Proposed Experiment of a Voluntary Coalition Game for the Provision of Public Goods
PublisherThe University of Arizona.
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AbstractA proposed approach to avoiding the tragedy of the commons involves a public goods scenario in which players may join a coalition whose members contribute to the public good only when it is in the best interest of the group as a whole. Theoretical analysis of this scenario predicts a constant coalition size, regardless of the number of players vying for the public good. Here, a laboratory experiment is proposed to examine the relationship between number of players and number of coalition members in a coalition game based on this scenario. Two hypotheses will be tested: (1) The number of coalition members is independent of the number of players. (2) The likelihood of the formulation of a contributing coalition is independent of the number of players. Possible outcomes and their interpretations are discussed. The results will have potential applications in devising strategies for increasing contributions to public goods in the real world.
Degree ProgramHonors College