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    Institutions, contracts, and asset market prices

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    azu_td_9829390_sip1_c.pdf
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    Author
    James, Duncan Ross
    Issue Date
    1998
    Keywords
    Economics, General.
    Economics, Finance.
    Advisor
    Isaac, R. Mark
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    The University of Arizona.
    Rights
    Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
    Abstract
    Tournament incentives have been extensively analyzed, and recommended as policy, by economists and compensation consultants alike. Analysis of tournaments typically looks at the effect of tournament contracts for individuals on individual behavior in non-market settings (public good provision, team tasks, etc.). In contrast, this work investigates the effect of tournament contracts for individual agents on market performance. In particular, this work investigates the effect on asset market performance of individual contracts that reward "beating the market". To this end, both theory and laboratory experiments are employed. The theoretical prediction that the rational expectations equilibrium is destroyed by the introduction of "beat the market" contracts is overwhelmingly supported by the experimental data.
    Type
    text
    Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
    Degree Name
    Ph.D.
    Degree Level
    doctoral
    Degree Program
    Graduate College
    Economics
    Degree Grantor
    University of Arizona
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