Accepting It
Publisher
The University of Arizona.Rights
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.Abstract
Most of us are aware of believing things we know we should not - often, we cannot help it. My dissertation comprises three papers exploring this phenomenon. In "Revealed Irrationality," I defend the possibility of believing, of one of one's beliefs, that it is irrational. "The Dispositionalist Gambit" examines a recent strategy for defending the claim that we have voluntary control over what we believe and finds it wanting. But there is a propositional attitude we have control over - what I call acceptance - and in "Acceptance" I argue that we need this attitude to explain otherwise puzzling behavior.Type
textElectronic Dissertation
Degree Name
Ph.D.Degree Level
doctoralDegree Program
Graduate CollegePhilosophy