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dc.contributor.advisorNichols, Shaunen
dc.contributor.authorTierney, Hannah
dc.creatorTierney, Hannahen
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-13T16:06:49Z
dc.date.available2016-10-13T16:06:49Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/621000
dc.description.abstractTraditionally, philosophers have argued that a single relation-like psychological continuity (e.g. Locke) or biological continuity (e.g. Olson)-grounds personal identity and persistence. But recent empirical work has shed light on a vast number of identity-related practical concerns, and it is unlikely that a single persistence relation could address all of these concerns. In my dissertation, I defend a pluralist view of personal identity, according to which more than one relation can ground persistence and survival. In doing so, I present a novel account of personal identity, which I call the Subscript View. According to the Subscript View, there exist several distinct survival relations, all with different persistence conditions, which can obtain independently of one another. I argue that the Subscript View is able to avoid threats to its ontology and charges of conventionalism and can accommodate a feature of our experience of persistence that no other view, pluralist or otherwise, is able to accommodate.
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en
dc.subjectPhilosophyen
dc.titleLiving Variouslyen_US
dc.typetexten
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen
dc.contributor.committeememberNichols, Shaunen
dc.contributor.committeememberMcKenna, Michaelen
dc.contributor.committeememberHorgan, Terenceen
dc.contributor.committeememberSartorio, Carolinaen
dc.contributor.committeememberGill, Michaelen
dc.contributor.committeememberShoemaker, Daviden
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en
refterms.dateFOA2018-09-11T15:11:55Z
html.description.abstractTraditionally, philosophers have argued that a single relation-like psychological continuity (e.g. Locke) or biological continuity (e.g. Olson)-grounds personal identity and persistence. But recent empirical work has shed light on a vast number of identity-related practical concerns, and it is unlikely that a single persistence relation could address all of these concerns. In my dissertation, I defend a pluralist view of personal identity, according to which more than one relation can ground persistence and survival. In doing so, I present a novel account of personal identity, which I call the Subscript View. According to the Subscript View, there exist several distinct survival relations, all with different persistence conditions, which can obtain independently of one another. I argue that the Subscript View is able to avoid threats to its ontology and charges of conventionalism and can accommodate a feature of our experience of persistence that no other view, pluralist or otherwise, is able to accommodate.


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