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dc.contributor.advisorDhaliwal, Danen
dc.contributor.authorShaikh, Sarah
dc.creatorShaikh, Sarahen
dc.date.accessioned2015-06-09T18:15:59Zen
dc.date.available2015-06-09T18:15:59Zen
dc.date.issued2015en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/556588en
dc.description.abstractUsing a novel setting, I examine the relation between a CEO's career concerns and the provision of an annual earnings forecast. Specifically, I exploit staggered changes in non-compete enforcement laws in three U.S. states as a source of exogenous variation in a CEO’s career concerns. Consistent with theory suggesting that career concerns increase a manager's aversion to risk, I find that a CEO is less likely to issue an earnings forecast in periods of stricter non-compete enforcement. Further, cross-sectional analyses indicate that the lower probability of forecast issuance is more pronounced for a CEO who has greater concern for his reputation, faces more risk in forecasting, and is more vulnerable to dismissal.
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en
dc.subjectforecastsen
dc.subjectrisk-takingen
dc.subjectAccountingen
dc.subjectcareer concernsen
dc.titleManagerial Career Concerns and Earnings Forecastsen_US
dc.typetexten
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen
dc.contributor.committeememberDhaliwal, Danen
dc.contributor.committeememberEldenburg, Leslieen
dc.contributor.committeememberNeamtiu, Monicaen
dc.contributor.committeememberSunder, Jayanthien
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountingen
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en
refterms.dateFOA2018-09-08T13:33:44Z
html.description.abstractUsing a novel setting, I examine the relation between a CEO's career concerns and the provision of an annual earnings forecast. Specifically, I exploit staggered changes in non-compete enforcement laws in three U.S. states as a source of exogenous variation in a CEO’s career concerns. Consistent with theory suggesting that career concerns increase a manager's aversion to risk, I find that a CEO is less likely to issue an earnings forecast in periods of stricter non-compete enforcement. Further, cross-sectional analyses indicate that the lower probability of forecast issuance is more pronounced for a CEO who has greater concern for his reputation, faces more risk in forecasting, and is more vulnerable to dismissal.


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