PublisherThe University of Arizona.
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AbstractI argue that sweatshops cannot be morally grounded in arguments based on the autonomy of workers. I propose that merely because sweatshops are a better alternative than other options does not mean that the choice to work in sweatshops is one that we ought to respect; I also propose that choice itself does not always entail voluntariness. To make my arguments I utilize a framework of soft paternalism with a threshold for truly voluntary action to be delineated by one's ability to act as a global maximizer. I do not appeal the potential exploitative nature of sweatshop factories. Exploitation, I argue, presupposes that a group be in a position that is exploitable and that we believe that it morally permissible to treat individuals as merely having local maximizing preferences.
Degree ProgramHonors College
Philosophy, Politics, Economics and Law