with an employer-set sharing rule. I manipulate whether the share contract incorporates a form of mutual monitoring and examine the effects on employee effort, contract preference, and welfare. The results show that, compared to wage contracts, subjects exert more effort and have higher welfare when they choose share contracts. Incorporating mutual monitoring into the share contract also increases total effort and subject welfare but does not lead to an increase in the use of share contracts.
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.subjectAccountingen_US
dc.subjectCompensationen_US
dc.subjectEmploymenten_US
dc.subjectMonitoringen_US
dc.titleEffects of Pay Variability and Mutual Monitoring on Employee Effort and Contract Choiceen_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.contributor.chairWaller, William S.en_US
dc.identifier.oclc659749879en_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberShatzberg, Jeffrey W.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberEldenburg, Leslie G.en_US
dc.identifier.proquest2818en_US
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountingen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.namePhDen_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-04-24T19:06:33Z
html.description.abstractA primary cause of income volatility for employees is job loss due to firm downsizing. Economists have suggested that firms use share contracts rather than wage contracts as one possible solution to downsizing. In my experimental setting employment contracting involves an employer who hires two employees to produce output. In each of 31 rounds, employees choose between a wage contract (status quo) and a share contract with an employer-set sharing rule. I manipulate whether the share contract incorporates a form of mutual monitoring and examine the effects on employee effort, contract preference, and welfare. The results show that, compared to wage contracts, subjects exert more effort and have higher welfare when they choose share contracts. Incorporating mutual monitoring into the share contract also increases total effort and subject welfare but does not lead to an increase in the use of share contracts.


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