This article aims at gaining deeper insights into the environmental liability of companies in the European Union. It analyses the role of companies within the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD) and evaluates potential hurdles that may limit the possibility to hold companies liable for environmental harm. Various remedies to the limited liability of the corporation are discussed, and the suggestions are formulated to improve access to justice for victims of environmental harm. Specific attention is paid to a balanced regime of mandatory solvency guarantees to support the ELD liabilities of companies.

Many jurisdictions around the world are promoting private antitrust enforcement. However, currently, the dominant view is that private actions discourage leniency application, an important source for antitrust authorities to detect and combat cartels. Such a view hinders the development of private enforcement. In a separate theoretical work, based on a game theory model created by Professor Joseph E. Harrington, I discovered that private enforcement does not always have a negative impact on leniency application. Further, I argue that, instead, private enforcement, when used “properly,” could serve as a tool to promote leniency application. The current article offers a case study to support the theoretical work. To do so, I studied the 2014 Consumer Rights Bill in the U.K. which partly aimed at promoting private actions. Using Germany as the control group, I have conducted a difference-in-difference analysis and found around a 50% rise in leniency application in the U.K. following the introduction of said bill.