Labels and Tags: A New Look at Naming
| dc.contributor.advisor | Reimer, Marga | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Slabey, Margaretta | |
| dc.creator | Slabey, Margaretta | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-12-06T13:23:17Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-12-06T13:23:17Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194773 | |
| dc.description.abstract | What meaning does a name have in a sentence? How do we escape the inevitable difficulties that arise in delineating an individual's meaning through one's speech? The need arises for a distinction between proper names on the basis of the kinds of objects to which they refer. This distinction can provide the theoretical tools needed to solve the problems of empty names, negative existential statements, cognitive significance and substitution failure. Through a study of these issues, the fallacies inherent in current theories of meaning for proper names becomes apparent, as they fail to provide adequate or complete solutions. By elucidating a distinction between two kinds of proper names, labels and tags, we are able to provide solutions to the problems of naming where other theories fail. | |
| dc.language.iso | EN | en_US |
| dc.publisher | The University of Arizona. | en_US |
| dc.rights | Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Proper Names | en_US |
| dc.subject | Propositional Attitudes | en_US |
| dc.subject | Substitution Failure | en_US |
| dc.subject | Direct Reference | en_US |
| dc.subject | Quotation | en_US |
| dc.subject | Kripke's Puzzle | en_US |
| dc.title | Labels and Tags: A New Look at Naming | en_US |
| dc.type | text | en_US |
| dc.type | Electronic Dissertation | en_US |
| dc.contributor.chair | Reimer, Marga | en_US |
| dc.identifier.oclc | 659749725 | en_US |
| thesis.degree.grantor | University of Arizona | en_US |
| thesis.degree.level | doctoral | en_US |
| dc.contributor.committeemember | Lavine, Shaughan | en_US |
| dc.contributor.committeemember | Tolliver, Joseph Thomas | en_US |
| dc.identifier.proquest | 2716 | en_US |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | en_US |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Graduate College | en_US |
| thesis.degree.name | PhD | en_US |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2018-06-23T09:56:10Z | |
| html.description.abstract | What meaning does a name have in a sentence? How do we escape the inevitable difficulties that arise in delineating an individual's meaning through one's speech? The need arises for a distinction between proper names on the basis of the kinds of objects to which they refer. This distinction can provide the theoretical tools needed to solve the problems of empty names, negative existential statements, cognitive significance and substitution failure. Through a study of these issues, the fallacies inherent in current theories of meaning for proper names becomes apparent, as they fail to provide adequate or complete solutions. By elucidating a distinction between two kinds of proper names, labels and tags, we are able to provide solutions to the problems of naming where other theories fail. |
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