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dc.contributor.authorFallis, Don
dc.contributor.authorLewis, Peter J.
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-06T01:24:45Z
dc.date.available2016-12-06T01:24:45Z
dc.date.issued2015-12-14
dc.identifier.citationThe Brier Rule Is not a Good Measure of Epistemic Utility (and Other Useful Facts about Epistemic Betterness) 2015, 94 (3):576 Australasian Journal of Philosophyen
dc.identifier.issn0004-8402
dc.identifier.issn1471-6828
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/00048402.2015.1123741
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/621517
dc.description.abstractMeasures of epistemic utility are used by formal epistemologists to make determinations of epistemic betterness among cognitive states. The Brier rule is the most popular choice (by far) among formal epistemologists for such a measure. In this paper, however, we show that the Brier rule is sometimes seriously wrong about whether one cognitive state is epistemically better than another. In particular, there are cases where an agent gets evidence that definitively eliminates a false hypothesis (and the probabilities assigned to the other hypotheses stay in the same ratios), but where the Brier rule says that things have become epistemically worse. Along the way to this 'elimination experiment' counter-example to the Brier rule as a measure of epistemic utility, we identify several useful monotonicity principles for epistemic betterness. We also reply to several potential objections to this counter-example.
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTDen
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2015.1123741en
dc.rights© 2015 Australasian Association of Philosophyen
dc.subjectBayesianismen
dc.subjectBrier scoreen
dc.subjectepistemic utilityen
dc.subjectformal epistemologyen
dc.subjectlaw of likelihoodsen
dc.subjectproper scoring rulesen
dc.titleThe Brier Rule Is not a Good Measure of Epistemic Utility (and Other Useful Facts about Epistemic Betterness)en
dc.typeArticleen
dc.contributor.departmentUniv Arizonaen
dc.identifier.journalAustralasian Journal of Philosophyen
dc.description.notePublished online: 14 Dec 2015; 18 Month Embargo.en
dc.description.collectioninformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.en
dc.eprint.versionFinal accepted manuscripten
refterms.dateFOA2017-06-14T00:00:00Z
html.description.abstractMeasures of epistemic utility are used by formal epistemologists to make determinations of epistemic betterness among cognitive states. The Brier rule is the most popular choice (by far) among formal epistemologists for such a measure. In this paper, however, we show that the Brier rule is sometimes seriously wrong about whether one cognitive state is epistemically better than another. In particular, there are cases where an agent gets evidence that definitively eliminates a false hypothesis (and the probabilities assigned to the other hypotheses stay in the same ratios), but where the Brier rule says that things have become epistemically worse. Along the way to this 'elimination experiment' counter-example to the Brier rule as a measure of epistemic utility, we identify several useful monotonicity principles for epistemic betterness. We also reply to several potential objections to this counter-example.


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