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PublisherThe University of Arizona.
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AbstractUsing a novel setting, I examine the relation between a CEO's career concerns and the provision of an annual earnings forecast. Specifically, I exploit staggered changes in non-compete enforcement laws in three U.S. states as a source of exogenous variation in a CEO’s career concerns. Consistent with theory suggesting that career concerns increase a manager's aversion to risk, I find that a CEO is less likely to issue an earnings forecast in periods of stricter non-compete enforcement. Further, cross-sectional analyses indicate that the lower probability of forecast issuance is more pronounced for a CEO who has greater concern for his reputation, faces more risk in forecasting, and is more vulnerable to dismissal.
Degree ProgramGraduate College