• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • UA Graduate and Undergraduate Research
    • UA Theses and Dissertations
    • Dissertations
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • UA Graduate and Undergraduate Research
    • UA Theses and Dissertations
    • Dissertations
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of UA Campus RepositoryCommunitiesTitleAuthorsIssue DateSubmit DateSubjectsPublisherJournalThis CollectionTitleAuthorsIssue DateSubmit DateSubjectsPublisherJournal

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    About

    AboutUA Faculty PublicationsUA DissertationsUA Master's ThesesUA Honors ThesesUA PressUA YearbooksUA CatalogsUA Libraries

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

    Epistemic reasons and the basing relation

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Thumbnail
    Name:
    azu_td_3010223_sip1_w.pdf
    Size:
    5.840Mb
    Format:
    PDF
    Download
    Author
    Hendricks, Scott Christopher
    Issue Date
    2001
    Keywords
    Philosophy.
    Advisor
    Lehrer, Keith
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    The University of Arizona.
    Rights
    Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
    Abstract
    When we believe for reasons, we appreciate those reasons. That is, we believe on the basis of those reasons. This relation between beliefs and their reasons is the basing relation. The basing relation is a psychological relation. How should we understand the nature of this relation? I examine two accounts: a causal theory of the basing relation and a noncausal, dispositional theory. Sententialism is the most widely embraced version of the causal theory of the basing relation. According to general sententialism, when beliefs are produced by deliberation, they are supported by a relation of causal production. Standing beliefs, on the other hand--our background beliefs--are organized into a structure of relations of causal sustaining. The systems theory provides a noncausal, dispositional account of the basing relation. A single, cognitively efficacious state contains all the contents we attribute when we attribute standing or "background" beliefs. These contents do not participate in relations of causal sustaining with each other. Nevertheless, we can make sense of the claim that some contents are based on others as reasons. The basing relation is understood in terms of counterfactual dependencies; or more generally, it is understood as a dispositional property. Counterfactual dependencies do not necessarily reflect the presence of causal relations. They may instead reflect our conceptual tools for organizing certain kinds of possibilities--possible ways that our public and cognitive behaviors might be. In the end, I argue for a "mixed" theory. If we claim that sententialism is true across the board, we encounter a serious objection: the problem of congestion. But if we claim that the systems theory is a theory of all intentional properties, we will be hard-pressed to say how the systems theory explains inferential activity and occurrent belief. The best solution is to admit that in the case of occurrent thought, sententialism is the best theory of belief states and the relations between them; while the systems theory accounts nicely for nonoccurrent thought and the basing relation between nonoccurrent contents. The basing relation is both causal and noncausal; it depends on what sort of beliefs you are interested in.
    Type
    text
    Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
    Degree Name
    Ph.D.
    Degree Level
    doctoral
    Degree Program
    Graduate College
    Philosophy
    Degree Grantor
    University of Arizona
    Collections
    Dissertations

    entitlement

     
    The University of Arizona Libraries | 1510 E. University Blvd. | Tucson, AZ 85721-0055
    Tel 520-621-6442 | repository@u.library.arizona.edu
    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2017  DuraSpace
    Quick Guide | Contact Us | Send Feedback
    Open Repository is a service operated by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.