• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • UA Graduate and Undergraduate Research
    • UA Theses and Dissertations
    • Dissertations
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • UA Graduate and Undergraduate Research
    • UA Theses and Dissertations
    • Dissertations
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of UA Campus RepositoryCommunitiesTitleAuthorsIssue DateSubmit DateSubjectsPublisherJournalThis CollectionTitleAuthorsIssue DateSubmit DateSubjectsPublisherJournal

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    About

    AboutUA Faculty PublicationsUA DissertationsUA Master's ThesesUA Honors ThesesUA PressUA YearbooksUA CatalogsUA Libraries

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

    Governance Reputation and the Market Reaction to the Auditor Switch and Retention Decision

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Thumbnail
    Name:
    azu_etd_1815_sip1_m.pdf
    Size:
    898.2Kb
    Format:
    PDF
    Description:
    azu_etd_1815_sip1_m.pdf
    Download
    Author
    Rodgers, Theodore
    Issue Date
    2006
    Keywords
    Corporate Governance
    Auditing
    Auditor Changes
    Reputation
    Experimental Markets
    Advisor
    Schatzberg, Jeffrey W
    Committee Chair
    Schatzberg, Jeffrey W
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    The University of Arizona.
    Rights
    Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
    Abstract
    The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the informational role of audit client (i.e. firm) reputation in the auditor switching and retention decision. I perform an experimental examination of an analytical model, prescribing the optimal choices made by firms in the decision to retain or switch auditors without considering firm reputation. Using an experimental markets approach, I provide evidence of the market reaction to a firm's switch/retention decision under two alternative treatments. In the first (baseline) treatment, an explicit test of the analytical model, firms do not incur reputation effects when making the decision to switch or retain auditors. In the second treatment, firms consider market perceptions of opportunistic auditor switching and retention and the potential effects on the firm's reputation.The choice of auditor switching and retention is a significant component of the firm's corporate governance structure. I precisely measures reputation formation and its impact on this specific governance decision by the inclusion of prior period auditor switch/retention decisions made by firms in reputation treatment conditions. Prior archival research has demonstrated a link between auditor quality and earnings quality. These studies suggest that the retention of a high-quality auditor, or dismissal of a poor-quality auditor, can signal high quality earnings to the market. The converse is also suggested; retention of a poor-quality auditor, or dismissal of a high-quality auditor, can signal poor earnings quality. The decision to retain or switch auditors is made annually by firms who have superior information over their auditors and investors. In the short run, the decision to retain or switch auditors offers a temporary signal which the market may not clearly price. However, including the firm's track record of auditor switching and retention decisions among auditors of differing quality allows for the development of a positive or negative reputation on this portion of corporate governance.The results presented provide evidence of the model's descriptive validity for the firm's optimal choices and related market reaction to the auditor switching decision for a finite time horizon. Additionally, the study examines the market reaction to a firm's reputation on the auditor switching and retention decision.
    Type
    text
    Electronic Dissertation
    Degree Name
    PhD
    Degree Level
    doctoral
    Degree Program
    Management
    Graduate College
    Degree Grantor
    University of Arizona
    Collections
    Dissertations

    entitlement

     
    The University of Arizona Libraries | 1510 E. University Blvd. | Tucson, AZ 85721-0055
    Tel 520-621-6442 | repository@u.library.arizona.edu
    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2017  DuraSpace
    Quick Guide | Contact Us | Send Feedback
    Open Repository is a service operated by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.