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dc.contributor.advisorCrisp, Brian F.en_US
dc.contributor.authorEscobar-Lemmon, Maria Cecilia
dc.creatorEscobar-Lemmon, Maria Ceciliaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-09T09:39:21Zen
dc.date.available2013-05-09T09:39:21Zen
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/289193en
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation examines the causes and the process of decentralization in Latin America. Decentralization, the transfer of functions from higher levels of government to lower ones, has both political and fiscal forms. The current literature suggests ten possible explanations for both political and fiscal decentralization. Using data from 18 Latin American countries between 1985 and 1995, I tested these different explanations. Political decentralization (measured as the election rather than the appointment of governors) resulted from federalism, legitimacy, presidential power, democracy, economic conditions, level of development and ethnic diversity. Economic and social factors including structural adjustment, level of development, urbanization, and social and religious diversity, in addition to presidential decree authority, played a strong role in predicting the election of mayors. Federalism, presidential power, structural adjustment, level of development, and social and religious diversity were all predictors of the level of subnational expenditures (a measure of fiscal decentralization). As a companion to the region-wide statistical analysis conducted above, I also studied the process of decentralization in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. These case studies allowed me to observe the broader variables studies above "in action." In each of the case studies I traced the path decentralization has taken and I considered the major actors in the process of decentralization. I found that decentralization in both Colombia and Venezuela is relatively advanced. In contrast, decentralization in Costa Rica is not nearly as advanced. Among the most important causes of these differences is the absence, in Costa Rica, of strong local actors demanding decentralization and the fact that while presidents have supported decentralization, they are weak relative to the congress. In Colombia and Venezuela, the opposite is true, in part explaining the higher levels of decentralization.
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.subjectHistory, Latin American.en_US
dc.subjectPolitical Science, General.en_US
dc.titleThe causes and process of decentralization in Latin Americaen_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
dc.identifier.proquest9983916en_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePolitical Scienceen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
dc.identifier.bibrecord.b40834323en_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-06-17T22:46:03Z
html.description.abstractThis dissertation examines the causes and the process of decentralization in Latin America. Decentralization, the transfer of functions from higher levels of government to lower ones, has both political and fiscal forms. The current literature suggests ten possible explanations for both political and fiscal decentralization. Using data from 18 Latin American countries between 1985 and 1995, I tested these different explanations. Political decentralization (measured as the election rather than the appointment of governors) resulted from federalism, legitimacy, presidential power, democracy, economic conditions, level of development and ethnic diversity. Economic and social factors including structural adjustment, level of development, urbanization, and social and religious diversity, in addition to presidential decree authority, played a strong role in predicting the election of mayors. Federalism, presidential power, structural adjustment, level of development, and social and religious diversity were all predictors of the level of subnational expenditures (a measure of fiscal decentralization). As a companion to the region-wide statistical analysis conducted above, I also studied the process of decentralization in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. These case studies allowed me to observe the broader variables studies above "in action." In each of the case studies I traced the path decentralization has taken and I considered the major actors in the process of decentralization. I found that decentralization in both Colombia and Venezuela is relatively advanced. In contrast, decentralization in Costa Rica is not nearly as advanced. Among the most important causes of these differences is the absence, in Costa Rica, of strong local actors demanding decentralization and the fact that while presidents have supported decentralization, they are weak relative to the congress. In Colombia and Venezuela, the opposite is true, in part explaining the higher levels of decentralization.


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