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dc.contributor.advisorEldenburg, Leslie G.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHall, Curtis Matthew
dc.creatorHall, Curtis Matthewen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-04T15:45:12Zen
dc.date.available2013-06-04T15:45:12Zen
dc.date.issued2013en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/293403en
dc.description.abstractI examine the influence of ownership structure on labor decisions by comparing how public and private banks manage their labor costs. I find that, compared to private banks, public banks grow their labor force by more when activity increases. However, due to capital market pressure, managers of public banks reduce labor costs to avoid reporting earnings declines while private banks increase labor costs around the same benchmark. In particular, I find that managers of public banks reduce labor costs to avoid reporting an earnings decline when they have diversified lines of business or when they do not make use of alternative methods of earnings management. Furthermore, public banks that reduce labor costs and report a small earnings increase experience improved subsequent performance. Overall these findings suggest that financial reporting pressure in public firms can constrain empire building by incentivizing managers to make strategic cost cuts.
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.subjectCost Behavioren_US
dc.subjectCost Managementen_US
dc.subjectLaboren_US
dc.subjectOwnership Structureen_US
dc.subjectAccountingen_US
dc.subjectBanksen_US
dc.titleDoes Ownership Structure Affect Labor Decisions?en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberDhaliwal, Dan S.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberTrombley, Mark A.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberVallabhajosyula, Shyam S.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberEldenburg, Leslie G.en_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountingen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-08-14T08:20:03Z
html.description.abstractI examine the influence of ownership structure on labor decisions by comparing how public and private banks manage their labor costs. I find that, compared to private banks, public banks grow their labor force by more when activity increases. However, due to capital market pressure, managers of public banks reduce labor costs to avoid reporting earnings declines while private banks increase labor costs around the same benchmark. In particular, I find that managers of public banks reduce labor costs to avoid reporting an earnings decline when they have diversified lines of business or when they do not make use of alternative methods of earnings management. Furthermore, public banks that reduce labor costs and report a small earnings increase experience improved subsequent performance. Overall these findings suggest that financial reporting pressure in public firms can constrain empire building by incentivizing managers to make strategic cost cuts.


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