AuthorFarnham, Daniel Elliott
MetadataShow full item record
PublisherThe University of Arizona.
RightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
AbstractIn this dissertation, I argue that the structure of eudaimonist ethics is similar to the structure of Kant's ethics and its relatives. In Chapter One, I discuss some different ways of thinking about the good life of a person and its relation to morality, as a way of situating eudaimonism and clarifying what is distinctive about it. In Chapter Two I argue that eudaimonism does not violate strong intuitions about the subjective aspect of the good life. In Chapter Three I discuss and defend the view of our nature to which Aristotle and other eudaimonists are committed. I argue reflection on our practical thinking reveals incompatibilities between the presuppositions we make in the practical sphere and a reductive naturalism. The Interlude explicates eudaimonia's conceptual role in the structure of human willing and the formal constraints of completeness and self-sufficiency . In Chapter Four, I argue that a dominant end interpretation of eudaimonism is motivated by an untenable consequentialist interpretation of our reasons for acting. In Chapter Five I develop a formal conception of eudaimonism, based on central features of our practical thought, or willing. The two key steps here are recognizing the essential intersubjective appeal at work in our willing, and recognizing the nature of this appeal. In Chapter Six I show how this formal conception can respond to a common objection to eudaimonist theory, that it presents an unacceptably egoistic account of our reasons for being moral.
Degree ProgramGraduate College