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    azu_etd_14776_sip1_m.pdf
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    Author
    Tierney, Hannah
    Issue Date
    2016
    Keywords
    Philosophy
    Advisor
    Nichols, Shaun
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    The University of Arizona.
    Rights
    Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
    Abstract
    Traditionally, philosophers have argued that a single relation-like psychological continuity (e.g. Locke) or biological continuity (e.g. Olson)-grounds personal identity and persistence. But recent empirical work has shed light on a vast number of identity-related practical concerns, and it is unlikely that a single persistence relation could address all of these concerns. In my dissertation, I defend a pluralist view of personal identity, according to which more than one relation can ground persistence and survival. In doing so, I present a novel account of personal identity, which I call the Subscript View. According to the Subscript View, there exist several distinct survival relations, all with different persistence conditions, which can obtain independently of one another. I argue that the Subscript View is able to avoid threats to its ontology and charges of conventionalism and can accommodate a feature of our experience of persistence that no other view, pluralist or otherwise, is able to accommodate.
    Type
    text
    Electronic Dissertation
    Degree Name
    Ph.D.
    Degree Level
    doctoral
    Degree Program
    Graduate College
    Philosophy
    Degree Grantor
    University of Arizona
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    Dissertations

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