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dc.contributor.authorJacquez, Johnny Franklin
dc.creatorJacquez, Johnny Franklinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-13T23:23:24Z
dc.date.available2012-09-13T23:23:24Z
dc.date.issued2012-05
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/243975
dc.description.abstractInvoluntary psychiatric treatment of persons with mental disorders is a very complicated and controversial issue. The following essay will present a paternalistic justification of the practice of involuntary treatment in reply to Thomas Szasz's criticism that such action is hostile to libertarian principles. First, the essay will present the case Szasz makes against coercive psychiatry. Subsequently, the paper will respond to this criticism in three parts. First, the paper will present a theoretical defense of the legitimacy of psychiatry made by George Graham. Secondly, an argument in favor of paternalistically motivated involuntary treatment will be made based on Gerald Dworkin's theory of paternalism, which appeals to the notion of hypothetical consent and a concern for autonomy. Third, an argument will be presented for a relaxation of the standards of responsibility for those with mental disorders, appealing to the involuntary nature of mental disorders. Subsequently, the circumstances that must be met for involuntary treatment to be justified in practice will be explored and presented. Finally, possible objections to the arguments made for paternalistic coercive psychiatry will be acknowledged and addressed.
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.titleConcern and Coercion: Paternalistic Justification of Involuntary Psychiatric Treatmenten_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Thesisen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
thesis.degree.levelbachelorsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineHonors Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.nameB.A.en_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-09-04T00:17:32Z
html.description.abstractInvoluntary psychiatric treatment of persons with mental disorders is a very complicated and controversial issue. The following essay will present a paternalistic justification of the practice of involuntary treatment in reply to Thomas Szasz's criticism that such action is hostile to libertarian principles. First, the essay will present the case Szasz makes against coercive psychiatry. Subsequently, the paper will respond to this criticism in three parts. First, the paper will present a theoretical defense of the legitimacy of psychiatry made by George Graham. Secondly, an argument in favor of paternalistically motivated involuntary treatment will be made based on Gerald Dworkin's theory of paternalism, which appeals to the notion of hypothetical consent and a concern for autonomy. Third, an argument will be presented for a relaxation of the standards of responsibility for those with mental disorders, appealing to the involuntary nature of mental disorders. Subsequently, the circumstances that must be met for involuntary treatment to be justified in practice will be explored and presented. Finally, possible objections to the arguments made for paternalistic coercive psychiatry will be acknowledged and addressed.


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