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dc.contributor.advisorStekelberg, Jamesen
dc.contributor.authorDevlin, Christopher James
dc.creatorDevlin, Christopher Jamesen
dc.date.accessioned2015-10-01T21:22:07Zen
dc.date.available2015-10-01T21:22:07Zen
dc.date.issued2015en
dc.identifier.citationDevlin, Christopher James. (2015). The Effect of the Capital Gains Tax Rate on Earnings Management (Bachelor's thesis, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA).
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/579041en
dc.description.abstractI find evidence that when the capital gains tax rates fell before SOX regulations, earnings were managed up by United States based firms through both accrual and real methods. This maximizes executives take home pay. Just following SOX regulations, earnings were managed higher, which was predominately done through accrual methods. When the capital gains tax rates fell in 2013 levels of earnings management were lower, which is consistent with the idea that executives are looking to maximize their pay. How levels of institutional ownership affect earnings management is less conclusive. Earnings management is also influenced by how executives are compensated showing that managers who are primarily compensated through stock options bonuses may choose to manage earnings higher.
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.titleThe Effect of the Capital Gains Tax Rate on Earnings Managementen_US
dc.typetexten
dc.typeElectronic Thesisen
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen
thesis.degree.levelbachelorsen
thesis.degree.disciplineHonors Collegeen
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountingen
thesis.degree.nameB.S.B.A.en
refterms.dateFOA2018-06-25T01:18:04Z
html.description.abstractI find evidence that when the capital gains tax rates fell before SOX regulations, earnings were managed up by United States based firms through both accrual and real methods. This maximizes executives take home pay. Just following SOX regulations, earnings were managed higher, which was predominately done through accrual methods. When the capital gains tax rates fell in 2013 levels of earnings management were lower, which is consistent with the idea that executives are looking to maximize their pay. How levels of institutional ownership affect earnings management is less conclusive. Earnings management is also influenced by how executives are compensated showing that managers who are primarily compensated through stock options bonuses may choose to manage earnings higher.


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