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dc.contributor.advisorGoldman, Alvin I.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPust, Joel Eric, 1968-*
dc.creatorPust, Joel Eric, 1968-en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-09T09:03:34Z
dc.date.available2013-05-09T09:03:34Z
dc.date.issued1997en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/288736
dc.description.abstractThis essay addresses the use of intuitions as evidence in contemporary analytic philosophy. Chapter 1 demonstrates that intuitions are currently treated as the primary source of evidence in philosophical investigation. Chapter 2 defends an account of intuition on which an intuition that p involves p's seeming necessarily true. Chapter 3 takes up one broad strand of contemporary skepticism about the evidential value of intuitions. It outlines some contemporary arguments against the use of intuitions in moral philosophy, semantics, modal metaphysics, and epistemology. It concludes with an outline of the general argument form of which the particular arguments presented are instances. Chapter 4 explains why one contemporary attempt to meet this kind of skepticism fails, and then goes on to argue that the skeptical arguments fail because they are unsupported and self-defeating. Chapter 5 turns to a more general ground of skepticism about intuitions: the claim that we have no independent assurance of their reliability. Drawing on the work of Thomas Reid and William Alston, it shows that this fact cannot reasonably ground a skepticism restricted to intuition because the same is true of every one of our basic faculties.
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy.en_US
dc.titleIntuitions as evidenceen_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
dc.identifier.proquest9806850en_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
dc.identifier.bibrecord.b37563762en_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-06-15T13:48:29Z
html.description.abstractThis essay addresses the use of intuitions as evidence in contemporary analytic philosophy. Chapter 1 demonstrates that intuitions are currently treated as the primary source of evidence in philosophical investigation. Chapter 2 defends an account of intuition on which an intuition that p involves p's seeming necessarily true. Chapter 3 takes up one broad strand of contemporary skepticism about the evidential value of intuitions. It outlines some contemporary arguments against the use of intuitions in moral philosophy, semantics, modal metaphysics, and epistemology. It concludes with an outline of the general argument form of which the particular arguments presented are instances. Chapter 4 explains why one contemporary attempt to meet this kind of skepticism fails, and then goes on to argue that the skeptical arguments fail because they are unsupported and self-defeating. Chapter 5 turns to a more general ground of skepticism about intuitions: the claim that we have no independent assurance of their reliability. Drawing on the work of Thomas Reid and William Alston, it shows that this fact cannot reasonably ground a skepticism restricted to intuition because the same is true of every one of our basic faculties.


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