Weapons for Peace or War? The Role of Military Independence in Militarized Interstate Disputes

Abstract

The global trade in weaponry has created an environment in which states are now utilizing arms transfer agreements to bolster their own domestic defense industry aspirations. Previous research concerning arms transfers has suggested that a state may alter its behavior depending on its level of dependency on foreign sourced weapons. However, previous scholarship primarily examined the effect from importing arms and not the effect that military industry will have upon state behavior. Since the number of states possessing domestic defense industries has risen by 250% since 1950, it is paramount that we understand the effect of a domestic military industry on state behavior. To explore this problem, this dissertation utilizes militarized interstate dispute and arms procurement data. 3 primary independence variables are created, all of which measure military independence in different ways. These variables include, military industry presence, arms supplier diversification, and foreign dependence on military goods. The dissertation hypothesizes that the level of military independence will have an effect on the probability that a state will be involved, initiate as well as decrease dispute duration.