Corporate Accountability Reporting, Assurance, and High-Profile Misconduct
AuthorChristensen, Dane Mark
KeywordsCorporate Accountability Reporting
Corporate Social Responsibility
AdvisorDhaliwal, Dan S.
MetadataShow full item record
PublisherThe University of Arizona.
RightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
EmbargoRelease after 12-Apr-2014
AbstractI investigate whether corporate accountability reporting and assurance help protect firm value. Specifically, I examine: 1) whether corporate accountability reporting helps firms prevent the occurrence of high-profile misconduct (bribery, kickbacks, discrimination, etc.), and 2) when high-profile misconduct does occur, does prior corporate accountability reporting reduce the negative stock price reaction. Using propensity-score matching to address self-selection, I find that on average firms that report on their corporate accountability activities are less likely to engage in high-profile misconduct, consistent with the reporting process helping firms manage their operations better. Additionally, I find that when high-profile misconduct does occur, firms that have previously issued corporate accountability reports experience a less negative stock price reaction, consistent with corporate accountability reports influencing perceptions of managerial intent, which in turn influences expected punishments. Lastly, I find no evidence that external assurance of corporate accountability reports decreases the likelihood of high-profile misconduct occurring, nor does it reduce the stock price hit when high-profile misconduct occurs, consistent with concerns raised about the value of this new form of assurance.
Degree ProgramGraduate College