Corporate Accountability Reporting, Assurance, and High-Profile Misconduct

Abstract

I investigate whether corporate accountability reporting and assurance help protect firm value. Specifically, I examine: 1) whether corporate accountability reporting helps firms prevent the occurrence of high-profile misconduct (bribery, kickbacks, discrimination, etc.), and 2) when high-profile misconduct does occur, does prior corporate accountability reporting reduce the negative stock price reaction. Using propensity-score matching to address self-selection, I find that on average firms that report on their corporate accountability activities are less likely to engage in high-profile misconduct, consistent with the reporting process helping firms manage their operations better. Additionally, I find that when high-profile misconduct does occur, firms that have previously issued corporate accountability reports experience a less negative stock price reaction, consistent with corporate accountability reports influencing perceptions of managerial intent, which in turn influences expected punishments. Lastly, I find no evidence that external assurance of corporate accountability reports decreases the likelihood of high-profile misconduct occurring, nor does it reduce the stock price hit when high-profile misconduct occurs, consistent with concerns raised about the value of this new form of assurance.