Episodic Memory and the Conceivability of Zombies

Abstract

In the zombie argument against materialism, we are asked to conceive of a creature just like ourselves, but without subjective experiences or phenomenal consciousness. But in what ways is this zombie really just like you or me? In this paper, I show that we can imagine a zombie as physically identical to some human, functionally identical to some human, or both. I argue that, if we take the role of phenomenology in our lives seriously, then we are mistaken when we think we can conceive of a physically identical and functionally identical zombie, whose possibility would threaten materialism. In order to support this argument, I discuss the role of phenomenology in episodic memory, and then try to imagine a zombie with episodic memory. Since I cannot conceive of a zombie that has an episodic memory system and is also physically and functionally identical to me, I conclude that zombie arguments against materialism are untenable barring a better scientific understanding of the role of phenomenology in our mental abilities.