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dc.contributor.advisorSullivan, Michael P.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMills, Penny Brundage
dc.creatorMills, Penny Brundageen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-04-25T10:04:37Z
dc.date.available2013-04-25T10:04:37Z
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/284316
dc.description.abstractThis work examines U.S. recognition policy toward governments obtaining power through extra-legal means (coup d'etat or revolution). The purpose of the research is to evaluate the effectiveness of withholding diplomatic recognition as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Through empirical analysis of U.S. recognition policy toward Latin American states (1913-1994), the research determines if the withholding of diplomatic recognition enabled the United States to influence the behavior and policies of target governments, under what conditions the strategy is successful, and what conditions influence the U.S. to withhold recognition. Withholding recognition is treated as a bargaining strategy intended to elicit a desired response from the target state in exchange for diplomatic recognition by the United States. An analytical framework derived from the coercive diplomacy model, developed by Alexander George, is used to evaluate policy effectiveness. The intent is not only to determine if the U.S. recognition strategy succeeded or failed but also to identify conditions conducive to successful use of the policy in order to guide contemporary foreign policy choices.
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.subjectHistory, Latin American.en_US
dc.subjectHistory, United States.en_US
dc.subjectPolitical Science, International Law and Relations.en_US
dc.titleDiplomatic recognition as coercive diplomacy: The inter-American experienceen_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
dc.identifier.proquest9927510en_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePolitical Scienceen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
dc.identifier.bibrecord.b39569895en_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-09-06T02:49:49Z
html.description.abstractThis work examines U.S. recognition policy toward governments obtaining power through extra-legal means (coup d'etat or revolution). The purpose of the research is to evaluate the effectiveness of withholding diplomatic recognition as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Through empirical analysis of U.S. recognition policy toward Latin American states (1913-1994), the research determines if the withholding of diplomatic recognition enabled the United States to influence the behavior and policies of target governments, under what conditions the strategy is successful, and what conditions influence the U.S. to withhold recognition. Withholding recognition is treated as a bargaining strategy intended to elicit a desired response from the target state in exchange for diplomatic recognition by the United States. An analytical framework derived from the coercive diplomacy model, developed by Alexander George, is used to evaluate policy effectiveness. The intent is not only to determine if the U.S. recognition strategy succeeded or failed but also to identify conditions conducive to successful use of the policy in order to guide contemporary foreign policy choices.


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