AdvisorReynolds, Stanley S.
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PublisherThe University of Arizona.
RightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
AbstractThis thesis examines several issues that arise in restructured electricity markets. These issues include production, scheduling and forward contract decision making, capital investment decisions in uncertain environments, and equilibrium bidding in wholesale electricity auctions. In the chapter, "Supply Function Equilibria with Pivotal Suppliers", we study the impact of pivotal suppliers in supply function bidding settings. Observers of these markets have noted the important role that pivotal suppliers, those who can substantially raise the market price by unilaterally withholding generation output, sometimes play. However the literature on SFE has not considered the potential impact of pivotal suppliers on equilibrium predictions. This is a potentially important deficiency of applications of SFE to electricity markets, given the large role that pivotal suppliers sometimes play in these markets. We formulate a model in which generation capacity constraints can cause some suppliers to be pivotal. In symmetric and asymmetric versions of the model we show that when pivotal suppliers are present, the set of SFE is reduced relative to when no suppliers are pivotal. In the chapter, "Dynamic Oligopolistic Games Under Uncertainty: A Stochastic Programming Approach", we study several stochastic programming formulations of dynamic oligopolistic games under uncertainty. It is well known that if the number of state variables increases, dynamic programming becomes computationally intractable. For such games, we show that under certain symmetry assumptions, players earn greater expected profits as demand volatility increases. The key to our approach is the "scenario formulation" of stochastic programming. The examples presented in this paper illustrate that this approach can address dynamic games that are clearly out of reach for dynamic programming, the common approach in the literature on dynamic games. In the chapter, "Scenario-based Electricity-Gas Forward and Spot Pricing and Load Formulations", we propose load models and price and return formulations in specific energy markets. Existing energy models do not consider inter-relations between the trio: spot price, derivative price and electric load. Also these models, which are in the spirit of the models proposed in financial and commodity markets, ignore special characteristics of electricity, which may make the proposed models useless. In our formulations we consider these characteristics and correlations between these variables. Simulation results that we run support our modeling approaches.
Degree ProgramGraduate College