GET OUT THE (COSTLY) VOTE: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION
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Romero_Lotteries_May10_15.pdf
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Final Accepted Manuscript
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WILEY-BLACKWELLCitation
GET OUT THE (COSTLY) VOTE: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION 2016, 54 (4):1963 Economic InquiryJournal
Economic InquiryRights
© 2016 Western Economic Association International.Collection Information
This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.Abstract
We examine two commonly discussed institutions inducing turnout: abstention penalties ( used in 32 countries) and lotteries rewarding one randomly chosen participant ( as proposed on the 2006 Arizona ballot). We analyze a benchmark model in which voters vary in their information quality and participation is costly. We illustrate that both institutions can improve collective outcomes, though lotteries are a more effective instrument asymptotically. Experimentally, we provide strong evidence for selective participation: lab voters participate more when better informed or when institutionally induced. Lotteries fare better than fines, suggesting that they may be a useful alternative to commonly used compulsory voting schemes.Note
12 month embargo. First available online 20 March 2016ISSN
00952583Version
Final accepted manuscriptSponsors
National Science Foundation [SES 0551014]Additional Links
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/ecin.12332ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1111/ecin.12332